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Charlestown Navy Yard,
Clemson University
3 1604 019 779 604
1890- 1973S -^
by
Frederick R. Black
NOV 14 )986
LIBRARY
The Boston Navy Yard in the 1930s.
CULTURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT STUDY NO. 20
Volume II ofll
1988
Charlestown Navy Yard,
1890-1973
by
Frederick R. Black
Professor of History
C. W. Post Campus, Long Island University
CULTURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT STUDY NO. 20
Prepared under Contract No. CX1600-3-0083
Division of Cultural Resources
North Atlantic Regional Office
National Park Service
Volume II of II
Boston National Historical Park
National Park Service
U.S. Department of the Interior
Boston, Massachusetts
1988
This report is the third part of a series of
historic resource studies covering the history
of the Charlestown Navy Yard (Boston Navy Yard/
Boston Naval Shipyard) from 1800 to 1973. . The
first part, covering the years 1800 to 1842, was
written by Edwin C. Bearss and published in 1984.
The second part, covering the years 1842 to 1890,
is under preparation.
Suggested Library Cataloging:
Black, Frederick R.
Charlestown Navy Yard, 1890-1973/by Frederick R. Black.—
Boston, Mass. : Boston National Historical Park, National Park
Service, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 1988.
2 v. (xiv, 872 p.) : 24 ill., 7 folded plans ; 28 cm. — (Cultural resources
management study : no. 20)
Continues: Charlestown Navy Yard, 1 800-1 842 /by Edwin C. Bearss. 1984.
"Prepared under contract no. CXI 600-3-0083, Division of Cultural Resources,
North Atlantic Regional Office, National Park Service."
Bibliography: p. 835-842.
Includes index.
"NPS D6I62A"— P. 872.
Supt. of Docs, no.: I 29.86:20
I . Charlestown Navy Yard (Boston, Mass.) — History. I. United States. National
Park Service. North Atlantic Regional Office. Division of Cultural Resources. II.
Title. III. Series.
[VA70.B68B47 1988x]
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface i
Table of Contents ix
List of Photographs xi
List of Tables xii
List of Administration Tables xiii
List of Charts xiv
Chapter I. THE EIGHTEEN-NINETIES AND THE REVIVAL
OF THE YARD 1
A Nineteenth-Century Administration 4
The Yard's Physical Plant 40
Civilian Employees: Policies and Problems 73
Industrial Activity: Equipment Manufacturing
and Ship Repair 9 8
Chapter II. THE BOSTON NAVY YARD AND THE WAR WITH SPAIN,
1898-1899 121
Chapter III. THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY, 1900-1914 163
Yard Administration in an Age of Reform 166
Expansion of the Yard's Facilities 196
The Yard's Enlarged Work Force 229
"Serving the Fleet" 279
Chapter IV. THE TEST OF WORLD WAR I 301
Neutrality and Preparedness, 1914-1916 302
Yard Administration in Wartime 312
The War and Yard Facilities 324
The Expanded Work Force 329
ix
The War Effort of the Boston Navy Yard 352
Postwar Years, 1919-1920 369
Chapter V. THE YARD IN DECLINE: THE TWENTIES 383
Administration: The Return of the Manager 384
Fiscal Austerity and the Yard's Plant 400
The Reduction in Civilian Employees 406
The Yard's Industrial Activity in the Era
of Naval Disarmament 421
Chapter VI. THE YARD IN THE GREAT DEPRESSION 4 39
A Closing Scare 441
Yard Workers in an Era of Hard Times 445
Yard Administration in the Thirties 464
The Yard's Plant During the Depression 475
From Repair Yard to Construction Yard 487
Chapter VII. SIX THOUSAND SHIPS AND FIFTY THOUSAND WORKERS:
THE BOSTON NAVY AND WORLD WAR II, 1939-1945 505
Yard Administration and Its Additional Burdens.. 505
Wartime Development of the Yard and Annexes 528
The Yard's Civilian Workers in World War II 540
Ship Construction, Repair,. Conversion 594
Chapter VIII. POSTWAR, COLD WAR, KOREAN WAR: 1945-1955 635
Demobilization, 1945 and 1946 636
Administering the Boston Naval Shipyard 641
Plant Improvement: Plans and Actuality 668
Civilian Employees in the Postwar Decade 680
The Shipyard at Work 705
Chapter IX. THE BOSTON NAVAL SHIPYARD IN THE AGE OF
MISSILES AND THE VIETNAM WAR, 1956-1973 729
Yard Administration in an Age of Advanced
Technology 731
The Decline of the Yard's Plant 749
Civilian Employees: Training, RIFs, Union
Contracts 761
Industrial Activity: Final Years 780
The Closing of the Yard 798
Appendix: A Guide to Building Usage at Boston Navy Yard,
1890-1973 817
Bibliography 835
Index 843
Photograph 1
Photograph 2
Photograph 3
Photograph 4
Photograph 5
Photograph 6
Photograph 7
Photograph 8
Photograph 9
Photograph 10
Photograph 11
Photograph 12
Photograph 13
Photograph 14
Photograph 15
LIST OF PHOTOGRAPHS
USS Amphitrit e 115
USS Wyandotte 149
Battleships at the Yard 165
Launching of New Caisson 203
USS Olympia 287
USS Pentucket 295
Battleships Virginia and New Jersey 303
USS Rhode Islan d 353
USS Aroostook 361
The Former German Liner Amerika 363
USS Delphy 375
SS Leviathan 429
The Boston Navy Yard, 1930s 443
USS Ralph Talbot , July 1, 1936 496
Ralph Talbot, October 29, 1936 497
XI
Photograph 16
Photograph 17
Photograph 18
Photograph 19
Photograph 20
Photograph 21
Photograph 22
Photograph 23
Photograph 24
Ralph Talbot and Mugford , October 31 , 1936. . . . 498
Ralph Talbot , July 1, 1937 499
Boston Navy Yard, 1940 507
South Boston Annex, 1941 509
Launching of Humbolt 617
USS Buckley 627
South Boston Annex and Boston Group, Atlantic
Reserve Fleet 663
USS Willis A. Lee 791
USS Constitution 797
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Dry-Dockings, Boston Navy Yard, 1890-1897 110
Table 2: Dry-Dockings, Boston Navy Yard, 1889 and 1899 147
Table 3: Number, Civilian Employees on June 30, Boston Navy
Yard, 1890-1915 231
Table 4: Total Vessels Dry-Docked By Year, Boston Navy Yard,
1890-1916 281
Table 5: Dry-Dockings, Boston Navy Yard, 1900-1913, By Ship
and Vessel Types 283
Table 6: Total Civilian Employees on June 30, Boston Navy
Yard, 1915-1933 331
Table 7: Total Vessels Dry-Docked, Boston Navy Yard,
1910-1934 355
Table 8: Dry-Dockings, Boston Navy Yard, 1914-1920, By
Ship and Vessel Types 357
Table 9: Comparative Wages, Boston Navy Yard and
Bethlehem Shipbuilding, 1927, 1928 421
Table 10: Dry-Dockings, Boston Navy Yard, 1921-1929, By
Ship and Vessel Types 423
Table 11: Total Civilian Employees on June 30, Boston Navy
Yard, 1934-1953 5 57
XII
Table 12: Proportion of Women in Continental Navy Yard Work
Forces, March 1943 571
Table 13: Civilian Personnel Statistics, Select Months, 1939-
1945, Boston Navy Yard 573
Table 14: Total Vessels Dry-Docked, Boston Navy Yard,
1938-1958 595
Table 15: Destroyers Constructed at Boston Navy Yard, 1933-
1945 597
Table 16: Utilization of Shipbuilding Facilities, 1933-1954 .. 601
Table 17: Destroyer Escorts Built at Boston Navy Yard During
World War II 606
Table 18: Miscellaneous Ships Constructed at Boston Navy
Yard During World War II 607
Table 19: LSTs Built at Boston Navy Yard During World
War II 611
Table 20: Numbers of Ships Overhauled, Boston Navy Yard,
1938-1945 626
Table 21: Total Personnel in Select Units, Boston Naval
Shipyard, September 1945 and October 1946 637
Table 22: Ship Overhauls, Boston Naval Shipyard, 1946-1955 ... 719
Table 23: Dry-Dockings, Boston Naval Shipyard, 1946-1955 719
Table 24: Total Civilian Employees, Boston Naval Shipyard,
19 54-1973 763
LIST OF ADMINISTRATION TABLES
Administration Table 1: Boston Navy Yard, 1897 7
Administration Table 2: Boston Navy Yard, July 1909, (The
Newberry Reorganization) 179
Administration Table 3: Boston Navy Yard, 1913 189
Administration Table 4: Boston Navy Yard, 1928 (Industrial
Department ) 387
Administration Table 5: Boston Navy Yard, 1928
(Non industrial Units) 389
Administration Table 6: Boston Navy Yard, 1944 513
xm
Administration Table 7: US Naval Base, Boston,
November 30, 1945 645
Administration Table 8: US Naval Shipyard, Boston,
November 30, 1945 647
Administration Table 9: Paint Shop, Boston Naval
Shipyard, 1958 657
Administration Table 10: Boston Naval Shipyard, 1969 735
LIST OF CHARTS
(Maps and their covering sheets follow the pages indicated.)
Chart 1: Plan of U.S. Navy Yard, Boston, August 1890 47
Chart 2: The United States Navy Yard, Boston,
June 30, 1906 227
Chart 3: The United States Navy Yard, Boston,
June 20, 1920 327
Chart 4: Map of U.S. Navy Yard, Boston, June 30, 1934 475
Chart 5: Map of Boston Naval Shipyard, June 30, 1946 533
Chart 6: Map of Boston Naval Shipyard, Jan. 1, 1963 749
Chart 7: Map of Boston Naval Shipyard, Jan. 1, 1973 759
xiv
Chapter VI
THE YARD IN THE GREAT DEPRESSION
The twenties constituted a decade of decline for the Boston
Navy Yard. No new construction followed completion of Whitney in
1924, the volume of repairs dwindled, and the work force
contracted in size. The early 1930s saw a worsening situation.
Economic developments subsequent to the collapse of Wall Street
dealt the yard a blow, as the federal government pursued a
program of general retrenchment and austerity. The London Naval
Treaty of 1930 extended the moratorium on capital ship
construction to the end of 1936 and led to the scrapping of three
1
more American battleships and ninety-four destroyers. Because
of the persistence of fears of Japan, the Navy continued
deployment of the bulk of the fleet in the Pacific. With little
prospects of new construction, fewer ships arriving for repairs,
and reductions in funds, navy yards faced perilous times. Rumors
circulated about abandoning certain shore establishments, and a
proposal was made in the early 1930s to close the Boston Navy
Yard.
For both the yard and the economic system of the nation, the
winter of 1932-1933 was something of a nadir. However, there the
parallel largely ends. The country's economy recovered at a slow
pace, but the yard began to bounce back more rapidly, and in a
way that had not been anticipated. In 1932, Boston
1. Richard W. Leopold, The Growth of_ American Foreign Policy ; A
History (New York, Alfred A. Knopf: 1962), pp. 447-8; Donald I.
Thomas, "The Four-Stackers," U.S . Naval Institute Proceedings ,
vol. VII (July 1950), p. 754.
439
administrators succeeded in underbidding five other government
and private yards for the construction of a destroyer. Well
before completion of that ship, the yard received a contract for
a second destroyer, and others soon followed, as a new president
enlarged the fleet, both to stimulate the economy and to keep
pace with the growth of foreign navies. The 1930s transformed
the Boston Navy Yard into an activity primarily engaged in
shipbuilding, a role it would retain until the last years of
World War II.
New Deal measures respecting the depression and the
threatening international scene led to the recovery of the Boston
Navy Yard, the Navy's other industrial activities, and the
nation's private shipbuilding industry. A provision in the
National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 authorized expenditures,
"if in the opinion of the President it seems desirable, for the
construction of naval vessels within the terms and/or limits
established by the London Naval Treaty...." Franklin Delano
Roosevelt, long a champion of a large Navy, set aside
$280 million in NIRA funds for thirty-two warships, including
sixteen destroyers. Two of the destroyers were built by the
Boston Navy Yard. Through a separate section of the National
Industrial Recovery Act and by the terms of other legislation,
small sums became available for public works at navy yards. Of
long-range importance was passage of the Vinson-Trammel Act of
1934, which committed the nation to a definite program of
enlarging the fleet to treaty strength. Congressional decree
and Navy Department policy provided that, with the exception of
aircraft carriers, half of the new ships be built at government
440
2
yards .
These measures created the new role for the Boston yard. As
early as December 1933, Commandant Henry H. Hough described his
facility as "almost exclusively engaged in building." And in the
following spring, the Navy Department issued a policy statement
which explicitly established Boston's primary mission as
construction of destroyers and its secondary function as
manufacture of cordage and anchor chain. That statement
specifically asserted that "it is not contemplated to overhaul
3
vessels" at Boston. Building destroyers required an expansion
of the labor force, and by the middle of 1939, more than 5000
people worked at the Boston yard.
Although the 1930s transformed Boston, both in terms of its
chief activity and its general health, the period was a
troublesome one. This is especially true for the early years, but
slowdowns and layoffs occurred even later in the decade. Not
until the outbreak of World War II was the yard safely out from
under the shadow of economic hard times .
A CLOSING SCARE
The Boston Navy Yard suffered a closing scare in the early
1930s. In his annual report for 1930, Secretary of the Navy
Charles Francis Adams stated that "there are more navy yards on
2. P.L. 67, Jun. 6, 1933, SAL, vol. XLVIII, p. 201; Mitchell,
p. 348; Annual Report , Secretary of the Navy for 1934
(Washington: GPO, 1935), p. 2.
3. Commandant, Boston Navy Yard to Commandant, First Naval
District, Dec. 3, 1933, 181-40, Box 303, A-l; Acting Secretary of
Navy to All Bureaus, Commandants, etc., May 3, 1934, 181-40, Box
346, Al-2.
441
the East coast than can be economically maintained."
Generally, the administration of President Herbert Hoover
took the position that all naval building and repair work for the
Atlantic seaboard could be accomplished at Norfolk and
Philadelphia and that the yards at Portsmouth, Boston, New York,
and Charleston were unnecessary. No actual move was then made
to close any of the yards, although the press continued to report
President Hoover's hostility to maintaining operations which
entailed high overhead costs and relatively low production. In
the summer of 1930, it appeared that smaller yards and bases,
such as those at Charleston, South Carolina, and Key West,
Florida, were the most likely candidates for temporary or
permanent closing. Later, President Hoover and administration
spokesmen indicated that the effort to economize might result in
4
shutting down other facilities, including the Boston yard.
In October 1931, a specific proposal to close Boston emerged
from a White House Conference, touching off a storm of anger and
activity in Boston and Massachusetts generally. Fifty thousand
signatures were collected on petitions of protest; the move was
condemned by the mayor, governor, both senators, and most of the
state's congressional delegation; a meeting was called by the
Chamber of Commerce; and a committee formed to campaign against
the closing. The protestors made a number of points. Since the
proposal mentioned no other yards, the obvious question was "Why
Boston?" Abandoning the facility would result in joblessness for
the yard's 1540 workers, plus an estimated 5000 men employed by
4. New York Time s, May 14, 1931, p. 4; Aug. 29, 1930, p. 35.
442
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commercial establishments dependent on the yard. The general
contraction of the yard's work force during the 1920s had
produced a body of mechanics, many of whom were more than forty-
five years of age and who would thus have great difficulty in
obtaining work elsewhere. Moreover, it was argued that shutting
down the yard would produce little savings, since Boston had been
assigned one of the five destroyers in a current construction
program. If not built at Boston, that vessel would have to be
constructed someplace else, resulting in no reduction in the
5
Navy's expenditures.
The yard was not closed as a result of the proposal made in
October 1931, although the threat lingered on for several years.
In the following spring, Secretary Adams appeared before the
House Naval Affairs Committee and listed Boston as among the
yards and bases that might be discontinued. The possibility of
closing yards persisted after the inauguration of the new
president in March 1933. Doubtless because of concern for the
Boston Navy Yard, Massachusetts Congressman John W. McCormack
approached the Navy Department in April and was advised that no
East Coast yards "would be abolished at the present time."
However, in the following month, Secretary of the Navy Claude
Swanson announced a drastic cut in Navy funds and laid down
certain "general principles" to govern expenditures on shore
establishments. The yards at New York, Norfolk, Mare Island, and
Puget Sound would be maintained for service to the fleet. "The
status of the Navy Yards at Portsmouth, Boston, Philadelphia, and
5. New Yor k Times , October 25, 1931, section III, p. 6.
444
Charleston is dependent upon availability of funds for new con-
6
struction." Perhaps this was a political move to win support
for the administration's proposal to include funds for new con-
struction in a bill aimed at stimulating industrial recovery.
That measure, the National Industrial Recovery Act, was passed in
June. Boston received the assignment of building two destroyers
as part of the NIRA program. As events turned out, neither the
Republican nor Democratic administrations closed any major navy
yard during the depression. But for several years, apprehensions
existed that the Boston Navy Yard might be shut down.
YARD WORKERS IN AN ERA OF HARD TIMES
The Great Depression affected the Boston Navy Yard in a
variety of ways. Both the Republican Hoover and, at least
initially, the Democratic Roosevelt had ambivalent views of navy
yards, regarding them as areas in which funds could be saved and
as instrumentalities for promoting economic stability, if not
recovery. The government's response to the economic collapse
had an impact on the Boston yard's civilian workers,
administrative organization, plant, and industrial activity.
Early in the depression, Navy appropriations were cut, and
in allocating its meagre fiscal resources, the Navy sought to
provide for forces afloat by curtailing expenditures on shore
establishments. That policy most directly affected the number of
navy yard employees. Continuing the trend of the 1920s, the
Boston Navy Yard's labor force contracted from 2847 at the end of
6. New York Times , May 4, 1932, p. 18; Apr. 21, 1933, p. 37;
May 12, 1933, pp. 1, 5.
445
1928 to 1533 in 1932. The latter figure represents almost the
minimum set for Boston. To promote "employment stabilization,"
the Navy Department fixed minimum, or basic, and maximum limits
for the labor force of each of its yards. Essentially, the yards
fell into four groups. Charleston was assigned a basic force
level of 500 and a maximum of 600; Boston and Portsmouth, 1500
and 1800; Puget Sound, 2600 and 3120; and New York, Philadelphia,
and Mare Island, 3000 and 3600. Commandants received strict
7
orders not to exceed the maximum number.
The number of employees at the Boston Navy Yard declined in
the first years of the depression, reaching the low of 1533 in
November 1932. Through the efficiency-rating system, all workers
were ranked, and employees to be discharged or furloughed were
selected from those at the bottom of the list. That system
gave advantages not only to the more conscientious and productive
employees, but also those with long careers in the yard, so long
as they were not eligible for retirement. In addition, veterans
were somewhat more protected against permanent layoffs than
others. Navy policy directed that during their training period
of almost four years, apprentices were not to be discharged,
although there was no guarantee of a regular appointment when
8
they completed their schooling.
A view of the distribution of the yard's labor force in the
7. Assistant Secretary of Navy to Commandants, Mar. 30, 1933,
181-40, Box 304, A3-1; Yard Log, Dec. 31, 1928, 181-58; Monthly
Report of Personnel Statistics, Dec. 1, 1932, 181-40, Box 270,
A9-1; Assistant Secretary of Navy to Commandants, Dec. 30, 1931,
181-40, Box 233, Al-1.
8. Oral History Interview, Lyman Carlow, BNHP; Commandant's
Order, Sep. 12, 1933, 181-40, Box 405 (1936), A2-5.
446
depths of the depression is provided by a listing sent by
Commandant Louis M. Nulton to the Department of the Navy. In May
1933, because of objections in Washington to a proposal for
temporarily enlarging that force, Commandant Nulton provided a
detailed breakdown of the assignments of all civilian employees.
At that time, Group IV(b) employees numbered 255 and manual
workers roughly 1500. Mechanics, helpers, and laborers engaged
in ship work included 524 involved in repairs on the cruiser
Raleigh , seventy-two on Nitro , ninety-six on the two new
destroyers just started, twenty-six on Coast Guard vessels in the
yard, and seventy on miscellaneous projects associated with the
Bureaus of Construction and Repair and Engineering. One hundred
workers manned the manufacturing shops, namely the ropewalk and
chain forge. The Supply Department employed thirty-seven manual
workers, the power plant 255, and the other Yards and Docks shops
9
slightly more than 200.
After 1932, the labor force swelled and contracted,
generally within the basic and maximum limits of 1500 and 1800.
Beginning in 1935, employment figures rose steadily, only to
experience a sudden and sharp decline in the second half of 1937,
coinciding with a general economic reversal known as the
"Roosevelt Recession." A thousand workers were laid off, and the
employment rolls dropped from 3439 in June 1937 to 2471 in the
following November. As the yard newspaper described the
situation :
Christmas this year will not find the Boston Navy Yard
9. Commandant to Assistant Secretary of Navy, May 24, 1933, 181-
40, Box 3 03. A-l.
447
in as good a condition from an employment standpoint, as
it enjoyed during this happy season a year ago ....
Reductions in forces . . . have continued progressively
with the completion of work on various vessels . . . and
must unfortunately continue . . . , unless additional work
is assigned.... Unfortunately the business recession now
prevailing throughout the country has complicated the
situation by practically eliminating any prospect of
employment in private industry.
The yard did obtain additional work early in 1938, and from that
point the work force once more started to expand, an expansion
culminating in the vastly enlarged body of employees of World
10
War II.
The early depression saw increasing use of the practice of
furloughing workers or requiring them to take leave without pay.
In June 1932, for example, 179 employees were in such a status,
and the figure was expected to increase to 310 during the next
11
three months. Another common practice was hiring workers
strictly on a temporary basis. In January 1937, the yard
employed 547 such temporaries.
Although, expansion of the volume of work in the late 1930s
produced a steadily increasing labor force, temporary layoffs
still occurred. A worker hired in 1937, and still employed at the
yard when it closed in 1973, recalled that employment was
irregular when he started. "Some of the time," employees "didn't
work the full week" and "would have a week off or something of
10. Boston Navy Yard News , Dec. 9, 1937. The size of the work
force can be traced in a report regularly sent from the yard to
Washington. The report has several names, such as "Personnel
Statistics: Number of Civilian Personnel" and "Monthly Report of
Civil Personnel Statistics." For the 1930s, most of these
reports are found in 181-40, A9-4.
11. Personnel Statistics: Number of Civilian Employees, Jun.
1932, 181-40, Box 270, A9-4.
448
that nature." Two hundred mechanics engaged in the
construction of the destroyers Trippe and Mayrant were discharged
in February 1938, because of the Navy's delay in preparing and
12
forwarding to the yard needed plans for those vessels.
Respecting the wages and salaries of civilian employees, the
government and the Navy Department pursued ambivalent policies.
On the one hand, federal authorities sought to contribute to
national "wage stabilization" by refraining from cutting the pay
of workers. On the other, the desire to reduce expenditures led
to trimming payment to government employees. By 1935, the
contradiction between these two policies was resolved in favor of
wage stabilization. But that resolution came only after several
years of confusion resulting from manipulation of wages and
salaries and of the length of the work week. The most
consistently followed practice was cancellation of proceedings of
local yard wage boards. Had the usual yearly wage board methods
been employed, navy yard wages would have been lowered so as to
be in conformity with the declining rates paid by commercial
firms. To avoid further depressing the wage levels in the
nation, the traditional wage-fixing process was abandoned between
1930 and 1940.
Several secondary authorities, relying too heavily on the
wage schedules, do not accurately describe circumstances
surrounding navy yard wages and salaries during the depression.
In his highly useful administrative history of the Navy during
12. Oral History Interview, Albert Mostone, BNHP; Boston Navy
Yard News, Mar. 10, 1938.
449
World War II, Admiral Julius A. Furer explains that the 1862
wage-fixing system was in use
until 1930 when the law was temporarily suspended by
Congress, largely ... because wages in industry, due to
the depression, had fallen below those paid in the naval
shore establishments. By 1940, however, the wages in
industry had again risen to the point where it was
thought that they might be higher than those paid in
Navy yards. The Wage Board procedure was therefore
again put into effect ....
That the situation was somewhat more complicated is indicated in
a World War II study of the history of wages and salaries paid to
the Navy's civilian employees. That study states:
During the period January 1, 1930, to February 14, 1940,
[the] wage board procedure was not used because of the
downward trend of industrial wages; and statutory
prohibitions against reduction in compensation and
administrative promotions in the acts of Congress
also necessitated the continuance of the 1929 schedule.
Section 23 of the act of Congress of March 28, 1934 ...
relating to rates of wages and hours of labor had the
effect of giving for forty hours ' work the 48 hours ' pay
formerly given for 44 hours' work and the fixing of the
rate of wages on the level of the wage schedule in
effect on June 1, 1932, viz., the 1929 schedule.
Although basically correct, this description is somewhat
13
misleading and certainly oversimplifies events.
The usual wage-fixing mechanism was suspended, and the 1929
schedule did become the basis for determining wages during the
decade. Beginning in 1930, the Secretary or Assistant Secretary
of the Navy each July or August directed that navy yard wage
boards not be convened and that the current wage schedule be
continued for another twelve months. This meant that the wage
schedule for 1929 prevailed throughout the depression. The only
changes occurring in wage schedules resulted from the inclusion
13. Furer, p. 910; McPherson and Watts, p. 4.
450
of new ratings. For example, the Navy Department accepted the
Boston yard's recommendation to add the rating of temperer and to
14
assign it the wage of $.90 per hour.
However, the decade-long abandonment of the traditional
wage-fixing mechanism is only part of the story. By congressional
action, wages and salaries of federal employees were reduced.
Moreover, between 1931 and 1934, there was continued tinkering
with the length of the work week, mainly by repeated alterations
of the schedule for Saturdays.
The first change in hours benefitted government workers. In
an act approved on March 3, 1931 and effective immediately,
Congress declared that for employees of the government "four
hours ... shall constitute a day's work on Saturday throughout
the year, with pay or earnings for that day the same as on other
15
days when full time is worked ...." Generally, that act
tended to decrease the need to discharge or furlough workers,
since it spread the same volume of work over a longer period of
time. In practical terms, it means that employees worked five
and a half days and were paid for six, in effect increasing the
hourly and daily rates of pay and the unit rates for piecework.
As directed by the Secretary of the Navy, Commandant Nulton
immediately placed the Boston Navy Yard on a five-and-a-half-day
14. For examples of the annual cancellation of local wage board
operations, see Press Release, Aug. 9, 1930, 181-40, Box 203,
L16-1; Secretary of Navy to Navy Yard, Boston, Aug. 2, 1934, 181-
40, Box 353, L16-1; Assistant Secretary of Navy to Commandants,
Aug. 17, 1936, 181-40, Box 422, L16-1; Secretary of Navy to
Commandant, Jan. 3, 1936, 181-40, Box 422, L16-1.
15. P.L. 784, Mar. 3, 1931, SAL, vol. XLVI , p. 1482;
Commandant's Order No. 14, Mar. 4, 1931, 181-40, Box 405 (1936),
A2-5.
451
week, with Saturday hours from 8:00 a.m. to noon.
Sixteen months later, Congress enacted the Legislative
Appropriations or Economy Act of June 30, 1932. That legislation
cut the work week to five days and cut wages by one-eleventh.
Pay raises due to length of service or promotion were suspended.
Employees reaching retirement age were compelled to retire.
Overtime, Sunday, or holiday work no longer received a higher
rate, and annual leave with pay was eliminated entirely.
Otherwise, the act prohibited any reduction or increase in the
16
compensation of federal employees.
The new work week became effective at the Boston Navy Yard
at once, and beginning July 9, the facility was closed on
Saturdays. Navy yard commandants interpreted the new regulations
in different ways. At Mare Island, a furor resulted when the
yard went on a program of five days' pay for five days' work.
Admiral Nulton, at Boston, attached another meaning and issued a
chart to convert the former hourly and daily wage rates to the
new schedule. For example, a worker previously paid $.75 an hour
or $6.00 a day, now received $.90 per hour and $7.20 per day.
Similarly, Nulton ordered new piecework rates instituted in the
chain shop. According to his understanding, employees should
17
receive five and a half days' pay for five days of work.
Admiral Nulton 's interpretation apparently was correct for
per diem and salaried employees, but the Navy initially viewed
16. P.L. 212, June 30, 1932, SAL, vol. LXVII, pp. 382-407.
17. Lott, p. 197; Commandant's Circular No. 79, Jul. 18, 1931,
181-40, Box 283, L16-4; Commandant to Accounting Officer, Jul.
19, 1931, 181-40, Box 283, L16-1.
452
the new piecework rates as "a revision upward," which "cannot be
considered at this time," since it violated the terms of the
Economy Act. Nulton argued against the Department's ruling,
because it "in effect deprives the piecework employee of the
compensation previously allowed for Saturday afternoons, in
addition to depriving him of the compensation for the Saturday
forenoons not worked." "In other words," he continued, "the
piecework employee loses compensation for the entire Saturday,
whereas the per diem employee only loses compensation for half
18
the day . "
The Boston commandant ultimately won his argument. More
importantly, the exchange underscores the fact that, although the
1929 schedule was in effect, all manual workers, both per diem
and piecework, received less income after July 1, 1932, than they
had before that date. And further wage cuts lay ahead.
On March 20, 1933, during the hectic "Hundred Days," a
reluctant Congress, responding to the insistence of the
president, passed the New Deal's Economy Act. That provided for
pay cuts for all federal employees of up to fifteen percent.
Moreover, a five-and-a-half -day work week was reestablished.
In the following June, orders were issued, only to be rescinded
before they went in effect, to furlough all per diem workers on
Saturday. The decision to curtail work on Saturday mornings was
made "because of the necessity for economy in expenditures . . . ,
and to obviate discharges by spreading available work among
18. Assistant Secretary of Navy to Commandant, Aug. 6, 1932,
181-40, Box 283, L16-1; Commandant to Assistant Secretary of
Navy, Sep. 15, 1932, 181-40, Box 283, L16-1.
453
employees as far as practicable." The order was rescinded because
the administration was soliciting bids for new construction, and
private shipbuilding firms, whose employees worked more than
forty hours a week, would have a competitive advantage over
government yards, since they could promise earlier delivery
19 Y
dates .
In March 1934, Congress rebelled against the president and
passed over his veto the Independent Offices Appropriations Act.
That measure drastically amended the Economy Act of the previous
year and provided for a three-step elimination of the reductions.
The basic objective was to return all employees to the wages and
salaries they had received on June 1, 1932, that is before
enactment of Hoover's Economy Act, which had initiated the policy
of reducing the pay of federal workers. Another change in the
20
spring of 1934 was a resumption of the forty-hour week.
By the summer of 1935, wages and salaries at the Boston Navy
Yard had returned to the levels of the early years of the decade.
This is evident in a comparison of two documents, an
"organization personnel pamphlet" dated April 1, 1931, and a
similar statement for July 1, 1935. These pamphlets list every
position in the yard and, for each of the civilian positions, the
classification or rating, the daily wages or annual salary
19. P.L. 2, Mar. 20, 1933, SAL, vol. XLVIII, p. 13; Commandant's
Order No. 39, Apr. 7, 1933, and Commandant's Order No. 43, Jun.
6, 1933, both in 181-40, Box 405 (1936), A2-5; New York Times,
Jun. 25, 1933, p. 10.
20. P.L. 142, Mar. 28, 1934, SAL, vol. XLVIII, pp. 521-2;
Secretary of Navy to All Naval Stations, Mar. 31, 1934, 181-40,
Box 353, L16-4; Secretary of Navy to All Navy Stations, Apr. 6,
1934, 181-40, Box 353, L16-4; New York Times , Apr. 7, 1934, p. 6.
454
attached, and, in the case of supervisory personnel, the name of
the incumbent. For all positions, the wages or salaries paid in
1935 were identical to those four years earlier. The following
are examples of supervisors holding the same positions and
receiving the same pay in 1931 and 1935:
Chief Clerk, Commandant's Office, P. W. Walsh (CAF-6),
$3400; Sergeant of Police, Military Department, W. J.
Gibbons, $1920; Supervising Draftsman, Drafting Section,
Planning Division, A. Svenson (P-3), $3800;
Metallurgist, Metallurgical Laboratory, Production
Division, C. G. Lutts (P-3), $3700; Leadingman Ropemaker
F. B. Christensen, $7.60; Master Shipfitter J. L.
Carroll, $17.04; Quarterman Machinist C. C. Nispel,
$9.92; Master Boatbuilder W. C. Nicholls, $14.00; Pilot
and Tugmaster B. P. Kemp, $3200.
That wages and salaries for nonsupervisory personnel were the
same in 1931 and 1935 can be seen in the positions of
stenographer-typwriter , Commandant's Office (CAF-3),
$1920; laborer, classified, Medical Department, $4.48;
design draftsman (ship), Drafting Section, Planning
Division (P-3), $3400; painters, $7.12; blacksmiths,
heavy fire, $7.84; riggers, $7.20; boatbuilders , $7.20;
ropemakers, $6.16; shipfitters, $7.04; plumbers, $7.20;
molders, $7.68; machinists, $7.04; electricians, $7.60;
and under stockman, Supply Department (CAF-1), $1500.
Some employees received higher wages and salaries in 1935 than in
1931, but this resulted from promotions, such as from leadingman
to quarterman, and not because of alterations in the wage or
21
salary schedules.
Although wages and salaries made their way back to the pre-
1932 levels, overtime remained severely limited, and the five-day
week prevailed. The manual labor force worked eight hours each
day, and Group IV(b) employees eight hours during the first four
21 . Organization Personnel Pamphlet, Apr. 1, 1931, 181-40, Box
234, A3-1; Organization Personnel Pamphlet, Jul. 1, 1935, 181-40,
Box 376, A3-1. In the examples given for Group III, all ratings
are for first-class mechanics.
455
22
days of the week and seven on Fridays.
At the end of 1932, the size of the Boston Navy Yard's work
force was at its lowest point, 1533 persons. Approximately, 200
were in Group IV(b) and the remainder in Groups I, II, III, and
IV(a). Veterans totaled 592 and women thirty-four. Thereafter,
as the number of employees began to increase, veterans continued
to constitute roughly one-third of the work force, the number of
women increased only slightly, and Group IV(b) workers comprised
an increasingly smaller proportion of total employees. For
example, at the end of 1938, there was a force of 3745 persons,
which included 394 IV(b) workers, 1062 veterans, and forty-three
23
women .
The Hoover administration as well as the New Deal sought to
use navy yards as instrumentalities to contribute to economic
stabilization and recovery. In addition to manipulation of navy
yard wages and salaries and the maintenance of employment levels,
the federal government funded public works, including
improvements at the Navy's shore establishments. Public works
projects provided jobs in the building and construction trades
and also acted as an economic stimulus by increasing the demand
for building materials.
In 1931, the Boston Navy Yard began its role in combating
the depression. A deficiency bill passed by Congress in February
22. Secretary of Navy to All Naval Stations, Apr. 12, 1934, 181-
40, Box 353, L16-4.
23. Monthly Report of Personnel Statistics, Dec. 1, 1932, 181-
40, Box 270, A9-1; Monthly Report of Civil Personnel Statistics,
Dec. 1938, 181-40, Box 9, A9-4.
456
and covering the balance of the fiscal year provided funds for
"emergency construction" by the Navy's Bureau of Yards and Docks.
Slightly more than a half million dollars went to the First Naval
District, and the yard's share was $230,000. That money financed
a half-dozen moderate-sized public works projects at the
Charlestown site. Those projects created work for 170 employees
of the Public Works Division who otherwise would have been laid
24
off.
The New Deal 's approach was more extensive and, in addition
to public works, included shipbuilding and work relief. During
the Hundred Days, Congress created the Federal Employment Relief
Administration ( FERA ) and the Public Works Administration (PWA).
The latter was established by the National Industrial Recovery
Act, which also provided funds for naval construction. Utilizing
FERA and PWA funds, the Civil Works Administration (CWA) briefly
supervised a work relief program in 1934. The following year,
the Works Progress Administration (WPA) emerged as the New Deal's
principal work relief agency.
The NIRA had an impact on the Boston yard in the second half
of 1933. Work on $75,000 worth of plant improvements began in
September, being performed by yard labor and private contractors.
Also, NIRA funds for shipbuilding became available and were used
for preliminary work on construction of two destroyers,
manufacture of chain and appendages, building eleven boats, and
installation of machine tools. As of December 1933, the Boston
24. Navy Public Works Projects to Aid Employment, Boston Navy
Yard, Jan. 26, 1931, 181-40, Box 233, Al-1; Annual Report, Chief,
Bureau of Yards and Docks, 1931, 181-40, Box 238, A9-1; P.L. 611,
Feb. 6, 1931, SAL, vol. XLVI , pp. 1064-83.
457
Navy Yard was paying fifty-four workers under the NIRA
25
shipbuilding program.
The number of workers at the Boston Navy Yard employed in
connection with the New Deal 's antidepression schemes steadily
grew. This doubtless was most true for those covered by the NIRA
shipbuilding program, since the yard constructed a pair of
destroyers utilizing funds from that source. In addition, public
works projects gave employment to a large number. In November
1938, for example, 1406 WPA employees were engaged in a variety
26
of plant construction and improvement activities.
The Public Works Officer was the yard administrator
primarily concerned with FERA, CWA, PWA, and WPA employees.
However, since the Public Works Division was part of the
Industrial Department, the manager had overall supervision of
relief workers. In July 1935, Manager R. P. Schlabach observed
eight FERA employees loafing and smoking outside a building. In a
memorandum to those on the FERA employment rolls and to the
officers in his department, Captain Schlabach sought to remind
all that relief workers were expected to follow the same rules
respecting work habits and fire safety as the yard 's regular
25. Chief, Bureau of Yards and Docks to Commandant, Aug. 30,
1933; Assistant Secretary of Navy to Commandant, First Naval
District, Oct. 9, 1933; U.S. Department of Labor to Commandant,
Nov. 6, 1933; Commandant to Bureau of Engineering and Bureau of
Construction and Repair, Dec. 12, 1933, all in 181-40, Box 303,
Al-3.
26. Employment Report of Federal Civil Works Projects, Apr. 25,
1934, 181-40, Box 340, Al-3; Relief Labor at Naval Stations, Nov.
14, 1934, 181-40, Box 340, A-l; Medical Officer to Chief, Bureau
of Medicine and Surgery, Dec. 6, 1938, 181-40, Box 9, A9-4.
458
27
employees .
Particularly in the early years of the depression, unions
and other employee organizations appear somewhat inactive at the
Boston Navy Yard, at least with respect to seeking to influence
decisions on wages and other terms of employment. This resulted
from several developments. Abandonment of the traditional wage-
fixing apparatus removed an important area in which workers '
organizations previously had been active. Moreover, with Congress
and the president deciding issues of wages and salaries, local
protests would have been relatively ineffective. In addition,
the 1920s had not been friendly to organized labor, and both
public officials, most notably the Republican leadership in
Washington, and public opinion were decidedly anti-union-
Probably, the economic collapse resulted in some confusion within
the ranks of labor as to a course of action.
The strain on worker solidarity is evident in an incident
involving the Boston Navy Yard's most important civilian
employees, master mechanics and foremen. Those men were
organized in a local Master Mechanics and Foremen's Association,
which was part of a larger group, the National Association of
Master Mechanics and Foremen of Navy Yards and Naval Stations.
During a convention in Washington in May 1930, the national body
adopted a sweeping set of demands, including a fifty percent
increase in wages. One of the national officers and a signer of
the proposal was James L. Carroll, master shipfitter at the
27. Office of the Manager, Memorandum for Officers of the
Industrial Department and All ERA Employees, Jul. 18, 1935, 181-
40, Box 374, A2-5.
459
Boston Navy Yard. However, Carroll had been instructed by the
local association not to support the demands of the national
organization. During the convention, he had spoken and voted
against the proposal. Moreover, Boston's master mechanics and
foremen made certain that their commandant and manager were
28
informed of their disagreement with the national association.
The New Deal displayed a more favorable attitude toward
organized labor than its Republican predecessors, an attitude
most dramatically evident in a section of the National Industrial
Recovery Act, which required employers covered by the NRA codes
to grant their workers the right to organize and to bargain
collectively. Although navy yard workers were not allowed
collective bargaining, the Navy Department did seek to
reinvigorate the system of shop committees. In a circular letter
in March 1935, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy outlined the
department's policy. That policy specifically approved of the
existence of shop committees. The letter urged "all employees
... fully to participate in the elections" of committeemen and
"to utilize their commmitteemen . " Moreover, "since the
Department recognizes the right of shop committees to speak for
the men in the shops they represent, it is interested in being
sure that the committees do so speak." The system was designed
to provide an opportunity for management and workers to meet
together for a variety of purposes, including "to discuss
28. Assistant Secretary of Navy to National Association of
Master Mechanics and Foremen, Jun. 3, 1930; Assistant Secretary
of the Navy to Commandants, Jun. 7, 1930; Master Mechanics and
Foremen of the Boston Navy Yard to Commandant, Aug. 12, 1930, all
in 181-40, Box 203, L16-1 .
460
questions pertaining to work, to make and receive suggestions for
the improvement of physical working conditions; to promote mutual
29
cooperation, understanding and confidence."
At the Boston Navy Yard, the Assistant Secretary's action
resulted in a commandant 's order more rigid in its tone and
content than the circular letter. For example, committees were
not to take up with yard officials matters which could be settled
by individual employees. Emphasis was placed on communication
between workers and management " through proper channels . " This
meant that committees or individuals should take their
suggestions and grievances first to "their immediate super-
visors, coming only to their Superintendents, Heads of Division,
Manager, and finally the Commandant, when a satisfactory arrange-
ment cannot otherwise be made." When it was necessary for a shop
committee to meet with the commandant, "a comprehensive general
statement of the questions... should be submitted," and, of
course, through proper channels. Shop committeemen were in-
structed not to concern themselves with disciplinary actions
30
taken by the commandant against individual employees.
It does not appear that following the Navy Department's
circular letter and the commandant's order, shop committees be-
came active entities at the Boston Navy Yard. However, other
employee groups obtained greater visibility in the yard. This
may have resulted from the establishment of a vehicle for pub-
29. Assistant Secretary of Navy to All Navy Yards and Stations,
Mar. 16, 1935, 181-40, Box 375, A2-11.
30. Commandant's Order, Instructions for Shop Committeemen, 1935,
181-40, Box 374, A2-5. See also Commandant's Order No. 13, Jan.
15, 1936, 181-40, Box 405, A2-5.
461
licizing the activities of shops, yard-based unions, and other
groups. In accordance with a vote among employees, a newspaper,
The Boston Navy Yard News , began its career in January 1936.
Sponsored by the yard's Quartermens and Leadingmens '
Association and published on the second Friday of each month, the
paper had the approval of the administration. Lt.(jg) M. G.
Vangelli, attached to the Production Division, acted as the
representative of the commandant and reviewed all articles before
publication. The first issue contained a message from Commandant
Walter R. Gherardi , who perceived the purpose of "this little
publication" as "to promote the interests of the Boston Navy Yard
and thus at the same time to promote the interests of the Navy."
Admiral Gherardi further contended, "There should be no place in
it for contentious or destructive criticism; there should be no
31
personalities tending to hurt feelings...."
During the remainder of the 1930s, The Boston Navy Yard News
included articles about bills under consideration by Congress
affecting naval expansion and improvements in the yard's physical
plant, assignment to the yard of new construction and the
progress of vessels then being built, and the arrival and
departure of officers in the yard's administration. Most of the
space was devoted to reports on employee organizations and on
social activities, personnel matters, athletic teams, and the
industrial work of the various shops.
For example, the initial issue of the News carried
31. Boston Navy Yard News , Jan. 10, 1936; Manager s Memorandum,
Dec. 23, 1935, 181-40, Box 375, A2-1.
462
information about recent meetings of the Navy Yard Chapter, No.
17, Disabled Veterans of the World War; International Boiler
Makers, Local 304; Navy Yard Lodge No. 82, American Federation of
Government Employees; Navy Yard Mutual Benefit Association;
International Brotherhood of Boiler Makers, Iron Ship Builders
and Helpers of America, Local 685; and a newly organized Sheet
Metal International Association, Navy Yard Local No. 395. Later
issues reported the activities of such other organizations as the
Master Mechanics' Association; Retirement Association;
Charlestown Metal Trades Council; the Navy Yard Employees' Band;
Alumni Apprentice Association; Federation of Civil Service
Employees, Local No. 6; National Federation of Federal
Employees, Local 524; Navy Department Police Association; and
32
Bunker Hill Lodge, International Association of Machinists.
A standard feature in each issue of the yard newspaper was
coverage of the activities and personnel of the shops. A column
about the Electrical Shop in the issue of March 1936 reported the
promotion of one of its mechanics to leadingman; the efforts of
two electricians to lose weight; the retirement of another "Old
Timer"; and a shop banquet held at the Ritz Plaza. As the yard's
labor force enlarged in the second half of the 1930s, there was
an increase in social activities, usually sponsored by the shops
for their members, former workers, and their families or guests.
Such activities as banquets, dinner dances, picnics, and outings
became quite common. The yard commandant, manager, or another
32. Boston Navy Yard New s, Jan. 10, 19 36; Feb. 14, 1936; Mar 13,
1936; Feb. 8, 1940; May 9, 1940; Dec. 12, 1940.
463
officer was frequently a guest of honor at the banquets r which
also featured a master of ceremonies, entertainment, and music by
33
popular bands from the Boston area.
Some of the social events included the entire yard. In June
1937, Local 685 organized "the first annual" moonlight cruise, to
which all employees were invited. The Charlestown Metal Trades
Council, a federation of unions based on the yard, sponsored an
installation-wide annual ball. In April 1938, that event was
held in the Charlestown State Armory and offered a "big apple"
and other dance contests, the selection of a "Miss Boston Navy
Yard," a fifty-dollar door prize, and the music of Dick McGinley
34
and his orchestra.
Civilian employees of the Boston Navy Yard had much to
celebrate as the thirties drew to a close. If wages remained the
same as a decade previous, the work week had been reduced and
navy yard workers received better pay than employees in the
private sector. Reductions in force were rare and temporary,
and the yard's unions and other employee groups had little to
grumble about. The nation's naval expansion program promised a
secure future, and the hard times of the early 1930s were
receding into memory.
YARD ADMINISTRATION IN THE THIRTIES
The depression, the decline of repair activities, and the
emphasis on new construction had the consequence of altering the
33. Boston Navy Yard News , Mar. 13, 1936; Feb. 8, 1940.
34. Boston Navy Yard News , Jun . 10, 1937; Mar. 10, 1938; Apr.
14, 1938.
464
composition of the personnel of the Boston Navy Yard and
modifying slightly its administration. Most of these changes
become visible when comparing the organization and personnel of
the yard in 1931 and 1935.
In both years, approximately 1920 people were at work in the
yard. Navy personnel remained constant, there being eighty-eight
officers in 1931 and eighty-two four years later. What changed
was the ratio between manual workers and IV(b) employees. In the
early years of the depression, an eleven percent reduction
occurred in the IV(b) force and a thirty-two percent loss among
Groups I, II, III, and IV(a). However, after November 1932, when
the work force began to increase, IV(b) workers were not added as
rapidly as other categories of employees. As a consequence,
there were 355 IV(b) workers in 1931, and only 277 in 1935. In
addition, a reduction had occurred among manual workers not
actually engaged in productive work. This means that the number
of men in the shops increased. That group totaled 1468 in 1931
35
and 1576 in 1935.
The most striking increase occurred in the shops most
directly involved in ship construction. The structural shop
expanded from 215 to 482 men and the inside machine shop from
109 to 198. Several shops not engaged in shipbuilding, such as
the chain and anchor forge and the Preparation Service Shop,
35. The figures for total yard personnel do not include the
officers and enlisted men of the Marine Corps garrison or of the
receiving ship or station. Organization Personnel Pamphlet, Apr.
1, 1931, 181-40, Box 234, A3-1; Organization Personnel Pamphlet,
Jul. 1, 1935, 181-40, Box 376, A3-1; Cdr . Alfred W. Atkins to
Commandant, May 1, 1933, 181-40, Box 304, A3-1.
465
acquired only a few additional men. The outside machine shop,
much of whose work was repair of vessels, declined from 100 men
in 1931 to 75 in 1935. All three of the Public Works shops also
had fewer men in 1935 than in 1931. The Building Trades Shop
experienced the greatest decline, going from 347 to 142.
Probably the yard's plant did not suffer from the smaller
Building Trades Shop, since a large number of relief workers were
engaged in the maintenance, repair, and improvement of buildings.
Because of the redistribution of its personnel , the Boston
Navy Yard became leaner, with fewer clerks, planners, draftsmen,
inspectors, plant maintenance personnel, and others who
constituted the yard's overhead costs. The result was increased
productivity, but also an overworked office staff.
Doubtless the depression stimulated the Navy Department 's
constant quest for greater efficiency in the organization of its
yards. No major administrative change came until the end of the
decade and the emergence of the Bureau of Ships. In the 1930s,
the basic yard structure continued to consist of a commandant and
several departments, namely Military, Industrial, Supply, and
Accounting. Some modest changes did appear, including removing
the Supply Department from the Industrial Department and placing
it directly under the commandant. Also, the Supply Department
was reorganized, so as to consist of four functional groups:
service, incoming stores, outgoing stores, and storage.
Reorganization of the Supply Department at the Boston Navy Yard
resulted in fewer employees, both manual and office workers.
Another change saw the transfer of the yard's chemical laboratory
from the Supply Department to the Production Division of the
466
Industrial Department, already the administrative home of the
36
metallurgical laboratory.
A change somewhat overdue was decommissioning of the
receiving ship Southery and assigning its functions to a
Receiving Station, housed in Frazier Barracks (Building No. 33).
The captain of the yard, head of the Military Department, served
as commanding officer of the Receiving Station as he had of
37
Southery before she went out of service.
Several modifications took place respecting the Industrial
Department. The confusing title of "Engineering Division" was
discontinued and replaced with "Planning Division," the
"Engineering Superintendent" now being called the "Planning
Officer." No actual changes accompanied the semantic reform,
except for the inclusion of a radio section in the new Planning
Division. In 1933, the clerical forces of the Planning and
Production Divisions were consolidated. However, the change
proved unworkable, and by 1935 each division again had its own
38
force of clerks, stenographers, typists, and messengers.
Except for alterations in the size of their work forces,
shops retained the same internal organization throughout the
decade. The Shipsmith Shop, which manufactured chain and anchor,
was redesignated as the Forge Shop. An attempted merger involved
36. Commandant's Order No. 31, Mar. 31, 1932, 181-40, Box 405
(1936), A2-5; Organization Personnel Pamphlet, Apr. 1, 1931.
37. Report of Activities, First Naval District, Jul. 1, 1932 to
Jun. 30, 1933, 181-40, Box 309 (1933), A9-1 , p. 3.
38. Commandant's Order No. 31, Mar. 31, 1932, 181-40, Box 405
(1936), A2-5; Manager's Order, Jun. 26, 1933, 181-40, Box 304,
A3-1; Organization Personnel Pamphlet, Jul. 1, 1935.
467
three of the shops of the Production Division. In 1934, the
personnel of the paint shop and the sail loft were transferred to
the riggers and laborers shop. Consolidation reduced costs, since
it eliminated the master sailmaker, master painter, and other
positions in the shop expense groups in the former sail loft and
paint shop. The change was a permanent one for the yard's few
sailmakers and upholsterers. However, within a few years, the
39
paint shop reappeared as a separate entity.
In 1934, a single-billeted safety engineer appeared at the
Boston Navy Yard. Previously, the shop superintendent had been
the officer responsible for the yard 's safety program.
Apparently, Lt . T. Southall served as the first full-time safety
engineer. Although operating out of the office of the manager of
the Industrial Department, his duties extended to the entire yard
and included fire protection, inspection and testing of fire-
fighting equipment, and the investigation of all fires as well
as matters more directly involved with safety. Orders of the
commandant required the safety engineer to make frequent
inspections of the whole yard, giving particular attention to
"stagings, the proper use of goggles, helmets and other articles
of protective clothing," to "unsafe electric wiring, accumulation
of rubbish and oily rags, conditions of slings in weight
handling, unsanitary conditions," and to "dangers of poisoning
from work in confined spaces and carelessness on the part of
employees." The safety engineer had the duty of investigating
39. Commandant's Order No. 52, Apr. 17, 1934, 181-40, Box 405
(1936), A2-5.
468
all accidents to employees and filing the various reports
40
required in the event of on-the-job injuries.
In his orders detailing the duties of the safety engineer.
Commandant Gherardi called on officers and employees to cooperate
in the safety program, noting that the Boston Navy Yard was "in
competition with all other Navy Yards in safety work, and
improvement in accident prevention is of material benefit to the
Government and its employees." Efforts to make employees safety
conscious consisted of awards to shops and supervisors with
records of no lost-time accidents and by frequent articles in the
41
yard newspaper.
However, employees with long careers at the yard recalled a
genuine concern with safety as appearing during the years of
World War II. According to one, in the decades before Pearl
Harbor, the safety program was "non-existing" and "was in name
only." Another recollected that "there wasn't much emphasis on
safety at the time" and that "it seemed to me that everyone was
supposed to look after himself." Not until the war did hard hats
become common, "and then you'd only see people wearing them when
it rained." Perhaps one hindrance in the development of safety
habits, such as wearing of helmets, resulted from the "macho"
image navy yard workers had of themselves. One employee, who
40. Roster of Officers, Jun. 30, 1934, 181-40, Box 345, A9-4;
Commandant's Order, Rough Draft, Duties of Safety Engineer, 181-
40, Box 374 (1935), A2-5; Organization Personnel Pamphlet, Jul.
1, 1935. A finalized version of orders regarding the safety
engineer appears in Commandant's Order No. 16, Jan. 1936, 181-40,
Box 405, A2-5.
41. Boston Navy Yard News , Apr. 8, 1937.
469
started in 1936, commented, "When I first came around to the
shipyard, it was regarded as an industry of rugged men.... The
42
guys were accustomed to doing things with sledge hammers."
During the 1930s, major problems confronting yard
administrators consisted of keeping down costs, obtaining work
for the yard, insuring that there were sufficient employees on
hand to do the work, and completing jobs promptly. When the
Democrats first took over the government in Washington, the Navy
Department displayed great reluctance in approving the addition
even of temporary employees, if such an increment produced a work
force exceeding the maximum limit. That reluctance created
difficulties for the Boston Navy Yard in the spring of 1933.
In May, the yard had orders from the Bureaus of Construction
and Repair and Yards and Docks to complete several undertakings
before the expiration of the fiscal year on June 30. That work
included overhaul of the cruiser Raleigh , equipage manufacture,
a number of plant improvements, and as much work as possible on
the destroyer MacDonough , whose keel had been laid on May 15. To
meet the demands of the bureaus, Admiral Nulton estimated he
would have to expand the work force, then numbering 1760 workers,
and requested permission to hire 100 temporaries, which would
result in a force forty workers larger than the yard's maximum of
1800. The Navy Yard Division, the agency in Washington with
oversight of civilian employees, refused authorization to hire
42. Oral History Interview, Lyman Carlow, BNHP, pp. 10-11; Oral
History Interview, John Langan, BNHP, p. 23; David Himmelfarb,
Ropewalk Master, "A Talk about the Ropewalk", Jul. 17, 1984, BNHP
470
the additional hands. Nulton responded that the only way the yard
could complete Raleigh would be by moving men engaged in other
projects, and he sought directions as to what work should be
slowed down or abandoned to finish the cruiser on time. After an
exchange of correspondence, the matter was thrashed out by
43
telephone .
That conversation, between Nulton and Adm. H. L. Brinser
of the Navy Yard Division, highlighted the Navy Department's
chief organizational difficulty, namely that one agency in the
department was often ignorant of orders sent to yards by the
other agencies. Brinser explained to Nulton that his office
objected to the hiring of additional temporary workers, since
after July 1, there would be "practically no work" for Boston,
requiring a layoff of roughly 1000 men. Nulton acknowledged that
possibility, but argued it made little difference "whether we
discharge 1000 or 1100." Moreover, stated the commandant, "I am
between the devil and the deep sea ...." He had instructions to
finish Raleigh by June 26, and to do that required additional
mechanics, including twelve structural workers and thirty-five
plumbers and pipefitters. The structural workers could be
provided by halting work on MacDonough , but "the Bureau of C & R
have informed us they want the work to be pushed to the utmost
during this fiscal year." Similarly, plumbers to work on the
cruiser could be furnished by switching men from repair of the
43. Commandant to Assistant Secretary of Navy, May 18, 1933
Assistant Secretary of Navy to Commandant, May 22, 1933
Commandant to Assistant Secretary of Navy, May 24, 1933
Telephone Conversation, May 27, 1933, all in 181-40, Box 303,
A-l.
471
yard's heating system, a project Yards and Docks ordered finished
by June 30. Nulton also considered temporarily closing down the
ropewalk, discharging its workers, and in their stead hiring
mechanics to work on Raleigh . That maneuver, however, would not
result in a sufficient number of men, would interfere with needed
equipage manufacture, and would "have more serious effects as to
kicks." By "kicks," Nulton probably meant protests from workers
and possibly from congressmen. Nulton added that the temporary
workers he sought were men who "have been in previously on
temporary call, and in most cases are out of work and will be
very grateful for a few days work."
Admiral Brinser began to recognize the basic problem and to
appreciate the dilemma of the Boston yard. He stated, "We know
nothing about what the Bureaus are urging," adding "that is the
trouble with this organization." He also admitted, "We can't set
here in an office and tell you how to run your job." The matter
was resolved with immediate authorization from the Navy Yard
Division to Boston to hire the additional men required. Because
of the enlarged work force, Raleigh left as scheduled, and the
other work was completed or went forward. As events turned out,
it was necessary to discharge only several hundred workers at the
expiration of the fiscal year, not the thousand that had been
anticipated .
Throughout the early 1930s, more common than insufficient
manpower was the prospect of insufficient work. With fewer ships
coming to the yard for repairs, administrators leaped at the
opportunities to obtain new construction assignments. Boston's
most striking successes were contracts for the destroyers
472
MacDonoug h, awarded in February 1932, and Monaghan , in the
following October. However, additional work was sought, since
more than a year would pass between the contract awards and the
laying of the keels. The yard built two tugs, YMT-15, completed
in March 1932, and YMT-119, in April 1933. Through newspaper
articles, Commandant Henry H. Hough learned that the Treasury
Department had obtained NIRA funds for the construction of a
number of revenue cutters and tugs for the Coast Guard. The
tugs, he understood, were to be "practically duplicates of the
YT-119." Hough advised the Department of the Navy of his
interest in obtaining the assignment of constructing one or more
of the Coast Guard's new tugs, since that construction "at this
yard would, of course, increase the force somewhat, and by
providing additional direct labor would be of material assistance
in keeping the total indirect [costs] of the Yard down." Despite
the cooperation of the Navy Department, Boston was unsuccessful
44
in gaining a Coast Guard contract for any of its new vessels.
Several months later, the yard was awarded construction of two
more destroyers, and it appeared that the future was reasonably
secure, so long as Boston demonstrated it could successfully
compete with other shipbuilders.
Once the naval building program was launched, officials in
Washington and administrators at navy yards occasionally applied
pressure to insure prompt completion. That the Department of the
Navy had complaints became clear in June 1935. At that time, the
44. Commandant to Assistant Secretary of Navy, Sep. 6, 1933, and
Assistant Secretary of Navy to Commandant, Sep. 12, 1933, both in
181-40, Box 303, Al .
473
Chief of Naval Operations drew attention to the "considerable
delay in final completion and joining the Fleet" of "navy yard
built ships." The CNO focused exclusively on the various stages
at the end of the actual building process, that is on
commissioning, builder's trials, shakedown cruises, inspections,
official trials, post-trial examinations, and such repairs and
alterations as these various tests, trials, and inspections
45
indicated were required.
In the following September, the rate of actually building
ships came under fire. Secretary of the Navy Claude Swanson sent
a letter to all commandants declaring that he was "not satisfied
with the progress being made on new construction at Navy Yards."
He announced that beginning with fiscal year 1937, the Navy
Department would no longer be required to assign fifty percent of
its new construction to government yards, which henceforth would
be obliged to enter into competitive bidding with private
builders. Moreover, Swanson noted that because of the London
Naval Treaty, the contemplated building program for the next
several years would be smaller than that of fiscal years 1934,
1935, and 1936. The Secretary urged all commandants "to expedite
new construction in every practicable way" and concluded with the
injunction that no "answer to this letter is expected; action is
46
desired . "
At the Boston Navy Yard, Swanson 's letter produced a
45. Chief of Naval Operations, New Construction -- Procedure for
after Completion, Jun . 28, 1935, 181-40, Box 5 (1943), A4-1.
46. Secretary of Navy to Commandant, Sep. 16, 1935, 181-40, Box
374, A-l.
474
memorandum from Manager Schlabach to be read by shop masters to
all workers under their supervision. He noted that the yard had
recently been awarded two more destroyers ( Mugf ord and Ralph
Talbot ) , which he credited to the "very good record on MacDonough
and Monaghan . However, he pointed out that the record was not
being maintained on Case and Conyngham , then under construction
at Boston. "In fact," stated Schlabach, "our labor costs show
every indication of running well behind those of Norfolk and
Philadelphia." His explanation for the higher costs at Boston was
simply that "the average out-put per man at this Yard is less
than that of other Yards." Unless the situation changed, he
predicted that "when the next * letting of contracts ' is passed
around, either Boston will be left out, or we will have the
47
amount of work reduced." Probably both Secretary Swanson and
Manager Schlabach magnified the delays and costs somewhat in an
effort to speed up completion of the vessels. However, hints of
reduction in navy yard work doubtless had an impact on employees
because of continuing high unemployment rates throughout the
nation .
In the second half of the 1930s, it became clear that
deficiencies in plant, namely a shortage of proper shipbuilding
sites and facilities, was preventing the Boston Navy Yard from
delivering ships at a more rapid rate.
THE YARD'S PLANT DURING THE DEPRESSION
For more than a decade and a half following World War I, the
physical plant of the Boston Navy Yard remained essentially
47. Manager's Memorandum, Oct. 25, 1935, 181-40, Box 375, A2-11
475
CHART NO. 4: MAP OF U.S. NAVY YARD, BOSTON, MASS., SHOWING
CONDITIONS ON JUNE 30, 1934.
NOTE: Chart No. 4 reveals the impact of the government's
austerity programs during the 1920s and the early years of the
Great Depression. The only new buildings erected since 1920 were
No. 191, the pump house for the salt-water circulating loop, and
No. 192, an electric substation. Piers remain the same as during
World War I and were not extended to the bulkhead line. Some of
the temporary, portable buildings erected during the war were
eliminated, such as Nos. 151, 152, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 168,
179, 181, 182, 183, and 188. Others were moved to different
locations. For example, Nos. 154-156, originally erected south
of No. 42, are here shown at the east end of the yard (location
c-17). The southern half of the area generally between Building
No. 42 and Dry Dock No. 2 has been cleared of structures and
trackage and converted to an athletic field. Other changes since
1920 include elimination of buildings on Pier No. 1, except for
No. 109 (substation), all that remained of the former coaling
plant; double trackage on Piers No. 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, and 9, and
triple on No. 5; and multiple tracks into the west end of
Building No. 105, used as a crane and locomotive roundhouse.
es
- — References
Railroad Tracks — — — — -
0»'e (40»oo>Tr«cksIIlIIIIIIIII
Hydr»nts _ . . _ #
Capstans .__.._.. . (£]
tlectr.c Street Lights *-
Fire Alarm Boxes _ . —
MAP OK
U. S. NAVY YARD
IJOSTON, MASS.
SHOWING CONDITIONS ON
Jl NJ; 30,1034.
H3-II5
prox) 110
100
975
5CALC Or FEET.
!■■ ■ ■«
lOO u
■ ituT. j- if i»n or* nr tin:
At TiNu rueyL wOF»*S O f r c i •*
30O +OC
399-1 II
unchanged, there being no substantial alterations or additions at
the Charlestown site or the South Boston annex. Because of the
decline of industrial activity at the yard during the 1920s,
major problems did not then arise. However, in the 1930s, as the
yard began to build ships at a regular rate, the facilities
proved less than adequate. Although primarily engaged in
constructing destroyers, Boston lacked a proper building site and
used its dry docks for new construction. Moreover, the
structural, pipe, and sheetmetal shops, activities essential to
the shipbuilding program, had poor layouts and insufficient
space. The yard revealed other deficiencies. Piers had not been
extended to the 1918 harbor line, out-of-date equipment had not
been replaced, and structures and services had not been properly
maintained. The period of neglect ended in the early 1930s, as
the federal government turned to a policy of funding public works
to combat the national woes of high unemployment and the slump in
industrial productivity. A major breakthrough for the Boston
Navy Yard came in mid-1938 when Congress approved funds for a
sizeable addition to the structural shop and the restoration of
the shipbuilding ways. Those projects initiated the expansion
of facilities associated with World War II.
At the outset of the 1930s, plant improvements at the Boston
Navy Yard, the First Naval District, and the Navy's shore
establishments became involved in the government's efforts to
fight the depression. Compared to its successor, the Hoover
administration's program appears tentative and restrained.
However, the essential strategy was identical, utilization of
federal public works projects to stimulate the production of
476
building materials and to reduce joblessness.
The regular naval appropriations act of June 1930 provided
$76,000 for further improvements in the Boston Navy Yard's
waterfront and $68,000 to continue work on the power plant. Two
deficiency acts, both passed the following February, contained
additional funds for the yard as "emergency appropriations for
the purpose of increasing public employment." The first of these
two measures authorized expenditure of $80,000 to reroof the
shipsmith shop (Building 105); $60,000 for additional paving;
$50,000 more for the waterfront; $150,000 for improvements in the
electrical distribution system; and $50,000 for crane facilities
at the marine railway. The second contained yet $100,000 more
for work on the waterfront. It was anticipated that these
projects would provide work for 200 men during the remainder of
48
the fiscal year.
The two deficiency acts of February 1931 assigned a total of
$7,800,000 to the Bureau of Yards and Docks to be spent at the
Navy's shore establishments throughout the nation. The Relief and
Construction Act of July 1932 provided Yards and Docks with
$10 million to be used in the same fashion. By contrast, the New
Deal's NIRA allocated $28 million for naval public works, and the
relief appropriations passed by Congress, 1934 to 1937, nearly
49
$100 million. The Boston Navy Yard's share of these funds is
48. P.L. 345, Jun. 11, 1930; P.L. 612, Feb. 6, 1931; and P.L.
745, Feb. 28, 1931, SAL, vol. XLVI , pp. 569, 1072, 1444; Navy
Public Works Projects to Aid Unemployment, Jan. 26, 1931, 181-40,
Box 233, Al-1.
49. Annual Report, Chief, Bureau of Yards and Docks, 1938, 181-
40, Box 9, A9-1 .
477
undetermined, but the rate of plant improvement at the yard
quickened. A consideration of conditions in the yard for the
period 1935 to 1937 suggests that substantial progress had been
made and also that there remained a sizeable backlog of needed
repairs, improvements, alterations, and additions.
Buildings throughout the yard were generally in fair
structural condition, except for a number of relatively small
storehouses, many erected for temporary use during World War I.
To provide space for a new salvage stores building (No. 193),
Nos . 154, 156, and 157, "old wartime sheds," were removed in
fiscal year 1937. The Public Works Officer recommended other
structures be eliminated. These included Nos. 146, 147, 148,
164, 167, and 177, all built in the World War I era; No. 101,
constructed in 1900 and most recently used for storage; No. 127,
built in 1904 and housing a latrine three decades years later;
50
and No. 130, a thirty-five-year-old iron-framed storehouse.
Although structurally sound, the major buildings of the
Boston Navy Yard revealed neglect in the maintenance of their
exteriors, interiors, wiring, plumbing, and equipment. Exterior
masonry needed to be repointed and brick walls sandblasted.
Money was sought to repair existing elevators in shops and store-
houses so as to meet safety code standards; to replace elevators
in Frazier Barracks (No. 33), the post office and laboratories
(No. 34), and the sawmill and joiner and boat shops (No. 114);
50. Information about the condition of the yard in the years
1935, 1936, and 1937 is primarily from Progress of Repairs and
Improvements, Jan. 30, 1935, 181-40, Box 374, Al-3; Annual
Inspection of Public Works, Nov. 16, 1937, 181-40, Box 445, A9-1.
478
and to install new elevators in the machine shop (No. 42-A) and
the riggers and laborers shop (No. 24). Necessary electrical
repairs included removing wiring defects and modernizing
interior lighting and power circuits. Improved lighting was
required in the machine shop and foundry (No. 42), Public Works
shops (Nos. 33 and 108), pipe and electric shops (No. 103), mold
loft (No. 36), angle shop (No. 40), and the Construction Office
(No. 39). Several shops, storehouses, and offices needed
additional fire protection equipment and overhaul of plumbing,
piping, and ventilation. Up-to-date toilet and washroom
facilities were lacking in the paint shop (No. 125), shipsmiths
shop (No. 105), ropewalk storehouse (No. 62), structural shop
(No. 104), pipe shop (No. 103), machine shop (No. 42-A), power
house (No. 108), metallurgical lab (No. 34), mold loft (No. 40),
and the mold loft annex (No. 36). Interior walls had not been
repainted for some time, particularly in shops.
During the twelve-month period ending June 30, 1937, WPA
workers reconditioned Building No. 5, used for an armory and by
the Naval Reserves; converted half of No. 38 to a garage and a
motion picture theater for enlisted men; started extensive
repairs and alterations on No. 107, Public Works shop; began
overhaul of No. 109, an electric substation; constructed an
incinerator at the power plant; and completed the new salvage
store building, No. 193. Yard labor or contractors reconditioned
No. 4, also used by the Naval Reserves; remodeled No. 22, which
housed tinsmiths and shipwrights; began modernization of the
lighting systems in the structural shop (No. 104) and sawmill and
joiner and boat shops (No. 114); remodeled the ordnance
479
storehouse (No. 79); and completed reconstruction of No. 165, the
acetylene plant.
All of the major industrial, office, and storage buildings
were serviceable. Prior to its reconstruction before World War
I, Building No. 42, which contained the foundry and the machine
and pattern shops, presented major structural problems. A
listing of its defects in 1937 suggests no serious challenges.
Probably workmen assigned to the building would list providing
adequate heating and ventilation and overhauling and
modernization of toilet and locker rooms as the most pressing
needs. Many panes of glass in the skylights were broken, and the
roof leaked in a section of 42-B. The Public Works Officer
recommended removal of a narrow, unneeded stairway in one part of
the building and replacing a ladder with stairs in another part.
Old doors at the south end of No. 42 barely functioned. Repairs
suggested by the Public Works Officer amounted only to $12,000, a
modest figure given the size and complexity of the structure.
As a structure, the ropewalk (No. 58) celebrated its
centennial in 1936. . Among the repairs it required was laying
nonabrasive steel plates over the concrete floor to prevent the
chafing and cutting of rope. Floor repairs were also needed in
the second story. Surface water ran through basement windows on
the Chelsea Street side of the building, resulting in a flooded
basement. The spinning room lacked adequate lighting and
ventilation. In an annex of the ropewalk, ventilation was even a
greater problem. The Public Works Officer recommended
installation of a forced draft to remove fumes from the tarring
480
house (No. 60). The hemp and rope storehouse (No. 62) had
recently acquired new fireproof lighting and a new sprinkler
system. The floors in that building were described as "very old,
and worn through in places," and steel floor plates were
recommended. The fourth building in the cordage manufacturing
complex was No. 62, the ropewalk extension. Recent improvements
to it consisted of painting and the installation of rolling fire-
shutters and fireproof lighting. Overhaul of the dust collecting
apparatus and minor repairs to the roof were the only additional
work the building required.
An interesting view of the Boston Navy Yard generally and of
the ropewalk plant before World War II is provided in an 1981
interview with David Himmelfarb, who started work at the
laboratory in 1936 as an associate of Mr. C. G. Lutts and went
on to become master ropemaker. With degrees in chemical
engineering and chemistry, Himmelfarb had been employed at
laboratories of the United States Army and the State of New York
before arriving at Boston. "My first impression," he stated
about the yard in general,
was of an archaic institution .... The buildings looked as
though they were built in the Civil War days.
Everything looked archaic, to me particularly, because
the furniture was not really modern office furniture.
When he made his initial visit to the laboratory in Building
No. 34:
my impressions became even more dismal when I saw the
furniture around .... It apparently had been taken off
wardrooms of older ships. Mr. Lutts, I remember, had a
telephone on his desk with the little green wires coming
out of the receiver.... It looked like it had gone back
almost to the days of Alexander Graham Bell!
Himmelfarb 's observations were conditioned by his previous
481
employment in a "laboratory located in a modern building, with
51
modern and new equipment.
As for the ropewalk, Himmelfarb recalled:
It was a sort of kaleidoscope of a lot of noise and a
lot of moving machinery and people bent at their tasks
as though they'd been doing it for centuries ... .There
was the feeling of walking into a sort of grim,
unbelievable world of old buildings, musty old smells,
people hoary with age ,.. .overriding a pervasive odor of
grease and oil and tar. I suppose this generation would
call it a bunch of "icky" smells, and a lot of noise,
walking into a page of history of the past. Everything
was dark, dim and dingy and just hoary with age....
Doubtless, Himmelfarb 's perception of the laboratory and
ropewalk, that he was "slipping backwards" in time, was equally
applicable to some other parts of the yard.
Beginning in 1926 and periodically thereafter, officers at
the Boston Navy Yard urged the construction of a new structural
shop, because of the inadequacy of the existing building, No.
104. Not until 1938 were the needed funds appropriated,
although in 1933, the yard commandant recommended that the
proposal be given a high priority. In the meantime, the yard had
to struggle along with the existing plant. Building No. 104 was
regarded as "too small and not properly laid out or equipped to
handle successfully either repair work under war conditions or
new construction." It was further argued that the shop's
facilities were not "on a par" with those of the other repair and
construction shops in the yard. The sheetmetal shop was located
in the same building and occupied two galleries on either side of
the central bay. Such an arrangement hindered the efficient
movement of sheetmetal work from one part of the shop to the
51. Oral History Interview, David Himmelfarb, BNHP
482
52
other .
While waiting for Congress to appropriate funds for a new
shop, Building No. 104 had to be maintained. In 1936 and 1937,
the lighting system was modernized, but some $50,000 in other
repairs had yet to be performed. Part of the floor in the first
story was "in poor condition, unsafe and dangerous." The power
distribution system appeared "in very poor condition, unsafe and
inadequate." The shop needed improved ventilation to remove
welding and furnace fumes. Windows and doors were not
effectively insulated, and the slate stair treads were
"dangerously worn."
Of the major industrial buildings in the yard, those in the
worse condition in 1937 appear to have been the structural shop,
the pipe and electric shops (No. 103), and the shipfitters shop
(No. 106). In No. 103, heating was inadequate, poor drainage
allowed the floor to be flooded, part of the floor had settled
unevenly, the roof leaked, and the power distribution system was
frankly labeled "a fire hazard." Since its completion in 1904,
new utilities had been introduced into the building without
removal of old systems. Thus in the 1930s, "old lighting holes"
had not been plastered over, and "many old gas and oil outlets at
work benches need sealing...." The shipfitters of Building No.
106 had to contend with poor heating, inadequate lighting, and
52. Development Program, Boston Area, May 4, 1933, 181-40, Box
303, A-l; Local Shore Development Program (Boston Area), Annual
Report, Nov. 21, 1934, 181-40, Box 34, Al-1; Commandant to
Commandant, First Naval District, Dec. 21, 1933, 181-40, Box 303,
A-l; Local Shore Station Development Board (Boston Area), Annual
Report, Dec. 2, 1937, 181-40, Box 1, A-l.
483
the absence of a ventilating system "to carry off heavy,
poisonous and obnoxious gases from metal cutting and welding
operations . "
Fairly sizeable sums of money had been appropriated for use
in the improvement of the waterfront of the Boston Navy Yard.
Such funds had been expended chiefly on maintenance with the
result that in 1937, both dry docks, the marine railway, and all
of the piers were in service. No enlargement of facilities had
occurred or had been recommended, except for proposals to extend
some of the piers and to enlarge and refurbish the yard's
building ways, last used in the construction of Whitney . The
repairs required by Dry Docks Nos . 1 and 2 during the mid-1930s
appear routine. Both caissons needed repainting and new gaskets
and that for Dock No. 2 replacement of its wooden deck. In 1937,
Dry Dock No. 1 was declared in "good condition," except for its
sill. When the caisson was placed on the outer sill, cracks
caused excessive leakage. Dry Dock No. 2, at that time being
used for the construction of two destroyers, also suffered from
leakage, water entering the dock through the wing walls of the
entrance way. A WPA project, then in progress, was repointing
all of the entrance.
Work on the marine railway early in the decade had included
replacement of underwater wooden members damaged by limnoria or
other marine borers and repairs to the sea walls. An accident to
the marine railway in 1934 placed the mechanism out of commission
for a brief period. The yard log records that on March 10, a link
in the hauling-out chain broke, causing the cradle to run down to
484
a point eighty feet beyond the outboard end of the track.
Repairs were funded by the NIRA and consisted of hauling the
cradle back up the track and installing new chain. Unlike the
original wrought-iron chain, the replacement was made of cast-
steel marine links, which increased the hauling strength by
53
thirty-six percent.
In 1933, it was proposed that Piers Nos . 4, 4-A, 5, and 6 be
reconstructed and extended to the pierhead line of 1918. Such
pier extension did not occur until the outbreak of war. During
the 1930s, work on wharves consisted of rebuilding several of the
wooden piers as well as Pier No. 1, an all-masonry structure.
Repairs seemed to have been routinely made, so that in 1937, all
of the piers were serviceable, a decided improvement over the
1920s.
As early as 1933, Commandant Hough pressed the necessity of
modernizing and extending the existing shipbuilding ways in order
to provide the yard with a proper shipbuilding facility. However,
in the following year, the Secretary of the Navy ruled against
repair of idle ways in all navy yards "until the need for same is
54
foreseen." That time did not come for the Boston Navy Yard
until 1938, and all of the destroyers launched at Boston before
1940 were constructed in dry dock.
During the 1920s, the Central Power Plant (No. 108) had
53. Yard Log, 181-58; Mary Jane Brady and Crandall Dry Dock
Engineers, Inc., pp. 11-3.
54. Commandant to Commandant, First Naval District, Dec. 21,
1932, 181-40, Box 303, A-l; Acting Secretary of Navy, Policy for
Industrial Navy Yards, May 3, 1934, 181-40, Box 346, Al-2.
485
benefitted from regular funding, and it continued to be improved
in the following decade. In 1935, the building itself was in good
condition. However, much of its equipment needed overhaul,
repair, or replacement. Overhauling was recommended for the salt
water pump, instruments, and stokers. Some of the boilers,
compressors, and turbo-generators could be repaired, but others
required replacement. The system for distributing the electrical
power, steam, heat, and compressed air produced at the power
plant also needed attention, as did the yard's water mains.
A fairly high priority was given in the Thirties to
improvements at the Dry Dock, South Boston Annex. Particular
emphasis was placed on proposals for providing housing for the
Marine guard, the enlargement of the service building, additional
blocking and fittings for the dock, and the removal of a large
rock in the approach to the dock's entrance. However, most of
these projects were not realized. The WPA constructed a building
to accomodate twelve guards, not thirty-two as had been
requested. Dry Dock No. 3 was in good condition, there being
none of the leakage problems that bedeviled the older docks at
Charlestown. Unlike the wharfs at the main yard, the two
approach piers at the annex had decking so rotted that driving
vehicles on them became hazardous. In 1937, the pumping plant
and electrical distribution system at South Boston functioned
properly, but the water supply and sewage disposal systems
55
required attention.
Nineteen-thirty-eight appears as a significant year in the
55^ P.L. 36, Apr. 15, 1935, SAL, vol. XLIX, p. 155.
486
history of the physical plant of the Boston Navy Yard. In June
Congress enacted a deficiency appropriations bill that assigned
more than $1,000,000 to public works at the yard. Perhaps more
important than the amount of the funds was the nature of the
projects to be undertaken. Those projects consisted of
improvement of shipbuilding ways ($250,000), replacing shipway
cranes ($150,000), improvement of power plant ($175,000),
improvement of electrical lines to the waterfront ($150,000) and
of power circuits in shops ($100,000), extension of services to
Pier No. 1 ($100,000), improvement of shop cranes ($60,000), and
56
work on weight-handling and transportation equipment ($67,000).
Through general funds awarded the Bureaus of Construction and
Repair and Yards and Docks, money was acquired for a two-story,
steel frame addition to the structural shop and for new machinery
for that shop and the foundry and machine and pipe shops.
Essentially, this congressional enactment launched the yard on a
course of plant expansion and growth and permitted the continued
rise of new construction as the major activity.
FROM REPAIR YARD TO CONSTRUCTION YARD
The most striking alteration in the Boston Navy Yard during
the 1930s was its transformation into one of the nation's
important builders of warships. Construction of destroyers, which
began in 1933, is essentially part of the yard's World War II
history and will be covered in the following chapter. This
section discusses the yard's industrial activity in the 1930s,
including the change from repair to shipbuilding. A decline in
56~. P.L. 723, Jun. 25, 1938, SAL, vol. LII, p. 1140.
487
the yard's repair work preceded and accompanied its emergence as
principally a building yard.
The desire to economize funds combined with the requirements
of the London Naval Treaty to further reduce the fleet of the
U.S. Navy. In fiscal year 1931, eight new ships entered service,
but a total of sixty were taken out of commission. Contraction
of the fleet meant fewer ships arriving at yards for repairs. As
the depression deepened, the Navy made even further efforts to
lower expenditures for repair of its ships. Those efforts in-
cluded extending the interval between overhauls for vessels in
commission from twelve to eighteen months; utilizing "alongside
tender" repairs; and shelving plans for ship improvements. The
Navy also ordered that ships do as little steaming as possible.
To achieve that end, fleet problems and gunnery and engineering
exercises were sharply curtailed. In the spring of 1933, the
Navy Department announced a scheme to place one-third of the
fleet on rotating reserve. Because of criticism, that scheme was
promptly scratched in favor of another calling for scheduling
three-month-long overhaul periods for all vessels, during which
57
ships' crews would perform as much of the work as possible.
The decline in repair activity at the Boston Navy Yard is
evident in the drydocking records. In the 1930s, the marine
railway was the most extensively used of the yard's docking
facilities. Prior to 1940, two-thirds of all dockings consisted
of hauling out vessels on the marine railway. This resulted from
57. Annual Report, Bureau of Construction and Repair, 1931, 181-
40, Box 238, A9-1; Annual Reports of Department of the Navy, 1932
(FSS #9696), pp. 9, 38, 124; New York Times , June 10, 1933, p.
2.
488
a combination of circumstances. The bulk of the vessels in the
yard for repairs were destroyers, submarines, and other
relatively small ships within the 2000-ton capacity of the marine
railway. After May 1932, one or both of the dry docks at
Charlestown were employed as ship building facilities and thus
unavailable for ship repairs. Dry Dock No. 3, at the South Boston
Annex, saw service only in infrequent docking of a battleship or
of the few commercial vessels, such as Leviathan , which came to
Boston for work .
In the 1930 calendar year, the yard engaged in approximately
120 drydockings, including barges, tugs, and caissons, as well as
larger vessels. The number steadily dropped during the next four
years, reaching a low of twenty-one in 1934. In the year
following, ships and other craft entered dry dock on
approximately fifty-four occasions, but the increase proved
temporary, and the annual total fluctuated during the remainder
of the decade. The yard's activity in 1938 included twenty-six
58
dockings, and in 1939 forty-three.
That fewer ships docked in the thirties is partly explained
by utilization of Dry Docks No. 1 and No. 2 for new construction.
However, less use was also made of the marine railway, which
hauled out approximately sixty-five vessels in 1930 and only
twenty-one in 1934.
The pattern of declining repair work is further evident in
58. The number of dockings for a period in the mid-1930s can not
be determined because of a hiatus in the Yard Log 181-58. Data
for 1938 and 1939 is provided in George 0. Q. Mansfield,
Historical Review, Boston Naval Shipyard, Formerly Boston Navy
Yard, 1 938-1957 (Boston: Boston Naval Shipyard, 1957), p. 100.
489
the annual reports submitted by the yard's Industrial Department.
Those reports listed the number of naval vessels by type, not
including yard and district craft and ships belonging to parties
other than the Navy. According to the report for the fiscal year
ending on June 30, 1931, the yard "repaired or altered" forty-
three ships, the number of days all ships were worked on totaling
1562. Two years later, the number of ships "repaired, altered or
fitted out" was down to twenty and the total days of ship repair
59
work to 641 .
Early in the 1930s, the Boston Navy Yard worked on light
cruisers and destroyers more than any other types. Twelve
cruisers were in the yard in fiscal 1931 and four in 1933,
counting the heavy cruiser Portland . The light cruisers had been
commissioned in 1923 and 1924, being in the classes from CL-4 to
CL-13. Work performed by the yard consisted of overhaul of
Raleigh and repairs and modest improvements on the others. Those
improvements included modification of battle telephone systems;
equipping steering gear with auxiliary storage batteries; removal
of certain guns; providing for stowage of fragmentation bombs;
and installation of new catapults, soot blowers, and antiaircraft
machine guns. Some of the light cruisers were assigned to the
cruiser division of the Scouting Force, but others were attached
to the Battle Force and left for the Pacific Coast between 1932
and 1934.
The Boston Navy Yard outfitted Portland , built by the
59. Report of Activities, Industrial Department, Jul. 1, 1930 to
Jun. 30, 1931, 181-40, Box 230 (1931), A9-1; Report of
Activities, Jul. 1, 1932 to Jun. 30, 1933, 181-40, Box 435
(1934), A9-1.
490
Bethlehem Steel Company, Shipbuilding Division, Quincy, and
commissioned in February 1933. Within two years, the ship
steamed through the Panama Canal for duty off California. The
transfer of cruisers to the Pacific further reduced repair work
for East Coast yards.
Usually, fewer than ten Navy destroyers were in the Boston
Navy Yard during any year of the early 1930s. Since the United
States built no new destroyers for one and a half decades after
World War I, nearly all of the destroyers arriving at the yard
for repairs in the early 1930s had originally been commissioned
in the years from 1916 to 1921. A few had initially entered
service even earlier, such as Paulding , completed in 1910.
During the 1920s and early 1930s, many of the destroyers had
undergone periods of being out of commission, usually at
Philadelphia or San Diego. Others had been transferred to the
Coast Guard and then back into the hands of the Navy. At the
time the destroyers were ordered to Boston for repairs, most of
them were on duty with the Scouting Force or the Special Service
Squadron. Babbitt , Hamilton , Herbert , and Leary were based on
Newport. Several, such as the original Connyngham (DD-58) and
the twenty-year old Paulding , were near the end of their careers
and would be scrapped in a few years.
Repair of a destroyer by the Boston Navy Yard in most
instances was routine and on the average took less than a month.
The machine shop performed some notable work on two ships during
fiscal year 1930. Following overhaul of Bainbridge , a post-
repair run indicated malfunctioning of the reduction gear. A
lengthy investigation determined that the failure resulted from
491
the cumulative impact of several minor faults and departures from
original specifications. After consultation by the yard with the
Westinghouse company, the defective parts were reworked. The
turbine of Paulding was received in the machine shop in a badly
wrecked condition, caused by a fracture of a shaft, which
resulted in a crumpling of blading and the destruction of gear
60
teeth .
In the middle of the decade, recently constructed destroyers
began to arrive in the yard. Farragut , America's first new
destroyer since the World War I era, was built by Bethlehem
Shipbuilding and entered commission on June 18, 1934. The ship
spent sixteen days on the marine railway in the following July
and two days at the end of August. Bath Iron Works constructed
Dewey , which was also hauled out by the marine railway shortly
after the vessel was commissioned in October 1934.
Other warships in the Boston yard for repairs during the
period 1930 to 1934 included small numbers of battleships,
submarines, minelayers, gunboats, and patrol boats. In 1931, the
battleship Arizona entered Dry Dock No. 3, during the course of
eight days of repairs. The same facility received Idaho in
February 1935, following completion of a lengthy modernization at
the Norfolk Navy Yard, similar to the changes made by Boston to
Florida and Utah . Idaho received minor repairs at South Boston
61
prior to her departure for the trial course off Rockland. In
60. Commandant to Bureau of Engineering, Jul. 12, 1930, 181-40,
Box 191, A9-1.
61. DANFS, vol. Ill, p. 416.
492
1930 and 1931, the yard at Boston worked on three "0"-class and
six "S"-class submarines.
Ships in the Boston yard for repairs included a wide range
of auxiliaries, such as the fuel ships Brazos and Sal inas ; the
ammunition ship N itro ; cargo carriers Sirius and Vega ; transports
Chaumont and Henderson ; minesweepers Chewink and Quail ; the
submarine rescue ship Falcon ; the storeship B ridge ; and tenders
Whitney and Bridgeport . In addition the yard repaired
Constitution ; Southery , the receiving ship until 1933; and the
Massachusetts nautical training ship, Nantucket .
As in the past, the Boston Navy Yard performed work on
vessels other than those belonging to the Navy. These consisted
of ships of government agencies, steamship companies, and foreign
navies .
Second only to the U.S. Navy, the yard's best customer was
the Coast Guard. During the 1920s, a large number of destroyers
had been transferred to the Treasury Department for use by the
Coast Guard. In some years, Coast Guard destroyers were more
frequently in the yard for repairs than destroyers of the Navy.
For example, in 1932, Coast Guard destroyers accounted for twenty
dockings and those of the Navy for only four. It is also true
that the repairs to the Navy's own vessels were more substantial
and that work on the Coast Guard ships involved only brief
dockings on the marine railway. Among the Coast Guard destroyers
were Herndon , Wilkes , Cassin , Tucker , Wainwright , Davis , and the
original Conyngham (DD-58), all of them being four-stackers of
World War I vintage. In addition to its destroyers, the Coast
Guard sent to the yard numerous cutters and other smaller craft,
493
such as Achusnet , Active , Aggassiz , Antietam , and Arqo .
Beginning in 1920, the Treasury Department bore some of the
responsibility for enforcement of Prohibition and used its
vessels against rumrunners. The repeal of the Eighteenth
Amendment in 1934 led to a reduction in the Coast Guard's fleet.
The Treasury Department also managed the nation's
lighthouses and lightships. The Boston Navy Yard repaired
lighthouse tenders, such as Azuela and Shrub , and the lightships
Pollack and Nos . 86, 106, and 117. Among the ships of other
government agencies repaired at Boston were Albatros , which
belonged to the Bureau of Fisheries, and Boat No. 4, the property
of the Department of the Interior.
Until the mid-1930s, Leviathan , the huge passenger liner,
continued to arrive at the South Boston Annex for docking in Dry
Dock No. 3. In 1930, the Boston Navy Yard performed an overhaul
of the liner, which included utilizing newly developed electric
welding techniques to repair large, heavily pitted areas on her
propellers. The docking of the ship in 1932 required the
62
services of two navy yard and ten civilian tugs. Two other
steamships in the yard in the early 1930s were Lurline and
Montery . Somewhat out of the ordinary was the arrival in 1930 of
two foreign warships, HMS Durha m and a French sloop of war, Ville
d'Ys .
As the volume of repair work decreased, the Boston Navy Yard
grew dependent on new construction. Building destroyers became
62. Commandant to Bureau of Engineering, Jul. 12, 1930, 181-40,
Box 191, A9-1.
494
the yard's primary mission, but that activity was preceded by the
construction of two tugboats, YMT-15 and YMT-119. The first, a
sixty-five-foot, motor driven, all-welded tug was built in the
structural shop, Building No. 104. Commissioned on March 11,
1932, YMT-15 left the same day for Portsmouth to serve there as a
yard tug. Dry Dock No. 1 began its career as a shipbuilding
facility in June 1932, when on its floor was laid the keel of
YMT-119. Boston's second tug measured 119 feet in length and had
a propulsion system consisting of two Mcintosh and Seymour Diesel
engines and General Electric generators and auxiliaries. Like
YMT-15, she was of all-welded construction. After extensive
trials, YMT-119 sailed from Boston on April 4, 1933, for
Honolulu. During a brief lull in the destroyer program, the yard
produced a third tug, YT-128, also built in Dry Dock No. 1 and
63
launched in June 1938.
Between the spring of 1933 and the spring of 1940, the
Boston Navy Yard constructed fourteen destroyers in its two dry
docks and two on the shipbuilding ways. The keel of MacDonough
was laid in Dry Dock No. 1 in May 1933, and that of Monaghan in
Dry Dock No. 2 in the following November. Upon, the launching or
undocking of MacDonough in August 1934, Monaghan was shifted
63. Annual Report, Chief, Bureau of Construction and Repair,
1931, p. 5, 181-40, Box 238, A9-1; Commandant to Bureau of
Engineering, Jul. 3, 1931, 181-40, Box 238, A9-1; Production
Superintendent to Engineering Superintendent, Jun . 15, 1932, 181-
40, Box 269, A9-1; Report of Activities, Jul. 1, 1932 to Jun. 30,
1933, 181-40, Box 345 (1934), A9-1; Production Officer to
Planning Officer, Jun. 6, 1933, 181-40, Box 309, A9-1.
Information about building sites, keel laying, and launching is
found in three notebooks maintained by foremen of the Shipwright
Shop, Construction Notebooks, 1933-1946, BNHP, RG 1, Series 40A.
495
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from No. 2 to No. 1, where she was completed. This left the
larger dock free for construction of two new ships, Case and a
new Conyngham . Until 1939, all subsequent new keels were laid in
Dry Dock No. 2, with the exception of tug YT-128. Dry Dock No. 1
was thus generally available for repair work and for outfitting
and otherwise completing the new destroyers after their launching
from No. 2.
During 1933, 1934, and 1935, the yard laid two new keels
each year. Utilization of Dry Dock 2, enabled pairs of
destroyers to be built simultaneously at the same site. After
construction began on Mugf ord and Talbot in October 1935, a short
break occurred in the rate of shipbuilding, no new keels being
laid until April 1937. In that month, work began in Dry Dock No.
2 on Mayrant and Trippe . Following the launching of those two
ships in May 1938, keels went down simultaneously in December
1938 in Dry Dock No. 2 for "Brien , Walke , Madison , and Lansdale .
The last pair of destroyers built in No. 2 during the 1930s were
Wilkes and Nicholso n . In the meantime, the shipbuilding ways had
been renovated and extended, and in June 1939, it received the
keels of Meredith and Gwin . Thus Dry Dock No. 2 was the most
active building site in the Boston Navy Yard during the 1930s.
In the enormous shipbuilding boom of World War II, construction
continued in No. 2 and on the shipbuilding ways and was resumed
in No. 1. Moreover, the yard's ship construction capacity became
enlarged with the completion of a second building ways and a
building dry dock.
Clearly, the most important development in the history of
the Boston Navy Yard during the 1930s was its direct
500
participation in the nation's naval expansion program. That
development accounts for the yard's recovery from the slack times
of the depression, the steady increase in the number of
employees, and the readiness of Congress to appropriate funds for
plant improvement and enlargement. The increasing size of the
American fleet also invigorated other activities at the yard,
such as the commissioning and outfitting of new ships and the
manufacture of equipment, most dramatically seen in the work of
the chain forge.
Dielock chain was developed by the metallurgical laboratory
and the chain shop of the Boston Navy Yard in the second half of
the 1920s and was quickly recognized as superior to chain made of
cast iron or cast steel. However, before dielock became
available for widespread use in the Navy, methods had to be
devised to manufacture it in a variety of sizes on a production
basis. This happened essentially in the early 1930s. The period
also saw advances in the quality of steel utilized in the
manufacture of dielock and cast steel links.
At the end of the 1920s, the smithshop began the production
of two-and-one-half -inch dielock chain for use in one light
cruiser. It also made some three-quarter-inch and one-inch shots
of dielock on an experimental basis. Between 1930 and 1932, the
manufacture of the new chain on a production basis began in sizes
of one, one and five-eighths, two and one-half, and two and
three-quarter inches. The volume of manufacturing increased with
enlargement of the shop's work force and the acquisition of
additional equipment. In the autumn of 1930, fourteen men worked
501
in the shipsmith shop. Within six months, the number had expanded
to thirty-seven. The installation of gas furnaces and new drop
hammers had the effect of both expanding production and lowering
64
labor costs .
By mid-1932, drop-forged, nickel-steel dielock chain had
been provided for two light cruisers, seventy-seven destroyers,
and nine smaller ships. Service tests had demonstrated the
superiority of this type of chain over others and led to its
becoming standard for ships' cables in the smaller sizes. The
Bureau of Construction and Repair declared dielock as having
greater uniformity and as being fifty percent stronger than cast
steel chain. Although stronger, dielock chain was one-third
cheaper to manufacture. However, alloy cast steel chain was
retained for eighteen large ships and eighty-nine smaller ones,
including thirty-two submarines.
Progress was steady during the remainder of the decade.
In fiscal year 1933, the manufacture of dielock chain on a
production basis was extended to the three-inch size, and
64. Information about chain production in this paragraph and
those which follow is found in Ivas, Millen and Palmer,
"Development of Die-Lock Chain," pp. 18-20; Commandant to Bureau
of Construction and Repair, Sep. 10, 1928, 181-40, Box 118, A9-1;
Commandant to Bureau of Construction and Repair, Aug. 16, 1929,
181-40, Box 155, A9-1; Annual Report, Chief, Bureau of
Construction and Repair, 1932, 181-40, Box 269, A9-1 ; Production
Superintendent to Engineering Superintendent, Jun . 15, 1932, 181-
40, Box 269, A9-1; Production Officer to Planning Officer, Jun.
6, 1933, 181-40, Box 309, A9-1; Report of Activities, Jul. 1,
1932 to Jun. 30, 1933, 181-40, Box 345 (1934), A9-1; Commandant
to Secretary of Navy, Oct. 12, 1934, 181-40, Box 353, LI 6-1;
Secretary of Navy to Commandant, Mar. 16, 1936, 181-40, Box 422,
L16-1; Secretary of Navy to Commandant, Jul. 18, 1936, Box 422,
L16-1; Chief, Bureau, Construction and Repair to Secretary of
Navy, Aug. 27, 1937, 181-40, Box 445, A9-1; Chief, Bureau,
Construction and Repair to Secretary of Navy, Aug. 29, 1938, 181-
40, Box 8 , A9-1 .
502
the Boston chain shop produced 150 tons of three-inch, seventeen
tons of one and one-eighth, 106 tons of one and five-eighths, and
forty-five tons of one-inch dielock chain. Two years later, the
chain forge produced a three-inch dielock anchor cable for the
new carrier Enterprise . By 1936, dielock chain had superceded
other types for all sizes. At that time, there were ninety-eight
ships in commission with cast-steel chain and ninety-three with
dielock. Service records showed ten failures in the cast-steel
chains and only one for dielock. All of the failures had
occurred in chain of smaller sizes.
Commercial chain manufacturing companies, eager to benefit
from the nation's naval building program, pressed the Navy
Department to increase its use of cast-steel or NACO chain. This
produced a series of comparative tests, conducted in 1939 in the
Boston chain shop and a NACO plant in Pennsylvania. These tests
confirmed the decided superiority of dielock and cleared the way
for use of Boston-made chain in most of the ships built by and
for the Navy during the huge construction program associated with
World War II. The development of dielock chain and of the
techniques for its production on a large scale rescued the chain
shop from the near oblivion it had faced in the early 1920s.
By September 1939, when Hitler initiated World War II by his
attack on Poland, the Boston Navy Yard was a flourishing
industrial institution. Primarily because of its shipbuilding
activities, the yard had rapidly left the doldrums of the
depression. In the summer before the war began, the yard
employed more than five thousand workers, was embarked on a
program of plant expansion, and had six ships then actually
503
under construction. However, these were only hints at the
\
enormous industrial \ effort the yard proved capable of in the
years 1939 to 1945.
504
Chapter VII
SIX THOUSAND SHIPS AND FIFTY THOUSAND WORKERS:
THE BOSTON NAVY YARD AND WORLD WAR II, 1939-1945
How many vessels the Boston Navy Yard built, repaired,
overhauled, converted, reconverted, or outfitted during the years
1939 to 1945 can only be approximated. Perhaps 6000 is on the
conservative side. If that figure seems high, consideration
should be given to the fact that by the end of the World War II,
the United States Navy had in commission 68,936 ships, vessels,
1
and craft of all sorts. It is not improbable that, during a
seven-year period, one-tenth of that number should have been
directly served by what was for a time the second busiest navy
yard in the nation. In addition to ships of the U.S. Navy, the
yard also repaired Allied vessels. Whatever the grand total,
World War II was the high point in the entire career of the
Boston Navy Yard.
YARD ADMINISTRATION AND ITS ADDITIONAL BURDENS
The chief changes in navy yard administration associated
with the World War II era resulted from the merger in 1940 of the
Bureau of Construction and Repair and the Bureau of Engineering.
That consolidation placed the manager of the Industrial
Department of the Boston Navy Yard under the authority of a
single bureau, the Bureau of Ships. It eliminated bureaucratic
clashes about cognizance in most areas of ship construction and
repair and doubtless reduced the volume of paper work required of
1. Hanson W. Baldwin, The New Navy (New York: E.P. Dutton,
1964) , p. 11.
505
yard officers. The new bureau became the dominant agency in the
yard, but it did not exercise full authority until three months
after the end of the war, when a major restructuring of all navy
yards occurred. The emergence of the Bureau of Ships in 1940
required no reorganization of the administration of the yard at
Boston .
Essentially, the yard prosecuted its war work with the same
basic structure which had prevailed during the 1920s and 1930s.
The commandant had general oversight of activities in the yard
and its various annexes. Directly connected with his office were
a number of units, the most important of which were a Personnel
Classification Board, the Labor Board, and the Chief Clerk. The
remaining components of the yard fell under the authority of one
of four departments: military, industrial, supply, and
2
accounting .
The captain of the yard headed the Military Department.
Units in his charge included the Marine Corps detachment, shore
patrol, civilian security forces, the Dispensary or what
previously had been the Medical Department, and the yard post
office. Other officers and matters in the charge of the Military
Department were the Fire Marshal, Chaplain, Disbursing Office,
Naval Intelligence, Communications Section, all enlisted person-
nel, a Ships Service Section, and the Pre-Commissioning Detail.
The captain of the yard had an assistant at the main yard as
2. This discussion of the yard administration is based on an
organizational chart of 1938 in Mansfield, p. 9; Regulations,
Boston Navy Yard, Jan. 1, 1944, 181-40, Box 294, A2-5.
506
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well as a subordinate captain of the yard at South Boston.
The most important of the Boston Navy Yard's four
departments was the Industrial Department, headed by the
Industrial Manager, its chief executive. The divisions of
Planning, Production, Public Works, Conversion, and Personnel
Relations constituted the major parts. The chief subordinates of
the Manager were the Planning and Production Officers. With
respect to ship work, the Planning Officer had responsibilities
for planning and estimating; issuance of job orders; and
drafting, including redesigning or alterations in existing
installations. He also had cognizance of radio and underwater
sound materials. Arrival and departure conferences between yard
personnel and officers of ships being repaired were arranged by
him. When required, the Planning Officer initiated the ordering
of materials from the Supply Department.
The largest division in the yard in terms of its officer
corps and civilian employees was the Production Division of the
Industrial Department. The Production Officer had the charge of
carrying out the job orders issued by the Planning Division and
within the time and budgetary restraints imposed. His principal
assistants were the Shop, Hull, and Machinery Superintendents.
The conditions of war reduced the importance of a fourth
assistant, the Progress Superintendent. To each ship under
construction or repair, the Hull and Machinery Superintendents
assigned officers, who had supervision of the work on that vessel
under their cognizance. The Production Officer, assisted by the
Hull Superintendent, arranged the schedules for the dry docks at
508
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509
the main yard and the annex.
Three other divisions of the Industrial Department were not
directly involved in the yard's ship work. As in the past, the
Public Works Officer had responsibility for the design,
construction, repair, maintenance, and inspection of all public
works, that is buildings, other structures, grounds, roadways,
rail system, and vehicles. He also had similar functions
respecting the yard's public utilities and had charge of the
power plant and yard transportation systems and services.
Contracts for the work on American and Allied warships and
auxiliaries in private yards within the First Naval District were
handled by the Conversion Division. The Conversion Officer, in
1944 also referred to as the Assistant Industrial Manager, had
general responsibility for alterations, repairs, and conversions
performed at commercial establishments. He was particularly
charged with supervising the installation of ordnance equipment
in ships at private yards.
The Personnel Relations Division of the Industrial
Department had superintendence of industrial or labor relations,
employee services, safety, and training programs. His cognizance
included all employees in the yard, not only those in the
Industrial Department.
That department was the chief employer in the yard, having
supervision of all shops. Except for three, the shops were in the
Production Division. The Public Works Division included the
Power Plant, Building Trades Shop, and Transportation Shop, all
of which were in the charge of the Public Works Officer. The
vast bulk of the yard's shops and their workers came under the
510
general supervision of the Production Division's Shop
Superintendent, with master mechanics exercising direct
management. No separate shop structure existed for the Naval Dry
Dock at South Boston, and masters at the main yard had
responsibility for the activities of their shops at the annex.
Theoretically, the Industrial Manager's authority extended
to those activities of the Supply and Accounting Departments
involving work on ships. Indeed, in the mid-1930s, the
Accounting Department did not have a separate existence, but was
part of the Industrial Department and in the charge of the
Industrial Manager. In practice, during the war, both the Supply
and the Accounting Departments operated independently of the
Manager .
Until 1945, the Commandant of the Boston Navy Yard also
served as Commandant of the First Naval District. However, the
district had a staff, which, except for its head, did not
include officers of the yard. In December 1940, the Headquarters
of the First Naval District moved out of Building No. 39 in the
yard to quarters in the North Station Industrial Building, 159
Causeway, Boston. District and yard activities impinged, indeed
overlapped, one another in a number of areas, such as personnel
relations, pre-commissioning , degaussing, and outfitting ships
with stores .
Although, the administration of the Boston Navy Yard during
World War II had the same general outline as in the 1930s, it
differed substantially in size. On March, 1, 1939, seventy-three
officers managed the yard and its various annexes. By the end of
511
1943, the complement of officers reached a peak of 633. Nineteen-
forty-three was the period of most rapid growth. In April 1943,
the allowance for the yard was 216, with 201 officers actually on
board. During the next seven months, the number of officers at
the yard tripled. Officers in the Industrial Department
outnumbered those in all other departments and offices combined.
The yard's commissioned personnel in March 1945 consisted of 232
officers in the Production Division, ninety-eight in Planning,
twenty-five in Personnel Relations, and sixteen each in
Conversion and Public Works. At that time, the Medical Division
had forty-eight officers, the Supply Department ninety-one, and
3
the Military Department thirty.
If the officers were many, sometimes their tours were brief.
The rapid expansion of the Navy, both afloat and ashore, probably
caused frequent reassignment of officer personnel . During two
periods of World War II, the Boston Navy Yard may have suffered
because of a quick turnover in officers. In the nine-month
period beginning July 1942, the yard had three commandants and
three managers. Respecting both positions, the turnover resulted
from the assignment to the yard of officers who served only six
months before being ordered elsewhere. Rear Adm. Wilson Brown
3. N. T. Dana, "High Spots in the History of the Boston Navy
Yard from 1 January 1939 to 30 June 1945," p. 1. The "High
Spots" is a section in Lt . Dana's World War II "History of the
Boston Navy Yard," July 22, 1945. All parts of Dana's history
are in 181-40, Box 314, A-12. For data on the number of yard
officers, see also Commandant, IND, to Chief, Naval Personnel,
April 12, 19 42, U.S. Naval Administration, World War II : First
Naval District (11 vols; Historical Section, First Naval
District), vol. II, p. 11; Roster of Officers as of Oct. 31,
1943, 181-40, Box 11, A9-4; Roster of Officers, Mar. 1, 1944,
181-40, Box 297, A9-4.
512
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513
assumed command of the Boston yard in July 1942 and was replaced
in the following January. Similarly, Capt . Earl F. Enright took
up his duties as manager in October 1942, only to leave in April
4
1943.
A Navy inspection board surveying the yard in November 1944
reported that during the previous few months, the commandant,
captain of the yard, supply officer, and medical officer had
changed. Also the yard lost several experienced officer
assistants to the shop superintendent. The board further found
that "there have been three Planning and Estimating Officers in
six weeks, two design Superintendents in six weeks, etc."
Actually, the officer turnover in 1944, at least at the upper
echelons of yard administration, was not as severe as the board
implied. Changes did occur, but the departing officers had
completed tours of duty of reasonable length, given the
conditions of war. Commandant Robert Theobold left in 1944,
after serving a year and eight months; Captain of the Yard R. C.
Grady, after five years; Supply Officer W. C. Wallace, after one
year and nine months; and Medical Officer W. H. H. Turville,
after fourteen months. One key position in the administration
was occupied by the same man for the entire war. Captain G. T.
Paine, Production Officer, arrived in the yard in July 1940 and
5
remained until July 1945.
Navy yard administrators faced tremendous challenges during
4. For lists of the yard's officers and their tours, see
Mansfield, pp. 54-62.
5. Industrial Survey Division, Report No. 3, Nov. 25, 1944, 181-
40, Box 294, A3-1.
514
World War II. Those challenges arose chiefly because of the huge
volume of ship work, the rapid changes by the Navy Department in
its priority lists, the pressure to expedite all jobs, and the
vastly enlarged labor force. Moreover, some chores which had
been slight or nonexisting tasks in the prewar years became heavy
burdens. In Boston, all departments, except accounting, were
involved in activities carried on at sites other than the main
yard. The Naval Dry Dock at South Boston and its two annexes are
prominent in this respect, but there were additional locations:
Chelsea Annex, Lockwood 's Basin, the Fuel Annex in East Boston,
Commonwealth Pier No. 5, other off-yard storage facilities used
by the Supply Department, and the many commercial yards engaged
in the repair of ships through contract with the Navy or under
the supervision of the navy yard.
In addition to ship work performed by private establishments
for the navy yard, other commercial establishments were engaged
to undertake manufacturing processes that would ordinarily have
been done at the yard. This system, known as "farming out,"
focused on small businesses. In part, the purpose of the program
was to allow navy yards to concentrate on new construction and
repairs by reducing manufacturing activities. Although the
arrangements lessened the demands on certain Production Division
shops, oversight of Navy work at the private firms by yard
officers constituted another administrative chore.
During the war, a number of new Navy units appeared at the
Boston yard, which at a minimum had to be provided with space for
.their activities and quarters and messing for their personnel.
The Navy Department established several training programs at the
515
yard, including a submarine training activity, antisubmarine
school, Fire Fighting School, and Ship Repair Training Unit.
Some of these instructional programs did not involve the yard's
regular officers, but the last mentioned was placed under the
control of the Industrial Manager and was administered by the
6
Production Division.
The Ship Repair Training Unit, established at Boston in
October 1943, was designed to equip navy enlisted men with the
skills necessary to make ship repairs operating from advanced
bases, repair vessels, and tenders. Trainees were berthed and
messed at Frazier Barracks, Building No. 33 in the main yard, and
were instructed by civilian supervisors in the yard's shops and
on ships in the yard for repairs. On one occasion, during a
shortage of electricians in the yard's civilian work force, the
trainees took over and completed the electrical wiring system on
a destroyer escort under construction. By August 1945, when
the training unit was disbanded, a total of 2883 men had received
7
instruction at Boston.
Some of the new nontraining activities had little or
nothing to do with routine navy yard affairs. The Net Depot,
located at the South Boston Annex, serves as an example. That
operation was essentially a military one, the defense of Boston
Harbor. However, besides providing space and accomodations for
the depot, the yard also supplied labor, and a small group of
6. Administration Division, Training, to Commandant, Dec. 6,
1944, 181-40, Box 293, A3-1 .
7. Dana, "High Spots," p. 12; Dana, "History of the Boston Navy
Yard (Industrial Department): Ship Repair Training Unit."
516
employees were carried as an unnumbered shop at that facility.
Technical developments required additions to the administra-
tive and physical resources of the yard, as evident in the
phenomenon of deperming or degaussing. Early in the war, Germany
laid mines in England's Thames Estuary, which were triggered not
by contact with a hull, but by a ships' magnetic field.
Degaussing and deperming refer to techniques of minimizing or
neutralizing a vessel's magnetic field, thus enabling it to pass
closer to a magnetic mine than otherwise would be the case. This
was accomplished by either magnetic treatment of a ship or by the
installation of degaussing coils, which reduced the ship's field
by generating a magnetic current in the other direction.
Administratively, degaussing came under both the navy yard and
the First Naval District, and there were seven degaussing
stations in the Boston area, the most important one being at the
Boston Navy Yard. First located on Pier No. 1, it was moved in
April 1942 to Pier No. 11. Facilities included the new 500-foot
pier, a two-story building, and a magnetic "garden" of
approximately fifty underwater instruments and other pieces of
equipment. Before the end of the war, the yard station depermed
9
1100 vessels.
The state of war raised problems of security for the yard
and its administrators. Those problems included the actual
8. "U.S. Naval Dry Dock, South Boston, Massachusetts," May 1945,
p. 3. This is a description of the South Boston Annex, prepared
by the Assistant Maintenance Superintendent, South Boston Dry
Dock and is included in the history of the yard assembled by
Dana.
9. U.S. Naval Administration During World War II , First Naval
District , vol. VIII, Appendix C, pp. 1-6.
517
defense of the yard against air attack; protecting the plant and
ships from sabotage; the elimination of suspect persons from the
yard labor force; and preventing the careless disclosure of
sensitive information by workers.
With the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, a Shipyard
Defense Bill went into effect, and on December 10, 1941, the
Boston Navy Yard had its first air raid drill and blackout.
Subsequently, the Army installed antiaircraft batteries on the
roofs of Buildings No. 197, the new electrical shop, and No. 149,
the original Supply Department storehouse. These two structures
were among the tallest in the yard. Army personnel, housed in
barracks constructed on those roofs, constituted the gun
10
crews .
Beginning with the first exercise in December 1941, air raid
drills became common. Thirty years later, the master of the
ropewalk recalled the yard's civil defense measures:
We had evacuation drills in case of attack, we had
equipment given to us to handle incendiary bombs, we had
drills. On the sound of . . . an emergency whistle, we
were supposed to stop all work, stop all machinery, herd
our people into assembly points, and then on to air raid
shelters after securing the building....
Each shop had a squad of its workers designated to deal with
11
emergencies, such as the removal of incendiary bombs.
Something of a dilemma arose, since air raid drills seemed
appropriate, especially at a military installation. On the other
10. Mansfield, p. 15
11. Oral History Interview, David Himmelfarb, p. 24; Oral
History Interview, Albert Mostone, p. 14.
518
hand, they disrupted the progress of work. The yard newspaper,
doubtless reflecting the views of the administrators, included in
a December 1942 issue an article "WHAT TO DO IN AN AIR RAID." In
addition to providing directions for such an event, the article
emphasized the necessity to have the least interruption of work.
It stated:
Remember that this is a WAR OF PRODUCTION. Your work
must continue every possible minute. Special
precautions have been arranged to enable you to do this
and have the maximum protection.
The same issue contained an explanation of the dim-out program,
which called for the reduction of outside lighting along the
entire East Coast during nighttime hours to minimize Allied
shipping being clearly silhouetted and thus visible to German
12
submarines .
Blackouts and dim-outs were other wartime procedures that
could impede prosecution of the yard's work. Blackouts apparently
became less common. In fact, when one employee was interviewed
several decades after the war, he could remember no such
exercises. He did recall that "they started to brick up all the
windows ... to stop the light from going out and ... to protect
the people on the inside if anything did happen." Defensive
measures at the yard also included painting the walls of
13
buildings facing the water in an effort to camouflage them.
The tightening of security precautions began as early as May
of 1938, when restrictions were imposed on visitors, and certain
areas of the yard were closed to all unauthorized persons. By
12. Boston Nav y Yard News , Dec. 12, 1941.
13. Oral History Interview, Albert Mostone, pp. 14-5.
519
January 1940, the Marine Corps detachment had been reduced, and
civilian guards took over the duties of manning the gates and
patrolling the waterfront and the yard perimeter. In the summer
of that year, the commandant appointed a board of five officers
to consider the matter of yard security and make recommendations
for its improvement. Those officers held regular meetings and
produced a twenty-eight page report. Each employee was issued a
button or badge for ready identification as well as a check pass
bearing his or her photograph. Master mechanics were frequently
advised to take steps to insure that unauthorized persons were
not permitted in their shops or in other areas where their
14
employees worked.
A program of insuring the loyalty of yard workers went into
effect prior to Pearl Harbor. On May 27, 1941, President
Roosevelt proclaimed an unlimited national emergency. In that
proclamation, which was subsequently telegraphed to navy yards,
Roosevelt called "upon loyal state and local leaders and
officials to cooperate with the civilian defense agencies of the
United States to assure our internal security against foreign
directed subversion." The president's actions apparently trig-
gered a process already initiated in the yard, and on May 29, the
15
commandant suspended a number of workers for security reasons.
Although the suspensions must have resulted from steps
14. Record of Security Board, Jul. 22, 1940, 181-40, Box 2,
A-8; Production Division Notice No. 1344, Sept. 25, 1942, 181-40,
Box 16, A-8.
15. The proclamation is quoted in SEC NAV To ALNAV, May 30,
1941, 181-40, Box 2, A2-8. Correspondence concerning the
suspended employees appears in a file "Suspension of Unfriendly
Persons," 181-40, Box 12 (1941), A8-5.
520
already taken by yard administrators or the Navy Department, the
proceedings reveal a rushed and ad hoc quality. When and how
information was collected is not clear. In a letter to a con-
gressman, who intervened on behalf of Albert Petrelli, one of the
suspended workers, Commandant W. T. Tarrant described the
procedure :
Shortly after the United States recognized an
emergency, instructions were received to investigate all
employees in the Yard. If any employees were found to
be associated with societies inimical to the Government,
or if they made remarks which were inimical to the
Government, they were placed on certain lists. In June
instructions were received to discharge those on the
lists above referred to. The name of Mr. Petrelli was
on one of those lists in the Yard, therefore, he was
suspended and a report made to the Navy Department.
The final action will be taken by the Navy
Department, presumably within a short time.
Commandant Tarrant's letter confuses two procedures. Suspension
temporarily prevented an employee from working and thus resulted
in a loss of pay, unless leave days could be used. Discharge
16
meant permanent separation from navy yard employment.
While the Secretary of the Navy was deciding on "the final
action" respecting the suspended workers, the Navy Department
issued further orders dealing with personnel loyalty. According
to a transcription of a telephone conversation between the Boston
yard and Washington, these included the requirement that all
employees submit notarized affidavits "on Communism, etc." In
the same conversation, a yard official also brought up the
16. Commandant to Honorable Thomas A. Flaherty, Jul. 7, 1941,
181-40, Box 12, A8-5.
521
subject of
removals or suspensions [of] subversives or suspected
subversive activities. We have been holding hearings
and investigations and there are a number of them for
which we have not found justification of continuing the
suspension .
Boston administrators sought authority for the commandant to
reinstate employees when it appeared to yard review boards that
17
the initial suspension had been unwarranted.
Beginning in October, the situation began to stabilize, and
at least twenty-two of the men originally suspended suffered
"summary removal" on orders of the Secretary of the Navy,
following his review of their particular cases. To each, the
commandant sent a memorandum explaining the Navy's actions. In
late November, Julius Gobstoob, a driller, was informed:
You have been reliably reported to have been active in
the membership and to have participated in furthering
the purpose of organizations reputed to have policies
directed at the breakdown of the principles upon which
the Government of the United States is founded,
particularly the organization known as the Independent
Workingmen's Order, which is believed to be a Communist
Front Organization. You are reported to have been
active in Camp Unity, Franklin, Mass., reported to be a
training school for the Young Communist League. You are
alleged to have been active in May Day celebrations and
in Communist protest meetings and to have been
instrumental in formenting Communist inspired strikes in
the Provision Industry.
Gobstoob was advised that he could personally appear before the
Commandant or "his authorized representative" at 10:00 o'clock,
December 4, and "again have the foregoing reasons for your
discharge submitted to you in writing." Also, he was invited to
furnish statements or affidavits pertinent to his case, which
17. Confirmation of Telephone Conversation, Jun. 26, 1941, 181-
40, Box 12, A8-5.
522
carried the implication that his discharge might be further
18
reviewed.
Most of the men summarily removed from employment at the
yard allegedly had connections or views associated with the
ideological extreme opposite of that identified with Gobstoob.
Karl Freisinger, sheetmetal worker, was reported to have "a
sympathetic attitude toward the existing Nazi administration of
the German Government." In addition, his "former German military
service" and his "relation to German nationals" indicated to the
Navy that he "would be amenable to pressure in furtherance of
Nazi policies toward this country." Doubts arose about the
"wholehearted loyalty to the United States" of electrician George
Henry Geisser, because of his reported "enthusiasm for and
sympathy with the policies and methods" of Nazi Germany.
Moreover, he allegedly "insulted the uniform of the United States
Army" and "referred to a fire in the Navy Yard Boston as being
19
caused by a bomb, and that [he] proposed to do a better job."
Some of the men discharged for security reasons sought to
defend themselves against the charges and secured the interven-
tion of clergymen and congressmen. Ralph Samuel Sanborn, a
rigger, contended that the report of his membership in the Bund
had its origins in his failure to cooperate with a "certain
18. Gobstoob apparently did appear on Dec. 4, and the files
contain a memorandum to him bearing that date and quoting from
the earlier memorandum. Commandant to Julius Gobstoob, Nov. 24,
1941; Memorandum to Julius Gobstoob, Dec. 4, 1941, both in 181-
40, Box 12, A8-5.
19. Commandant to Karl Freisinger, Oct. 15, 1941; Commandant to
George Henry Geisser, Dec. 4, 1941, both in 181-40, Box 12, A8-5.
523
forced collection" extracted in the riggers shop for the benefit
of injured workers. Joseph Jaffe claimed to be the victim of
20
anti-Semitism.
The discharge of suspected disloyal workers in the second
half of 1941 was an unpleasant affair. Among those ordered
removed were men with long periods of yard employment, Joseph
Jaffe having worked for fifteen years. It appeared to some
officers that no warrant existed for the discharges in several
cases. Hearsay collected from unknown informants often seemed to
constitute the evidence against the workers in question.
Ultimately the Boston Navy Yard had a program for an
initial screening of new workers. All civilian employees were
fingerprinted and the prints checked against criminal records
and the suspect files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Prospective workers were also checked against the records of the
Civil Service Commission. No other investigation preceded actual
employment. After a new employee started work at the yard, a so-
called "voucher check" was conducted by mail with the
individual's references and former employers and with the police,
FBI, and Army and Navy intelligence. If the voucher check
indicated reasons for suspicion and in the cases of all aliens
and all persons of Japanese origins, further investigations were
undertaken as each instance warranted. Special procedures, in-
cluding individual investigations, were used for certain posi-
tions, such as those involved in yard or personnel security
20. Ralph S. Sanborn to Honorable George Holden Tinkham, Jul.
17, 1941; Joseph Jaffe to Congressman Tinkham, n.d., both in 181-
40, Box 12, A8-5.
524
(guards, firemen, watchmen, and Labor Board employees), those
handling classified material or equipment (draftsmen, naval
architects, engineers, instrument makers, and tool and gauge
designers), and those involved in communications (telephone oper-
21
ators ) .
During the war, administrators waged a constant campaign
against civilian employees' divulging, through careless talk,
sensitive information about ship movements and other matters.
Orders prohibiting discussion of yard activities with
unauthorized people were issued by the Secretary of the Navy and
the commandant, and signs reminding workers of the dangers were
posted around the yard. In April 1942, the yard newspaper
carried a notice from R. C. Grady, Captain of the Yard, in which
he included a letter reporting a yard worker, who in public
discussed a ship preparing for departure. Captain Grady added
that the letter was typical of many that he had received. About
the same time, the commandant issued a circular on the subject,
stating that he had reports of "leaks of information of great
value to the enemy." He held: "There is too much loose talk --
too much confiding of naval business in wives, families and
22
friends . "
A month after the United States became a belligerent, a
problem of speech of a different kind arose. The commandant
21. Headquarters, First Naval District to all Shore Activities,
Aug. 16, 1943, 181-40, Box 10, A8-5.
22. Boston Navy Yard News , Apr. 9, 1942; Commandant's Circular
No. 432, Mar. 23, 1942, 181-40, Box 16, A-8. See also Boston
Nav y Yard New s, Feb. 12, 1942.
525
complained about some workmen speaking a foreign language in the
yard. He claimed that "the use of a foreign language, especially
of that of a country with whom we are at war, leads to suspicion
and distrust." Accordingly, he directed that "English only will
be used in the Yard or on any ship or property under the control
23
of the Commandant."
In the early stage of the war, as the prohibition of foreign
languages suggests, there was excessive concern with security and
patriotism. This had unfortunate consequences at least in one
instance. "Due to the secrecy about the movement of ships" in
June 1941, several vessels arrived at the Boston Navy Yard for
stores, ammunition, and other articles "without any notice to the
Captain of the Yard, the Supply Officer, or anybody else that
they were coming, what they wanted, when they wanted it, and how
they wanted it...." This resulted in the yard's inability to
24
service the ships as rapidly as the Navy desired.
Although they created problems, the various security
measures pursued by the yard seem to have generally worked. It
is also possible, of course, that spies, saboteurs, and subver-
sives never constituted a grave problem. The administrative
history of the First Naval District, whose intelligence section
handled such matters, states that only a small number of cases of
sabotage were discovered in the district, none being enemy-
inspired. And the few acts which were uncovered centered on
23. Commandant's Circular Letter No. 395, Jan. 2, 1942, 181-40,
Box 16, A- 8.
24. Confirmation of Telephone Conversation, Jun. 26, 1941, 181-
40, Box 12, A8-5.
526
persons motivated by hostility toward a superior, feebleminded-
ness, or other personal or petty reasons. One incident involved
enlisted men aboard a British vessel at the Naval Dry Dock who
sabotaged the ship's engine to delay departure from Boston. It
appears a similar episode occurred at the main yard in connection
with some newly completed LSTs, probably in mid-winter of 1943-
1944. The British crews had taken over the vessels, which were
scheduled to go to sea. However, during the night before the
actual departure, the engine room valve for flooding the normally
dry fire main system would "accidentally" open. By the following
morning, the main had frozen and ruptured, causing a week's
delay. When the yard and the ships' officers discovered what was
25
happening, guards were posted and the problem disappeared.
Apparently, the most serious wrongful disclosure of informa-
tion occurred at South Boston, and involved a radio operator,
Christopher Core, who was either employed by a private company or
by a commercial shipping line. Core "knowingly and wilfully"
discussed matters of a confidential nature pertaining to his
employment. For that act, the Secretary of the Navy disapproved
of Core's employment on ships of United States registry and his
employment by radio communications companies. The Secretary
noted that Core's actions "may have been predicated upon
26
emotional instability as a result of enemy action."
Most of the problems encountered by yard officers in
25. U.S. Naval Administration During World War II : First Naval
Distric t , vol. VI, p. 40; Oral Interview, Lyman Carlow, p. 12.
26. Secretary of the Navy to Commandants, Apr. 20, 1943, 181-
40, Box 10, A-8.
527
matters of wartime security paled in comparison with the task of
recruiting and maintaining a monumental work force to carry out
the yard's mission of ship repair and construction. At the height
of the war effort, that force never seemed adequate for the
volume of ship work at hand or sufficient to match the capacity
of the yard's plant.
WARTIME DEVELOPMENT OF THE YARD AND ANNEXES
During the era of World War II, the plant of the Boston Navy
Yard was more heavily used than at any other time in its history.
This held true for all components, not only the main site in
Charlestown. The war sparked the rapid development of the South
Boston Annex into a major facility for ship repair and
conversion. In addition, industrial activity was carried on at
the Chelsea Annex and Lockwood 's Basin. Also to be considered as
part of the yard's plant was the Fuel Depot in East Boston.
Plant improvements made between June 1939 and August 1945 cost a
total of $50 million: $15 million for the main yard; $27 million
for South Boston, $800,000 for Chelsea Annex; and almost $7
27
million for the fuel depot.
At the beginning of 1940, according to a report of the
Public Works Officer, the buildings and industrial facilities of
the main yard were in fairly good condition, and important
additions were then under construction. Those additions as well
as deterioration resulted in the removal of several older
structures and plans to raze others. The west end of the angle
27. Dana, "History of the Boston Navy Yard. Chapter I,
Development of Facilities," Jul. 22, 1945, p. 11, 181-40, Box
314, A-12.
528
shop and mold loft (No. 40) had been demolished to make space for
an extension to the machine shop. Structures totally removed in
recent years included an electric substation (No. 134), three
storehouses (Nos. 147, 148, and 186), a pump house for fuel oil
(No. 141), and an air house (No. 167). The Public Works Officer
considered beyond repair several of the temporary structures,
Nos. 127, 130, and 146, erected for storage purposes during World
28
War I .
Many of the older buildings required repairs, but no major
reconstruction or remodeling seemed necessary. As usual, the
roof of the foundry, machine shop, and pattern shop (No. 42)
needed extensive work, but the structure itself was rated as
"fair to good." The buildings in the best condition were those,
of course, which had been recently constructed. These included a
new pump house for fuel oil, which retained the same number as
the one it replaced (No. 141); a store house for paints and oils
(No. 131); a structure for salvage stores (No. 193); the pipe
shop and shipfitting shop (No. 195); and the ship machinery
testing plant (No. 196). The toolroom for outside machinists (No.
101) had received extensive repairs in 1939. Other improvements
had included the installation of new or additional elevators in
the paint shop (No. 125), Public Works shop (No. 107), and saw-
mill, joiner, and boat shop (No. 114).
In 1940, all major units of the waterfront of the main yard
were in service, including the eleven wharves. The Public Works
28. Information in this and the following paragraphs is taken
from Annual Inspection of Public Works and Public Utilities, Mar.
20, 1940, 181-40, Box 8, A9-1 .
529
Officer described Piers 1, 2, and 9 as in "good" condition and
the remainder as "fair." He rated the dry docks as "good,"
although both of them needed attention. The outboard portions of
Dry Dock No. 1 had deteriorated over the years and required
reconstruction, a project estimated as costing $200,000. Dry
Dock No. 2, then being used for the construction of destroyers,
was not available for docking. The stone and concrete of No. 2 's
seaward end had severe leaks, which were not remedied by repairs
performed by yard labor. Proper repairs, according to the Public
Works Officer, might necessitate a cofferdam and the expenditure
of $500,000. Fortunately, this proved unnecessary. Generally,
those portions of the marine railway above low water were in good
condition, but other parts needed work. The Public Works Officer
had requested $100,000 for the renewal of the railway above the
piles, replacing some of the main frames in the cradle, and the
construction of steel piling bulkheads as "permanent protection
against further ravages by limnoria and possible future teredo
attack. "
An important addition to the waterfront was then under
construction. Work on Shipbuilding Ways No. 1 had progressed to
the point where it was possible to begin building two 350-foot
destroyers. The launching section of the ways was completed in
1941. Construction of the shipways required the removal of parts
of the structural shop (No. 104) and Pier No. 7.
The yard had twenty-one cranes: three at the dry docks;
three floating cranes; and fifteen locomotive cranes. The condi-
tion of the weight-lifting equipment varied from "poor" to
530
"excellent." Most of the yard's eight miles of railroad track
needed work .
At the beginning of the war in Europe, the South Boston
Annex remained relatively undeveloped. Moreover, much of the
existing plant was in poor condition. Both approach piers and
many of the buildings needed repairs. The caisson of the dock had
recently undergone a major overhaul, and the dock itself was
generally in good condition. Four suction gratings had
entirely rusted away and needed to be replaced immediately, since
debris might be sucked into the pumps and cause major damage.
In light of the tremendous expansion in the labor force at
the Boston Navy Yard during World War II and the great volume of
work performed, the changes in physical facilities at the main
site seem fairly moderate. In part this resulted from the yard's
being too congested for a major program of plant expansion.
A dozen new buildings appeared, many of them somewhat small
and not used by the Industrial Department. The Electric Shop (No.
197), seven stories and 186 by 134 feet, was a sizeable and
significant addition to the yard. Even larger was a new
storehouse, No. 199, built in two sections. The original, a
concrete structure, nine stories and measuring 173 by 195 feet,
was finished in October 1941. Subsequently, it was enlarged by a
seven-story steel addition, 173 by 200 feet. Other new structures
included two additional storehouses (Nos. 198 and 201), a Public
Works Building (No. 200), a garage and transportation office (No.
204), incinerator (203), deperming station (No. 205), locker
building (No. 206), decontamination building (No. 207), two first
531
aid centers (Nos. 208 and 209), and a salvage building (No. 210).
Buildings which were extended during the war years included the
machine shop (No. 42-A), power plant (No. 108), the new pipe and
shipfitters shop (No. 195), administration building (No. 39),
telephone building (No. 31), Frazier Barracks (No. 33), the old
29
pipe shop (No. 24), and ropewalk (No. 58).
The vastly increased labor force accounted for some changes
in the yard's plant, such as additional lockers and lavatories,
including those for women. Also, to facilitate traffic in and
out of the yard, especially when shifts were changing, another
gate was created at Henley Street by removing a portion of the
granite wall. Thereafter, the new gate, No. 2, was the exit from
the yard, and No. 1 served as the entrance.
During World War II, the Boston Navy Yard's primary
industrial activity centered on the construction of 174
destroyers, destroyer escorts, LSTs , LSDs , submarines, and
auxiliaries. That undertaking could not have been accomplished
without a remarkable expansion in the yard's shipbuilding
facilities. When the yard began to participate in the naval
building program in the early 1930s, it had no bona fide
construction facilities in operation and employed its two dry
docks. Dry Dock No. 1 had a relatively brief career as a
construction site, but between 1934 and 1940, twelve destroyers
were built in Dry Dock No. 2. Although adequate for construction
purposes, the docks lacked the crane and other services required
29. Improvements at the yard and the various annexes are
discussed in Dana, "Development of Facilities," and Mansfield,
pp. 13, 26.
532
for expeditious shipbuilding, and they were too far removed from
the structural shop, Building No. 104. The enlargement of the
yard's shipbuilding capacity began with congressional funding in
1938, which provided for the modernizing of Shipways No. 1 and
equipping it with new cranes. By June 1939, work had progressed
sufficiently to permit the laying of the keels for the destroyers
Gwin and Meredith
The yard also acquired two other construction sites.
Shipways No. 2, 495 feet long, was built east of and parallel to
Shipways No. 1. The second building ways went into service in
January 1941, when work began on Forrest and Fitc h , both
destroyers. With two ways available, utilization of Dry Dock No.
2 for new construction ceased following the launching of Wi Ikes
and Nicholson in May 1940. A third shipbuilding facility began
operations in the spring of 1942. Originally referred to as "the
basin" or Shipways No. 3, it ultimately evolved into a
shipbuilding dry dock and after the war was designated Dry Dock
No. 5. Dry Dock No. 5 was constructed in connection with the
destroyer escort program, and in April 1942, it received the
keels of the the first ships of this type built at the yard. The
dock was 518 feet long and ninety-one wide and had a depth over
the blocks of seventeen feet. The new facility was of the
relieving type, equipped with weep holes to allow the ground
water to flow into the dock, where it was removed by drainage
pumps. The urgent need for escorts resulted in the dock being
hastily built "at the expense of construction standards." Its
pumps lacked capacity, and it sometimes took twenty hours to
533
CHART NO. 5: MAP OF BOSTON NAVAL SHIPYARD, BOSTON, MASS., SHOWING
CONDITIONS ON JUNE 30, 1946.
NOTE: This map reveals changes in the Charlestown yard made
during the era of World War II. Changes in the waterfront
include lengthening of piers east of Dry Dock No. 2; enlargement
of Piers No. 5 and 10; elimination of the former Pier No. 7;
construction of Pier No. 11; construction of Dry Dock No. 5; and
construction of Shipbuilding Ways No. 2.
Among the new buildings shown on the map are No. 193,
salvage stores, built by the WPA; No. 195, Pipe Shop, Assembly
and Welding Shop, Boiler Shop, and Shipfitting Shop; No. 196,
Ship Machinery Testing Plant; No. 197, Electrical Shop and
Outside Machinists Shop; No. 199, General Storehouse; No. 201,
Storehouse; No. 206, Locker Building; and numerous Industrial
Service Buildings (Nos. 211-A, 211-B, 211-C, 212-A, 212-B, 212-C,
213-A, 213-B, 213-C, 214-A, 214-B, 215-A, 215-B, and 215-C),
mostly located on Piers No. 5, 6, 7, and 8. The construction of
Shipbuilding Ways No. 2 required the removal of the southern part
of the former Shipfitters Shop (No. 104) and the addition of an
extension on the east side. The Machine Shop, No. 42-A, was
extended northward .
As a result of the plant expansion during World War II, the
yard became more congested than ever, with the elimination of
former open spaces, such as the baseball and recreation field,
now occupied by Buildings Nos. 197 and 195, and the tennis
courts, the site of No. 198.
13
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Mean Low Water > v
Cxtreme Low Water
References:
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Hjrdrante
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IO0
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acres
MAP OF
BOSTON NAVAL SHIPYARD
BOSTON. MASS
SHOWING CONDITIONS ONI
JUNE 30.1946
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unwater the dock. Moreover, its poorly designed swinging gate
created a three-foot obstruction over the sill. Despite its
defects, Dry Dock No. 5 proved sufficient for the construction of
30
more vessels than any other facility in the yard.
No major repairs were made to the yard's graving docks, but
the marine railway was rehabilitated in 1941 and 1942. This
included completely rebuilding, overhauling, or repairing the
cradle, track, and supporting piles. This reconstruction
increased the capacity of the track and cradle from 2,000 to
3,000 tons, but since no alterations occurred in the hauling
mechanism, the working capacity of the railway remained the same.
To prevent ice from hindering the operations of the marine
railway during the winter months, a thawing system was installed,
which included a salt-water storage tank and a connection with
31
the yard's steam lines.
The yard's wharfage increased with the extension of Piers 4,
7, 6, and 9. A new Pier No. 5 replaced the former No. 4-A. Pier
No. 10 was improved in the process of construction of the
shipbuilding dry dock. That construction also ultimately led to
a facility known as Pier No. 11, part of the deperming station.
By the end of the war, the yard possessed approximately 10,000
feet of berthing space.
The most spectacular plant improvement occurred at the South
3 . Building the Navy 's Bases in World War II : History of the
Bureau of Yards and Docks and the Civil Engineer Corps , 1940-
1946 , (2 vols.; Washington: GPO, 1947), vol. I, pp. 173-4; Boston
Naval Shipyard, Shore Development Program, Dec. 31, 1946, 181-40,
Box 365, Al-1 .
31. Brady and Crandall, pp. 14-5.
534
Boston Annex, whose official designation became the U.S. Naval
Dry Dock, South Boston. Development of that area was promoted by
the circumstances of the main yard and by the natural advantages
of the South Boston site. A hundred and forty years of growth
left the yard at Charlestown with no space for expansion. Also,
large vessels had difficulty in operating in the restricted
waters of that location. On the other hand, South Boston had
practically unlimited anchorage, with a great depth of water
leading to Dry Dock No. 3. This made it advantageous for battle-
damaged ships with increased draft. Moreover, the annex had room
for additional buildings and other facilities. The original
site, consisting of 66.5 acres of hard land, could be enlarged by
32
filling and by the Navy's acquisition of adjacent tracts.
In 1939, South Boston's principal facilities, in addition to
the large dry dock, consisted of a pumphouse, utility building,
Marine Corps barracks, and two approach piers. This soon
changed, and in 1940 and 1941, Congress appropriated $10 million
33
for improvements. Those funds made possible the implementation
of plans for the annex that had been first formulated in 1939.
Since the Charlestown yard primarily engaged in new ship
construction and the repair of medium-sized vessels, utilization
of South Boston focused on outfitting, repairing, and converting
large warships, auxiliaries, and transports. During the war, the
32. U.S . Naval Administration, World War II : First Naval
District , vol. VIII, Appendix A, p. 6.
33. P.L. 786, Sep. 18, 1940, SAL, vol. 54, p. 956; P.L. 13, Mar.
17, 1941, SAL, vol. 55, p. 36; P.L. 22, Mar. 27, 1941, SAL, vol.
55, p. 49; P.L. 48, May 6, 1941, SAL, vol. 55, p. 163; P.L. 240,
Aug. 21, 1941, SAL, vol. 55, p. 663.
535
annex also became a location for the fabrication of hull
sections, which were transported to the main yard for the new
construction programs. In addition, certain nonindustrial
activities previously located in Charlestown, such as the
34
receiving station, were moved to South Boston.
By August 1945, the U.S. Naval Dry Dock, South Boston, had
acquired twenty-five new buildings, including structural,
machine, ordnance, subassembly, building trades, boiler,
shipfitting, and riggers shops; storehouses; and structures for
support services, such as administration, power, security, and
dispensary buildings. Moreover, its docking capacity enlarged
with the construction of a new dry dock for heavy cruisers, Dry
Dock No. 4, and with the assignment to the annex of Floating Dry
Dock No. 24, used for destroyers, and Floating Dry Dock No. 2,
for net tenders, minesweepers, and similar craft. The waterfront
changed remarkably with the construction of seven piers, each
more than 900 feet in length.
Development of the waterfront of the South Boston site
increased the size of the yard from 66.5 acres to almost one
hundred acres of hard land and seventy-two of water. Further
space was obtained by the acquisition of several tracts. The
"E" Street Annex contained a plate field and storage area, a
marginal wharf, and buildings for stores; and the "K" Street
Annex, the Fire Fighting School and a salvage yard for the Supply
Department. South Boston became the location of the Receiving
34. Assistant Maintenance Superintendent to Public Works Officer,
May 2, 1945, 181-40, Box 314, A-12.
536
Station, formerly housed in Frazier Barracks in the main yard.
Frazier Barracks could accomodate no more than a hundred enlisted
men. Adequate quarters were needed for the crews of destroyers of
the North Atlantic Patrol, whose vessels were in the yard for
short overhaul periods. Funds were allocated in 1941 and 1942 to
increase the barracks capacity of the Boston area. Part of those
funds were used to enlarge Frazier Barracks and to provide
quarters for almost 10,000 men at South Boston. Among the
structures acquired or built there was Fargo Barracks, designated
as the Receiving Station.
Another unit at South Boston was the Net Depot, which
operated in Boston Harbor and included Pier 7-E, Building No. 17,
and a net weaving area. Adjacent to the annex was the
Commonwealth Pier, leased by the Navy from the state of
Massachusetts and used by the Supply Department. In March 1945,
the Naval Dry Dock expanded further with the acquisition of an
additional tract of forty acres. At the end of the war, an
officer responsible for the plant at South Boston stated that the
site "shows signs of pains and injuries in various sections
that have a raw and rough appearance." But clearly, the annex
had established itself as a major industrial facility and was
considered by some parties within the Navy as the most promising
35
area of the Boston Navy Yard.
During World War I, the Navy obtained a small commercial
repair yard on the Chelsea waterfront, which became the Chelsea
35. Assistant Maintenance Superintendent to Public Works
Officer, May 2, 1945; Industrial Activities Survey, Nov. 24,
1944, 181-40, Box 194, A3-1 .
537
Annex of the Boston Navy Yard. Improvements began in 1940 and
included the installation of two marine railways. The Navy
purchased Marine Railway No. 12 from Green's Shipyard and No. 13
from the Boston Dry Dock Company, moved them to the Chelsea
Annex, and made repairs upon them. Other improvements consisted
of rehabilitation of one existing pier, construction of new
wharves, building a sea wall, dredging, and provision for
electrical, steam, air, and water services for the piers. By
1944, the Chelsea Annex had almost 2,000 feet of wharfage with
depths of between nine and twenty feet. In World War II, the
annex was used primarily for the repair and fitting out of small
craft, and in the last three years of the conflict, repair work
averaged thirty ships a month. The annex's location across the
Mystic River from the main yard made it reasonably convenient.
Considered part of the main yard was Lockwood 's Basin.
Beginning in 1934, the Navy leased the site to the Bureau of
Marine Fisheries of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. That
bureau built a marine railway for its thirty-eight-foot boat. The
lease was a revocable permit, and with the outbreak of war, the
Navy retook possession and developed the site for the repair of
small vessels.
Because of the great volume of naval vessels coming to the
Boston area during the war, an adequate fuel supply was
essential. This led to the development of the U.S. Naval Fuel
Annex in the Orient Heights section of East Boston, directly
opposite the South Boston dry dock. By the end of 1942, the
fuel depot included fuel tanks, each with a capacity of between
538
27,500 and 37,500 gallons; a fuel pier; pipelines; heating plant;
and fire protection system. The Supply Department of the Boston
Navy Yard operated the annex.
Locating the fuel depot at some distance from the yard had
advantages, but the distribution of industrial activity among
several sites probably resulted in inefficient operations. This
was the conclusion of a Navy board which made an industrial
survey of the yard in November 1944.
Following its inspection, the board prepared a report, which
noted that the war made it necessary to construct new buildings
on practically all available ground areas of the main yard:
There was nothing else to do, but the result is a
congested hodge-podge of shops, offices, storehouses and
other structures, whose arrangement precludes good
practice in efficient flow of material and of work.
The board also found the main yard deficient in other aspects.
Crane service at the dry docks was adequate for normal
activities, but inadequate for the new construction taking place.
The power plant had become obsolescent, requiring the yard to
purchase five percent of its electricity. The foundry was dark
and poorly laid out, and the units of the structural shop in need
of consolidation. The board further observed that the yard
administration had been "extremely conservative" in ordering
replacement of machine tools, with the consequence that many old
36
machines remained in use.
The officers conducting the survey found better conditions
"as to space and equipment" at South Boston, and they concluded
that "if not more than one Navy yard plant is needed after the
36. Industrial Activities Survey, Nov. 24, 1944
539
war in the Boston area," consideration should be given to the
annex.
THE YARD'S CIVILIAN WORKERS IN WORLD WAR II
During World War II, the United States Navy ranked as the
largest single employer of industrial labor in the world, having
three-quarters of a million workers on its payrolls at the end of
the conflict. For the Boston Navy Yard, the peak period of
employment was July 1943, when 50,000 people worked at the yard
3 7
and its several annexes. Recruitment and retention of such a
huge work force constituted major challenges. Because of the
great demand for shipyard labor, generated by a remarkable
expansion in both commercial and military shipbuilding, experi-
enced mechanics became scarce. Thus, navy yards had to hire
workers with no skills and then train them.
The sheer size of the Navy's work force, the unf amiliarity
of many of its members with industrial environments, and the
obvious logistical and humanitarian advantages in maintaining
vigorous workers directed the attention of the Navy Department
and the administrators of its yards to safety programs. The
shortage of male workers, resulting from the competition for
labor as well as the demands of the selective service, led to the
employment of women in navy yards, not only in clerical forces,
but also as manual workers. Because of the fundamental
importance of industrial manpower and the problems of securing,
training, retaining, and providing for the safety of labor, the
Navy administratively accepted the ideas and practices of
37^ Furer, p. 882; Mansfield, p. 28.
540
industrial relations. As in World War I and the economic
emergency of the Great Depression, regulation of wages for blue-
collar workers was taken out of the hands of local yard labor
boards and became matters to be decided by those in charge of
economic mobilization on a nationwide level.
Consideration of civilian employees at the Boston Navy yard
during World War II consists of the topics of the operations of
the selective service system, labor recruitment, training,
safety, labor relations, and wages. In addition, of course, the
entire area of civilian employees had to be administered, both at
the level of the department in Washington and in the yard itself.
The basic categories of employees persisted, manual workers
being in Group I, unskilled laborers; Group II, helpers; Group
III, skilled mechanics; and Group IV(a), supervisors. White-
collar employees were in Group IV(b). Civil Service regulations
and congressional legislation gave the Navy greater freedom in
the hiring and compensating its manual labor force than Group
IV(b) employees. For example, laws existed limiting the number
of white-collar workers and controlling their salaries.
Because of the gradually accelerating program of naval
expansion initially launched in the early 1930s, manpower consid-
erations first became important in the years before Pearl Harbor,
although it was not until midway through the war that the full
magnitude of the problems became apparent.
The Navy ^s Apparatus for Civilian Employees
When hostilities began in Europe in September 1939, the Navy
Department had a fairly complete apparatus for the administration
541
of civilian personnel. Early in the century, the office of the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy emerged as a prominent unit in
handling matters involving navy yard workers. In 1921, the
Secretary of the Navy created the Navy Yard Division, under the
immediate supervision of the Assistant Secretary. That agency,
renamed the Shore Establishment Division in June 1934, had as one
of its charges civilian personnel. An executive order of June
1938 directed all cabinet heads to establish within their
departments a division for the oversight of civilian workers.
The Navy responded in the following December with the formation
of a Division of Personnel Supervision and Management, thus
setting up a rivalry with the Shore Establishment Division. Not
only did both of these units have authority respecting navy yard
workers, all bureaus and the Chief of Naval Operations claimed a
38
voice in policies and decisions affecting civilian employees.
In 1939, the Secretary of the Navy gave approval to war
plans developed by the Shore Establishment Division for navy
yards, including arrangements respecting employees. Those plans
required Naval District organizations to draft local plans, and
created positions of District Civilian Personnel Officers to
assist navy yard commanders in implementing them. After the
United States formally took up arms, it soon became clear that
the Navy had difficulties in hiring, retaining, and molding an
expanding and productive industrial labor force. Early in 1942,
Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox engaged a New York consulting
firm, Industrial Relations Counselors, Inc., to make a survey of
38. Furer, pp. 886-7, 893.
542
civilian employee affairs at three navy yards, Boston being one
39
of them, and to make recommendations for improvements.
In hesitant fashion, the Navy accepted the suggestions of
the consultants and after considerable delay recommended each of
its major industrial facilities create a Personnel Relations
Division, headed by a Personnel Relations Officer and consisting
of sections concerned with labor relations, training, safety, and
employee welfare and services. The Navy Department continued to
alter its own administrative organization for employee matters,
and in January 1944, established a Division for Shore
Establishments and Civilian Personnel.
Given the ponderous, redundant superstructure within the
Navy Department, it is surprising that the field units succeeded
as well as they did in their efforts to recruit and manage large
work forces. Most difficulty was encountered by new industrial
establishments, which could not even obtain from the Navy, a
manual to guide them in dealing with civilian workers. Despite
the many divisions in Washington involved with personnel matters,
none of them had collected the 800 department letters and circu-
lars issued since 1910 touching on navy workers. Well-established
activities, such as the Boston Navy Yard, at least had complete
files and, more importantly, considerable institutional
40
experience with the hiring and management of workers.
At the outset of the war, those parts of the Boston Navy
39. Furer, p. 908; U.S. Naval Administration, World War II :
Office of Secretary of the Navy, Civilian Personnel (3 vo 1 s . ;
Office of Secretary of the Navy, Historical Section), vol. I,
p. 500.
40. Furer, p. 899.
543
Yard's administration which dealt with civilian employees, other
than utilization of their labor, included the Labor Board, the
Wage Board, the Industrial Manager, and a Personnel Officer. The
Labor Board, attached to the office of the commandant, functioned
mainly in hiring of workers, liaison with the local Civil Service
authorities, and as a records-keeping office. The Wage Board, not
a permanent body but appointed each year by the commandant, was a
familiar entity to career officers and old-time employees,
although it had not been convened since 1930. The Industrial
Manager had formal charge of the administration of civilian
personnel affairs, and the Personnel Officer had actual direction
of those affairs.
Early in 1942, a change gave responsibility for civilian
personnel administration to the Shop Superintendent, an officer
in the Industrial Department and thus an assistant to the
Manager. The Shop Superintendent became the senior member of the
Labor Board. To aid him in his new duties, he was assigned a
full-time staff, which included two officers. Since the Shop
Superintendent had general charge of the activities of all manual
workers, except those of the Public Works and Supply Departments,
giving him oversight of personnel matters had merit. On the
other hand, he probably was the most overburdened division head
in the yard. This arrangement prevailed until the establishment
of a Personnel Relations Division in July 1943. In part, the
latest organization resulted from the findings of Industrial
Relations Counselors at the Boston, New York, and Puget Sound
yards .
The IRC report on the Boston Navy Yard reported that a "dual
544
arrangement exists under which identical operations are frequent-
ly directed by both officer personnel and civilian supervisors."
Those supervisors were "overburdened, inadequately trained and
not kept informed of current developments." Respecting manpower
procurement, the report held that "procedures for selection and
hiring are not such as to satisfy present requirements." As for
wages and compensation, "confusion exists ... concerning promotion
in pay and grade." "Unjustifiable pay differentials exist." "Pay
scales are not directly related to the work performed." The
consultants found little in the way of viable systems for
handling workers' complaints. "The need for procedures for
adjusting employee grievances ... are not sufficiently recognized."
Particularly in view of the anticipated further enlargement of
the work force, the report found the "training program. .. not suf-
41
ficiently comprehensive."
Almost a year after receiving the report of Industrial
Relations Counselors, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy issued
a directive to commandants requesting all yards to take measures
to strengthen their organizations for handling personnel matters
and suggesting, but not ordering, the appointment of Personnel
Relations Officers.
On July 8, 1943, the Boston yard commandant directed the
establishment of a Personnel Relations Division, under the
supervision of the Manager. However, its cognizance extended
beyond the Industrial Department to include personnel matters for
41. U.S. Naval Administration, World War II: Office of the
Secretary of the Navy , Civilian Personnel , vol. I, pp. 500-5.
545
all units of the yard. The new division was to be headed by a
Personnel Relations Officer, a commissioned naval officer. The
PRO served "only in an advisory capacity." The commandant's order
called for five major sections in the division: Labor Relations
(employee grievances, dealings with shop committees, unions, and
other employee associations); Employment (hiring, separations,
deferments, liaison with selective service, records and
statistics, job classification analysis, annual and sick leave,
retirement regulations); Training (apprentice, trade,
instructor, supervisory, and technical and scientific training;
indoctrination); Employee Services (assistance in transportation,
housing, rationing; food service, credit union liaison; employee
publications; advice on matters of personal finance, such as
42
indebtedness and income taxes); and Safety.
Administratively, the new Personnel Relations Division soon
became apparent in such forms as the comprehensive training
program, a system of workers' committees to stimulate interest in
production, and competitions among shops and offices to reduce
absenteeism. During the remainder of the war, the Boston yard
retained the personnel relations organization established in
July 1943.
The reform of the apparatus for management of its employees
came at the same time as the yard reached its peak employment,
50,128. Although the recruitment of a work force of that size
represents a major accomplishment, it had not been achieved
42. Commandant's Order No. 187, Jul. 8, 1943, 181-40, Box 5,
A3-1.
546
without difficulty, and a serious problem was anticipated in
maintaining sufficient workers for the various new construction
programs and for the yard's share of repairs and conversions. In
their quest for manpower, navy yards were in competition with
other shipbuilding activities, war plants generally, and the
selective service.
The Yard and the Selective Service
In September 1940, Congress enacted and the President
approved the first peacetime program of compulsory military
service in the nation's history. That program required the
registration of all men between the ages of twenty-one and
thirty-five, 1,200,000 of whom would be drafted for a period of
a year. The first draft numbers were selected on October 29, and
inductions soon began. In the following August, the service of
army draftees was extended by eighteen months. During the three
and a half years of the nation's actual participation in the war,
selective service regulations underwent several changes.
Ultimately, all males between eighteen and sixty-four were
required to register, and, for a brief period, men of ages from
thirty-eight to forty-five were actually drafted. In January
1943, the War Manpower Commission sought to force able-bodied
adult male Americans into war-related jobs by a "work or fight"
order, which eliminated military deferments for everyone who held
unessential jobs, including fathers with dependent children.
Congress raised a storm over that policy, and it ended in
December of the same year. During much of the war, deferments
were limited to the clergy, hardships cases, and to men in
547
essential jobs in war industries and agriculture.
With respect to government workers, it was decided that only
the heads of certain federal departments and agencies could
request deferments for their employees. The Secretary of the
Navy delegated that authority to the chiefs of bureaus, heads of
other offices in the Navy Department, commandants of naval dis-
tricts, and commanding officers of certain shore establishments,
including the navy yards. In the early stages of the war, com-
mandants executed selective service deferment forms with a simple
statement that the worker was necessary to the war effort. For
example, early in 1942, Commandant William T. Tarrant appealed
the assignment of a draft classification of "I-A" to Clayton
Curley, an "experienced Gas Cutter & Burner" and employed at the
yard since the previous September. Tarrant sought to retain
Curley at the yard because of ""the necessity of the Registrant to
the National Defense Program." The fate of Curley is unknown,
but lacking more ample information, many local draft boards,
which had the power to grant or refuse a deferment, often drafted
43
the man in question. Eventually, much closer coordination pre-
vailed between navy yards and selective service authorities.
Protection of the yard work force against the manpower
requirements of the military services resulted in administrators'
seeking to prevent or discourage needed workmen from voluntarily
enlisting. Albert Mostone, who already had experience in the
repair of locomotives, started work at the yard in 1937 in the
43. U.S. Naval Administration, World War II: Office of the
Secretary of the Navy, Civilian Personnel , vol. I, pp. 263-4;
Commandant to Local Board #99, Mar. 11, 1942, 181-40, Box 186,
LAC ( 1 ) .
548
Transportation Shop. Because of his ability to read blueprints
and his general competence, he became a shipfitter in 1939 and
soon advanced to the rank of first-class mechanic in that trade.
After Pearl Harbor, Mostone tried to enlist in the Navy.
However, as he described the situation thirty years later, "they
refused to grant me permission," because "I was doing work for
the government, and they said I was essential." Had he
persisted, Mostone probably would have succeeded, but he was
intimidated by his shop master, who said if the shipfitter left
to enter the service, he would "never get another ... government
44
job again. "
During the middle years of the war, cooperation between the
yard and selective service authorities took the form of manning
tables and replacement schedules. Manning tables were elaborate
personnel inventories prepared by navy yards and other defense
employers. They included a list of all positions in the yard;
the number of people employed in each job; the time necessary to
train people for those jobs; and a replacement schedule. Those
schedules listed by name the men in the yard within the age
limits liable to military service, the date at which time they
could be replaced, and a list of men for whom deferments were
requested. In the First Naval District, when accepted by both
parties, a replacement schedule became an agreement between an
employer and selective service authorities, whereby workers were
released at a stipulated rate. Such an agreement allowed the
employer to arrange to replace drafted personnel without serious
44. Oral History Interview, Albert Mostone, p. 6.
549
45
disruption of operations.
Despite the understandings reached with local draft
officials, the Boston Navy Yard had difficulty in maintaining a
labor force adequate for the work required by the Navy. The yard
had proceeded on the basis that it would have to recruit a large
number of inexperienced workers, men and women, and provide
the training necessary to enable them to work as mechanics.
Although this consumed valuable time, it nevertheless appeared as
a practical scheme. Such plans were disrupted by frequent
changes in selective service regulations on the national level
and the necessity of local draft authorities to provide men for
the military services at a more rapid rate than anticipated.
For example, at the beginning of the war, the yard recruited
large numbers of young men with the idea of training them and
then utilizing their services for several years before they
became eligible for the draft. In November 1942, the draft age
was lowered to eighteen, which immediately placed these workers
in jeopardy. Moreover, the Civil Service Commission would not
withhold certification for young men who would become subject to
the draft within six months. This meant that when such men
applied for work at the yard, they could not be refused, although
by the time they were becoming of some value to the yard, they
might be conscripted.
Such occurred in the case of Frank Coolidge, who started in
the yard in 1941 as an apprentice molder. Then nineteen years
old, Coolidge participated in the apprenticeship training program
45. U.S ♦ Naval Administration During World War II : First Naval
District , vol. II, pp. 43-9.
550
46
until he was drafted in 1943.
Respecting manpower, the most critical period for the Boston
yard was 1943. At a conference in the yard, local selective
service authorities gave notice that they would have to take men
from Navy industrial establishments to meet the needs of the
military forces. At the same time, word spread that following
the war, veterans would be entitled to a number of valuable
benefits. Many employees resigned to enlist. During the war,
7100 workers took military leave from employment at the Boston
Navy Yard, and another group of almost 6000 enlisted without the
formality of a leave. The 13,000 men who left the yard during the
war represent a work force equivalent to the total number of yard
47
employees in early 1941.
The selective service system had a definite impact on the
Boston Navy Yard's work force, affecting both its size and compo-
sition. A new personnel statistics form, introduced in the summer
of 1944, reveals that in July of that year the Boston Navy Yard
had almost 42,000 workers, of whom slightly more than 34,000 were
male. This does not include 6629 men on military furlough as of
July 31. Nineteen-thousand and five hundred of the men then at
work in the yard had ages of thirty-eight years or older. Thus,
fifty-seven percent of the male workers or forty-six percent of
the entire yard force was in an age category which made their
being conscripted highly unlikely. Some 800 male employees were
46. Oral History Interview, Frank Coolidge, p. 4. Coolidge
returned to the yard after the war and was the foundry 's last
master mechanic.
47. Report of Civil Personnel Statistics, Jan. 1941, 181-40, Box
13, A9-4.
551
under eighteen years of age and, for the time being, ineligible
for the draft. The remainder of the yard's men, those from
eighteen to thirty-seven years of age, numbered 13,800. Of that
number, 10,600 were physically qualified for military service.
However, most of the physically fit were beyond twenty-five
years. In July 1944, only 700 of the yard's employees were of an
age and physical condition which made them prime candidates for
48
the draft.
Comparison of the data for July 1944 with that of June 1945
suggests two trends in the composition of the Boston yard's labor
force in the last years of the war: that part of the work force
made up of men was becoming older, and there were fewer and fewer
men who, by virtue of their age and health, were in any danger of
being drafted. In June of 1945, the yard employed only eighty-
nine men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five who were
49
physically qualified for military service.
Changes in Employment Regulations
By mid-1943, with 50,000 workers then employed at the yard,
with other defense establishments in the area seeking more
labor, and after several years of large draft quotas, there were
few workers left to hire as replacements. Moreover, by that
time, practically all peacetime limitations respecting the hiring
48. Monthly Report of Civilian Personnel for Jul. 1944, 181-40,
Box 287, A9-4.
49. Monthly Report of Civilian Personnel for Jun. 1945, 181-40,
Box 312, A9-4. The June 1945 report is the last one in which the
section on the eligibility of men for the draft was completed.
552
of workers and the hours they could work had been eliminated.
Beginning with President Roosevelt's declaration of a lim-
ited national emergency in September 1939, laws and regulations
governing labor had been relaxed or suspended. In the summer of
1940, the Civil Service Commission amended a number of its
existing provisions. One was a regulation restricting the hiring
of navy yard mechanics to men of the ages of forty-eight or
younger. Thereafter, fifty-five became the maximum permissible
age for the hiring of almost twenty trades, including
blacksmiths, boatbuilders , machinists, diesinkers, ropemakers,
shipfitters, and shipwrights. When that amendment did not produce
sufficient numbers of new workers, the commission changed the top
50
age for many trades to sixty-two.
About the same time, there occurred a relaxation of Civil
Service rules respecting the promotion or transfer of new workers
within the same line of work. Previously, no changes could be
made during the first six months, without approval of the Civil
Service Commission. The new ruling enabled workers to be
promoted or transferred to another position in the same trade or
occupation after one month. The alteration in rules applied to
the War Department, which apparently had sought a change, and was
available for application to Navy industrial establishments.
However, the Navy took a conservative course and did not accept
51
the ruling until later.
Yet another Civil Service rule change occurred in the summer
50. Boston Navy Yard News , Jul. 11, 1940 and Aug. 8, 1940.
51. U.S. Civil Service Commission, Jun. 21, 1940, 181-40, Box 2,
A2-7.
553
of 1940, when the commission stipulated that new employees of the
navy yard could start work prior to the required physical
examination. If that examination, when given, revealed physical
defects other than communicable diseases, the new worker could
52
continue as a temporary employee for one year.
The Secretary of the Navy prevented a disruption of the
recruitment of additional workers which would have occurred in
the fall of 1940, because of an 1876 act of Congress. To curtail
the political uses of navy yards, then in common practice,
Congress had prohibited yards from enlarging their labor forces
within sixty days of presidential or congressional elections,
unless the Secretary of the Navy certified that increases were
required by the national interest. Respecting the election
scheduled for November 5, 1940, the Secretary issued the
necessary certification, which was published in newspapers in
53
Boston and other areas with navy yards. Presumably, the same
process occurred before the congressional elections in 1942 and
the presidential contest in 1944.
Recruitment of labor for navy yards and other establishments
was facilitated by the relaxation of federal and state laws
affecting hours of work. At the beginning of the war, the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts required for all workers one day of
rest in every seven and also forbade the employment of women and
minors more than forty-five hours a week and between 10:00
52. First Civil Service District, Boston, to All Rating Boards,
Jul. 16, 1940, 181-40, Box 2, A2-7.
53. Secretary of Navy, Circular Letter, Aug. 22, 1940, 181-40,
Box 2, A2-11.
554
o'clock at night and 6:00 o'clock in the morning. Shortly after
Pearl Harbor, the state legislature empowered the governor to
relax these prohibitions in specific instances which would
54
promote more effective prosecution of war work.
Early in the war, major shortages occurred in the ranks of
mechanics in practically all trades, and there was an acute
dearth of blue-collar supervisors. Further easing of age
restrictions became necessary. In January 1942, the Shore
Establishment Division of the Navy Department reduced the minimum
age for mechanic-learners from eighteen to sixteen. A few months
later, the Personnel Supervision and Management Division raised
the maximum age for the same position from twenty-five to fifty
for both men and women. Also PS&M announced Civil Service
approval of the Navy's request to waive the minimum age of
55
twenty-five for employment as leadingmen and quartermen.
Because of the labor shortage, the Navy sought to restrict
leaves taken by workers at its industrial establishments. A
fairly generous policy had developed whereby workers received
twenty-six days of regular leave each year, plus fifteen sick
days. An executive order issued early in 1938 allowed employees
to accrue sixty days above the twenty-six days due them in the
current year. It was thus possible for a navy yard employee to
acquire, by the end of any calendar year, almost three months of
54. U.S. Naval Administration During World War II : First Naval
District , vol. II, p. 37.
55. Assistant Secretary of Navy (SED), Circular Letter, Jan. 26,
1942; Assistant Secretary of Navy (PS&M), Circular Letter, Mar.
12, 1942; Assistant Secretary of Navy (PS&M), Circular Letter,
Jan. 26, 1942, all in 181-40, Box 59, L16-1 .
555
leave. During the war, navy yards such as Boston, fully engaged
in rush programs to build destroyers, destroyer escorts, or
landing craft, simply could not afford its workers the peacetime
luxury of a long vacation. In July 1941, the commandant of the
Boston Navy Yard advised the yard that the Secretary of the Navy
had authorized commandants to require employees to forego
vacations, if their services could not be spared. Such vital
employees with accumulations of leaves in excess of sixty days
would be compensated at the rate of one day 's pay for each leave
56
day.
In the following April, the Navy Department issued a direc-
tive restricting all workers to no more than fifteen leave days a
year. For the leave time to which they were entitled, but which
the new ruling prevented them from taking, compensation would be
57
paid to them at the time of their resignation.
During the spring of 1944, the urgency of the landing craft
program led the Boston Navy Yard commandant to use his authority
to prevent employees from taking leave. However, he assured
"faithful employees," meaning those with good attendance records,
58
that they would be able to enjoy week-long summer vacations.
Labor Recruitment
Manipulation of leave time and changes in regulations and
laws respecting the hours of work and the ages of employees only
56. Commandant's Circular Letter No. 353, Jul. 21, 1941, 181-40,
Box 2 (1940) , A2-3.
57. U.S . Naval Administration, World War II ; Office of the
Secretary of the Navy, Civilian Personnel , vol. I, p. 224.
58. Boston Navy Yard News , April 18, 1944.
556
Table 11: TOTAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES ON JUNE 30, BNY, 1934-1953
34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53
50,000
48,000
46,000
44,000
42,000
40,000
38,000
36,000
34,000
32, 000
30,000
28,000
26,000
24,000
22,000
20,000
18,000
16,000
14,000
12, 000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
(SOURCE: Yard Log, 181-58;
Average Employment Levels,
1950-1963, BNHP, RGl, Ser-
ies 2 2; Mansfield, p. 89)
34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53
557
indirectly dealt with the major wartime problem of recruiting
large numbers of workers. War plans made in Washington and on
the district and yard level did not anticipate the magnitude of
the civilian labor force which would be required to meet the
demands of the Navy afloat nor did they forecast the competition
for labor in the shipbuilding industry. In July 1940, the United
States had forty-eight shipbuilding establishments, both govern-
ment and private. By 1943, there existed 522, including two new
navy yards, Terminal Island and Hunter's Point, both in
California, the area which saw the most bitter competition for
59
labor .
The expansion of its labor force in the World War II period
by the Boston Navy Yard constitutes a remarkable story. At the
beginning of 1939, the yard employed slightly under 3900 workers
in all categories. That force increased to approximately 9000 by
June 17, 1940, when most of the shops changed to a schedule of
two eight-hour shifts. At that time, the high unemployment
characteristic of the economically depressed thirties continued
to linger across the nation. However, most of the unemployed
lacked the skills then in demand at ship work establishments.
For example, in July 1941, Congressman Thomas Flaherty wrote the
Boston Navy Yard, concerning the possibilities of a position as
machinist's helper for one of his constituents, who had made
application and been found eligible for employment. Commandant
5 9 . U.S. Naval Administration ^n World War II : An Administrative
History of the Bureau of Ships (4 vols.; Historical Section,
Bureau of Ships), vol. II, p. 167.
558
Tarrant informed Flaherty that the man in question was
"approximately No. 980" on the Labor Board's eligibility list.
What the yard then needed and sought to hire were not helpers,
60
but full-fledged mechanics.
During 1941, yard workers doubled in number, from 13,000 in
January to 26,000 twelve months later. At the beginning of 1942,
the yard was in operation around the clock, with a schedule of
three eight-hour shifts. In July 1943, the yard employed the'
greatest labor force in its history, 50,128 people, about 45,000
61
being industrial workers and the remainder in Group IV(b).
In the following September, the Secretary of the Navy placed
62
a limit of 51,000 as the yard's complement. If an emergency
arose in the form of a sudden increase in the volume of repair
work, employees would be shifted from new construction rather
than an effort made to hire more workers. The ceiling on the
yard's labor force had little practical meaning, since after July
1943 the yard encountered difficulty in recruiting and retaining
employees, and the number of workers began to decline. By
January 1944, the work force had shrunk to 47,500, by the summer
of that year to 42,000, and by August 1945 to 36,000.
As of October 10, 1943, the yard's Industrial Department
60. Commandant to Flaherty, Jul. 30, 1941, 181-40, Box 119, LA-
C (1) .
61. For information on the size of the work force, see Dana,
"High Spots"; Yard Log, 181-58; and the yard's regular report,
Monthly Report of Civil Personnel Statistics, filed for the war
years in 181-40, A9-4. Unfortunately, the reports for the
crucial year of 1943 are missing.
62. Assistant Secretary of Navy to Commandant, Sept. 16, 1943,
181-40, Box 5, A3-1.
559
generally went on a schedule of two nine-hour shifts and six days
a week. One shift began at 7:30 a.m. and stopped at 5:10 in the
afternoon. The second shift worked from 8:30 in the evening
until 6:10 the following morning. Workers rotated shifts approx-
imately every three months. The ropewalk, forge and foundry
shops, and the power plant continued on a three-shift schedule.
Group IV(b) employees worked eight hours during the day. The new
schedule reduced, but did not eliminate, Sunday work and eased
the parking situation, as the two shifts did not overlap. Since
the yard employed the same number of workers as before the change
from three to two shifts, there was no loss of manpower. In
fact, there was a gain, since most production workers put in
63
fifty-four hours a week instead of forty-eight.
In October 1940, the Secretary of the Navy condemned
improper means to recruit skilled labor, practices he labeled as
"scamping" and which he defined as "the stealing of men from
another yard by direct or personal solicitation through promise
of higher wages, better housing, etc." He noted that the Navy
abjured such methods. As a matter of fact, Civil Service
advertisements for government positions included a statement that
applications were not desired from any persons then in the employ
of private industries vital to the national defense program. It
was also the policy of the Navy to object to the Civil Service
certification of any applicant then at work in another defense
agency of the federal government or a commercial firm engaged in
63. Boston Navy Yard News , Oct. 7, 1943.
560
64
defense activities.
If the Secretary adhered to a high standard in February
1940, he had come close to advocating what was known as "labor
hoarding" in the previous June. At that time, he directed navy
yards to build up the number of mechanics in shipbuilding trades
in which shortages, "present or prospective," existed and which
were viewed as vital to the expeditious completion of new
65
construction .
Like the Navy and navy yards, the Civil Service Commission
had not foreseen the wartime demand for labor. That agency had
first appeared as the result of a reaction against incompetency
and favoritism in government employment and over the years had
developed a complex set of regulations to assure that government
appointments were based on merit as determined by competitive
examinations. Beginning in 1941, what the Boston Navy Yard and
other Navy industrial activities needed were thousands of
workers. Certainly the Navy preferred to hire employees with
experience and skills, but increasingly yards were ready to
accept anyone who appeared capable of being trained. In such a
situation, the Civil Service emphasis on merit could become an
obstruction. Another ingredient in civil service reform had been
the desire to give government employees some measure of job
security, especially to protect them against the ebb and flow of
partisan politics. By the end of the 1930s, newly hired
64. See example of letter from Frank Knox to private
shipbuilding companies, Oct. 31, 1940, attached to Secretary of
Navy to All Commandants, Dec. 19, 1940, 181-40, Box 2, A2-ll.~
65. Mansfield, p. 13.
561
government employees served a probationary period, upon the
successful completion of which they received permanent
appointment. For many reasons, the conditions of war rendered
permanent appointments inappropriate.
In March 1942, the Civil Service Commission capitulated to
the unusual wartime circumstances respecting manpower. War
Service Regulations suspended conventional appointments and
provided that workers hired subsequent to March 12 would hold
temporary appointments, lasting for the duration of the war and
six months thereafter. Also, the commission waived peacetime
procedures and standards and allowed government agencies to
66
accept the best talent available, regardless of qualifications.
Navy yard labor boards, the traditional apparatus for
hiring blue-collar workers showed signs of their ineffectiveness
in mass labor procurement in 1940, and other techniques were
employed. The Boston Nav y Yard News ran an article in July 1940,
which called upon current employees to become involved in
recruitment and seek among their acquaintances former mechanics
who had drifted away from their trades during the days when
shipyard skills had not been in great demand. The article
included the wages paid at the yard for first-class mechanics in
the needed trades and advised readers of the recent alterations
by Civil Service authorities which permitted the hiring of
67
mechanics with ages up to fifty-five years.
When prospective workers appeared at the Labor Board, it was
6 6 . U.S . Naval Administration Durin g Worl d War II ; First Naval
District , vol. II, pp. vi-vii.
67. Boston Navy Yard News , Jul. 11, 1940.
562
necessary to process them rapidly, lest they change their minds
while standing in a line. This called for an enlargement of
staff, and at one time 153 people manned the Boston yard's Labor
Board, which had an average visiting load of 831 persons a day
and made 2419 appointments a month. New forms allowed the
68
simplification and abbreviation of the hiring process.
The Boston yard had its greatest difficulty in achieving a
sufficiently sizeable work force in late 1942 and in 1943.
Estimates of the yard's short-handedness during the spring and
fall of the latter year ranged from 6000 to 10,000. In May of
1943, the yard hired approximately 2,000 new workers, but
employees were leaving at a somewhat greater rate, and the rolls
went down by twenty-two people. The Navy Department in
Washington was of small help. It claimed that it was not aware
that Boston had a manpower problem and advised the yard to take
steps, such as a recruitment campaign, which in fact had already
been utilized. Washington reported that there was something of a
labor surplus in Texas and that the Navy was ready to pay the
railroad fare and provide subsistence for Texans recruited by
Boston. However, procuring labor at a distance of 1500 miles
obviously entailed immense practical problems, and the suggestion
was of little value in answering the yard's immediate need of
69
some 8,000 new hands.
On June 14, 1943, with suitable fanfare and with pledges
6 8 . U.S. Naval Administration in Worl d War II : Office of the
Secretary of the Navy , Civilia n Personnel , vol. II, pp. 636-7.
69. Digest of Telephone Conversation, Jun. 9, 1943, 181-40, Box
55, L16-2.
563
of support from public officials, the yard opened a branch labor
office at 82 Summer Street in downtown Boston. Local newspapers
cooperated and ran stories in their columns about the interesting
job opportunities in the yard. In February 1944, when a large war
plant in the town of Lowell suddenly closed, the Boston Navy Yard
organized a special campaign to hire several thousand of the
plant's former employees and established a temporary branch labor
70
office in Lowell.
In the middle years of the war, the yard seemed to be able
to hire new workers, but suffered from labor turnover, because of
the demands of the selective service, workers who were
voluntarily enlisting, discharges resulting from misconduct or
missing six consecutive musters, and employees leaving for other
reasons. By October 1943, when the situation appeared acute, the
new Personnel Relations Division had been established, and a
practice instituted of a yard officer visiting and interviewing
workers who gave notice of intention to quit. Among the
explanations for the decision to leave were: (1) ill health and
physical disability; (2) working hours and the inconvenience of
shifts; (3) working conditions; (4) family circumstances; (5) the
inability to do the work assigned; (6) insufficient wages; (7)
transportation problems; and (8) unadjusted grievances. After
the interview, about ten percent of the workers decided to
71
continue their employment at the yard.
The yard reached its peak employment of 50,000 in July
70. Dana, "History of the Boston Navy Yard, Chapter III,
Manpower and Industrial Relations," Jul. 17, 1945, pp. 3-4.
71. Dana, "Manpower and Industrial Relations," pp. 6-7.
564
1943, and thereafter significantly more workers left than were
hired. In the following December, when the labor force numbered
46,412, the yard hired 562 new workers, but lost 1251. In June
1944, 1187 individuals joined the work force and 1925 were
separated. In December, the figures were 594 and 1002. An
Industrial Survey board inspecting the Boston facility in
November stated that the situation was common to all East Coast
yards. Hiring and retaining workers faced a new difficulty in the
second half of 1944 in the form of word spreading through the
yard of a possible layoff. That rumor probably gained currency,
when the Boston Navy Yard News devoted four issues to reprinting
7 2
new Civil Service regulations governing reductions in force.
New Workers : Women , Blacks , the Disabled
By necessity, wartime recruitment of labor at the Boston
Navy Yard included efforts to hire people in groups previously
untapped. These included mechanics who were older or younger
than allowed by regulations of the 1930s. In 1940 and 1941, the
expanding shipbuilding industry, other defense manufacturing, and
the selective service absorbed experienced mechanics of all ages.
The yard then turned to the hiring of unskilled persons who were
given training for positions as helpers or mechanics. These
included the physically disabled, black Americans, and women.
World War II constitutes a great turning point in the
history of women in America. Well over six million women entered
72. Monthly Reports of Civilian Personnel for Jun . 1944 and for
Dec. 1944, both in 181-40, Box 297, A9-4; Industrial Survey
Division, Report No. 3, Nov. 25, 1944, 181-40, Box 294, A3-1;
Boston Navy Yard News , Sep. 9, Sep. 23, Oct. 7, and Oct. 21,
1944.
565
the labor force, two million taking clerical jobs and two and a
half million working in manufacturing. Prior to World War II,
the Boston Navy Yard had employed women almost exclusively in
clerical positions, except in 1917 and 1918, when a few had
worked in shops, primarily the ropewalk. During the Second World
War, women composed from fifteen to twenty percent of the yard's
force. The general trends respecting women employees were an
increase in their numbers and in their proportion of the yard's
total workers. Moreover, whereas at the outset of the war, there
were virtually no blue-collar women, by the end of 1943, females
in Groups II and III far exceeded those in Group IV(b).
The Boston Navy Yard employed 281 women in June 1941 and 478
in the following December. The personnel reports for that year
did not provide a breakdown by sex between Group IV(b) workers
and others. However, it seems clear that all of the women had
clerical or office positions. That understanding is prompted by
subsequent data. The yard's personnel statistics for June 1942
indicate an increase of women workers to 1232, only two of whom
were not in Group IV(b). During the next six months, large
numbers of women entered the shops, and in December somewhat more
than 2000 of the yard's 3400 female employees were in groups
other than IV(b). On November 1, 1943, their numbers peaked at
8348. Female workers became a majority, fifty-seven percent, of
Group IV(b) employees, but most of the yard's women were in
73
Groups II and III.
A deliberate program to recruit women began in June 1942,
73. Mansfield, p. 29.
566
the original intention being to use them as replacements in slots
requiring little training and less physical strength and
reassigning male workers to the basic shipyard trades in which
shortages existed and which were considered unsuitable for women.
However, women ultimately appeared in many of the shops.
The active recruitment of women workers included use of
newspapers and radio. Mary O'Brien heard the Navy's call from
those sources and also doubtless from her husband, who worked at
the Watertown Arsenal and then the navy yard. Mrs. O'Brien was a
twenty-seven-year-old mother of four when she started at the yard
in March 1943. She later recalled that on the basis of a test
administered to new employees, she was assigned to the electrical
shop. Her activities at the yard consisted of three types of
work. Initially she joined a number of other women in the repair
of portable, temporary lights used at the yard in work on ships.
Later, she was involved in a brief and rushed program to
manufacture large searchlights, probably for the Normandy
invasion. Her third assignment was as a one-woman attendant in a
generator shack on one of the piers. Thirty years later, Mrs.
O'Brien could not recall any kind of orientation program and
described her training as a "more or less one-to-one" on-the-job
type. She did participate in a voluntary, supplementary training
74
program conducted during the lunch hour.
Barbara Green also began work at the Boston Navy Yard in
1943. Single and seventeen years old, she first was assigned as
a welder in the shipfitting shop and participated in a six-week
74. Oral History Interview, Mary O'Brien, BNHP.
567
training program in welding. Upon completion of her training,
Green worked as a welder on the decks and stowage areas of APLs
and particularly LSTs, then under construction at the yard.
After six months, Green began to suffer from a condition the yard
Dispensary diagnosed as asthma, but her own physician claimed was
poisoning from galvanized dust and fumes. She stopped working at
the yard, recuperated for several months, and in the spring of
1944 was rehired, this time as a sheet metal worker. With no
training in sheet metal work, she and a number of other women
were employed in the shop, chiefly in the manufacture of small
units, described as "butt cans" or "butt trays." As she recalled
in the late 1970s, "towards the end" of the war, "when they ran
out of butt cans for us to pound..., they told us to start
washing windows." When Green and other women in the shop refused
to do that type of work, they were given the option of resigning,
75
which they did.
It appears that women worked in many of the Boston Navy
Yard's shops during World War II. The Navy adopted a policy of
prohibiting women from tasks requiring them to board ships in
commission, the concern being the reaction of the crews of such
vessels. Thus, women did not engage in shipboard repair work,
but did participate in the new construction programs.
In a development anticipated in 1917 and 1918, the ropewalk
acquired a large number of female employees during the Second
World War. This resulted from at least two considerations.
First of all, the nature of the work was regarded as suitable for
75. Oral History Interview, Barbara Tuttle Green, BNHP.
568
women. Secondly, the primary mission of the yard was the
construction and repair of ships. Although the manufacture of
cordage had importance in the Navy at large, it had relatively
low priority in the yard. This meant that male ropewalkers were
more likely than other yard workers to be drafted or to be
transferred to other shops. Accordingly, women came to
constitute a large proportion of the ropewalk 's labor force.
Ultimately, they did the same work as men, but were not expected
76
to maintain the same productivity.
In the summer of 1945, when he wrote his history of the
Boston Navy Yard, Lt . N. T. Dana stated: "Experience over the
past two years has proven that female employees are able to work
efficiently on an equal basis with men on many jobs that were
formerly considered to be men's jobs." The same author notes the
consequences of the introduction of women in the ropewalk. In
1942, the shop had an average monthly production of 2,135,656
pounds. In that year, women began to replace men, who were
shifted to new construction, repairs, and conversion work.
Ultimately, women were forty percent of the shop's work force.
Production declined in 1943 to 1,849,810 pounds and in 1944 to
1,635,241. Dana concluded that "when it is considered that
ropemaking had never before, in the Yard, been attempted by
77
female labor, the results were gratifying."
Based on oral interviews conducted in the 1970s, the
76. Oral History Interview, David Himmelfarb, BNHP , pp. 11-12.
77. Dana, "Ropewalk: Rough Draft," Jul. 18, 1945; "Manpower and
Industrial Relations," p. 11. Dana apparently was unaware of
women workers in the ropewalk during World War I.
569
introduction of women into the industrial activities of the yard
seems not to have created major difficulties. "Close to 2000"
women were part of the 5000 workers in the pipe shop, recalled
Lyman Carlow. He noted of the women employees, "they did very
well." "On things like silver soldering and assemblies in our
shop, they were excellent." Albert Mostone recalled that most of
the women in the shipfitters shop were helpers, although there
were thirty-five or forty electric welders and acetylene burners.
Mostone stated that "it was kind of strange," when the women
first arrived, but that "we worked in harmony with them" and "we
had no problems with them." John Langan, who started in the
yard in 1919 and thus was something of an old-timer during World
War II, described one male shipfitter who threatened to quit if
women remained in his shop. Without elaboration, Langan also
stated that "it was a very ticklish situation" and that "a lot of
78
homes were broken up in the Navy Yard."
Some differences did appear in the work habits of male and
female workers. Women had a higher incidence of absenteeism and
higher turnover rates, which might be explained by their
responsibilities at home. Also, lower paid workers had poorer
attendance records than employees receiving higher wages. The
Navy's policy was to make no distinction between men and women
respecting wages and salaries, but this does not mean that women
were evenly distributed throughout all of the yard's wage and
salaries schedules. Women had fewer lost time accidents than
78. Oral History Interview, Lyman Carlow, p. 13; Oral History
Interview, Albert Mostone, p. 10; Oral History Interview, John
Langan, p. 22.
570
men, quite probably a result of assigning female workers to jobs
79
not involving heavy equipment and dangerous operations.
TABLE NO. 12: PROPORTION OF WOMEN IN CONTINENTAL NAVY YARD
WORK FORCES, MARCH 1943
Navy Yard Total IV(b) Women Per- Total Other Per-
Workers IV(b) cent Other Women cent
Portsmouth
1666
737
44.2
19078
1026
5.4
Boston
4864
2437
50.1
41100
2517
6.1
New York
7406
3153
42.6
56412
1946
3.4
Philadelphia
5020
2166
43.1
38842
2804
7.2
Norfolk
4457
2403
53.9
38182
1874
4.9
Charleston
3326
2018
60.7
20290
1097
5.4
Mare Island
3614
3065
84.8
32381
4232
13.1
Puget Sound
3383
1908
56.4
22888
2514
11.0
Washington
5059
2054
40.6
18471
1589
8.6
TOTAL
SOURCE
39,259
23,265
59.3 261,162 27,870
10.7
U.S. Naval Administration , World War II : Office of the
Secretary of the Navy , Civilian Personnel , vol. I, p. 247a.)
By the end of the war, the Boston yard had hired 250
handicapped or "limited service" workers. Procedures for
appointment in such instances included a physical examination, a
decision by the Labor Board recorder as to which shop might best
utilize the services of the handicapped worker, and a conference
between the individual and the shop's master or personnel
assistant. Approval for appointment rested with the shop master.
In seventy-five percent of such appointments, the worker was able
80
to meet the normal standards of employment.
Less celebrated than the recruitment of women at the Boston
Navy Yard was the hiring of blacks. Prior to the war, the yard
79. Dana, "Manpower and Industrial Relations," pp. 11-12;
Assistant Secretary of Navy, Circular Letter, Aug. 18, 1942, 181-
40, Box 59, L16-1.
80. Dana, "Manpower and Industrial Relations," pp. 12-13.
571
had no policy of exclusion based on race, and blacks had been
employed, as this report has shown. However, no records have
been discovered of the distribution of employees according to
race, and it appears likely that the number of black workers was
small. The participation of blacks in war production became a
national issue in 1941 with the March-on-Washington movement
organized by A. Philip Randolph. That movement forced President
Roosevelt to produce an executive order banning racial discrimi-
nation in the employment of workers in defense industries.
Roosevelt also established a Fair Employment Practices Committee
to handle cases of violation of the order. A small number of
states, including Massachusetts, enacted fair employment prac-
tices legislation.
Neither the Navy nor the Boston Navy Yard seem to have had a
specific program for recruiting black labor, but by the end of
the war, records were being kept of the number of white and "non-
white" employees. Those records for the Boston yard for
September 1944 indicate that among the yard's 40,500 workers were
2216 nonwhites. Their distribution is as follows: 1048 in Group
II, 769 in Group III, one in Group IV(a), and 398 in Group IV(b).
By the following January, the total yard force had dropped to
31,000, but the number of nonwhite personnel had increased to
81
2356.
One of the Group III black mechanics was Bill Richards, who
started his thirty-year-long career at the yard in April 1942. As
81. Supplement to Form NAVEXOS-695 for Sept. 1944, 181-40, Box
297, A9-4; Supplementary to Form NAVEXOS-695 for Jan. 1945, 181-
40, Box 312, A9-4.
572
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an apprentice machinist, he participated in a forty-four-week
training program at what is now Boston Technical High School.
Richards then worked as both an inside and outside machinist. In
1978, he informed his interviewer that, when he began to work at
the yard, the feelings of white workers toward him was "very
bad." He stated:
Being a black person it was quite bad... there was a lot
of resentment. Many times when I went on board the ship
I was asked to send the mechanic along because they
didn't want to talk to a helper.
Apprarently, his white co-workers refused to give recognition to
82
Richards as a bona fide mechanic.
Establishment of the Personnel Relations Division
The size and character of the Navy's work force during World
War II gave the area of industrial relations special importance.
Doubtless the Navy concluded that proper management of personnel
affairs would assist in recruiting and retaining workers and
making them more productive. Of course, from their beginnings,
navy yards and their officers have always been involved in labor
relations. However, not until the late 1930s was it recognized
that personnel affairs was a special field and not until 1943
that a more or less complete personnel relations office was
included in navy yard organizations. Previous to July 1943, the
Boston yard had a number of programs to give assistance to
workers and to enlist their enthusiasm and talents more
effectively in the prosecution of the yard's work. But such
programs became more common and better organized after the
82. Oral History Interview, Bill Richards, BNHP, p. 3.
574
establishment of the Personnel Relations Department.
Both the Navy Department directive upon which it was based
and the Boston commandant's order of July 8, 1943, creating the
new unit, specifically assigned the Personnel Relations Officer
advisory functions only. He could not force his decisions or
policies on anyone. His effectiveness depended on personal powers
of persuasion and, indeed, salesmanship. In fact, Lt. Cdr. P.
S. Strecker, the Boston yard PRO in 1943 and 1944, likened
himself to a door-to-door salesman. Strecker advised other
personnel officers: "You've got to get enthusiasm; you have to
have a determination that you are going to sell that job
similar to a Fuller Brush salesman." Strecker claimed that
through persistent salesmanship he had been able to persuade
leadingmen, foremen, and master mechanics to attend a series of
personnel management conferences. Initially, only half of the
83
masters showed up, but ultimately he had perfect attendance.
Training Programs
The Personnel Relations Department was given oversight of
the several programs in the yard for training employees. A
training section had first appeared in 1941 in the Production
Division and under the supervision of the Shop Superintendent.
The programs, as subsequently administered by the Personnel
Relations Division, included the apprenticeship school; on-the-
job training; supplementary training; supervisor training; and
83. Conference of Personnel Officers, 7 Through 10 August 1944;
NAVEXOS 9-7 3, quoted in U.S. Naval Administration, World War II:
Office of Secretary of the Navy, Civilian Personnel , vol. I.
p. 518.
575
instructor training. Also the Training Division of Personnel
Relations conducted an indoctrination program for new workers.
All of the programs, except supplementary training, were
given on government time. Classroom instruction for trainees took
place in Building No. 79 in the main yard and in Building No. 16
in the annex at South Boston. The indoctrination sessions were
held in the Greeting Center, Building No. 34 of the Charlestown
site .
Of the training programs, the oldest and most arduous was
the apprenticeship school . Apprenticeship instruction began in
1868 and was formally organized as a school and on government
time in 1912. The traditional four-year program consisted of
instruction and of practical work in the shop of the trade for
which the apprentice was being prepared. Many officers and old
employees in the yard regarded apprenticeship as the only proper
way to produce competent mechanics. Therefore, they had doubts
about the wartime schemes to turn out skilled workers in far less
than four years. As a matter of fact, during the war the length
of apprenticeship was changed from four to two and a half years,
84
and a reduction made in hours of classroom instruction.
On-the-job training was designed to produce operators or
specialists to work in specific shops or to convert a worker from
one trade to another. The length of the training and the
proportion of classroom and shop instruction varied with the job
being learned. Men and women in this training program held Group
84. Dana, "Manpower and Industrial Relations," p. 14; U.S.
Naval Administration in World War II ; Office of the Secretary of
the Navy, Civilian Personnel , vol. I, p. 760.
576
II positions as helpers or "mechanic-learner," a special rating
created during the war and for which there existed only one
class, not three as was common in other ratings. Upon promotion
from mechanic-learner, the individual became a helper.
Supplementary Training provided instruction in blueprint
reading, mathematics, and trade theory to help existing employees
qualify for a more advanced rating. The most serious manpower
shortage at the Boston Navy Yard throughout the war was in the
ranks of supervisors, leadingmen, quartermen, foremen, and master
mechanics. A supervisory training course was given to improve
supervision and to familiarize supervisors with the techniques of
personnel management. The expansion of training activities at the
yard created a demand for instructors and led to a special twenty-
hour-long program. Training courses were offered for Group IV(b)
employees in such technical and scientific areas as mechanical
engineering, electrical engineering, marine engineering,
drafting, and naval architecture. Indoctrination was a program
given on their first day to all new employees, designed to
acquaint them with the yard and its rules and with safe work
practices .
At the end of October 1943, when the number of employees was
near its peak of 50,000, the various yard training programs had a
combined enrollment of 6300 people. In addition, 1068 new
workers had gone through the one-day indoctrination during the
month. On-the-job training, the largest of the various programs,
was being given to 5678 learners, helpers, and trainees. Four
hundred and sixty-eight were engaged in supplementary training in
a variety of trades. During the month, 123 men had completed the
577
shop supervisors' training course. The scientific and technical
training programs included eighty-nine Group IV(b) personnel, and
85
the apprenticeship program, fifty-seven young men.
Safety
The increase in the labor forces at navy yards produced
more deliberate safety programs, and in February 1941,
commandants were called upon to make greater efforts to reduce
the incidence of accidents and occupational diseases. Prior to
1943, the Boston yard had a safety section, but no expert in that
field. The first safety engineer was assigned to the yard in
February 1943. Later in the same year, a Safety Division was
established in the newly created Personnel Relations Department.
Efforts were made to eliminate unsafe conditions, such as
inadequately guarded machines, hazardous fumes and dust, insecure
stagings and ladders, and faulty weight-handling practices. The
safety program also included continuing plant inspection and
education of supervisors and employees.
Employees with long careers at the yard, stretching back
before Pearl Harbor, seem to agree that it was not until the
middle years of World War II that the safety program began to
have a conspicuous presence in the yard. That probably was owing
86
to the establishment of the Personnel Relations Department.
The Navy measured its accident prevention work in terms of a
85. Monthly Report of Employee Training, Oct. 31, 1943, 181-40,
Box 11, A9-4.
86. Oral History Interview, Lyman Carlow, pp. 10-11; Oral
History Interview, John Langan, p. 23; Oral History Interview,
Albert Mostone, p. 10.
578
lost-time-accident frequency rate. In 1945, the rate for all
shipyards, both private and government, was approximately 24.
During the war years, the rate at Boston varied from 8.8 in March
1945 to 23.5 in December 1943. Undigested data pertinent to
accidents appeared in the annual report of the yard's medical
officer. For the calendar year 1942, he reported his department
rendered treatment to civilian employees in 101,050 instances.
During that year, there were nine industrial and two
nonindustrial deaths. The report for 1943 report referred to
168,264 treatments and twelve industrial and three other deaths.
Although the labor force became smaller in 1944, that year saw
almost 180,000 treatments of civilian workers and a total of
twenty-four deaths, eight industrial and sixteen nonindustrial.
In his report for 1944, the medical officer stated that the
increase in nonindustrial deaths resulted from the employment of
persons in older age groups. Studies indicated that the accident
rate moved upward during those periods in which the Navy exerted
great pressure for the completion of new construction or of
87
repairs .
Stimulating Worker Productivity
With the establishment of the Personnel Relations Department,
greater attention was given to training, safety, and other
programs dealing with the civilian work force. The administra-
tion also made efforts to enlist workers in programs to increase
87. Dana, "Manpower and Industrial Relations," pp. 13-14; Annual
Sanitary Report for 1942, 181-40, Box 10 (1943), A9-1; Annual
Sanitary Report for 1943, 181-40, Box 296 (1944), A9-1; Annual
Sanitary Report for 1944, 181-40, Box 312 (1945), A9-1.
579
efficiency. On orders of the commandant, a fairly elaborate
system of War Production Committees went into effect in September
1943. Each shop or "other logical unit" elected from its
employees three to five persons. They would join with management
members, no greater in number than the employee members, to form
that shop's War Production Committee. Each shop committee
elected at least one of its members to serve on a yard-wide
committee to coordinate the activities of the station as a whole.
At a still higher level was a War Production Steering Committee,
with five employee members chosen from delegates to the yard-wide
committee. The senior management member of the Steering
Committee was to be a naval officer and chairman. The
commandant's order also called for the creation of subcommittees
88
in the various sections and subsections of shops.
The sole function of this apparatus was to decide on and
place into operation programs to increase production. The
committees acted in an advisory capacity to the commandant and
had no executive or administrative powers. The orders stipulated
that "it is to be clearly understood that the operation of such
committees will in no way interfere with the prerogatives and
responsibilities of Management." Nor were committees to concern
themselves with employee grievances. The War Production
Committees, which remained in operation until the Japanese
surrender, were involved in programs to fight absenteeism,
promote safety, and secure greater participation in the
88. Commandant's Order No. 193, Aug. 31, 1943, 181-40, Box 5,
A3-1.
580
Beneficial Suggestions system.
The last mentioned was an incentive program that had been in
operation since September 1941. Employees submitted concrete and
practical suggestions for improvements in industrial procedures
and equipment. A board reviewed the suggestions and gave awards
of money for the best. The program languished for several years,
but then participation increased greatly, in part because of an
increase in the amount of the awards and also because of the
backing of the War Production Committees.
Beneficial Suggestions and the crusades against absenteeism
and for safety became involved in a number of competitions in
1944. Individuals receiving the highest and second highest
Beneficial Suggestions awards each month won the right to
designate the sponsors and matrons of honor in the launching of
LSTs under construction in the yard. The same right was granted
to the shops with the lowest and second-lowest absentee rates and
to the shops with the best and next-to-best safety records.
Shops winning these competitions often selected one of their
89
women workers to participate in the launchings.
Problems with Workers
Absenteeism was fought through competitions, signs in
buildings, notices in the yard newspaper, and assistance in
solving transportation problems. The Public Relations Department
maintained a Transportation Office, where employees could obtain
89. Boston Navy Yard News , Jan. 15, 1944; Master, Sheet Metal
Work Shop to Commandant, Jul. 11, 1944; Master Woodworker to
Manager, Jun . 27, 1944, both in BNHP, RG 1, Series 16, Box 1.
581
information to assist them in finding gasoline and tires for
their cars. That office also maintained lists of drivers seeking
passengers for car pools and of workers in need of rides. The
Boston Navy Yard News occasionally published these lists.
Absentees also were subject to disciplinary action. Warning
letters were sent, and the threat of discharge remained for those
90
who missed six consecutive musters.
At the first conference of navy yard Personnel Relations
Officers in Washington in August 1943, one unidentified PRO,
probably from New York, noted that his yard had 2000 absences a
day, whereas Boston, with ninety percent as many employees, had
only fifty-nine. Commander Strecker of the Boston Navy Yard
indicated that the figures were faulty and suspected that Boston
yard workers were using sick leave to cloak absences. He said:
"I know we are not any better than any of the other yards on
absenteeism on the whole." Many of the officers attending the
conference favored abandoning the ancient six-muster rule,
91
apparently because of failure to enforce it.
Wartime did not seem to affect the matter of disciplinary
action against individual employees, except probably in a
quantitative fashion. The extant files of papers on particular
employees are enormous for the World War II period, consisting
of sometimes as many as three fat folders for each letter of the
alphabet for each year. What follows in the next several
90. Boston Navy Yard New s, Dec. 12, 1942.
91. Record of First Conference of Personnel Relations Officers,
Washington, Aug. 18, 19, 20, 1943, 181-40, Box 5, A3-2.
582
paragraphs is based on only a few documents found in the "C"
files for 1941 and 1943. Suspension and discharge continued to
be the major means by which yard administrators dealt with
instances of sleeping on the job, intoxication, and other forms
of improper behavior by civilian employees. Prior to the rapid
expansion of the labor force after Pearl Harbor, both the Civil
Service Commission and the Navy had no toleration for workers who
gave false information in their job application forms, as
Nicholas Carabitses discovered. Carabitses began his employment
at the yard on September 18, 1940, as an electrician's helper.
His application stated that he had graduated from high school,
where he had received extensive training and shop experience in
electricity. Moreover, he claimed to have worked for various
employers in the capacities of electrician's helper and
electrician. In the course of its "voucher check" in the
following spring, the Civil Service Commission determined none of
these claims were true, and Carabitses was promptly "discharged
92
with prejudice."
On July 5, 1941, two electricians at the South Boston Annex
were discovered intoxicated, apparently from imbibing on the job.
Obscene language and abusive behavior compounded their original
offense. Following a fairly extensive investigation of the
incident, they were discharged, despite the inquiry on their
behalf of Congressman John McCormack. Congressional influence
also proved unavailing in the case of two helpers caught sleeping
92. U.S. Civil Service Commission to Secretary of Navy, Jun. 18,
1941, and Personnel Officer to Nicholas L. Carabitses, Jul, 11,
1941, both in 181-40, Box 119, LA-C(l).
583
93
in a ship's compartment.
Disciplinary action in December 1943 included the
discharging of the following workers; a woman mechanic-learner
for twenty-five and one-half days of unauthorized absences since
the previous August; a chipper and calker for checking in and
then leaving the yard without permission; an engineman in the
Transportation Shop for "being implicated in the theft of
Government property"; and a gas cutter and burner for
intoxication. For sleeping in the bread locker of a destroyer,
one rigger was suspended for ten days without pay. Three
riggers and a shipfitter suffered three days' suspension for
playing cards in a shack at South Boston. Possibly the most
serious offense was committed by a buffer and polisher, who
assaulted a female employee. His punishment consisted of a
94
discharge and being deprived of payment for his accrued leave.
No documents have been found for the period before the early
spring of 1944, which offer a statistical insight into
disciplinary action. In March 1944, the Navy Department modified
its monthly form for reporting civilian personnel data and
included an entry for "Removals for Cause." Another change,
effective in July, broke the discharges into two categories,
93. Commandant to Henry Campbell, Jul. 19, 1941, and C. L. Brand
to John McCormack, Jul. 25, 1941, both in 181-40, Box 119, LA-
C(l); Joseph Cologey to Capt. C. L. Brand, Jun. 1, 1941, and C.
L. Brand to Joseph G. Cologey, Jun. 6, 1941, both in 181-40, Box
119, LA-C(l).
94. Commandant to Anna Cunningham, Dec. 21, 1943; Commandant to
Patrick Cunningham, Dec. 4, 1942; Commandant to Edward L.
Connors, Dec. 27, 1943; Commandant to Alphee Countre, Dec. 8,
1943; Commandant to Hubert Clark, Dec, 28, 1943; Commandant to
Nicola Ciccone, Dec. 8, 1943; Commandant to Edward Correia, Dec.
31, 1943, all in 181-40, Box 187, LA-C.
584
"Removals for abandonment of job" and "Other removals for cause."
During the months of April, May, and June of 1944, the total
removals for cause rose from 302 to 356. In July, ninety-seven
workers were discharged for abandoning their job and 178 for
other causes. Throughout the remainder of the war, the number of
discharges each month was less than that for the period of April
to July 1944, and the number removed for abandoning their jobs
was always less than those discharged for other causes. No other
patterns seem evident. For example, in October 1944, the yard
fired twenty-eight employees for abandoning their jobs and 147
95
for other causes. In June 1945, the figures were nine and 210.
The Personnel Relations Department of the Boston Navy Yard
had charge of dealings with unions and other organizations repre-
senting or consisting of yard employees. Neither of the two
existing histories which cover the yard during World War II nor
the wartime history of the First Naval District refer to any
difficulties the yard encountered with workers' organizations.
N. T. Dana reports that the yard had excellent relations with the
American Federation of Labor and the few independent unions with
members in the yard. The First Naval District filed reports on
240 strikes in its area, but apparently none occurred at the
96
Boston Navy Yard.
In November 1944, the general absence of union difficulties
was also noted by a board of officers making a survey of the
95. See Monthly Reports of Civilian Personnel for 1944, 181-40,
Box 297, A9-4; and for 1945, 181-40, Box 312, A9-4.
96. Dana, "Manpower and Industrial Relations," p. 17; U.S.
Naval Administration , World War II ; First Naval District , vol .
II, p. 33.
585
Boston yard, which reported on aspects of personnel relations as
well as other conditions. The inspectors found that "labor
relations, particularly with the AF of L, have been excellent."
They made special note that the relaxation of trade
jurisdictional lines had facilitated the increase in war
production. At the time of the survey, one group, the "UFWA,"
was then engaged in an organizing campaign among welders and
coppersmiths. This produced the "usual stressing and pressing of
97
grievances . "
With respect to other aspects of the yard's policies and
relations with its employees, the survey reached mixed
conclusions. The authors found among employees "considerable
loafing, quitting before the whistle blows, stand-by time, etc."
Notwithstanding the elaborate War Production Committees, the
survey claimed there were no regularly established shop
committees elected by the employees of the yard. The report
included no comments about training activities, except for noting
that the apprenticeship school had an enrollment of only twenty-
seven. The yard's safety program was deficient in a number of
respects. The safety record was not satisfactory; disciplinary
action against employees for safety violations was rare; safety
headwear, "almost universal in private yards, are noticeable by
their absence"; and guards were lacking on machines. The report
stated that an eye clinic had been established to provide
optically corrected goggles and to detect and reduce eye
disorders. On the other hand, "goggles are not worn as they
97. Industrial Activities Division, Nov. 25, 1944.
586
should be." With respect to general working conditions, the
survey gave the yard a rating of "only fair." It mentioned
inadequate lighting in the ropewalk and too little attention
paid in other shops to lighting intensity at working levels.
Wages and Salaries in Wartime
From 1939 to 1945, except briefly, the determination of
wages paid to manual workers at the Boston Navy Yard rested in
hands other than the yard 's Wage Board and the Department in
Washington. The wage board process, which centered on the
concept that navy yard wages should be consistent with the
prevailing rates paid in the area by commercial employers, had
been set aside during the depression, with the result that yard
employees received better wages than paid to workers in private
establishments. By 1940, because of the nation's expanding
shipbuilding industry, this was no longer the case, and the
Secretary of the Navy put into operation the wage board system.
Local wage boards submitted recommended schedules, the Wage
Review Board in Washington acted upon those recommendations, and
new schedules were ordered to take effect on November 18, 1940.
However, wages thereafter were determined by agreements reached
by committees of shipbuilding industry managers and labor
spokesmen, with officials of the government sitting as
98
observers .
Those agreements, known as Zone Standards Agreements,
98. Furer, pp. 910-13; U.S. Naval Administration, World War II :
Office of Secretary of the Navy , Civilian Personnel , vol. II, pp.
546-80.
587
received the support of the government, which sought to establish
uniformity of wages and working conditions and thus avoid the
labor piracy which had occurred during World War I. In 1942, the
National Shipbuilding Stabilization Committee emerged as the body
to administer and interpret the agreements. Industry, labor, and
government produced agreements for four zones, Boston being in
the Atlantic Coast Zone. The schedules placed in operation by
the Navy in 1940 remained in effect, although subject to
amendment by the Shipbuilding Stabilization Committee. Each of
the four zone standards agreements contained provisions for
automatic adjustments based on changes in the cost of living as
measured by statistics of the government's Labor Bureau.
From August 1943 to the end of the war, the National War
Labor Board had jurisdiction over pay rates in navy yards. That
board delegated its authority respecting Navy blue-collar workers
to the Secretary of the Navy, who in turn gave it to a Wage
Administration Section in the Division of Personnel Supervision
and Management and its successors. That section had a staff of
only six and relied primarily on the findings of the War Labor
Board, which made surveys in all geographic areas and in all
industries and set bracket rates that industries were required
to follow. Henceforth, separate wage schedules were not
published for each yard, but reliance placed on the
determinations of regional wages by the War Labor Board. Except
for new positions, not covered by War Labor Board brackets, local
yard wage boards were relatively inactive. Beginning in the
summer of 1943, the tendency of the national government was to
588
resist further increases in wages.
The curtailment of wage-fixing authority by boards of yard
officers and by the Department of the Navy had the tendency of
restraining protests by Navy yard workers, particularly in the
second half of the war. However, yard administrators were
sensitive to complaints about wages, since low rates for a
particular trade could result in the inability to recruit and
retain workers with those skills.
Persistence in protesting wages seemed to have had results,
not in securing an immediate change, but in the next round of
general adjustments in a wage schedule. This appears to be the
case in the wages paid Boston yard sandblasters . Before
November 18, 1940, the maximum hourly wage in the yard for sand-
blasters was $.864. That had been increased to $.87 in the new
schedule of November 1940, and that rate had been retained in a
schedule adjustment made in October 1941. Shortly after the
adjustment, a sandblasters' committee protested their wages in a
letter to the Secretary of the Navy, who responded that rates
were established on the basis of corresponding wages paid by
private shipyards in the vicinity as a result of the Atlantic
Coast Zone Standards Agreement. The Secretary also forwarded the
protest to the commandant at Boston, who sought from the commit-
tee data to demonstrate that the yard wage was less than that
prevailing in the area.
The committee produced evidence that at the Bethlehem Steel
Fore River plant, first-class sandblasters received $.93' an hour,
plus a bonus of between twenty and twenty-seven percent; that
General Electric at Lynn paid $1.05, plus a bonus of up to six
589
percent; and that sandblasters at the government's Watertown
Arsenal received $.98. The commandant made his own investiga-
tion, which led him to conclude that the yard rate was below that
prevailing in the area and to recommend an increase. No altera-
tion was made, however, until a general wage amendment in June
1942. Then the sandblasters received an increase of $.13, giving
99
them an hourly rate of $1.00.
The same amendment increased wages for drillers, who claimed
that they had not received an improved rate in the November 1940
schedule, since they had been erroneously informed that it was
not necessary for them to send a delegation to appear before the
Navy's Wage Review Board. Other shipbuilding trades which had
made presentations had won better wages. In the spring of 1942,
the yard drillers sent a protest to the Secretary of the Navy,
and they included data on wages paid at Fore River. That data,
incidentally, demonstrated that, although Bethlehem Steel was
paying its drillers more than the yard, the company gave its
workers no paid holidays and only one week's paid vacation after
three years of service and two weeks after fifteen years. In
June 1942, the Boston yard drillers received an increase which
100
brought them to the same level as most basic shipyard trades.
The amendment of June 1942 applied to all groups of manual
99. Commandant to Henry Swenbye, Sandblasters' Committee, Nov. 6,
1941; Sandblasters to Commandant, Nov. 19, 1941; Sandblasters,
Foundry, to Commandant, Jan. 23, 1942; Commandant to Assistant
Secretary of Navy (SED), Mar. 3, 1942, all in 181-40, Box 59
(1942), L16-1.
100. Committee Representing Drillers of Boston Navy Yard to
Secretary of Navy, n.d., 181-40, Box 59 (1942), L16-1; Assistant
Secretary of Navy to Commadant, May 21, 1942, Box 59, L16-1.
590
workers and to all trades at the Boston Navy Yard. Generally,
first-class helpers were assigned an hourly rate of $.83, and
the standard wage for most mechanics in shipyard trades was
$1.20. This constituted an increase of approximately $.15 over
the rates prevailing up to November 1940. By June 1942, wage
schedules had been amended to provide for unskilled workers who
held ratings as mechanic-learners. Only one class existed for
this category, and the wage was set at $.58, the lowest pay in
101
the yard.
In December 1942, the commandant of the Boston Navy Yard
began a campaign to improve wages for foundry chippers. This was
a separate rating, not to be confused with calkers and chippers,
who received $.26 an hour more. That wage difference was part of
the problem, because foundry chippers in the yard sought
transfers to the rating of calkers and chippers, since they would
earn substantially more. Also, the commandant determined that
three private firms in the area paid their foundry chippers wages
in excess of the $.94 rate used in the yard. The Navy Department
held that the increase recommended by the commandant would not be
in accord with the wage directives of the Director of Economic
Stabi lization .
In letters and through telephone calls to Washington, the
yard sought to win approval of better wages for foundry chippers.
It was noted that such mechanics, who had been employees from two
to fifteen years, were working alongside recently hired women,
101. Assistant Secretary of Navy, Circular Letter, June 16,
1942, 181-40, Box 59, L16-1.
591
who had attended burners school and were making $1.14, ten cents
more. Moreover, the foundry chippers could go to private plants
in Fore River and Hingham and be immediately hired as calkers and
chippers. The yard was losing its foundry chippers, since it was
difficult to hire new ones, and those already employed were
serving six months and then going elsewhere at a higher rate of
pay. The yard and its foundry chippers were caught in a situa-
tion created by a desire of the government to hold the line on
wages and the inability simply to reclassify foundry chippers as
102
chippers and calkers.
As evident in the instance of the foundry chippers,
occasionally navy yards encountered disadvantages in labor
procurement because of the failure to pay prevailing wage rates.
Also, private shipbuilding companies were more ready to give a
new employee a rating higher than his experience warranted. In
addition, the Navy did not use any scheme of wage bonuses or
103
other system of incentives found in commercial establishments.
The war years saw a number of changes in the distribution of
types of workers at the Boston Navy Yard. The general tendency
was to upgrade Group I laborers to Group II, and by the end of
1944, the yard had no employees in Group I. The proportion
between workers and supervisors dropped, although the recruitment
102. Commandant to Assistant Secretary of Navy, Dec. 21, 1942,
181-40, Box 59, L16-1; Assistant Secretary of Navy to Commandant,
May 27, 1943; Digest of Telephone Conversation, Jun . 9, 1943,
both in 181-40, Box 55, L16-2.
103. U.S. Naval Administration, World War II : Office of
Secretary of the Navy : Civilian Personnel , vol. II, pp. 371-4.
592
of employees with little or no industrial experience required a
greater, not a lesser, number of supervisory personnel.
Navy yard employees in Group IV(b) had never been covered by
the wage schedules produced through yard Labor Boards, and their
salaries had been established by acts of Congress. This created
rigidity and resulted in white-collar employees falling behind
manual workers in matters of compensation. Similarly, the
categories of Group IV(b) positions were items of congressional
legislation, particularly the 1930 Brookhart Amendment to the
Classification Act of 1923.
The size of the Group IV(b) work force at the Boston Navy
Yard increased along with the blue-collar force. Especially in
its new construction program, the yard was engaged in mass
production, and such industrial activity required what appeared
to some as an excessive number of office personnel.
In its report, the survey board visiting the yard in
November 1944 noted some inequities in the conditions prevailing
among Group IV(b) employees. The classification of many in this
group was such as to result in their receiving less in the way of
compensation than manual workers. Also they suffered because of
restrictions on overtime. These problems were not the result of
policies of the yard or of the Navy, but required reforms in
basic legislation. Some alterations occurred during the war. In
May 1943, Congress enacted a War Overtime Act, which enabled
office workers to be paid for overtime, but at the same time
limited the number of IV(b) workers the Navy could employ. At the
very end of the war, Congress provided for increases of about
593
fifteen percent in the salaries of white-collar employees of the
104
Navy.
SHIP CONSTRUCTION, REPAIR, CONVERSION
The years of World War II, 1939 to 1945, constitute the most
active and productive era in the entire history of the Boston
yard. Compared to previous and subsequent periods, the amount of
ship work undertaken by the yard seems incredible. The facility,
including its several annexes, constructed almost three hundred
vessels, docked 2432, outfitted 1100, commissioned 120
constructed elsewhere, converted or reconverted seventy-four, and
overhauled or repaired more than 3000.
In addition to the emergency circumstances generated first
by the likelihood of and then the actual state of war, the years
1933 to 1945 are unique in the story of the Boston Navy Yard,
since the facility served primarily as a site for the
construction of new vessels. To be sure, the repair record is
staggering, but during most of the period, more workers were
engaged in building ships than in repairing them.
Several circumstances launched the yard on its thirteen-
year-long career as chiefly a builder. In 1931, funds became
available for the construction of ships originally authorized in
the navy bill of 1916. Two Farragut -class destroyers included in
this program, MacDonough and Monaghan , became the Boston Navy
Yard's first new construction since completion of W hitney in
1924. Work on the destroyers did not begin until the spring of
104. Civil Service Commission, Dec. 18, 1943, 181-40, Box 56,
L16-4; Industrial Activities Survey, Nov. 25, 1944.
594
Table No. 14: TOTAL VESSELS DRY-DOCKED, BOSTON NAVY YARD,
1938-1958
19 19
38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58
700
650
600
550
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
(SOURCE: Mansfield, p. 100; Yard
Log, 181-58)
lillliliU
19
38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 5:
595
1933. By that time, the nation had a new chief executive, and to
combat unemployment, stimulate steel production, and revive a
moribund shipbuilding industry, President Roosevelt used
$281 million of National Recovery Administration funds to build
ships for the Navy. That action, of course, also strengthened
the American fleet, which had slipped behind the forces of other
naval powers. Among the industrial activities benefitting from
the NIRA program was the Boston yard, which received contracts
for the destroyers Case and Conyngham . In 1934, Congress passed
the Vinson-Trammel Act, providing for a continuous program of
naval construction during the remainder of the decade. That
legislation contained the authorization for seventeen additional
destroyers built at Boston, work which was not concluded until
after Pearl Harbor.
A second Vinson Act in 1938 authorized a twenty percent
overall tonnage increase in the American Navy, and after the fall
of France in 1940, Congress approved and appropriated funds for
no less than a seventy percent increase. These measures, the
Lend-Lease act of March 1940, and wartime appropriations
accounted for the bulk of the new construction produced at the
Boston Navy Yard during World War II. The yard's new construction
consisted primarily of destroyers, destroyer escorts, and landing
craft .
The Destroyer Program
Beginning with the laying of the keel of MacDonough in May
1933 and ending with the commissioning of Richard P . Leary in
February 1944, the Boston Navy yard completed thirty-six
596
Table No. 15
DESTROYERS CONSTRUCTED AT BOSTON NAVY YARD,
1933-1945
No.
Name
Class
Date Au-
Keel
Date Com-
thorized
Laid
missioned
351
MacDonough
Farragut
4/20/16
5/15/33
3/15/35
354
Monaghan
Farragut
4/20/16
11/21/33
4/19/35
370
Case
Mahan
6/16/33
9/19/34
9/15/36
371
Conyngham
Mahan
6/16/33
9/19/34
11/4/36
389
Mugf ord
Craven
3/17/34
10/28/35
8/16/37
390
R. Talbot
Gridley
3/27/34
10/28/35
10/14/37
402
Mayrant
Benham
3/27/34
4/15/37
9/19/39
403
Trippe
Benham
3/27/34
4/15/37
11/1/39
415
'Brien
Sims
3/27/34
5/31/38
3/2/40
416
Walke
Sims
3/17/34
5/31/38
4/27/40
425
Madison
Benson
3/27/34
12/19/38
8/6/40
426
Lansdale
Benson
3/27/34
12/19/38
9/17/40
433
Gwin
Gleaves
3/27/34
6/1/39
1/15/41
434
Meredith
Gleaves
3/27/34
6/1/39
3/1/41
441
Wilkes
Gleaves
5/17/38
11/1/39
4/22/41
442
Nicholson
Gleaves
5/17/38
11/1/39
6/3/41
461
Forrest
Bristol
3/17/34
1/3/41
1/13/42
462
Fitch
Bristol
3/27/34
1/3/41
2/3/42
632
Cowie
Benson
7/19/40
3/18/41
6/1/42
633
Knight
Gleaves
7/19/40
3/18/41
6/23/42
635
Earle
Benson
7/19/40
6/14/41
8/1/42
634
Doran
Fletcher
7/19/40
6/14/41
8/4/42
476
Hutchins
Fletcher
3/27/34
9/27/41
11/17/42
472
Guest
Fletcher
3/27/34
9/27/41
12/15/42
473
Bennet
Fletcher
3/27/34
12/10/41
2/9/43
474
Ful lam
Fletcher
3/27/34
12/10/41
3/2/43
475
Hudson
Fletcher
3/27/34
2/20/42
4/13/43
581
Charette
Fletcher
7/19/40
2/20/42
5/18/43
582
Conner
Fletcher
7/19/40
4/16/42
6/18/43
583
Hall
Fletcher
7/19/40
4/16/42
7/7/43
584
Hal ligan
Fletcher
7/19/40
11/9/42
8/19/43
585
Haraden
Fletcher
7/19/40
11/9/42
9/16/43
586
Newcomb
Fletcher
7/19/40
3/19/43
11/10/43
662
Bennion
Fletcher
12/23/41
3/19/43
12/4/43
663
H.L. Edwards
Fletcher
12/23/41
7/4/43
1/26/44
664
R.P. Leary
Fletcher
12/23/41
7/4/43
2/23/44
(SOURCE: Tables Nos . 15, 17, 18, and 19 have been compiled from
information in DANFS; Manfield, pp. 91-96; Construction
Notebooks, BNHP, RG 1, Series 40A, vols. I and II.)
597
destroyers- During that period, major changes occurred in the
design of warships of this type.
Most destroyers built in the 1930s had displacements of 1500
tons, the maximum permitted by the 1930 London Naval Treaty.
Ships of the Farragut class, constructed in the early part of the
decade, were the first American destroyers designed since the
four stackers of World War I. Although the Farraguts ' propulsion
systems generated greater horsepower, their main turbines,
reduction gears, boilers, and feed systems were practically
unchanged from the vessels built in the second decade of the
twentieth century. America's World War I destroyers had been
designed by New York Shipbuilding. That company, Bethlehem
Shipbuilding, and Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company
constituted the "Big Three," which had built all of the Navy's
privately constructed ships between 1918 and 1933. These
companies held licenses from a British firm for the fabrication
of turbines and exerted considerable pressure on the Navy not to
105
make alterations in propulsion systems.
Mahan -class destroyers, of which the Boston Navy Yard built
two, included a major innovation in their machinery, since they
were the the first Navy ships to be powered by high-pressure,
high-temperature propulsion systems and high-speed turbines with
double reduction gears and direct coupled cruising turbines. As
design agent for those systems, the Navy used the New York firm
105. Donald W. Mitchell, Histor y of the American Navy; From 1883
to Pearl Harbor (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), p. 358; Harold
Bowen , Ships , Machinery , and Mossbacks : The Autobiography of a
Naval Engineer (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), p.
55.
598
of Gibbs and Cox, which had designed high-pressure, high-
temperature equipment for merchant vessels during the 1920s.
Appointment of Gibbs and Cox as agent ended American naval
dependence on British machinery design.
Because of the resistance from the Big Three and their
allies within the Navy Department to the innovative propulsion
systems, the Maha n class became controversial. Moreover, as the
first of a kind, the ships contained flaws. Even their defenders
recognize that they were congested, and major machinery repairs
sometimes required opening holes in their sides. In a few
106
instances, deck plating buckled.
Vessels in the classes after the Mahans were essentially
similar, although having higher-pressure, higher-temperature
turbines. The Craven class, which included Mugford and Talbo t,
built at Boston, was the first of a group of single stackers.
Also beginning with this class, all main guns were in a gunhouse,
which previously had only contained forward armament.
Some thirty-five American destroyers, starting with No. 397,
became known as the "top-heavy" or the "over-weight" ships,
because of problems with stability. No danger existed of their
turning over, but when fuel oil, ammunition, and stores all
became low, they did not respond quickly to "hard-over-helm."
Consequently, another controversy arose, one aspect of which was
antagonism between the Bureau of Construction and Repair and the
Bureau of Engineering. That situation contributed to the
decision to merge the two bureaus into a single Bureau of
106. Bowen, pp. 59-60; Navy Year Book (New York: Duell, Sloan
and Pearce, 1944), p. 208.
599
107
Ships. The Boston yard constructed six of the controversial
destroyers .
Two new classes of destroyers appeared during the war years,
ships in one of them, the Fletchers , being built at Boston.
Propulsion systems had increased from the 42,800 horsepower of
the Farragut s to 60,000. However, with displacements of 2050
tons and equipped with heavier loading of armament, electronic
gear, and personnel complements, their speed dropped to thirty-
five knots, as compared to the thirty-seven knots of the Bristol
class. Fletchers generally were armed with five 5-inch guns,
five 40mm or seven 20mm antiaircraft guns, two 21-inch quintuple
torpedo tubes, and eight depth charge throwers and projectors.
The Boston Navy Yard's career as a builder of destroyers
stretched from May 1933 to February 1944. Of the thirty-six
ships built at the yard, work on twelve commenced before 1939.
Usually, destroyers, destroyer escorts, and other ships, whether
built in dry dock or on shipways, were constructed in pairs. On
May 15, 1933, MacDonough was started in Dry Dock No. 1. Six
months later, the keel of Monaghan was laid in the same dock.
When the dock was flooded on August 22, 1934, for the launching
of MacDonough , M onaghan was transferred to Dry Dock No. 2, where
she was completed. The launching of the second destroyer came in
January 1935. Thereafter, the general practice was to lay two
keels in the same facility on the same day, to construct the
ships at the same pace, and to float or launch them at the same
107. Bowen, pp. 115-8.
600
time. A variation of this pattern occurred in the late thirties,
when Dry Dock 2 had four destroyers under construction at the
same time. Work on 'Brien and Walke began in the dock in May
1938 and on Madison and Lansdale in the following December. The
launching of all four occurred on October 20, 1939. In one
instance, there was no simultaneous launching of both ships in a
pair. The keels for the first vessels constructed on Shipways
No. 1, M eredith and Gwin , were laid on June 1, 1939, but Meredith
went down the ways on April 24, 1940, and Gwin one month later.
Although vessels became heavier and more complicated, the yard
reduced the construction period from two years in the mid-30s to
slightly more than eight months by the time it completed its last
two ships early in 1944.
TABLE NO. 16: UTILIZATION OF SHIPBUILDING FACILITIES, 1933-1954
Vessel Dry Dock Dry Dock Shipways Shipways Dry Dock
Type No. 1 No. 2 No . 1 No . 2 No . 5
DDs ~T~ 13 14 8
DEs 4 20 42
LSDs 12 2 2
LSTs 9 17 14 6
AVPs 2
APLs 4 2
APBs 6
Submarines 4
TOTALS ~T~ 23 43 52 54
(SOURCE: Construction Notebooks, 1933-1946, BNHP, RG I, Series
4A, vols. I-III. Data in the table is based on the facility from
which the vessels were launched or floated.)
The thirty-six destroyers built at the Boston Navy Yard from
1933 to 1945 had varied war experiences. Thirty-three served in
the war in the Pacific, twelve being first assigned to the
601
Atlantic or to the European theatre before their transfer to
participate in the struggle against Japan. Five of the first six
ships constructed at the yard survived the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor. During the war, a half-dozen Boston-built
destroyers perished. Enemy torpedoes, mines, gun fire, or air
attack demolished five vessels, and a Pacific typhoon wrecked
the other. After returning from the war in Europe, five of the
108
destroyers were converted to high-speed minesweepers.
Destroyer Escorts
In the spring of 1942, the Boston Navy Yard began
construction of its first two destroyer escorts. Such ships
represent a design innovation, required by the operations of
German submarines. Neither the British nor the American navies
were prepared for antisubmarine warfare. Early in the war,
German U-boats achieved great success against Allied shipping.
For example, in January and February 1940, they sank eighty-five
ships, aggregating 280,829 tons, and in the single month of June
1940, the figure was 585,496 tons. Convoys proved the most
effective defense against submarine attacks on shipping, and
convoys required escort vessels. The British were hard pressed
to provide escorts, and it was in that connection that in May
1940, Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill sought from the United
States the loan of fifty World War I destroyers.
Although destroyers proved excellent escorts, their high
108. Information about the wartime careers of particular ships
is taken from DANFS.
602
speeds and versatile weaponry exceeded the requirements, and
their services could be better used elsewhere. Needed were
smaller vessels which could be built more rapidly and at lower
costs. Thus the destroyer escort appeared, a smaller version of
the destroyer, slower and especially designed for antisubmarine
warfare. Britain and Canada began to construct such vessels, and
American production commenced in July 1941.
All American-built destroyer escorts were of the same basic
design, although variations in hulls, propulsion systems, and
armaments produced seven different types. Some of the ships had
hulls 289 feet, five inches in length, and others were 306 feet
long. Power plants consisted of either diesel engines or steam
turbines. Use of diesels resulted from a shortage of turbines
and constituted a design compromise, since the vessels had less
horsepower and thus slower speeds. The Navy elected to equip
some of the escorts with diesel engines, rather than cut back the
number of ships being constructed. The chief variation
respecting armament centered on the main guns. Ships produced
early in the escort program had 3-inch weapons, and some of those
109
built later had 5-inch guns.
The sixty-two destroyer escorts constructed at the Boston
Navy Yard were covered by four contracts awarded to the yard.
All of the first twelve, DE-1 through DE-12, were originally
intended for transfer to Great Britain under the Lend-Lease
program. Five of them in fact were delivered to the British Navy,
109. U.S. Naval Administration in World War II : An Administrative
History of the Bureau of Ships , vol. I, p. 94.
603
as were twenty-six built later. The other three contracts
covered DE-256 through DE-280; DE-516 through DE-530; and DE-531
through DE-540. Several additional contracts for escorts were
canceled by the Navy Department.
The escorts built by the yard under the first three
contracts were identical, having short hulls and being powered by
General Motors diesel electric tandem motors, which produced 6000
horsepower and gave them a design speed of twenty-one knots.
They had displacements of 1140 tons and main armaments of three
3-inch guns. The ten ships built under the last contract, DE-531
through DE-540, were of the long-hull or 306-foot type. Their
Westinghouse or General Motors turbines and reduction drive gave
them propulsion systems producing 12,000 horsepower and speeds
of twenty-four knots. DE-531 through DE-540 had two 5-inch guns
and displacements of 1350 tons.
Three of the sixty-two Boston built destroyer escorts were
completed after the war ended. Qsberg entered commission in
December 1945. Although the yard launched Wagner and Vandi ver
in December 1943, the vessels remained hal f -finished until 1954
and 1955, when they were completed as radar picket escort ships.
Four other hulls had been launched as part of the yard's wartime
destroyer escort program, but the Navy canceled further work and
the hulls were scrapped.
Great Britain received thirty-one of the escorts
constructed at Boston, four of which were sunk during the war.
The United States regained some of the remainder after
hostilities ceased. All of the twenty-eight destroyer escorts
604
that served with the American Navy survived the war. Seven had
been on escort duty in the Atlantic and sixteen in the Pacific.
Three, completed toward the end of the program, served as school
or training ships.
The Boston Navy Yard built all of its destroyer escorts on
Shipways No. 1, Shipways No. 2, and Shipways No. 3, later known
as Dry Dock No. 5. The last of these had been especially
constructed for fabrication of escorts and turned out forty-two
vessels of this type. It received the keels of the first two,
Bayntun and Bazel , in early April 1942. After their launching in
late June, a short hiatus occurred in the escort construction, as
priority was briefly assigned to LSTs . In the following
September, the escort program went into high gear, and ships were
built at a rapid pace until early 1944.
All of the escorts constructed on Shipways No. 1 and No. 2
were worked on in pairs. That pattern also generally prevailed
at Shipways No. 3. However, at the height of the escort program,
that facility also built three sets of four vessels, DEs 274
through 277, 521 through 524, and 525 through 528. Shipways No.
3 's size and versatility and wartime pressures resulted in other
innovations. Seven escorts were built essentially in halves,
first from frame No. 38 1/2 to the stern or bow and then the
remaining section. The most complex arrangement in Shipways No. 3
occurred in the autumn of 1942. Keels were laid on September 17
for all of BDE-3 and half of BDE-4, and on September 22 for LST-
309 and the after section of LST-310. All four units were
605
Table No. 17: DESTROYER ESCORTS BUILT AT BOSTON NAVY YARD
No
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
Name
Keel
Date Com-
Notes
Laid
missioned
Bayntun
4/5/42
Transferred
to
G.B.
Bazel
4/5/42
Transferred
to
G.B.
Berry
9/22/42
Transferred
to
G.B.
Blackwood
9/22/42
Transferred
to
G.B.
Evarts
10/17/42
4/15/43 i
Vtl,
Med
Wyf fels
10/17/42
4/21/43 i
Atlantic
Griswold
11/17/42
4/28/43
Paci
.fie
Steele
11/27/4-2
5/4/43
Pacific
Carlson
11/27/42
5/10/43 :
Pacific
Bebas
11/27/42
5/15/43 :
Pacific
Crouter
12/8/42
5/25/43
Paci
.fie
Burges
12/8/42
Transferred
to
G.B.
Seid
1/10/43
6/11/43
Pacific
Smartt
1/10/43
6/18/43
Atlantic
W.S. Brown
1/10/43
6/25/43 1
^led,
Atl
W.C. Miller
1/10/43
7/2/43
Pacific
Cabana
1/27/43
7/9/43
Pacific
Dionne
1/27/43
7/16/43
Pacific
Canf ield
2/23/43
7/22/43
Pacific
Deede
2/23/43
7/29/43
Pacific
Elden
2/23/43
8/4/43
Pacific
Cloues
2/23/43
8/10/43
Pacf ic
Capel
3/11/43
Transferred
to
G.B.
Cooke
3/11/43
Transferred
to
G.B.
Dacres
4/7/43
Transferred
to
G.B.
Domett
4/7/43
Transferred
to
G.B.
Foley
4/7/43
Transferred
to
G.B.
Garlies
4/7/43
Transferred
to
G.B.
Gould
4/23/43
Transferred
to
G.B.
Grindall
4/23/43
Transferred
to
G.B.
Gardiner
5/20/43
Transferred
to
G.B.
Goodall
5/20/43
Transferred
to
G.B.
Goodson
5/20/43
Transferred
to
G.B.
Gore
5/20/43
Transferred
to
G.B.
Keats
6/5/43
Transferred
to
G.B.
Kempthorne
6/5/43
Transferred
to
G.B.
Kingsmill
7/9/43
Transferred
to
G.B.
Lawford
7/9/43
Transferred
to
G.B.
Louis
7/9/43
Transferred
to
G.B.
Lawson
7/9/43
Transferred
to
G.B.
Paisley
7/18/43
Transferred
to
G.B.
Loring
7/18/43
Transferred
to
G.B.
Hoste
8/14/43
Transferred
to
G.B.
Moorsom
8/14/43
Transferred
to
G.B.
Manners
8/14/43
Transferred
to
G.B.
Mounsey
8/14/43
Transferred
to
G.B.
Inglis
9/25/43
Transferred
to
G.B.
Inman
9/25/43
Transferred
to
G.B.
'Toole
9/25/43
1/22/44
Atlantic
J.J. Powers
9/25/43
2/29/44
Atlantic
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266 Capel 3/11/43 Transferred to G.B. (sank)
267
268
269
270
271
272 Gould 4/23/43 Transferred to G.B. (sank)
273
274
275 Goodall Transferred to G.B. (sank)
276
277
278
279
280
516 Lawford 7/9/43 Transferred to G.B. (sank
606
(Table No. 17: Destroyer Escorts, continued)
No. Name Keel Commissoned
Notes
529
Mason
10/14/43
3/20/44
Atlantic
530
Bermingham
10/14/43
4/8/44
Atlantic
531
E.H. Allen
8/31/43
12/16/43
(school ship)
532
Tweedy
8/31/43
2/12/44
(train, ship)
533
H.F. Clark
10/8/43
5/25/44
Pacific
534
Si 1 verstein
10/8/43
7/14/44
Pacific, Korea
535
Lewis
11/3/43
9/5/44
536
Rivin
11/3/43
10/31/44
Pacific
537
Rizzi
11/3/43
6/26/45
(train, ship)
538
Osberg
11/3/43
12/10/45
539
Wagner
11/8/43
11/22/55
Completed as DER 539
540
Vandi ver
11/8/43
10/11/55
Completed as DER 540
(SOURCE:
See Table 15,
p. 597. )
Table No.
18: MISCELLANEOUS SHIPS
CONSTRUCTED AT BOSTON NAVY YAR
DURING WORLD WAR II
No
Name
Type
Keel
Laid
Date
Launched
Date Com-
missioned
YSD
YRB
YD
AVP
AVP
YSD
YSD
YSD
YSR
APL
APL
APL
APL
APB
APB
APL
APL
SS
SS
SS
SS
APB
APB
YFN
YFN
APB
APB
YF
11
1
77
21
22
20
22
23
3
11
12
13
32
38
39
33
34
522
523
524
525
3 5
40
891
892
36
37
893
Humbolt
Matagorda
Marlboro
Mercer
Amber jack
Grampus
Pickerel
Grenadier
Benewah
Nueces
Col leton
Echols
S 'Plane
Sub Rep
Float.
S 'Plane
S 'Plane
S 'Plane
S 'Plane
S 'Plane
Sludge
Barrack
Barrack
Barrack
Barrack
Barrack
Barrack
Barrack
Barrack
Submari
Submari
Submari
Submari
Barrack
Barrack
Cov'd L
Cov'd L
Barrack
Barrack
Cov'd L
Derr
Barge
Derrick
Tender
Tender
Derrick
Derrick
Derrick
Barge
s Ship
Ship
Ship
Ship
Ship
Ship
Ship
Ship
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
ne
ne
ne
ne
s Ship
s Ship
ighter
ighter
s Ship
s Ship
ighter
5/16/40
6/10/40
9/6/40
9/6/40
11/12/41
11/12/41
11/20/41
10/7/41
8/5/44
8/5/44
9/5/44
9/5/44
8/25/44
8/25/44
11/18/44
11/18/44
2/8/44
2/8/44
2/8/44
2/8/44
1/2/45
1/2/45
5/7/45
5/7/45
6/9/45
6/9/45
6/6/45
8/21/40
8/22/40
3/17/41
3/18/41
3/6/41
2/14/41
2/15/41
12/31/41
9/4/44
9/4/44
10/12/44
10/12/44
11/17/44
11/17/44
1/1/45
1/1/45
12/15/44
12/15/44
12/15/44
12/15/44
5/6/45
5/6/45
6/9/45
6/9/45
7/30/45
7/30/45
7/30/45
11/15/40
8/30/40
1942
2/7/42
3/24/42
5/31/41
4/30/41
5/8/41
5/10/42
10/9/44
10/23/44
11/19/44
1/17/45
8/17/45
9/18/45
4/4/45
5/15/45
3/25/46
5/1/50
7/25/49
5/23/51
3/18/46
11/29/45
7/10/45
7/10/45
9/27/46
12/30/47
8/18/45
SOURCE
See Table 15, p. 597. )
607
launched on November 23.
During World War II, the Navy ordered the construction of
more than one thousand destroyer escorts, utilizing its own
yards and private shipbuilding firms, including experienced
builders and newcomers, some of which were inland. Among the
many facilities fabricating these vessels, the Boston yard became
the pacesetter. It was the first shipbuilder, either government
or private, to deliver four ships in one month, May 1943, and
then five in a single month, July 1943. In each of the months of
August and September of the same year, the yard completed six
vessels. Boston's delivery of forty-six escorts in 1943 was also
a record. At the peak of the escort program, it took Boston Navy
110
Yard workers a mere four months to produce a completed vessel .
Landing Craft
Although the Navy began experiments with small landing craft
in the 1930s, no one in the United States or among the Allies
anticipated the demand which arose in World War II for vessels
capable of landing large numbers of men and vehicles on enemy-
held beaches. Such craft were required for the opening of a
second front in Europe and for advances against the Japanese in
the Pacific. These considerations led to the American landing
craft program, "the most stimulating and spectacular of all
design programs in World War II." In 1942, one billion dollars
was earmarked for that program. There came into being fifteen
basic types of landing craft, ranging in size from rubber boats,
110. Mansfield, pp. 19-20
608
carrying six men, to LSDs , Landing Ship Dock, 450 feet long and
111
designed to transport and launch other landing craft.
The Boston Navy Yard participated in the landing craft
program, producing 150 LCM (3)s, tank lighters, and forty- four
LSTs , tank landing ships. At the very end of the war, the yard
constructed four LSDs.
The LST was a response to the Allies' need for a relatively
large, seaworthy ship with the capability of delivering tanks and
other vehicles in amphibious assaults on Fortress Europe. The
Bureau of Ships quickly produced the basic design, a vessel with
an extensive ballast system that could be filled to give the deep
draft required for travel on the high seas and that could be
emptied to provide the shallow draft essential for beaching
operations. Final plans provided for a ship 328 feet in length
and fifty in width, with a minimum draft of three feet, nine
inches. LSTs could carry tanks and other vehicles aggregating
2100 tons. An elevator lowered tanks from the main to the tank
deck, which was equipped with ventilators to remove the exhaust
112
when tank motors were running.
Assigned top priority, the LST program went rapidly forward,
with contracts let even before the completion of a test vessel.
The first keel was laid at Newport News, Virginia, on June 10,
1942. The Boston Navy Yard, not far behind, started its first
pair of LSTs two weeks later. By the end of the war, navy yards
111. U.S. Naval Administration in World War II ; An
Administrative History of the Bureau of Ships , vol. I, p. 94.
112. For a description of the development of LSTs, see DANFS,
vol. VII, pp. 569-72.
609
and private firms had built 1,051 of these vessels.
The LST program at the Boston Navy yard consisted of two
main stages. First came the construction of LST-301 through 310
during the period from June 1942 to January 1943. In December
1943, after an eleven-month interruption, the yard resumed the
program, building LST-980 through 1003 and LST-1028 through 1037.
That stage was over in September 1944. In July and August 1945,
the yard laid two more LST keels, the vessels not being completed
until several years later.
To expedite fabrication of the LSTs , the Navy resisted
changes in design. However, some alterations appeared, and the
vessels built at the Boston yard during the second stage of its
program differed from the first ten. A ramp replaced the
elevator connecting the main and tank decks, armament was
increased, a distilling plant added, and the main deck
strengthened to accomodate a fully equipped LCT. Further
changes were made in the two ships constructed by the yard in the
years 1945 to 1949. LST-1153 and LST-1154 were the only steam-
powered vessels of their type built by the Navy. They also had
greater cargo carrying capacity and better berthing arrangements
than those constructed during the war.
Three of the LSTs built at Boston in the summer of 1944 were
converted into landing craft repair ships (ARLs). In the
conversions, the bow doors were removed and the bow sealed. To
enable the vessels to haul aboard and repair damaged landing
craft, ARLs were equipped with derricks, cranes, winches, and
blacksmith, machine and electrical shops.
From its inception, the LST program held a high priority,
610
Table No. 19: LSTS BUILT AT BOSTON NAVY YARD DURING WORLD WAR II
Number
Keel
Date
Date Com-
Notes
Laid
Launched
missioned
301
6/26/42
9/15/42
11/1/42
Transferred
to GB
302
6/26/42
9/15/42
11/10/42
Transferred
to GB
303
7/3/42
9/21/42
11/20/42
Transferred
to GB
304
7/3/42
9/21/42
11/29/42
Transferred
to GB
305
7/24/42
10/10/42
12/6/42
Tr. to GB (sank)
306
7/24/42
10/10/42
12/11/42
Italy, Normandy
307
9/15/52
11/9/42
12/23/42
Italy, Normandy
308
9/15/42
11/9/42
1/2/43
Italy, Normandy
309
9/22/42
11/23/42
1/11/43
Italy, Normandy
310
9/22/42
11/23/42
1/20/43
Italy, Normandy
980
12/9/43
1/27/44
2/26/44
Normandy
981
12/9/43
1/27/44
3/11/44
Normandy, Pacific
982
12/22/43
2/10/44
3/19/44
Normandy, Pacific
983
12/22/43
2/10/44
3/25/44
Normandy
984
1/3/44
2/25/44
4/7/44
985
1/3/44
2/25/44
4/7/44
986
1/15/44
3/5/44
4/14/44
Pacific
987
2/2/44
3/5/44
4/19/44
988
2/10/44
3/12/44
4/25/44
S. France
989
2/10/44
3/12/44
4/28/44
S. France
990
2/26/44
3/27/44
5/1/44
Pacific
991
2/26/44
3/27/44
5/6/44
Pacific
992
3/5/44
4/7/44
5/10/44
Pacific
993
3/7/44
4/7/44
5/12/44
Pacific
994
3/12/44
4/17/44
5/17/44
S. France
995
3/12/44
4/17/44
5/20/44
S. France
996
3/27/44
5/2/44
5/23/44
S. France, Pacific
997
3/27/44
5/12/44
5/26/44
S. France
998
4/8/44
5/14/44
5/29/44
999
4/8/44
5/14/44
5/30/44
Pacific
1000
4/18/44
5/26/44
6/14/44
Pacific
1001
4/18/44
5/26/44
6/20/44
Pacific
1002
5/3/44
6/8/44
6/25/44
Pacific
1003
5/3/44
6/8/44
6/28/44
Redesignated
ARL-10
1028
5/15/44
6/18/44
7/7/44
Pacific
1029
5/15/44
6/18/44
7/13/44
Pacific
1030
5/27/44
6/25/44
7/19/44
Pacific
1031
5/27/44
6/25/44
7/25/44
Pacific
1032
6/9/44
7/9/44
8/1/44
Pacific
1033
6/9/44
7/9/44
8/12/44
Pacific
1034
6/26/44
8/4/44
8/26/44
Pacific
1035
6/26/44
8/4/44
9/1/44
Pacif if
1036
6/10/44
8/24/44
9/15/44
Redesignated
ARL-11
1037
6/10/44
8/24/44
9/21/44
Redesignated
. ARL-12
1153
7/19/45
4/24/47
9/3/47
1154
8/4/45
7/19/46
6/9/49
(SOURCE:
See Tabl
e 15, p. 5<
?7. )
611
and the Navy pressed its yards and private contractors for the
earliest possible completions. This urgency was manifest at the
Boston yard in several instances. In late 1942, the Navy was
ready to accept three LSTs from Boston, even though they lacked
stern winches, owing to the slow and erratic delivery of those
parts. When the Navy assigned the Boston yard construction of
LSTs 980 through 1003, it authorized utilization of Dry Dock No.
2 as a construction facility. By the summer of 1944, the yard
had developed procedures resulting in the completion of an LST in
seven weeks. One technique consisted of the pref abrication of
deckhouses on Pier No. 1, installing as much of the equipment and
wiring as possible. Then the sixty-ton units were hoisted by
113
crane onto completed hulls.
Four of Boston's shipbuilding facilities were employed in
the LST construction. Shipways Nos. 1, 2, and 3 saw service in
the initial stage in the latter half of 1942 and in the second,
occurring largely in 1943. Dry Dock No. 2 also served as an LST
construction site from January to June 1944. The final two LSTs,
1153 and 1154, started in the summer of 1945, were built on
Shipways No. 3 and No. 1.
Roughly half of the LSTs built at the Boston Navy Yard
saw action in the European theatre, the other half being assigned
to the Pacific. The first five completed by the yard were
transferred to Great Britain several days following their
commissioning. The next five remained in the U.S. Navy and
participated in the Sicilian and Italian campaigns and later in
113. Memorandum for File, Nov. 25, 1942, 181-40, Box 41, L8-3.
612
the Normandy landings. The first four finished in early 1944,
following the resumption by the yard of LST construction, also
took part in the invasion of Normandy. Six others were used in
the Allied landing in Southern France in August 1944. Twenty
Boston-made LSTs , including three that had served in Europe, saw
action in the war against Japan in the Pacific. Only one of the
LSTs built at Boston fell victim to the enemy. LST-306, among
those turned over to the British Navy, was sunk by an Italian or
114
German submarine off Anzio in February 1944.
The smallest landing craft built at Boston during World War
II were Landing Craft Mechanized or LCMs , designed to serve as
"tank lighters." The Navy tested such a craft in 1938, utilizing
the then standard Marine Corps tank, which weighed six tons.
Combat experience produced rapid change in tank design, and by
the time the Navy launched its landing craft program, tanks had
weights in excess of thirty tons. To carry such vehicles to
enemy beaches, the fifty-foot-long LCM was developed. The Navy
ordered 1100 of these craft for the American and British invasion
of North Africa. Boston received orders for 150 LCMs in mid-
April 1942 and completed construction by the end of the summer.
In the month of August, the yard fabricated no less than 110
LCMs, almost twice as many as any other builder. Fabrication of
the LCMs constituted a "crash program." As one employee later
described it: "We just stopped everything, and concentrated on
them and delivered them for the invasion." Shipfitters fabricated
the tank lighters in Building No. 195 of the main yard and also
114. DANFS, vol. VII, pp. 606, 703-6, 710-11
613
115
at the South Boston Annex
Prior to the surrender of the Japanese in August 1945, the
Boston Navy Yard launched four LSDs , Landing Ship Dock. These
were the largest of the World War II landing "craft," being
ocean-going ships. Their most conspicuous feature was a spacious
well deck, which could be flooded or pumped dry as the occasion
required. Bon a fide landing craft could be transported in the
well to the landing area. Before the actual landing, the well
was flooded and the smaller craft unloaded through a stern gate.
LSDs were large enough to function as mobile dry docks and
116
mother ships for such vessels as small minesweepers.
The four LSDs built by the Boston Navy Yard were all of the
Casa Grande class, being 457 feet, nine inches in length, and
seventy-two feet, two inches in breadth. Their full-load dis-
placement of 9,375 tons gave them a maximum draft of eighteen
feet. Propulsion systems were geared turbine drives, manufac-
tured by Newport News Shipbuilding, with Babcock and Wilcox two-
drum boilers. Besides a ship's company of 326 men, the four Casa
Grande s built by the Boston Navy Yard could accomodate 257 or 322
troops. Armament consisted of one 5-inch, twelve 40mm, and
117
twenty-four 20mm guns.
The keel for LSD-26, the first vessel of this type assembled
at the Boston yard, was laid on Shipways No. 1 on October 16,
115. DANFS, vol. IV, pp. 666-7; Dana, "History of the Boston
Navy Yard, Chapter 2, New Construction and Repair," Jun . 22,
1945, pp. 3-4; Oral History Interview, John Langan, pp. 2-3.
116. DANFS, vol. IV, p. 668.
117. DANFS, vol. IV, p. 522.
614
1944. Workmen there built the ship to the third deck. On January
20, 1945, she was launched and on the next day placed in Dry Dock
No. 2, where construction was continued, the completed ship being
undocked on March 4. The other LSDs were constructed entirely at
one facility, LSD-21 on Shipways No. 1 and LSDs 20 and 27 on
Shipways No. 3.
None of the four Boston-built LSDs was finished in time to
participate in World War II. Tortuga (LSD-26), commissioned on
June 8, 1945, was in the Canal Zone and on route to the Far East,
when the Japanese capitulated.
Other New C onstruction
In addition to destroyers, destroyer escorts, LCMs , LSTs ,
and LSDs, the Boston Navy Yard undertook the construction of
twenty-eight other vessels during the war. These constituted a
mixture of submarines, auxiliaries, and miscellaneous self-
propelled and nonsel f -propel led craft. Nine were built between
May 1940 and May 1942, and twelve between August 1944 and
November 1945. Work began on the remaining seven during the war,
but was not completed until after the beginning of 1946.
In the early stage of the war, the yard constructed two
seaplane tenders, H umbol t and Matagorda ; four seaplane wrecking
derricks; a submarine repair barge; a floating derrick, and a
sludge removal barge. Humbol t and Matagorda were built
simultaneously on Shipways No. 1, their keels being laid, their
hulls launched, and the actual ships commissioned on or about the
same days. In size, they were smaller than the destroyers then
under construction and larger than the escorts built later. Both
615
served during most of the war in South Atlantic antisubmarine
operations. In mid-1945, Matagorda began conversion to a press
information vessel to cover the projected invasion of Japan.
That conversion was halted by V-J Day.
During World War II and the postwar years, the Boston Naval
Shipyard was involved in the construction of eight submarines.
The yard completely built only one of these in the normal
fashion, progressing from start to finish. The other seven were
begun in other yards, completed in other yards, or at least spent
some time in other yards. Under a contract with the Navy, made
in December 1941, Cramp Shipbuilding Company started construction
of four Bala o-class submarines, SS-296 through 299. Two were
launched in August 1943 and two in November of the same year.
SS-298 and SS-299 were delivered to the Boston yard in March 1944
and then proceeded to Portsmouth, where they were completed and
placed in commission. SS-296, Lancef ish , and SS-297, Ling , were
towed from Philadelphia to Boston in May 1944. The Boston yard
completed Ling in early July 1945. Commissioned in February
1945, the unfinished Lancef ish , while tied up at Pier 8,
flooded through her after torpedo tube and sank on March 15,
1945. She was raised eight days later and decommissioned.
Transferred to the First Naval District, Lancef ish was delivered
to the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in November 1947. Apparently,
118
the vessel never reentered commissioned service.
On February 8, 1944, Dry Dock No. 5 received the keels of
118. Data on Submarine New Construction at Boston Naval Shipyard
Since the Beginning of World War II, BNHP, RG 1, Series 12, Box
4; DANFS, vol. I, pp. 44, 117, 119-29, 225-6.
616
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four submarines of the Tenc h class, SS-522 through 525, all of
which were launched on December 15, 1944. In October 1945,
three, then between sixty and eighty percent completed, were
transferred to Portsmouth. The Portsmouth yard completed Pickerel
in April 1949. G rampus and Grenadier returned to Boston in 1948.
Work on them was resumed in an irregular fashion. Both were
converted as "Guppy"-type submarines, with snorkels which
permitted them to run indefinitely in an awash condition. The
yard finished Grampus in May of 1950 and Grenadie r twelve months
later. Amber jack , which had remained in the Boston yard, was
complete as a conventional submarine in March 1946. The
119
Portsmouth yard subsequently converted her as a "Guppy. "
By August 1944, the Boston Navy Yard had finished its
construction of destroyers and LCMs and was nearing the end of
the escort and LST programs. This situation left space available
on building ways for low priority new construction, and the yard
began the fabrication of two APBs , self-propelled barracks ships.
The Boston yard was reverting to its pre-1933 function as a
repair facility, and most of the labor force no longer engaged in
new construction. Accordingly, by wartime standards, work on the
two APBs proceeded at a leisurely pace, the two ships being
completed a year after the laying of their keels.
Before the end of the war, the yard started construction of
four more self-propelled barracks ships, two of which were not
completed until 1946 and 1947. APBs provided temporary quarters
at ports, naval bases, and other locations. Benewah , completed
119. DANFS, vol. I, pp. 39-40; vol. Ill, pp. 132, 157; vol. V,
p. 294.
618
at the Boston yard in 1946, remained in Boston Harbor as a
berthing ship for men engaged in inactivating and decommissioning
aircraft carriers. Of a size similar to other APBs , Benewah had
a length of 328 feet, a beam of fifty, and a draft of eleven.
Her displacement was 2189 tons and her armament consisted of
eight 40mm guns.
The Boston yard's end-of-war construction included six APLs ,
nonsel f -propel led barracks ships, which differed little from APBs
except respecting propulsion. In fact, Benewah originally was
intended as an APL. The yard also built three nonself -propel led
covered lighters, YFNs .
The Boston Navy Yard and the Destroyer- Base s Swap
The Boston Navy Yard's earliest direct contribution to the
Allied cause in World War II was readying some of the vessels
included in the Destroyer-Bases Agreement of September 1940.
Beginning in mid-May, Prime Minister Churchill pleaded with the
Roosevelt administration for the transfer to Britain of forty or
fifty of the United States Navy's World War I destroyers. The
Royal Navy had suffered severe losses in the evacuations of
Norway and Dunkirk, and German submarines and aircraft continued
to have almost daily success against the fleet and merchant
vessels. The worse appeared yet to come, with Hitler's forces
preparing a cross-Channel invasion of England. After contending
with serious political, diplomatic, military, and legal
obstacles, the administration worked out an agreement to exchange
fifty "over-aged" destroyers for long term leases on eight bases
in Newfoundland and the Caribbean. President Roosevelt advised
619
Congress of the agreement on September 3. By that time, imple-
mentation of the transfer of the destroyers was already in
120
motion, as events at the Boston Navy Yard demonstrated.
Orders had gone out on September 1 for the first eight ships
in the transfer to proceed to the Naval Torpedo Station at
Newport and then to the navy yard at Boston. At the yard, work
was to progress expeditiously and the ships kept in a state
whereby they could be made ready for sea on forty-eight hours '
notice. The aim of the Navy was to have the first group arrive
at Halifax as soon as possible after September 6. The eight
four-stackers sailed into Boston on September 3. Aaron Ward , Abel
P. Upshur , and Hale departed the next day, followed on the 5th by
Herndon , Welborn C. Wood , Wei les , Crowninshield , and B uchana n .
By that time, the yard started to receive a second group, con-
sisting of four ships, with still a third set of six not far
behind. The second group left on September 17, and the final set
121
on September 18.
Some of the eighteen destroyers prepared for transfer at
Boston had been removed from commission during the 1920s and
1930s. However, within six months of the German invasion of
Poland in September 1939, all of the Navy's four-stackers were
back in commission, many of them on neutrality patrol. Accord-
120. Daniel S. Greenberg, "U.S. Destroyers for British Bases --
Fifty Old Ships Go to War," U.S . Naval I nstitute Proceedings ,
Nov. 1962, pp. 70-83; Howard Norman Kay, "The Fifty Old Maids
Come Through," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings , Sept. 1950, pp.
977-9; Abbazia, pp. 91-103.
121. Comdesatron to Comdesdiv 69, Sep. 1, 1940, 181-40, Box 4,
A4-1/EF13. For arrivals, departures, and dockings, see the Yard
Log, 181-58.
620
ingly, the work of the Boston Navy Yard did not consist of
preparing ships freshly removed from "mothballs." However,
considerable work was required of the yard. It dry docked the
eighteen destroyers assigned to its care, utilizing the marine
railway, Dry Dock No. 1, Dry Dock 3, and a commercial dock in
East Boston. In addition to the cleaning and painting of hulls,
the yard mounted antiaircraft batteries and in some instances
replaced bunks with hammocks and installed modern engine equip-
ment. The first eight ships left before degaussing equipment
could be installed, but orders were given Boston to provide such
installations for the second and third groups. All of the ships
received a full allowance of equipage and consumable supplies.
Torpedoes, torpedo accessories, and other ordnance items had been
delivered to the destroyers at Newport prior to their arrival at
122
Boston .
Probably work on the destroyers briefly disrupted the rou-
tine of the Boston Navy Yard, which at that time consisted
chiefly of construction of Matagorda and Humbolt on Shipways No.
1. During the two weeks the eighteen four-stackers were in the
yard, the work force increased from 1089 to 1134.
Repairs
Generally, the prewar policy of the Navy Department had
122. Commander Destroyers, Atlantic Squadron, to Commanders
Destroyer Squadrons 39, 41, 69, Sep. 7, 1940; Comdesatron to
Comdesdiv 79, Sep. 4, 1940; Comdesatron to Comdesdiv 69, Sep. 4,
1940; BuShips to Nyd Boston, Sep. 3, 1940; Opnav to NyBos , Sep.
4, 1940; all in 181-40, Box 4, A4-1/EF13. See this file for
other telegrams and correspondence regarding the role of Boston
in the transfer.
621
been to use its own yards primarily for repairs and only
secondarily for new construction. Private shipbuilders had
constructed most of the Navy's new ships. The number of
commercial shipyards expanded greatly after Pearl Harbor, and
all, both established yards and newcomers, concentrated on
building ships. Repair work continued to be performed by the
navy yards. However, for the Boston Navy Yard, new construction
became a more important activity than repairs, and throughout
most of the war, more of the yard's workers engaged in new
construction than in repairing existing ships .
Nevertheless, it would be erroneous to conclude that repair
work was downgraded, since the volume of that kind of activity
expanded remarkably. Moreover, during the entire war, the Navy
Department assigned the highest priority to repairs, not to new
construction. That policy required the Boston Navy Yard to
transfer workers from new construction to repairs, when the
occasion arose. Such an occasion occurred in early 1942, when
three cruisers, a transport, and a number of destroyers simultan-
eously arrived at the yard for repairs. That necessitated
temporarily transferring all electricians from new construction,
123
until the yard reduced its repair load.
The conditions of war created problems in the maintenance
and repair of naval vessels. Ships steamed further and faster
and under more adverse conditions than in peacetime, resulting in
greater wear and tear on the vessels, their propulsion systems,
123. Confirmation of Telephone Conversation, Feb. 16, 1942, 181-
40, Box 42, L-3.
622
and equipment. Oftentimes, crews were green and experienced
officers rare, which led to misuse, improper maintenance, and
more frequent breakdowns of machinery. Wars, of course, produced
battle-damaged vessels. Finally, the fleet greatly expanded
through new construction and the conversion to military use of
privately owned vessels. In 1939, the continental navy yards and
that at Pearl Harbor altered, converted, or fitted out 307 ships.
124
In 1945, the figure was 19,528. All of these considerations
produced a vastly increased demand for repair work.
During the war, the Navy followed a policy of not making a
ship available for repairs, unless it was so badly in need of
work that it could not continue operations or in such need of
alterations as to be obsolete without them. This meant that navy
yards had to provide more than routine overhauls and incidental
repairs when vessels fresh from active duty arrived. It is
generally recognized that repairing vessels constitutes a greater
challenge than building them, since the extent of the work
required is never fully known until machinery or structural parts
are opened up. Also repairs demand a higher level of mechanical
skill on the part of workmen than the fabrication of new ships.
The circumstances of war led to a compromise between the
desire to have a ship placed in the best condition possible and
the need to return it to duty quickly. This was illustrated in a
telephone conversation between Capt . C. L. Brand, Industrial
Manager of the Boston Navy Yard, and the office of the Commander-
in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANT) in March 1942. At that time,
12 4. U.S. Naval Administratio n in World War II : An Administra-
tive Histor y of the Bureau of Ships , vol. II, pp. 15, 18.
623
the yard was overhauling two seaplane tenders, Barneqat and
Biscayne .
Captain Brand proposed to include in the overhaul the
installation of new cranes, and workers had already proceeded to
remove the old crane from one of the vessels. Removal of the
crane afforded an opportunity for other changes, including
increasing the number of 20mm guns from six to ten, providing
splinter protection for torpedo storage and gas tanks, and
installing the foundation for a 5-inch gun. That work would
lengthen the stay in the yard, but the results would be "a very
much better ship." CINCLANT agreed on the value of the
improvements, but refused authorization since the ships "were
urgently needed at a couple of places." One of these "places"
was to relieve another vessel, so badly out of repair that her
speed was reduced to fifteen knots. Brand acknowleged that
disapproval of the additional changes was "a military decision
125
that we make . "
Arranging and then conforming to a schedule of availabili-
ties for ships proved an endless and sometimes frustrating task.
A sampling of correspondence and of transcripts of telephone
conversations may be poor foundation for a conclusion, but
evidence points to the likelihood that yard administrators and
operational commanders made efforts to understand and to
accomodate to the circumstances and problems of the other party.
Usually, tolerance was required on the part of forces afloat
because the yard frequently was unable to finish a ship as
125. Dictaphone Transcription of Telephone Conversation, Mar.
20, 1942, 181-40, Box 42, L9-3.
624
scheduled .
Capt . William G. Greenman, Chief of Staff, Atlantic
Destroyer Forces in February 1942, understood that unanticipated
delays would occur. What he wanted from the Boston yard was an
immediate telephone call advising him of a hitch in meeting a
ship's completion date. Greenman was concerned with the late
departure from the yard of the destroyers Jacob Jones and Broom e .
Captain Brand explained that because of inadequate supervision,
yard workmen had improperly installed a new galley range in Jacob
Jones , a defect not discovered until she was ready to sail. Work
on Broome was completed on schedule, and then, when taking on
126
oil, the fuel barge "bumped her and smashed in her frame."
For its part, the yard sought to be fully informed of the
condition of a ship when it came to the yard. This required a
conference between the officers from the vessel and officers from
the yard's Production Department. Sometimes, in their eagerness
to enjoy shore leave, ship's officers charged with reporting
needed work left without properly conferring with representatives
127
of the yard.
As in World War I, efforts were made to accelerate repair
work by eliminating or abbreviating peacetime procedures. To
reduce the interval between the arrival of a ship for repair and
"the appearance on the street of the necessary paper work,"
126. Confirmation of Telephone Conversation, Feb. 16, 1942, 181-
40, Box 42, L9-3. The records contain two versions of this
conversation, apparently transcribed by two different
secretaries. One is seven pages in length, the other nine.
127. Confirmation of Telephone Conversation, Feb. 16. 1942.
625
Manager Brand ordered the issuance of blanket job orders by the
Planning Section before the ship actually came to the yard.
Those job orders covered the five major groups of repair
requests: hull; engineering, both mechanical and electrical;
ordnance; degaussing; and radio and sound. With these documents
in hand, Production Department officers could meet with ships'
officers, decide on priority items, and commence actual repairs
128
immediately thereafter.
TABLE NO. 20: NUMBER OF SHIPS OVERHAULED BY BOSTON NAVY YARD,
1938-1945
Type
1938-41
1942
1943
1944
1945
Battleships
5
9
6
Carriers
10
7
6
Cruisers
8
12
26
17
Destroyers
138
157
244
109
Escorts
63
143
377
125
Submarines
3
Patrol , subchasers
6
44
63
Others
339
550
439
354
TOTAL
216
553
17
1143
677
(SOURCE: George O. Q. Mansfield, Historical Review, Boston Naval
Shipyard, Formerly Boston Navy Yard, 1938-1957 (Boston: Boston
Naval Shipyard, 1957), p. 98.)
Repairs of battleships, carriers, cruisers, and other large
ships were undertaken at the South Boston Annex. Smaller craft
went to the main yard, the Chelsea Annex, Lockwood 's Basin, and
a number of private yards in the Boston area. In April 1942,
overhauls were performed at four commercial establishments:
Bethlehem Steel Company, General Ship and Engine Works, George
128. Production Department Order No. 6, Jan. 5, 1942, 181-40,
Box 42, L9-3.
626
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Lawley and Son, and Newport Ship Yard. These yards worked on
small minesweepers, Coast Guard cutters, submarine chasers,
129
patrol craft, tugs, and barges.
Included in the work of navy yards at Boston and elsewhere
was repair of vessels of the nation's allies. This activity
began in 1940, when Germany controlled most of the European
continent. Shortly before Pearl Harbor, one out of every seven
ships repaired in the United States was British. Following the
North African campaign in 1942, French ships began to arrive in
the United States. For the most part, American and British naval
design and technology had moved in the same direction, and repair
of British ships encountered far fewer problems than work on
French vessels. French designs differed radically from those of
the American Navy, plans were often unavailable, and the use of
unique alloys and odd-sized guns and machinery created
difficulties. Among the British ships repaired at Boston were
Aquitania , Rodne y, and Queen Mary . French vessels . included the
battleship Richlieu and the destroyers F antasque , T errible ,
130
Malin , and Triomphant .
An appreciation of the volume of activity at the Boston Navy
Yard during the war is provided in the report of a Bureau of
Ships' inspection team, which made a visit in late 1944. The
report stated:
At the time of the Survey, the Yard had some 27 vessels
under construction ...and 90 vessels under overhaul. In
129. Commandant to Bureau of Ships, May 5, 1942, 181-40, Box 42,
L9-3.
13 0. U.S. Naval Administration in World War II : An
Administrative History of the Bureau of Ships , vol. Ill, p. 80.
628
the last seven months 35 new vessels have been delivered
and nearly 1000 vessels of many types have been more or
less extensively overhauled.
The report has particular impact, because it described the yard
131
at a time when the peak of activity had passed.
Ship Conversions
During World War II, the Boston Navy Yard converted seventy-
four vessels, thirty-one at the main yard and forty-three at the
South Boston Annex.
Conversions undertaken at South Boston changed a variety of
private and naval vessels to serve a diversity of new purposes.
In June 1942, the annex converted six private vessels into patrol
craft. At the same time, South Boston received two 200-foot
corvettes, Saucy and Surpris e, formerly units of the Royal Navy
and transferred to the United States under a reverse lend-lease
arrangement. Probably the yard did not convert them, so much as
overhaul and outfit them as patrol gunboats. More in the way of
genuine conversions were undertaken in late 1943, when three
patrol escorts were changed into weather ships. One seaplane
tender and two transports were converted at South Boston into
general communications vessels. To participate in the movement
of troops and equipment to the islands of the Pacific, an
ordinary cargo ship was altered into an attack cargo ship and six
destroyer escorts into high-speed transports. In the last ten
months of the war, the annex converted six World War I destroyers
131. Survey of Industrial Department, Navy Yard, Boston, Nov.
25, 1944, 181-40, Box 294, A3-1 .
629
132
into miscellaneous auxiliaries.
Some vessels experienced several conversions. Gulf Dawn , a
privately owned tanker, was purchased by the Navy in March 1942,
renamed Big Horn , and converted at the main Boston yard into an
antisubmarine Q-ship. After eighteen unsuccessful months in the
North Atlantic, the ship was transferred to the Coast Guard,
which operated her as a weather patrol vessel. In February 1945,
the Navy regained possession, and the South Boston Annex
reconverted the ship to perform its original purpose. Now
designated an unclassified miscellaneous auxiliary, Big Horn
sailed to the Far East and served as a shuttle tanker and then a
station tanker.
Prior to September 1944, the main site of the Boston Navy
Yard did little in the way of conversion work, having its hands
full with new construction and repairs. Then it undertook a
series of conversions. In the fall of 1944, six destroyers,
constructed a few years earlier, were converted to destroyer
minelayers. In December, the yard changed five others into high
speed minesweepers. In yet another series, lasting from December
until June 1945, ten LSTs were converted into coastal
133
minesweepers .
The Boston Navy Yard's conversion work constituted an
important activity, since it contributed to the Navy's ability to
quickly obtain ships equipped for the special functions demanded
132. List of Vessels Converted at... South Boston, BNHP , RG 1,
Series 12, Box 4.
133. List of Vessels Converted at the U.S. Navy Yard, Boston,
Aug. 14, 1945, BNHP, RG 1, Series 12, Box 4.
630
in a two-ocean war. Although sometimes carried out rapidly, at
least by peacetime standards, conversions were costly. For
example, changing destroyer escorts into high-speed transports
required nine to ten weeks and cost approximately one million
134
dollars for each ship.
Fitting Out
While hard at work constructing, repairing, and converting
ships during World War II, the Boston Navy Yard engaged in
another important function. Between 1939 and the end of the war
in 1945, the yard outfitted 1108 vessels. This included one
battleship, five carriers, fourteen cruisers, 109 destroyers, 144
destroyer escorts, 173 LSTs , ninety-five submarine chasers, and
135
161 auxiliary vessels.
As in the past, the yard's fitting-out function in part
resulted from its proximity to private shipyards constructing
vessels under contract with the Navy. Bethlehem Steel at Quincy
built the battleship Massachusetts and the cruisers San Diego and
San Jua n, all three of which were fitted out by the Boston yard
in 1941 and 1942. The Quincy plant also built numerous
destroyers, LSTs, and patrol gunboats. Other destroyers arrived
at Boston from Bath Iron Works in Maine. The yard outfitted
forty-five small minesweepers, some of which were built by George
Lawley and Son, Neponset. One unusual development of World War
134. U.S. Naval Administration , World War II : An Administrative
History of the Bureau of Ships , vol. II, p. 80.
135. U.S. Naval Administration During World War II : First Naval
District , vol. VIII, p. 64.
631
II was the Navy's use of inland shipbuilders, and at least two
minesweepers fitted out at Boston were constructed by Lake
136
Superior Shipbuilding Company, Superior, Wisconsin.
As in every other activity at navy yards, procedures were
sought to expedite the outfitting of new ships. In World War I,
the building yards undertook at least part of this process. The
same course appeared in the second war. Certain phases of
readying a ship for sea, nevertheless, had to be performed at
navy yards. In late 1942, Bath Iron Works delivered vessels
which were nearly completely outfitted. The Boston yard col-
lected the allowance goods and installed the radar, activities
which took about two weeks. Patrol boats built at Quincy re-
quired degaussing, and small minesweepers constructed by George
Lawley needed minesweeping gear and deperming. Ships transferred
137
to Great Britain required special final preparations.
Manufacturing
During World War II, efforts were made to enable navy yards
to concentrate on activities that could not be undertaken
elsewhere, namely the construction and repair of ships. A system
was introduced in 1940 to "farm out" the manufacture of some
items previously produced by the Navy's own industrial
facilities. That program had the additional intent of providing
136. Vessels Assigned to Navy Yard, Boston for Fitting Out, Nov.
12, 1942, 181-40, Box 41, L8-3.
137. Memorandum for File, Nov. 1, 1942; Outfitting New
Construction and Converted Surface Vessels and Preparing Them for
Service, Headquarters, First Naval District, n.d., both in 181-
40, Box 42 (1942) , L9-3.
632
war work for small factories and shops.
It became the normal procedure for the Boston Navy Yard to
farm out certain types of work. All galvanizing and repairs of
refrigeration equipment were performed under contract outside the
yard. Certain types of instrument gauges and equipment requiring
special testing were returned to the manufacturer for
reconditioning. The Barbour, Stockwell Company, a small plant in
nearby Cambridge, with fewer than a hundred employees, produced
all of the gray iron castings required by the yard. This enabled
the yard's foundry to concentrate on special alloy steel and
138
bronze castings.
Approximately fifty local plants were included in the Boston
Navy Yard 's farming-out program, which was administered by the
Planning Division of the Industrial Department. Those plants
produced watertight doors, hatches, scuttles, ladders, masts,
lockers, joiner doors, rail and awning stanchions, pine berths
and fittings, depth charge racks, and metal furniture. Through
the Navy's nationwide farming-out system, the yard obtained small
bulkheads, small integral deckhouses, ammunition hoists, boat and
hatch davits, and many other items.
During the war, the yard continued to manufacture cordage
and chain. The Japanese occupation of the Philippines created a
shortage of manila fiber, and the ropewalk developed new types of
cordage, using American hemp, sisal, jute, and mixtures of these
fibers, reserving manila for the most important applications.
The Boston ropewalk produced twenty percent of the rope and other
138. Dana, "History of the Boston Navy Yard (Industrial
Department), Farming Out."
633
cordage required by the United States Navy during World War II.
The yard's other manufacturing shop, the chain forge, had a total
wartime production of three-quarters of a million tons of die-
lock chain and chain appendages.
Shortly after Pearl Harbor, there developed a critical
shortage of engine components, such as gears, valves, turbines,
and forced draft blowers. In part because of those shortages,
the machine shop of the Boston Navy Yard began the manufacture of
turbines, in a reverse farming-out arrangement with Allis
139
Chalmers, Westinghouse , and General Electric.
World War II revealed the enormous and diverse capacity of
the Boston Navy Yard. During the previous decades, it had been
recognized that peacetime required utilization of no more than
one-quarter of the yard's industrial potential. Even that
calculation fell short of indicating how much work the yard could
perform in an emergency situation. More than any other event,
World War II demonstrated the 1910 statement of Secretary of the
Navy George von Meyer: "Navy Yards are primarily for war and only
incidentally for peace."
139. U.S. Naval Administration in World War II : An Administrative
History of the Bureau of Ships , vol. II, p. 178.
634
Chapter VIII
POSTWAR, COLD WAR, KOREAN WAR: 1945-1955
During the Spanish-American War and World War I, the Boston
Navy Yard had greatly expanded its industrial activity and
increased its civilian labor force. Cessation of hostilities
brought about reductions in work and in workers. However, the
yard did not return to pre-1898 or pre-1914 levels of either ship
work or employment, but retained some of the increment occasioned
by war. This basic pattern also holds for the experience of World
War II.
The years following the surrender of Japan differed from
other postwar periods, in part because of the duration of World
War II and the magnitude of wartime effort by the nation, the
Navy, and the yard. Moreover, there emerged an ongoing
antagonism between the United States and the Soviet Union that
seemed to necessitate a state of military preparedness, although
the size and character of America's defense establishment became
a matter of debate. The outbreak of the war in Korea in June
1950 resolved some of the issues in that debate.
Important developments in the history of the Boston Navy
Yard in the postwar decade include the completion of some of the
new construction started during the war and the return to
peacetime conditions respecting labor. Also, shortly after the
conclusion of the war, the Navy reorganized all of its industrial
yards, changing the internal administration and the relationship
635
between the yards and the department in Washington. No major
additions were made to the Boston yard's physical plant.
DEMOBILIZATION, 1945 AND 1946
For the Boston Navy Yard, the return to peacetime conditions
most obviously meant reductions in its industrial activity and
in its personnel. On September 1, 1945, the yard force included
34,000 civilians. Thirteen months later, the figure was down to
9570. The reduction in force was accomplished by discharging
employees, most of whom held war service appointments. However,
the process did not consist of simply sending out 25,000
1
discharge notices and imposing a ban on new hires.
Several difficulties existed in scaling down the civilian
labor force. The yard had to continue its industrial function,
and between September 1, 1945, and October 1, 1946, it worked on
500 vessels. Measures had to be taken to maintain shops in
operating condition, with adequate numbers of supervisors and
with workmen possessing the required skills. Complications arose
because of returning servicemen. Civil Service regulations and
the policies of the government and the Navy gave employment and
reemployment rights to veterans. What sometimes occurred was the
replacement of experienced, trained workers by ex-GIs who lacked
the competencies needed. At the Boston Naval Shipyard, the
electronics work force briefly "was on the verge of
disintegration because of the demobilization of wartime
1. A useful source of information about the Boston yard in the
immediate postwar era is Narrative of the Boston Naval Shipyard,
Sep. 1, 1945 to Oct. 1, 1946, 181-40, Box 369 (1946), A-12.
636
personnel." Particularly, layoffs broke up an important group of
workers known as the "Radio Gang." Throughout the yard, too many
quartermen and leadingmen were downgraded to the rating of
2
mechanic, resulting in a shortage of supervisors. That personnel
matters constituted a vital area is evident in the fact that the
staff of the Industrial Relations Department declined by only ten
percent, whereas the yard-wide decrease was seventy-two percent.
TABLE No. 21: TOTAL PERSONNEL IN SELECT UNITS BOSTON NAVAL
SHIPYARD, SEPTEMBER 1945 AND OCTOBER 1946
Sep. 1, 1945
Oct. 1, 1946
Unit
Offi-
Enl .
Civil-
Offi-
Enl .
Civil-
cers
Men
ians
cers
Men
ians
Shipyard
608
340
34,010
114
71
9570
Indus. Relations
22
119
2
124
Planning
132
61
1233
12
308
Electronics
85
61
46
10
55
Production
330
26,730
37
6133
Public Works
1981 '
1329
Supply
82
225
2700
20
781
Fisca 1
2,
266
2
132
SOURCE: Narrative of the Boston Naval Shipyard, 1 Sept. 1945 to
1 Oct. 1946, 181-40, Box 369, A12.)
The end of the war found the yard with excessive quantities
of equipment, material, and supplies. For example, the Public
Works Department had accumulated an abundance of cranes, trucks,
2. Electronics Officer to Commander, Dec. 13, 1946; Industrial
Survey Division's Report No. 32, Oct. 18, 1946, both in 181-40,
Box 365, A3-1.
637
and passenger cars. Many of them were declared surplus and had
to be disposed. More importantly, stocks of shipbuilding
materials had been built up for the yard's new construction.
Although shipbuilding continued, the Navy terminated further work
on some vessels, for which materials had been obtained. In
October 1946, it appears that the Production Department had on
hand excess material valued in the neighborhood of $40 million.
Prosecution of the yard's wartime mission had led to the
utilization of all possible interior and exterior work areas,
resulting in a dispersion of the activities of particular shops.
For example, the radio, radar, and sonar shops and laboratories
of the electronics organization were scattered about the yard.
Such conditions, necessary during the war, were unacceptable in
time of peace, especially in view of the reduced funds and an
emphasis on efficiency and economy. Thus, in late 1945 and in
1946, efforts were made at all of the Boston Naval Shipyard's
locations to achieve a physical consolidation of industrial,
technical, and clerical activity. The Production Officer
assigned the fifth floor of Building No. 197 for use by all
electronics laboratories. Related to the consolidation effort
was the closing down of op'erations at the Chelsea Annex. In
August 1946, work being performed there was ordered to be
completed or transferred to Charlestown and all portable tools
3
removed .
During World War II, the Boston Navy Yard's Supply Depart-
3. Production Department Memorandum No. 32-46, Aug. 5, 1946,
181-40, Box 365, A3-1 .
638
ment had leased 1,835,000 square feet of warehouse and storage
space in various parts of greater Boston. Demobilization saw a
reduction in leased space to 7,000 square feet, the department
relying primarily on the storage capacity of buildings and
outdoor areas in the shipyard. The surrender of leased warehouses
required reduction of stores, and the value of material monthly
shipped out of the yard increased from $300,000 in late 1945 to
$1,250,0000, beginning in January 1946. Vacating leased space
also required the Supply Department to rewarehouse a large
volume of goods.
In the year after the end of the war, the ship work at the
Boston yard consisted of completion or other disposal of ships
under construction; conversion, overhauls, outfittings, and post-
shakedown availabilities; and participation in the reduction
of the Navy's huge wartime fleet. The yard performed the work
necessary for the demobilization of an assortment of 154 ships
and vessels, ranging in size and type from a battleship to a
waterbarge. Eighteen destroyer escorts, seven miscellaneous
auxiliaries, two submarines, one high-speed minesweeper, and two
escort carriers were made ready for scrapping. Four submarines
and five landing craft were destined to become targets. The yard
"mothballed" two barracks ships, nineteen escort carriers, and
the battleship New Mexico , all assigned to the Atlantic Reserve
Fleet at South Boston. Six submarines and nine other vessels
were prepared for transfer to Naval Reserve units. All of the
remainder were classified as usable, and yard workmen readied
639
4
them for return to their original owners or for sale.
When the Japanese surrendered in the late summer of 1945,
the Boston Navy Yard had eighteen ships under actual
construction. Some were on the building ways or in the building
dock, and the remainder had been launched, but not yet completed
or commissioned. In addition, the yard was still home for the
unfortunate Lancef is h. Commissioned in February 1945, the
submarine sank at dock the following month. Raised and decom-
missioned, the fate of the boat remained undecided.
Between September 1945 and January 1947, the yard completed
building seven of the vessels: the destroyer escort Osberg ; the
submarine A mber jack ; three barracks ships, Benewah , Nueces , and
Col leton ; and the LSDs F ort Mandan and Whetstone . The Navy
canceled further work on LST-1155 and the destroyer escorts
Sheehan and Oswal d A. Powers . In October 1945, three uncompleted
submarines, Pickerel , Grampus , and Grenadier , were towed to the
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, followed by Lancef ish in November
1947. The yard completed construction of the five remaining ships
in the years from 1947 to 1955.
Between September 1, 1945, and October 1, 1946, 311 ships
were in the Boston Naval Shipyard for overhaul, conversion, or
fitting-out or post-shakedown availabilities. Significant work
included repair of battle damage to the cruiser Canberra;
installation of experimental sonar equipment in the destroyer
Witek ; a general overhaul of the cruiser Cleveland ; and preparing
two ships for an Arctic expedition. Designers of the Planning
4. Narrative, Sep. 1, 1945 to Oct. 1, 1946, pp. 10-4
640
Department developed plans for altering Portland , Enterprise , and
Bataan for service in "Magic Carpet," the transporting of
American troops from overseas to the United States. Yard
personnel also studied and made plans of two captured German
destroyers .
A variety of circumstances hampered the yard in the
performance of its industrial work in the immediate postwar
period. No system existed for handling the large number of ships
assigned the yard for disposal or inacti vation . Because of the
novelty of removing so many vessels from the fleet, a measure of
confusion prevailed in the Navy Department. The Boston yard
received conflicting directives and changes in orders. Although
an abundance of new construction material existed in the yard,
the material for preservation and dehumidif ication of inactivated
ships was in short supply. Ship demobilization also suffered
because of the low priority assigned to it and because of the
lack of trained ship personnel. At the same time, the yard was
seeking to evolve from the wartime emphasis on getting the job
done, regardless of cost, to the peacetime practices of
production controls and proper planning. Also, as the yard
engaged in demobilization, a major change was instituted in the
organization of the Navy's industrial activities.
ADMINISTERING THE BOSTON NAVAL SHIPYARD
Wartime revealed the want of more effective administrative
relationships between the Navy Department and shore establish-
ments, but it was decided to institute no comprehensive
641
alterations until the end of the struggle. Within a month of the
victory over Japan, a reorganization occurred, which involved
both internal administrative arrangements and the place of the
5
yards in the Navy organization at large.
In November 1945, the Boston Navy Yard became officially
designated as the Boston Naval Shipyard, one of the semantic
consequences of the Navy's reorganization of its eleven
6
industrial establishments. That reorganization resulted from
obvious defects, such as associating yards with naval hospitals,
receiving stations, and other nonindustrial activities. The
reform followed submission to the Secretary of the Navy of a
report entitled "Review of the Organization and Administration of
Navy Yards and U.S. Naval Drydocks , " also known as the "Paget
Report." The report emphasized defects in the existing struc-
tures of navy yards. Particularly it stressed the absence of
effective management control. The chief executive of a yard, the
commandant, lacked proper means of maintaining surveillance of
his facility's operating efficiency. Managers, the heads of the
Industrial Departments, likewise did not have the capability to
exercise administrative control of important aspects of
industrial activity. This resulted from the independence of the
Departments of Supply, Public Works, Medicine, and Accounting.
In addition to defects within navy yard administrations,
Furer, p. 541
6. At this time, the Navy had nine yards situated at Portsmouth,
Boston, Brooklyn, Philadelphia, Norfolk, Charleston, Bremmerton,
Mare Island, and Pearl Harbor. It also had two dry dock
facilities, at Hunters Point and Terminal Island, both in
California and neither connected with any navy yard.
642
confusion engulfed the relationship between navy yards and the
Navy Department. Eight different bureaus and offices in
Washington had authority over the yards or parts thereof. Those
agencies were the Chief of Naval Operations; the Division of
Shore Establishments and Civilian Personnel; the Industrial
Survey Division; and the Bureaus of Ships, Ordnance, Yards and
Docks, Supplies and Accounts, and Medicine and Surgery. In
exercise of their control, each bureau dealt directly with its
department in a yard, merely informing commandants of changes in
policies and procedures.
The Paget Report concluded that:
No one agency of the Navy Department is now able to
assume full responsibility for the effectiveness and the
efficiency of the performance of Ship Yards .... Ship
Yards are the only major type of field activity which do
not have a single Navy Department sponsor.
Another report submitted to the Secretary in 1945 emphasized the
absence of mechanisms for effective cost accounting in the
7
operations of the Navy's industrial facilities.
On the basis of these reports, Secretary of the Navy James
Forrestal gave orders in September 1945 for a thorough reform of
the yards. Those orders created in the geographical location of
each yard an overall organization known as a U.S. Naval Base. In
such a base were grouped the shipyard plus other activities
formerly adjacent or identified with navy yards, such as
hospitals, prisons, supply depots, ammunition depots, and
receiving stations. Command of a base was assigned to a line
7 . U.S. Naval Administration in World War II : An Administrative
History of the Bureau of Ships , vol. IV, pp. 397-404.
643
officer, who in turn was responsible to the commandant of the
naval district in which the base was located.
The Bureau of Ships gained management control of the former
navy yards, now U.S. Naval Shipyards. "Technical control of the
work of each shipyard is vested in the cognizant agencies of the
Navy Department." An officer, trained in naval construction or
marine engineering, headed each shipyard and had the title of
Shipyard Commander. Navy Department orders called for each yard
to have an internal organization consisting of seven departments:
planning, production, public works, supply, fiscal, medical, and
administration. In addition, attached to the office of the
shipyard commander were to be two divisions, one for industrial
8
relations and the other for management planning and review.
The U.S. Naval Shipyard, Boston, and the U.S. Naval Base,
Boston, appeared on November 30, 1945. The components of the
naval base included the shipyard and several elements previously
a part of or affiliated with the Boston Navy Yard, namely the
ammunition depot at Hingham, Chelsea Naval Hospital, the Marine
Barracks, the Commissioning Detail, and the Receiving Station.
Some of the administrative positions and units of the former
Boston Navy Yard were retained in the organization of the new
Boston Naval Shipyard. Others continued under different names.
Several were consolidated to form new positions, and there also
8. "Reorganization of Navy Yard and Establishment of Naval
Bases," Sep. 14, 1945; General Order No. 223, Sep. 14, 1945, both
reprinted in U.S. Naval Administration in World War II; An
Administrative History of the Bureau of Ships , vol. IV, pp. 4 06-
17. This volume contains other orders and directives pertinent
to the establishment of the new shipyards and naval bases.
644
Administration Table No. 7: US NAVAL BASE, BOSTON, NOV. 30, 1945
COMMANDANT, FIRST NAVAL DISTRICT
COMMANDANT, US NAVAL BASE, BOSTON
CHIEF OF STAFF
SUPPLY
OFFICER
ORDNANCE
OFFICER
PUBLIC WORKS
OFFICER
PUBLIC
INFORMATION
OFFICER
MATERIAL
OFFICER
MARINE
OFFICER
US Marine
Barracks
Net
Depot
Commissioning
Detail
US Fleet
Post Office
Motion Picture
Sub- Exchange
Receiving
Station
Small Craft
Facility
Training
Center
Degaussing &
Deperming
Activities
LEGAL
OFFICER
OPERATIONS
OFFICER
PERSONNEL
OFFICER
MEDICAL
OFFICER
COMMUNICATION
OFFICER
WATCH
OFFICER
US Naval
Shipyard
Hospital ,
Chelsea
Radio
Station
Permanent
Shore Patrol
Fire Fighters
School
Inactive Fleet
Berthing Area
Combat Information
Center
Training
School
(Electronics
645
Base Motor Vehicle
Transportation Unit
and Auto Pools
Registered
Publication
Issuing Office
appeared offices absent or not clearly established in the
previous organization. Reorganization recognized the central
role of industrial activity in navy yards. Although the reform
formally eliminated the Industrial Department, in effect it
enlarged that unit to include the entire shipyard and merged
the positions of yard commandant and manager of the Industrial
Department into the new post of shipyard commander. The
assignment of particular officers in the new U.S. Naval Base,
Boston, symbolically demonstrated the thrust of the reform, since
the former industrial manager became the shipyard commander.
Reorganization eliminated the captain of the yard, assigning his
duties to the Administrative Officer, head of the Administration
Department. The functions of the old disbursing and accounting
offices were consolidated into a single Fiscal Department. The
conversion officer became the Field Production Officer, and the
personnel relations officer, the Industrial Relations Officer.
Retained were the positions and titles of Planning,
Production, Public Works, and Medical Officers. A new feature
was an Industrial Engineering Officer, who headed the Management
Planning and Review Division. That division had the function of
advising the commander and department and division heads of the
performance of the various units of the yard, so as "to improve
and simplify organization, administration, procedures, and
utilization of manpower and facilities...." Also new were the
positions of Electronics, Ordnance, and Aeronautics Officers.
Each of these was responsible to the commander for the technical
control and inspection of work in his field performed at the
646
Administration Table No. 8: U.S. NAVAL SHIPYARD, BOSTON,
NOV. 30, 1945
COMMANDER
(Staff
Relationship) .
•
•
•
MANAGEMENT PLANNING &
REVIEW DIVISION
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
DIVISION
Industrial Engineering Officer
Industrial Relations Officer
PLANNING DEPARTMENT
PRODUCTION DEPARTMENT
Planning Officer
Production Officer
PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT
SUPPLY DEPARTMENT
Public Works Officer
Supply Officer
FIELD PRODUCTION DEPARTMENT
FISCAL DEPARTMENT
Field Production Officer
Fiscal Officer
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT
ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT
Medical Officer
Administrative Officer
647
9
shipyard.
The transition to the new organization at Boston doubtless
benefitted from the continuation in key positions of officers
familiar with the yard. Rear Adm. Felix X. Gygax, yard
commandant and commandant of the First Naval District in the last
years of the war, was relieved of his position in the yard, but
retained command of the district. For several months, he also
served as acting commander of the naval base at Boston.
Como. Adrian R. Marron, Manager of the Industrial Department
since 1942, became the shipyard's first commander. The
reorganization of 1945 apparently removed all hurdles in placing
men skilled and experienced in the building and repair of ships
as heads of the Navy's industrial activities. During the war,
the requirement that navy yard commandants be line officers had
continued. To provide leadership with the technical competence
to take charge of ship work, the Navy had appointed as its yard
commandants officers with backgrounds in marine engineering,
10
since the Engineering Corps had been merged with the line.
Commodore Marron brought to the post of Commander, Naval
Shipyard, Boston, the skills and experience of a career in naval
architecture, which he acquired initially in courses at Annapolis
9. Bureau of Ships, Approved Functions and Duties of the Heads
of the Departments and Divisions of a U.S. Naval Shipyard, Jan.
31, 1946, in U.S . Naval Administration in World War II : An
Administrative History of the Bureau of Ships , vol. IV, pp. 433-
43; Mansfield, pp. 45-6, 113; Boston Nava l Shipyard News , Jan.
31, 1946; Standard U.S. Naval Shipyard Regulations, Aug. 5, 1946,
181-40, Box 365, A3-1 .
10. U.S. Naval Administration in World War II : An Administrative
Histor y of the Burea u of Ships , vol. IV, p. 3 97.
648
and then MIT. Subsequently, he served in hull divisions in
several navy yards, including as outside superintendent in the
Boston yard. Marron's successors in the late 1940s and in the
11
1950s had similar careers. The elimination of the position of
captain of the yard, a line officer's billet, also was consistent
with the emphasis on special expertise, increasingly required
because of the complexity of modern shipyards.
The 1945 changes placed emphasis on professionalism and
insured that the highest administrators of the Navy's shipyards
would be men whose careers, training, experience, and aspirations
centered on shipwork. Two men who headed the yard at Boston
during the twentieth century illustrate the change. Albert
Gleaves, a career line officer, rotated between duty at sea and
assignments ashore. Prior to World War I, he served for three
years as commandant of the New York Navy Yard. Late in his
career, from May to December 1921, he had command of the Boston
Navy Yard. Shortly thereafter, Admiral Gleaves retired and used
part of his leisure to write his memoirs. In his book, Gleaves
simply did not mention his tours at the yards at New York or
Boston, although he did give attention to other shore
assignments. Apparently, he attached little importance,
professional or personal, to his experience as navy yard
commandant. In contrast, Raymond Burk, Commander, Boston Naval
Shipyard from 1969 to 1972, described his assignment as head of
the yard as the fulfillment of one of the goals of his
professional life. He further stated: "It was the best job I ever
11. Mansfield, pp. 59-60.
649
12
had in the Navy."
The postwar reorganization ended the practice of assigning
command of a naval district to the commandant of a navy yard
within that district. That double billeting had been the origins
of much confusion. Confusion persisted, however. The commander
of the Boston Naval Shipyard now served as the Industrial Manager
of the First Naval District, with important positions in that
office filled by key personnel from the shipyard. Particularly,
the Planning Officer of the yard acted as the Assistant to the
District Industrial Manager and maintained in the shipyard
Planning Department the headquarters of the Industrial Manager.
Counting the shipyard commander and the Planning Officer, a total
of eleven officers served both the yard and the district 's
Industrial Manager's organization.
The office of Industrial Manager, First Naval District, had
its origin in 1939, when a District Material Office was
established, with the responsibilities, among other things, of
inspecting commercial vessels for possible conversion to naval
use and surveying private shipyards to determine their
suitability for naval ship construction and repair. During World
War II, the title of the organization changed to Conversion
Office, Boston Navy Yard. The wartime accomplishment of the
office consisted of overseeing private shipworks in the area,
which converted 258 ships of all types and repaired 809 others.
The reorganization of November 1945 assigned the Industrial
12. Albert Gleaves, The Admiral : The Memoirs of Albert Gleaves,
Admiral , USN (Pasadena, Cali.: Hope Publishing House, 1985); Oral
History Interview, Adm. and Mrs. Burk, BNHP, pp. 1, 33.
650
Manager, First Naval District, the important function of
arranging repair work by private shipyards. This became an
increasingly sizeable volume of work. In 1954, such work involved
the repair of 154 vessels and cost slightly more than
13
$4 million.
Although the creation of the U.S. Naval Base, Boston,
alleviated the shipyard of responsibility for nonindustrial
activities, it created another layer of administration which
beclouded jurisdictions and cognizance. For example, in 1950,
the administrative location of the Deperming Station at Boston
became something of a mystery. The shipyard commander contended
that the Deperming Station fell under the authority of the
Industrial Manager, that is to say the district. In practice,
the Commander of the U.S. Naval Base, Boston, handled deperming,
"with Shipyard assistance." When enlightenment was sought from
Washington, the Bureau of Ships advanced the view that the
Deperming Station was a facility of the Bureau of Ordnance!
Although such administrative puzzles did not impede the
shipyard's performance of its industrial tasks, it seems clear
the Navy still had a problem in clarifying relations among its
14
various shore organizations.
Sometimes, the yard sought to retain control of activities
13. Historical Report, Industrial Manager, First Naval District,
for Period 29 June 1962 - 31 December 1962, BNHP, RG 1, Series
11; Mansfield, p. 42; Office of Industrial Manager, First Naval
District, Regulations, Jul. 1, 1950; Industrial Manager, First
Naval District to Chief, Bureau of Ships, Jul. 1, 1950; Boston
Naval Shipyard Notice No. 211-50 (Rev. 1), Nov. 19, 1950, all in
181-40, Box 397, A3-1.
14. Bureau of Ships to Commander, Nov. 9, 1950, 181-40, Box
397, A3-1.
651
ordered assigned to the district or the base. For example,
administrators waged a long and ultimately unsuccessful campaign
to keep the Printing Office, despite the fact that seventy
15
percent of its work was for parties other than the shipyard.
Throughout its existence, the Boston Naval Shipyard retained
the basic organizational structure implemented in late 1945 of
commander and departments. Small changes began almost
immediately. For many years, the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
had included dentistry in its cognizance. Dentists and
physicians required different facilities, and by the end of 1945,
shipyard organizational charts included separate departments of
medicine and dentistry. In 1947, Congress officially established
a Navy Dental Corps, by which time the Boston Naval Shipyard had
a Dental Department as well as a Medical Department. The
Aeronautical Officer was eliminated from the Boston
administration, and the Electronics and Ordnance Officers
underwent changes in title and in status, becoming the heads of
16
divisions within the Planning Department in 1954.
The largest department in the shipyard was the Production
Department. In 1950, when the total work force numbered somewhat
more than 8,000 people, Production employed almost 5500 workers.
All of the shops, except three in the Public Works Department,
came under the Production Officer. That officer's chief
subordinates included the Shipbuilding Superintendent, Repair and
15. Administrative Officer, Navy Department, to Chief of Naval
Operations, Dec. 12, 1950, 181-40, Box 397, A3-1 .
16. Mansfield, p. 127.
652
Assistant Repair Superintendents, Shop Superintendent, and Ship
Superintendents, the last being in charge of particular vessels
17
undergoing work in the yard.
Officers and the 342 civilian employees of the Planning
Department were distributed among the Planning and Estimating
Division, Design Division, Ordnance Division, and Electronics
Division. Planning and Estimating received requests for work
from the Navy Department and from forces afloat, together with
allocations of funds. The division assembled the plans,
information, and material required, prepared estimates, and
issued work specifications to the shops of the Production
Department. The Design Division, formerly called the drafting
room, was a shipyard agency of increasing importance. Rapid
developments in electronics and weaponry required continual
modifications of ships in the active fleet, each improvement
necessitating redesign of a portion of a vessel. Both the
Ordnance and Electronics Divisions of the Planning Department
provided technical advice and guidance to the shipyard,
conducted tests and inspections of work done in the yard, and
acted as consulting engineering and quality control units.
The Public Works Department employed fifty workers in its
offices and 900 in its three shops: Transportation Shop, Power
Plant, and Public Works Shop. The last mentioned had
responsibility for repair and maintenance of all buildings,
17. Employment figures are found in Commander to Chief, Bureau
of Ships, Jul. 7, 1950, 181-40, Box 399, Ll-1. For descriptions
of the functions of the various departments, see U.S. Naval
Shipyard Regulations, Aug. 5, 1946, 181-40, Box 365, A3-1 .
653
structures, utilities, communications systems, railway, and other
components of the yard's plant. The Public Works officer was
assigned the duty of monitoring work performed in the yard by
private contractors. That officer and his parent organization in
Washington, the Bureau of Yards and Docks, played a reduced role
in initiating consideration of major improvements in the
shipyard, and the commander and the Bureau of Ships became more
involved in shipyard development.
Reorganization of the Navy's ship construction and repair
facilities in 1945 saw the demise of the former Military
Department and the traditional position of captain of the yard.
Most of his duties were assigned to an Administrative Officer.
That new position no longer entailed being second in command of
the yard and had little to do with ships, such as commissioning,
decommissioning, and docking, all of which had concerned the
captain of the yard. The Administrative Officer did succeed his
predecessor as commanding officer of enlisted personnel assigned
to the yard and as responsible for operations of the yard tugs.
In the early 1950s, slightly more than 200 people were employed
in the Administrative Department of the Boston Naval Shipyard.
The Supply Department continued to be a major shipyard
agency somewhat functionally out of place. This resulted from
the fact that only one-fourth of its services were directly on
behalf of the shipyard. The vast bulk of its activities
consisted of rendering supply services to ships in the area and
to more than one hundred naval establishments of all different
sizes and requirements. The Supply Officer, his staff, and 550
654
civilian workers, had responsibility for or handled an enormous
variety and quantity of goods. In 1955, the Department carried
190,000 different items in stock, which had a dollar value of
$141 million. It was estimated that the monthly stock movement
was the equivalent of 260 railroad box cars, which would create a
18
train two miles in length.
The remainder of the departments of the Boston Shipyard in
the postwar decade were relatively small, with specialized
functions. The Fiscal Department provided the services
previously performed by the accounting and disbursing offices.
For a period, the Fiscal Officer was attached to the Planning
Department and then the Management Planning and Review Division.
In 1954, a separate Comptroller's Department was created. The
Fiscal Department had one hundred employees in 1950, all of them
clerks, accountants, and other office workers. The Medical
Department provided or arranged complete health care services
for Navy personnel. It also gave emergency treatment to civilian
employees, conducted a chest x-ray program, and offered safety
glasses and eye test services. The Dental Department restricted
its activities to military personnel.
The Navy Department pressed yard administrators to
investigate the feasibility of mergers so as to reduce costs and
increase efficiency. In 1950, the Bureau of Ships proposed
consolidating the functions of the Public Works, Planning, and
Production Departments. Such a move failed to gain the support of
the commander of the Boston yard, who noted the distinctly
18. Annual Report, Calendar Year 1955, BNHP, RG 1, Series 4.
655
different "trade cognizances" involved. On the shop level,
Public Works carpenters and Production shipwrights had little in
common. Profound differences also separated civil and marine
engineers. Probably other shipyard commanders reacted in similar
19
fashion to the proposal, and nothing came of it.
Over the years, mergers and divisions had occurred in the
shops of the Boston yard. In 1935, the Industrial Department had
twelve shops, and twenty years later, the Production Department
had seventeen. The shops existing in 1955 were:
Central Tool (06) Pipe and Copper (56)
Temporary Service (99) Woodworking (64)
Structural (11) Electronics (67)
Sheet Metal (12) Paint (71)
Forge (23) Riggers, Laborers,
Machine Shop, Inside (31) Sailmakers (72)
Machine Shop, Outside (38) Foundry (81)
Boiler (41) Pattern (94)
Electrical (51) Ropewalk (97)
The Public Works Department included the yard's three other
shops, namely Transportation, 02; Power Plant, 03; and Public
20~
Works, 07.
The internal organization of the shops at the Boston Naval
Shipyard became more complex, even for units of a modest size,
such as the paint shop. In some instances, such as the
electronics shop, that complexity resulted from rapid
developments in the technology covered by a shop's cognizance.
Also, shops evolved little bureaucracies of personnel not engaged
in actual ship work or manufacturing. The division of the yard's
19. Boston Naval Shipyard to Chief, Bureau of Ships, Dec. 29,
1950, 181-40, Box 3, A3-1 .
20. Mansfield, pp. 114-27; BOSNAYSHIPYD Instructions 4860.3, Aug
25, 1958, BNHP, RG 1, Series 10.
656
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activity between the Charlestown site and South Boston was not
recognized in the shop organization. A single shop master had
responsibility for performing work at both sites. Some of the
larger shops had an additional supervisor, who directed activity
at the annex when the occasion arose.
The paint shop continued to operate out of Building No. 125.
Its three principal components were sections for admini-
stration, shop planning, and industrial production. The Shop
Planning Section performed "detailed shop planning operations" in
accordance with Navy regulations. That section was divided into
four groups: job analysis, scheduling, clerical, and standards.
Personnel matters were administered by the Administrative
Section, which consisted of personnel, training, clerical, and
safety "units." The shop's actual work was performed by the
Industrial Production Section, made up of two subdivisions. The
New Construction, Conversion, and Repair Unit undertook
most operations involving ships and shipboard equipment,
including interior and exterior spray and brush painting,
application of plastic and vinyl coatings to ships' bottoms,
sandblasting procedures, and rubberizing of shafting and other
equipment. The unit also stripped, painted, and finished small
boats newly constructed or under repair; pickled and painted
steel plates and shapes; and painted sonar domes, transducers,
hydrophones, and other equipment. A separate division performed
services somewhat more removed from ships. The Equipment
Maintenance and Service Unit provided the yard with sign painting
services; painted articles manufactured in the shipyard; did
658
sandblasting for other shops; painted industrial machinery and
equipment; provided painting services for the equipment
restoration program of the electrical shop; mixed and developed
colors for painting; and issued to ships' forces and controlled
the loan of spray paint equipment, painters' floats, and other
21
items .
All shops possessed the same basic structure as the paint
shop, although larger organizations had more units under the
industrial production section and sometimes included additional
sections, such as technical, service, cost control, or quality
control .
The chief civilian supervisor within each shop continued to
be a master mechanic. Shop masters of the postwar period
differed significantly from their counterparts of the early
twentieth century. In addition to being thoroughly grounded in
all aspects of their trade and the industrial function of their
shop, they were expected to be skillful managers of the men in
their charge and to be competent administrators, well versed in
personnel relations, planning, scheduling, cost analysis, and
material controls. No longer merely head mechanics, masters of
the mid-twentieth century needed communication skills. For
example, the Bureau of Ships arranged annual conferences, which
gathered together all of the Navy's shipyard masters in the same
trade. The proceedings at these conferences included the formal
delivery of papers on technical or administrative problems. For
21. Table of Organization for Paint Shop, in Commander to Chief,
Bureau of Ships, Aug. 19, 1958, 181-40, Box 63A0377, A-3.
659
example, in 1958, the Boston Naval Shipyard's master woodworker
traveled to Puget Sound to present a talk, complete with visual
aids, on safety in woodworking shops. In the same year, forge
masters convened at Norfolk Naval Shipyard. Boston's master
delivered a paper entitled "Installation of a 25000 Pound Drop
Forge." Also in 1958, the master painters' conference at
Charleston included the presentation "Training Potential
Supervisors and the Accurate Selection and Training of Personnel
for Analyst and Scheduler Positions," written and delivered by
22
the master painter from the Boston yard.
When attending these national conferences, shop masters were
accompanied by others in the supervisory hierarchy of their
shops. Next in line in that hierarchy came foremen. Foremen were
found in those shops in which the master was in need of an
assistant to head a subunit. During the war, the position of
chief quarterman appeared because of the great size of some
shops. That position was retained after the war. At the Boston
Naval Shipyard, the paint shop's chief quarterman served as
acting head of the shop during the absence of the master. He was
also in charge of the Industrial Production Section and probably
supervised painting activities at South Boston, when the shop was
required to work on a ship in Dry Docks Nos . 3 or 4 . Men more
directly associated with supervision of workers on the job were
quartermen and leadingmen. Shop Personnel Supervisors appeared in
22. Commander to Commander, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Feb. 7,
1958; Commander to Commander, Charleston Naval Shipyard, Aug. 27,
1958; and Commander to Commander, Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Sep.
30, 1958, all in 181-40, Box 63A0377, A19.
660
1946. This was an important staff position, being a Group IV(a)
23
rating, the same as held by masters and foremen.
At the nation's naval shipyards, the chief administrative
problems arising in the years following World War II included an
immediate scaling down of the yard's work force in 1945 and 1946.
Subsequent budget cutting in the late 1940s by the Truman
administration led to further RIFs, reductions in force, that
sometimes involved workers who had been at the yard for many
years. A major and sizeable round of closing of military bases
and discharging of civilian employees occurred in August 1949.
The unanticipated outbreak of war in Korea saw a sudden,
emergency increase in the Boston yard's labor strength, followed
by the beginnings of a steady decrease, which remained the
pattern to the closing in 1974. During much of the first
postwar decade, then, yard administrators sought to adjust the
size of the labor force to the changing volume of ship work.
A special problem of labor recruitment emerged in the mid-
1950s, because of an acute shortage of qualified engineers. As
attrition thinned the ranks in the Design Division and depleted
the number of engineers elsewhere in the yard, the administration
made special efforts to recruit young graduates from the many
universities in the area, ultimately instituting a special summer
program for those still pursuing their degrees.
Postwar demobilization saw the yard divest itself of
property leased for the duration, such as the Draper Building and
23. Publication of the Master Mechanics and Foremen s
Association , 1951 , BNHP , RG 1, Series 16, Box 1, p. 69; Order No.
108-46, Aug. 20, 1946, 181-40, Box 365, A3-1.
661
various other warehouses used by the Supply Department during the
war. On the other hand, the yard became responsible for the
maintenance and security of deactivated facilities in the area.
Among these were the Bethlehem shipyard at Hingham and the Naval
Industrial Reserve Gear Plant at Lynn. The Bethlehem facility,
designated as the US Naval Storehouse, Hingham, became
incorporated into the organization of the shipyard in December
1946. As a part of the yard, it was known as the Hingham
Storehouse Department. Intended by the Navy for the storage of
ships, the Hingham Storehouse remained affiliated with the
shipyard until 1948. The Industrial Reserve Gear Plant was under
shipyard cognizance from November 1947 until July 1950, when it
was transferred to the care of the Industrial Manager, First
Naval District. The yard's Supply Department continued to
operate the Fuel Annex in East Boston. In 1954, the Navy
deactivated the Naval Air Station at Squantum and assigned its
care to the Commandant, First Naval District, who in turn placed
24
the Commander, Boston Naval Shipyard, in charge.
A close, sometimes perplexing relationship, existed between
the Boston Naval Shipyard and the Boston Group, Atlantic Reserve
Fleet, which used the South Boston Annex for the berthing of its
inactive ships. Officially, the Reserve Fleet was one of the
yard's tenants. The fleet was not only a collection of moth-
balled ships, but also was a Navy organization, with a sizable
24. Boston Naval Shipyard Order 144-46, Dec. 19, 1946, 181-40,
Box 365, A3-1; Boston Naval Shipyard Order 110-47, Oct. 30, 1947,
181-40, Box 301, A3-1; Mansfield, p. 50; Bosto n Nava l Shipyard
News, Feb. 2, 1954.
662
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group of men responsible for the initial inactivation of the
ships and their subsequent preservation. Reserve fleet personnel
used the facilities of the annex, particularly Dry Dock No. 4 and
the bulk of the piers. The shipyard rendered support services to
the reserve fleet organization. These included providing berthing
and mooring facilities; fire-fighting units and equipment; tugs,
small boats, and other craft; ship's services facilities, such as
laundry and barber shop; garbage and sewage disposal; and
automotive transportation for the commander of the Boston Group.
In addition to being a tenant of the shipyard, the Reserve Fleet
also was an occasional customer, its ships being worked on by the
25
yard at both Charlestown and South Boston.
Of course, services to the reserve fleet and custody of the
former Bethlehem yard and the gear plant did not constitute the
main mission of the Boston Naval Shipyard. In 1947, the Bureau
of Ships defined the chief parts of that mission as:
construction, docking, overhaul, and alteration of
destroyers, landing craft and destroyer escorts;
docking, overhaul and conversion of various types of
ships, including submarines, with emphasis on destroyers
and auxiliaries; docking and overhaul of local reserve
ships, mostly escort carriers;... planning yard for CA,
CVE, DD, and certain auxiliaries;... manufacture of
cordage and ground tackle, and of other items as
assigned including boats.
The definition also stipulated that the shipyard's function
included the maintenance of "a peacetime operational level of
about 9,000 civilian employees, with facilities for emergency
25. Commandant, First Naval District, and Commander, US Naval
Base, Boston, to Commander, Boston Naval Shipyard, Sep. 26, 1947,
181-40, Box 302, A3-1.
664
26
expansion to 40,000 employees."
Boston shipyard officers objected to the 1947 definition of
their mission, since the Bureau of Ships seemed to be limiting
the yard's ship work to smaller warships in commission, despite
the availability of Dry Dock No. 3, which at that time could
receive any ship in the fleet. In its subsequent updating of the
yard's mission, the bureau did alter the language so as to extend
repair work to ships "up to aircraft carriers." However, such
mission definitions remained of a highly general nature. On the
other hand, listings of the yard's "tasks and functions" grew
longer and more elaborate. A 1966 document lists seventy-one
"tasks and functions" for the yard. By 1970, there were eighty-
27
seven .
The 1947 definition of the mission of the Boston yard
specifically mentioned submarines as among the vessels the
facility was to dock, overhaul, or convert. Between 1948 and
1951, the yard did convert two conventional submarines to "Guppy"
types. Thereafter, work of any kind on submarines was rare. In
1953, the Navy sought to enlarge its available facilities on the
East Coast for the overhaul of submarines. At least tentatively,
the Boston yard was selected to participate in regular overhauls
of such vessels. One question was whether arrangements should be
made for a "two-ship" program at Charlestown or for a "four-to-
eight-ship" program at South Boston. Although the yard favored
26. Commander to Bureau of Ships, Nov. 17, 1947, 181-40, Box
302, A3-1.
27. Command History, Jan. 1, 1966 to Dec. 31, 1966; Command
History, Jan. 1, 1970 to Dec. 1, 1970, both in BNHP, RG 1, Series
11.
665
using the Charlestown site for submarine work, the Navy selected
South Boston, and started development of a facility at that
location. However, before its completion, the Navy changed its
mind and decided to locate its new submarine overhaul complex at
28
the shipyard in Charleston, South Carolina.
An important peacetime activity of the Navy was planning for
future wars. Understandably, World War II had great impact on
such plans. That struggle had demonstrated that in the 1930s,
the Navy Department had grossly miscalculated the magnitude of
the effort a global conflict required. Accordingly, in the late
1940s, the Navy Department sought more realistically to
anticipate what the fleet would need in the event of a third
world war. For example, in 1949, a destroyer construction
program was adopted for implementation should a full mobilization
be required. That program called for the building of 357 ships.
Boston's role would be construction of fourteen of them, most to
be delivered within thirty-six months. It also appeared that the
Boston Naval Shipyard would serve as the destroyer design
modification yard. In informing naval shipyards and private
builders of their parts in the destroyer program, the Navy
Department did not intend that any immediate preparations be
made. However, such mobilization plans did influence decisions
29
respecting plant improvement.
Considerations of a future war influenced Boston Naval
28. Bureau of Ships, M.P. & R. Division, Industrial Engineering
Report No. 168P, Apr. 20, 1953, 181-40, Box 583, A3.
29. Bureau of Ships, Industrial Mobilization Planning, Sep. 1,
1949; Design Superintendent to Planning Officer, Aug. 9, 1949,
both in 181-40, Box 390, Al-3.
666
Shipyard administrators in their projections for plant
development. In 1948, they planned for an emergency which would
require 50,000 people being employed at the Charlestown site,
35,000 at South Boston, and 2500 at the Chelsea Annex. The
Production Officer contended that sufficient plant improvements
should be made at South Boston as to enable that facility to
operate independently. Thus, the annex could continue
functioning, if enemy action should put the Charlestown yard out
of commission. In the decades after World War II, the development
of long-range plans for plant development for the Boston Naval
Shipyard proved to be an exercise in futility, and very few of
the major improvements recommended by yard administrators were
30
realized .
Another irony surrounds the shipyard's planning in 1948
for an emergency work force of almost 90,000 people. In the
following year, an economy move, instituted by the Defense
Department, resulted in the discharge of 1600 workers at Boston.
Moreover, shipyard administrators were presented with a priority
list for reducing "non-ship" work. Essentially, such work
encompassed manufacturing. Midway down the list was the
manufacture of Naval Stock Account items "in competition with
commercial vendors." Such items manufactured at the Boston
shipyard consisted chiefly of the products of the ropewalk and
forge. Perhaps this was the first sign of the ultimately
successful campaign to reduce the operations of these two
30. Master Development Plan, Jul. 21, 1948, 181-40, Box 385,
Al-1 .
667
31
shops .
PLANT IMPROVEMENT: PLANS AND ACTUALITY
As a consequence of the expansion of activity during the
years of World War II, the physical plant of the Boston Navy Yard
had been enhanced. Major improvements at Charlestown consisted
of rebuilding three piers and constructing a new one; the
modernization of one shipways and the addition of a second; the
construction of Dry Dock No. 5; and the erection of Building No.
198. The South Boston Annex experienced a general development,
including the construction of Dry Dock No. 4. However, it is also
true that wartime activities and pressures had some adverse
effects on the yard.
The need to construct facilities rapidly so they could be
employed in the yard's war effort sometimes resulted in
sacrificing quality. For example, instead of more durable
materials, wood was used in pier construction and reconstruction.
Building No. 198 went up hastily and in the postwar years was
regarded as a temporary structure, unsuited for industrial
purposes. Dry Dock No. 5 stood as the prime demonstration of the
consequences of cutting corners to complete shipbuilding and ship
repair facilities as soon as possible. In the late 1940s, large
cracks and other signs of disintegration appeared in the
operating tunnels, the outboard ends of the wingwalls, and the
inner edge of the sill. Moreover, the pumps used in the
dewatering system were those originally employed by the
31. Non-Ship Work, Priority of Reduction In, Sep. 6, 1949, 181-
40, Box 390, Al-1.
668
contractor in the construction of the dock. Emptying the dock
required between sixteen and twenty-nine hours. As early as
August 1943, Dry Dock No. 5 's closure gate was considered
inadequate .
The same pressures that led to deficiencies in the
construction of Dry Dock No. 5 also resulted in the postponement
of major repairs on buildings and structures. Since the late
1930s, inspections of Dry Dock No. 2 had indicated that the
entire outer section had raised and settled to such an extent as
to distort its cross section. However, a decision was made to
keep the dock in service, except in the event of an actual
failure. Another wartime expedient was draining sewage from a
number of waterfront buildings directly into the harbor instead
of making repairs or providing new connecting mains with the
Metropolitan District Sewage system.
Finally, the war had contributed to the overcrowding of the
yard at Charlestown. In 1951, Shipyard Commander Pleasant D.
Gold, Jr., described the site as a "densely congested area of
buildings and facilities, hemmed in by the Mystic and Charles
Rivers on three sides and the overhead Mystic River Expressway on
32
the fourth side."
In 1946, the Boston Naval Shipyard at CharlestOwn revealed
numerous plant deficiencies, the consequence not only of the war,
but also of its age and the small tract to which it was limited.
All three dry docks required major repairs. Dry Dock No. 1 's
inner caisson seat had deteriorated and the stone facing inboard
32. Commander to Chief, Bureau of Ships, Sep. 28, 1951, 181-40,
Box 401, Al .
669
of that seat had "moved, bulged and otherwise warped out of its
original position." Generally, the dock's outer end needed
reconstruction. Moreover, the facility lacked the depth and the
propeller and sonar pits required to accomodate destroyers then
being planned. No. 2 's outer section and both of its caisson
seats also suffered damage. The inner seat on the easterly side
of the dock had failed on April 3, 1946. Emergency repairs
placed the dock back in operation, but without reconstruction of
the outward portion of the dock, further difficulties could be
expected. In addition to the want of repairs to its masonry, Dry
Dock No. 5 was unsuitable for ship repair, because of its closure
33
gate and inadequate dewatering system.
With the exceptions of Piers No. 1 and 5, all of the yards
wharfs were of light timber construction, with wood piling
supports. Thus, they constituted a fire hazard to the yard and
to vessels berthed at them. For fire protection, the waterfront
was dependent on the fresh water supplied by the water system of
the city of Boston. No arrangement existed at the piers for
utilizing salt water, either in fire protection or in the
flushing of ships being serviced. Also, the piers lacked the
33. This discussion of the yard's plant in the period 1946 to
1955 is based primarily on the following documents: Shore Station
Development Program, Dec. 31, 1946, 181-40, Box 365, Al-1; Shore
Station Development Board Program, Fiscal 1951, Nov. 23, 1947,
181-40, Box 385 (1948), Al-1; Shore Station Development Program,
Dec. 15, 1947, 181-40, Box 302, Al-1; Memorandum for File, Master
Development Plan, Jul. 21, 1948, 181-40, Box 385, Al-1;
Memorandum to Senior Member, Shore Station Development Board, May
21, 1948, 181-40, Box 385, Al-1; Priority List - New Projects,
Fiscal Year 1952, 181-40, Box 390 (1949), Al-1; First Endorsement
on Local Shore Station Development Board, Dec. 29, 1951, 181-40,
Box 401, Al-1; Annual Inspection of Public Works and Public
Utilities, Mar. 1953, 181-40, Box 584, A-23.
670
deck loading capacity for work on modern ships, they had
restricted work areas, and they did not have adequate weight-
handling facilities. Because of their wooden construction, Piers
Nos . 2 through 4 and 6 through 11 required costly maintenance,
maintenance which never succeeded in arresting the steady
deterioration .
Generally, the Boston Naval Shipyard had a sufficient number
of cranes. In fact, in 1950, the Industrial Engineering Officer
reported a surplus of weight-handling equipment. However, crane
service suffered from several defects. The wooden piers could
not sustain the weight of mobile cranes. In addition, no
integrated system of portal crane tracks existed. The trackage in
the area of Pier No. 1 and Dry Docks Nos. 1 and 2 was not
connected to the tracks on Pier 5, placing that pier's two portal
cranes in a captive situation. This made it impossible to
concentrate a large number of cranes in one place for certain
operations, including work on radar masts. To accomplish such
work, the yard was forced to keep ships in Dry Dock No. 2, where
a large boom could be employed. Efficiency of operations
recommended undocking ships upon completion of work requiring a
dry dock, berthing them at Pier No. 5, and assembling as many
cranes there as needed. This could not be done at Boston because
of the absence of connecting trackage. Dry Dock No. 5 's portal
cranes were completely isolated from any other part of the yard,
and Pier No. 11 had no cranes or tracks whatsoever.
The area around Shipways No. 1 was particularly congested
and constituted a poor layout for ship construction. Several
671
buildings prevented the development of adequate stowage for
partially fabricated sections prior to incorporation in ships
under construction. There was also insufficient room for plate
storage .
A majority of the buildings in the Charlestown yard had been
erected in the nineteenth century or the early years of the
twentieth. In 1953, the Public Works Officer stated:
Buildings at this activity are generally of the older
type construction, consisting of granite block walls and
spread footings, with wood interior framing and
flooring, having slate roofs fastened to open-space
nailing strips. This condition has resulted in high
maintenance costs and reduced production in work being
performed under sub-standard conditions.
Built to serve an earlier age, many of the administrative and
industrial structures lacked the space required in the mid-
twentieth century. Also, a large number were used for purposes
other than those for which they had been originally designed.
34
This often resulted in poor layouts for industrial operations.
Because of the nature of the yard and its buildings,
consolidation of certain types of work was impossible. By 1951,
the electronic and electrical shops used twenty-one separate work
areas in eleven different buildings at Charlestown and the South
Boston Annex. In the main yard, administration was scattered
among a half-dozen buildings. Important activities, such as
drafting, suffered from inadequate space. Probably the foundry
was in the worst condition, respecting both its equipment and its
building, No. 42-C. The Bureau of Ships' Industrial Survey
34. Annual Inspection of Public Works and Public Utilities, Mar
1953, 181-40, Box 584, A-23.
672
Division made a terse recommendation in 1946: "Modernize foundry
or close it down and procure castings from local commercial or
35
other naval sources."
In 1944, an earlier Industrial Survey Division report had
noted the deficiencies of the Charlestown yard and had suggested
that South Boston be considered, should the postwar Navy decide
36
to retain only one of the Boston sites. A formal decision was
in fact made in the late 1960s to close down the Charlestown
facility and to move the entire shipyard to South Boston.
However, immediately after the war, Boston administrators assumed
that the old yard would continue to have primacy and recommended
long-range plans to overcome that site's deficiencies. Even
planning major plant improvements encountered difficulties. The
congestion required existing structures be eliminated to provide
the space for new ones. This meant that offices and shops would
have to be shuffled around, in a sort of musical chairs fashion,
during the construction of a particular building. The biggest
obstacle that yard officers encountered in seeking to devise a
scheme to improve the yard was the unwillingness of the Bureau of
Ships, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, and
Congress to expend the large sums of money required. In view of
that reluctance and from the perspective of the 1980s, the yard's
master planning in the decade after World War II appears somewhat
unrealistic. Nevertheless, consideration of those plans is
35. Industrial Survey Division's Survey Report No. 32, Oct. 18,
1946, 181-40, Box 365, A3-1 .
36. Industrial Survey Division Report No. 3, Nov. 25, 1944, 181-
40, Box 297, A3-1 .
673
useful in understanding the conditions in the yard and in
appreciating the small scope of the improvements actually
implemented .
Beginning in 1946, the yard sought funding for a wide
variety of Public Works projects. Sometimes a particular
recommendation was conditioned on the approval or rejection of
another item. For example, the yard proposed moving the foundry
to an entirely new facility in South Boston. However, if approval
could not be obtained for the appropriation of the $5 million
needed to pay for that undertaking, or until such an
appropriation was made, it would be necessary to modernize the
existing plant, which would involve $1.5 million.
In 1948, yard officers responsible for the master plan
recognized the necessity to arrange the various individual
projects in a workable chronological sequence. That sequence
consisted of thirty separate items. In addition, the plan
proposed thirteen other projects, which could be implemented at
anytime without affecting the construction sequence. The first
five items in that sequence dealt with the eastern end of the
waterfront. The program would be initiated with the demolition of
the narrow wooden Pier No. 11, used for degaussing in World War
II, and replacing it with a steel and concrete fitting-out pier.
Next in the sequence was replacing Piers Nos . 10, 9, and 8 with
permanent concrete and steel piers 130 or 140 feet in width and
extending to the maximum legal length. All of the new piers
would have twenty-foot gauge crane tracks along both of their
sides and standard gauge railway tracks, all trackage integrated
674
by spurs. Improvements in this part of the waterfront would
conclude with revitalizing Dry Dock No. 5 through equipping it
with proper pumps, replacing the closure gate with a steel
37
graving dock caisson, and repairing the dock itself.
The next seventeen projects in the 1948 master plan
essentially consisted of replacing existing buildings. This is
the stage which would see offices and shops moved to temporary
locations as demolition and construction proceeded. When it was
all over, the foundry, forge, and boat shop would be housed in
buildings in South Boston. New structures at Charlestown would
include two service buildings, a central office building, a
multi-level warehouse, an extension to the structural shop (No.
104), a woodworking shop, an extension of No. 42 for outside
machinists and ordnance shops, a sheet metal shop, and a
subassembly storage area.
To provide room for these facilities, some twenty buildings
would have to be eliminated. Demolition would remove Nos . 198
(used in the late 1940s as a temporary storehouse), 200 (fire
station and security), 34 (laboratories), 32 (Credit Union), 75
(warehouse), 187 (storehouse), 105 (forge and roundhouse), 106
(machine shop, die storage), 131 (storage), 206 (locker
building), 201 (storehouse), 36 (cafeteria), 42-C (foundry), 31
37. The chronology appears in Master Development Plan, Jul. 21,
1948, 181-40, Box 385, Al-1. Particulars on the separate
projects are given in numerous other documents. See especially
Shore Station Development Program, Dec. 31, 1946, 181-40, Box
365, Al-1; Shore Station Development Program, Dec. 15, 1947, 181-
40, Box 302, Al-1; Tentative Outline of Development Plan, May 21,
1949, 181-40, Box 385, Al-1.
675
(the old muster house), 120 (dispensary), 103 (sheet metal shop),
192 (outside machine, electrical shops), and the original portion
of 104 (structural shop and mold loft). Midway through this
stage, No. 197 would be improved for electronics work. Also the
scheme called for the rebuilding of both shipways, installing new
hammerhead cranes at the ways, and enclosing the outboard ends
with caissons. The two caissons would permit the continuation of
ship construction at the seaward portions of the ways during high
tides .
The final stage in the construction sequence would consist
of replacing Piers Nos . 7, 6, 2, 3, and 4 with large permanent
structures; demolishing buildings Nos. 114, 210, and 203, and
building a marginal wharf along Little Mystic River, from the new
fitting-out pier to Chelsea Street. Among the projects that
could be carried out at any point during the construction
sequence were providing salt water service to the piers and dry
docks; replacing dry dock cranes; improvements in the central
power plant; rehabilitation of Dry Docks Nos. 1 and 2; linking up
the portal crane track systems throughout the yard; revamping
the hot water heating system; and increasing the capacity of the
marine railway from 2000 to 3000 tons.
Only a few parts of the 1948 master plan were realized
either in the late 1940s and early 1950s or subsequently, which
meant that many of the major plant deficiencies persisted. In
1947 and 1948, the outward portions of Dry Dock Nos. 1 and 2
underwent reconstruction. In the process, No. 1 was extended to
its present length of 404 feet, and both caissons received
repairs. Several years later, larger propeller and sonar pits
676
were constructed in the floors of the two docks. No substantial
changes occurred in Dry Dock No. 5, and the capacity of the
marine railway remained unchanged. A mechanical failure in the
hoisting equipment placed the hauling-out ways out of commission
from November 1952 to January 1953. Repairs made at that time
included repositioning the cradle, which had derailed at the time
of the accident. In 1954, a 109-foot section of the center track
was raised to maintain an even grade, and the entire roller
38
system was replaced.
Several new piers constituted the most significant
improvement in the waterfront of the Boston Naval Shipyard in the
decade following the termination of World War II. By legislation
enacted in June 1948, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts replaced
the former Harbor Commissioners' line with a new pier and
bulkhead line, extending the limits of the shipyard farther
seaward. This fixed the boundaries of the yard as they existed
at the closing in 1974 and made possible the lengthening of the
replacement piers. Work had already started on replacing Pier
No. 4-A with a concrete and steel structure, twice the width of
the original wharf. Pier No. 4-A was redesignated Pier 5, and
the wharves in the eastern half of the waterfront renumbered
39
accordingly .
Pier improvement resumed in the mid-1950s, when Congress
38. Commander to Commandant, First Naval District, Jul. 16, 1952,
181-40, Box 60A272, A16; Annual Inspection of Public Works, Mar.
1953; Brady and Christopher J. Foster, Inc., pp. 28-9; Brady and
Crandall Dry Dock Engineers, Inc., pp. 16-7.
39. Bosto n Naval Shipyard News , Aug. 2, 1948; National Register
of Historic Places Inventory: Nomination Form. The Historic
Resources of the Charlestown Navy Yard, May 1978, pp. 58-88.
677
provided funds for replacing Nos . 4, 6, 7, and 11. Work began in
late 1955 and continued for the next several years. The new
piers, constructed of steel and concrete, had a high price tag,
each of them costing between $3,100,000 and $3,900,000. Other
work on the waterfront included repairing and improving the quay
40
walls in the vicinity of Piers Nos. 5, 6, and 7.
The yard's weight-handling equipment increased in 1948 with
the arrival from Long Beach of Crane Ship AB-1, the converted
battleship Kearsage . That vessel's 250-ton lift capacity made it
possible for the yard to work on all classes of ships. One of
AB-l's early assignments was lifting aboard a 120-ton gantry
crane from a pier in the South Boston Annex and delivering it to
Charlestown to further augment that site's weight-moving
capability. Moving the gantry crane was the heaviest lifting job
41
ever performed at the yard.
The most important public works improvement involving
industrial buildings at the Charlestown yard were the
modernization of the central power plant, Building No. 108, and
the enlargement of Building No. 197, which housed the electronics
and electrical shops. Work on the power plant proceeded in two
stages or increments, the first being completed in 1955.
Modernization included installation of more powerful generating
units and conversion from coal to oil. When completed, the plant
had a capacity to produce enough electricity for a community of
40. Mansfield p. 36; P.L. 534, Jul. 27, 1954, SAL, vol. 58, p.
539; P.L. 161, Jul. 15, 1955, SAL, vol. 69, p. 32 4; Annual
Report, Calendar Year 1955.
41. Boston Naval Shipyard New s, Aug. 16, 1948 and Nov. 11, 1948.
678
40,000 or 50,000 people. The modernized facility made the yard
self-sufficient respecting electricity, although a hookup was
maintained into the Boston Edison Company system as an auxiliary
42
or stand-by source.
A shortage of space and a desire to economize led to
enlarging existing structures rather than constructing new ones.
Modernization of the power plant followed that course as did the
enlargement of Building 197. In early 1954, the west end of
Building No. 197 was razed, followed by the erection of an
extension that added 50,000 square feet of floor space. The
project was completed in June 1955 at a cost of somewhat more
43
than $1 million.
Other additions, alterations, and improvements in the plant
of the Boston Naval Shipyard in the late 1940s and in the 1950s
were modest. For example, the diesinker and boiler shops
building (No. 106) and the Dispensary (No. 120) received
extensions, and a number of temporary industrial service
buildings were erected along the waterfront to serve Production
shops in their ship work.
During the period 1946 to 1955, improvements made in the
Boston Naval Shipyard fell far short of the plans developed by
the yard's administrators. Nevertheless, subsequent schemes for
the physical development of both the main yard and the South
42. Mansfield, p. 130; P.L. 153, Sep. 28, 1951, SAL, vol. 65, p.
347; Annual Report, Calendar Year 1955; Annual Report, Calendar
Year 1956, BNHP, RG 1, Series 4.
43. Public Law 534, Jul. 14, 1952, SAL, vol. 66, p. 609; Boston
Nava l Shipyard News , Apr. 4, 1953; Annual Report, Calendar Year
1955.
679
Boston Annex became even more extensive and included such items
as additional dry docks. However, serious consideration of such
plans had to await the resolution of questions that began to
emerge in the late 1950s about the future role of both sites.
CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES IN THE POSTWAR DECADE
From an all-time high of 50,128 workers in July of 1943, the
civilian work force of the Boston Navy Yard decreased to 42,500
in June 1944, 36,000 in June 1945, and 16,000 in June 1946. In
February of that year, the yard returned to a schedule of one
eight-hour shift, five days a week. A further layoff brought the
employment rolls to 9884 in June of 1947. Subsequently,
reductions occurred in more gradual fashion. A postwar low, not
to be exceeded until 1964, was reached in January 1950, when
workers totaled 7300. The North Korean invasion of its southern
neighbor in the following June triggered a remilitarization in
America, and increased ship work reversed the downward employment
trend at the Boston yard. Within two years, 13,800 people worked
at the facility. Beginning in August 1952, a pattern of decline
returned. From 1947 to 1970, except for the years of the Korean
War and 1964, civilian employees at the Boston shipyard numbered
44
between 7300 and 10,000.
Yard administrators in the postwar era had to contend with a
changing volume of work, and some employees were confronted with
layoffs. This was hardly unusual in the long history of the
Boston yard, but irregular industrial employment was less readily
44. Boston Nava l Shipyard News , Mar. 3, 1946; Mansfield, p. 89;
Average Employment Levels, 1950-1963, BNHP, RG 1, Series 22.
680
accepted by society, plant managers, and labor at mid-century
than previously.
The great demand for workers during World War II had caused
a suspension of hiring regulations. The immediate postwar years
saw a return of peacetime procedures and practices. In March
1946, Shipyard Commander Adrian Marron ordered that all future
appointments be of the conventional Civil Service type, that is
based on competitive examinations. Workers at the yard who had
originally received war service appointments were continued as
temporary employees, until the opening of registers for their
ratings. If they desired, they could take the Civil Service
examinations and were allowed to do so on government time without
45
being charged leave.
Civil Service authorities and the Department of the Navy
also resumed regular procedures for filling blue-collar
supervisory positions, those in Group IV(a). To qualify for the
examinations, applicants had to be employees of the yard. Those
applying in September 1946 for the position of master machinist,
outside, had to have achieved the status of journeyman machinist,
followed by experience in positions of responsibility, including
46
two years as a quarterman.
A change in 1946 had the effect of upgrading the status of
certain civilian supervisory personnel. All leadingmen, quarter-
men, chief quartermen, shop personnel supervisors, senior shop
personnel supervisors, and chief shop personnel supervisors were
45. Boston Nava l Shipyar d News , Mar. 3, 1946 and May 20, 1946.
46. Bosto n Naval Shipyard News , Jul. 1, 1946; Sep. 9, 1946; and
Sep. 23, 1946.
681
no longer to be paid a per diem wage, but were placed on an
annual salary basis, the same as master mechanics and foremen.
The change was accompanied by the introduction of a formula for
determining their salaries and a step system for periodic
47
increases in earnings.
In the Langer-Chavez-Stevenson Act of February 1948,
Congress provided improved retirement benefits for federal
employees covered by the Civil Service. There was a substantial
increase in the retirement annuity, in part financed by raising
the deduction from workers' salaries and wages from five to six
percent. After twenty-five years of service, all workers were
entitled to retirement benefits, regardless of their age.
Previously, a worker had to be at least fifty-five years old.
Another change provided for the payment of a worker 's retirement
48
annuity to his widow and children, should he die in service.
One new emphasis in government hiring policies and practices
resulted from the intense anticommunist mood evident in the
United States after World War II. That sentiment included fears
of internal subversion and espionage. Already in place in Navy
regulations was the requirement that the service "shall not
employ any person who advocates, or who is a member of an
organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of
the United States by force and violence." President Harry Truman
established a Loyalty Review Board on August 22, 1947, to check
47. Acting Secretary of Navy, Circular Letter, Oct. 7, 1946, 181-
40, Box 365, A3-1.
48. Chief, Office of Industrial Relations, Circular Letter, 181-
40, Box 385, A2-11.
682
on government employees. Four days later, the Department of the
Navy instructed naval shipyards as to the steps necessitated by
the President's program. Those steps included the execution of a
loyalty affidavit by employees and the taking of their
fingerprints, which would then be checked by the FBI. A change
instituted in September 1948 stipulated that "an eligible [for
naval shipyard employment] may be denied appointment if there is
a reasonable doubt as to his loyalty to the United States." In
the week after Senator Joseph McCarthy delivered his famous
speech at Wheeling, West Virginia, the Boston Naval Shipyard News
devoted an entire page to articles about the communist threat,
49
including one entitled "Who's a Communist? How to Tell."
In the series of reductions in force, which continued from
1945 to 1950, retention advantages went to those with regular,
permanent Civil Service appointments; those with efficiency
ratings of "good" or better; and to veterans. The yard first
encountered returning veterans during the war, but the number
vastly increased in 1946, so much so that the Industrial
Relations Division established a special section to handle the
placement of veterans and problems faced by veterans generally,
such as disability allowances and insurance. The employment
rights enjoyed by veterans had importance in shaping the
character of the Boston yard's postwar labor force.
All veterans received some sort of special employment
49. Standard Shipyard Regulations, Aug. 5, 1946, 181-40, Box
365, A3-1, p. 44; Loyalty Program -- Handling of Arrest and
Criminal Records, Feb. 15, 1948; Navy Civilian Personnel
Instructions, Sep. 30, 1948, both in 181-40, Box 385, A2-11;
Bosto n Nava l Shipyard New s, Feb. 13, 1949.
683
rights. An ex-GI who held permanent appointment in the yard
prior to military service or who had been a war service employee
had reemployment rights to the same type of appointment. All
veterans were entitled to a five-point preference over
nonveterans in the examination and appointment for Civil Service
jobs. Disabled veterans received a ten-point credit. An ex-
serviceman with a service disability of not less than ten percent
and who held a war service appointment had a right to have the
appointment changed to a permanent one, if he had worked in the
yard for more than a year, and to a probationary one if in the
yard less than a year. Such advantages gave real benefits to
50
veterans in securing and retaining jobs.
This became evident in 1949, when the Navy Department
ordered a reduction in force at the Boston yard from 9800 to 8600
and later to 7280. Some of the several thousand RIF notices went
to men with long careers at the yard, but who did not enjoy
veterans' preferences. In determining who should be laid off,
the Industrial Relations Division considered three major aspects
of a worker's status: whether or not he was a veteran; the type
of appointment held; and his efficiency rating. The first to go
were probably small groups, such as employees who had continued
to work beyond the age of automatic retirement. The least secure
major group were nonveterans with ratings of "fair" and with
limited-time appointments of a year or less. Veterans rated as
"good" or better and holding permanent appointments were the most
50. Boston Naval Shipyard News , May 6, 1946.
684
51
secure group.
The veterans ' preference system, a series of reductions in
force, the fact that most ex-servicemen were not of retirement
age, and the advantages veterans had in rehiring and new
appointments all operated to increase the proportion of ex-
servicemen in the work force of the Boston Naval Shipyard,
ultimately making them a majority. In the mid-1950s, a yard
branch of the Federal Employees Veterans Association began to
conduct itself as the dominant organized labor group at the
Boston facility. The actual membership of FEVA did not warrant
that role, but the number of workers eligible for membership was
great .
Not entirely unrelated to the ascendancy of veterans in the
yard was the reduction in the number of female employees. Since
most women workers had held war service apppointments and since
few of them were veterans, they tended to be vulnerable to
reductions in force. Moreover, American society celebrated
"Rosie the Ropewalker" during the war, but expected her promptly
to return to her kitchen when the emergency was over. In the
years 1943 to 1945, the yard employed one woman for every four or
five men. In 1946, the ratio changed to one to ten, shooting to
one to twenty in the late 1940s. Women virtually disappeared
from the shops and were most commonly employed in office work.
The RIF in August 1949 was the deepest since the end-of-the-
war layoffs. It was part of a nationwide effort to achieve a
general cutback in military expenditures. Secretary of Defense
51. Boston Naval Shipyard News , May 9, 1949; Jul. 7, 1949; Aug
29, 1949; and Sep. 12, 1949.
685
Louis Johnson ordered the firing of 135,000 civilian employees
and the closing of thirty installations, including the naval
shipyard at Long Beach, California. Banner headlines in Boston
newspapers shouted that the local yard might lose two thousand
workers. Actually the immediate reduction totaled 1614,
decreasing the force to 8894. Congressmen and senators from
Massachusetts protested the cuts as did unions based on the
52
yard .
The Charlestown Metal Trades Council, representing twenty-
one A.F. of L. unions, appeared the most vigorous in denouncing
the layoffs and seeking a reversal of the orders. The council
sent telegrams to congressmen, conferred with the Massachusetts
delegation and representatives of the Navy Department, urged A.F.
of L. President William Green to meet with President Truman, and
locally distributed copies of an information sheet, "Facts About
Your Boston Naval Shipyard." The labor organization argued that
the Boston yard work force was being cut by seventeen percent,
while the average in other yards was ten percent. The council
also complained that military personnel were being used to
perform shipyard work properly belonging to civilians.
Capt . Richard M. Watt, Jr., Shipyard Commander, and other
administrators met with Navy Department officials to save as many
jobs as possible, but only succeeded in delaying one stage of the
reduction. The yard made efforts to assist workers scheduled for
52. A collection of clippings from the local press is found in
181-40, Box 392 (1949), A7-1. The articles appeared on August 24
through August 28 in the Boston Globe , Boston Traveler , Christian
Science Monitor , and Boston Post.
686
separation in finding work elsewhere, and the State Employment
Division assigned three interviewers to the yard. However,
private defense contractors in the area were also affected by the
budget cutting of the federal government, and Massachusetts lost
53
some 5000 jobs.
As became apparent shortly, fate needlessly traumatized the
Boston yard at the time of the 1949 RIF. In January 1950, 270
workers were called back temporarily because of the assignment to
the yard of four destroyers for conversion. The next month, 300
more returned, and a temporary ceiling was set for the yard of
7850, up from 7280. With the outbreak of war in Korea, the yard
briefly found itself short of labor. Eight months after the RIF,
the Industrial Engineering Officer recommended consideration of
transferring to Boston some of the "hard hats" discharged at
Long Beach and other facilities. In the summer of 1952,
employment at the Boston Naval Shipyard reached almost 14,000
54
people .
The Korean War imposed no great strain on personnel policies
of the Boston Naval Shipyard. The yard retained the schedule of a
single eight-hour shift and a five-day week. Probably most
former workers discharged in the 1949 RIF who had ratings of
"good" or higher and who wanted to return were reemployed. All
entirely new workers held appointments as "emergency-
53. Boston Naval Shipyard New s, May 23, 1949, Sep. 12, 1949,
Sep. 26, 1949, and Oct. 24, 1949; Personnel Supervisors'
Conference, Sep. 26, 1949, 181-40, Box 391, A3-2.
54. Boston Naval Shipyard News , Jan. 30, 1950; Feb. 27, 1950;
and Jan. 15, 1951; Industrial Engineering Officer to Heads of
Departments and Offices, Apr. 25, 1950, 181-40, Box 46, A3-1.
687
indefinites," similar to the war-service arrangement used in
World War II. A serious labor shortage did not develop, and the
necessity did not arise to abandon regular qualification
standards for appointment to jobs in the yard. The Navy
Department adopted a policy of no deferments for shipyard workers
called up by the selective service. In fact, the yard simplified
procedures for obtaining a military leave by those who desired to
55
serve in uniform.
By May 1953, workers and yard officers once more faced the
necessity to reduce the labor force, as the Navy wound down from
the Korean conflict and sought, budgetwise, to run a tight ship.
Reductions in force occurred in the spring of 1953, June of 1954,
late 1955, and the second half of 1957. By that time, veterans'
preference employees constituted roughly two-thirds of the work
56
force .
Some modifications were made in the formula used in the mid-
1950s to determine which employees would be separated in
reduction in force programs. Veterans continued to be favored,
but all workers received one retention "point" for each year of
service in the yard. Also, four points were awarded to employees
57
having an efficiency rating of "outstanding."
The frequent scaling down of the yard's labor force gave
55. Boston Naval Shipyard News , Sep. 11, 1950 and Nov. 6, 1950.
56. Boston Naval Shipyard News , May 23, 1953; Jun. 11, 1953; and
Jun. 25, 1954; Annual Report, Calendar Year 1955; Annual Report,
Calendar Year 1956; Memorandum for the Honorable Sinclair J.
Armstrong, Oct. 4, 1957, BNHP, RG 1, Series 11.
57. Boston N aval Shipyard News , May 23, 1953.
688
importance to the efficiency rating system, since workers'
ratings were one of the elements in deciding who to keep and who
to discharge. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, navy
yards had assigned their workers ratings of "excellent," "good,"
"fair," or "poor." The old distinction between "character" and
"workmanship" did not persist, and workers received a single
rating for their overall performance. In 1952, the terminology
changed to "outstanding," "satisfactory," and "unsatisfactory."
The evaluation of a worker's performance was made by his
immediate supervisor, usually a leadingman for those in the
shops. The frequency of ratings altered. During the last years
of World War II, efficiency evaluations were made quarterly. In
1946, a semi-annual schedule was instituted. In late 1948, the
yard began a system of monthly "performance reviews." Those
reviews were not efficiency ratings, but could be used by
supervisors when preparing the next regular efficiency
58
evaluations .
Efficiency ratings covered a worker's overall performance.
Clear breaches of yard regulations resulted in disciplinary
action, which extended from a warning to temporary suspension to
discharge from employment. The ancient six-consecuti ve-muster
provision had given way to a more flexible approach to the
problem of absenteeism. For the first offense, a worker with an
unexcused or unauthorized absence for one or more workdays might
be punished with a warning or up to five days' suspension. A
second offense might result in a suspension from three to ten
58. Boston Naval Shipyard News , Mar. 23, 1952, May 20, 1946, and
Dec. 25, 1948.
689
days, and a third, suspension for ten days or discharge. Serious
misbehavior carried the possibility of discharge for the first
infraction. Such a punishment might be imposed on workers for
selling intoxicants or promoting gambling in the yard; sleeping
on the job; failing to safeguard classified material; carelessly
endangering the safety or causing the injury of another worker;
malicious damage to Navy property; theft or attempted theft;
insubordination; and making unfounded, false, slanderous, or
malicious statements about an employee, supervisor, or
59
official .
Shipyard workers holding temporary, probationary, or perma-
nent appointments in all classifications, that is Groups II, III,
IV(a), and IV(b), were included in the efficiency-rating system.
The ratings became part of a worker's personnel record. Regard-
less of whether or not the yard was undergoing a reduction in
force, a probationary worker given a "poor" or "unsatisfactory"
rating could be discharged forthwith. Ratings played a role in
decisions respecting retention and also promotion. Civil Service
and Navy Department regulations provided for several review and
appeal procedures, through which workers could challenge ratings
assigned them by their supervisors. The composition of one
appeals body, the Efficiency Rating Review Board, included seats
60
filled through election by the employees.
Numerous other committees and boards at the Boston Naval
Shipyard during the postwar period included or consisted
59. Boston Naval Shipyard News , Apr. 23, 1951.
60. Boston Naval Shipyard News , Jun . 17, 1949 and Jul. 4, 1949.
690
entirely of workers chosen by their peers. Shop committees had
existed in one form or another for many years. In 1947,
provision was made for a system of three elected committeemen in
all but five small shops and offices. All nonsupervisory
personnel, except those appointed for one year or less, could
participate in the elections and could serve as committeemen. The
chairmen of the shop committees formed a Joint Shop Council,
which had regular monthly meeting with the shipyard commander to
address matters of importance to employees.
In a review of its accomplishments during 1949-1950, the
Joint Shop Council described its success in gaining management's
cooperation in a variety of procedures. These included
arranging an orderly schedule of vacations for employees; posting
the numerical grades of those taking examinations for positions
as quartermen and leadingmen; more rigorous enforcement of yard
speed limits at closing time; obtaining improved sanitation,
ventiliation, and drinking fountains in various parts of the
yard; establishing check cashing services at the South Boston
Annex; providing employees with income tax advice; and limiting
participation in submarine trials to workers who volunteered. As
occasion required, subcommittees of the Joint Shop Council
addressed themselves to particular problems. For example, in
1948, one subcommittee reviewed the yard's promotion policies and
61
another studied the problem of sick leave.
The shop committee system was sponsored by the yard
management. Participation by a shop or office was not mandatory,
61. Boston Naval Shipyard News , Nov. 8, 1948 and May 19, 1950.
691
and some units of the yard chose not to elect committees. When
first started, the program enjoyed the support of almost the
entire work force, and the Joint Shop Council included
representatives of nearly all of the yards thirty-three to
thirty-five shops and office units. However, such complete
participation eroded. In 1949, twenty of thirty-five units
participated, and by 1960, the Joint Shop Council was composed of
62
only eight units, six of them consisting of office workers.
The decline of the shop committee system paralleled the
increasing role of employee groups not sponsored by the
Department of the Navy. At the Boston yard, beginning in 1890,
if not before, administrators had responded to inquiries and
protests from labor organizations about matters involving
civilian workers and had met with spokesmen for those groups so
long as they were employed in the yard. Similarly, the Navy
Department in Washington had acknowledged the right of unions to
solicit explanations and to make presentations. Contact between
the Navy and unions concerned such matters as wages, trade
cognizance, changes in shop administration, and grievances on the
part of individual employees. However, unions had no official
standing in navy yards nor in the Navy 's administration of
civilian personnel. The closest the Navy came to formally
acknowledging unions was the inclusion of a representative of
organized labor on the Department's Wage Review Board.
Prior to 1946, unions which were composed of Boston yard
62. Boston Naval Shipyard News , Jun . 6, 1949; Informal Turnover
Memorandum for Capt. W. A. Brockett, n.d. [Sep. 1960], BNHP, RG
1 , Series 5 , p . 34 .
692
employees or which included such workers among its members did
not meet in the yard and had no right to enter the yard for
recruitment or other purposes. Nor could they distribute litera-
ture or use the yard's bulletin boards. Several nonunion groups
did have privileges in the yard, such as veterans' organizations
and particularly the Master Mechanics and Foremen's Association
and the Quartermen and Leadingmen's Association. The last men-
tioned in fact published the yard newspaper from 1936 to 1943.
In 1946, a change occurred and the Navy began to give formal
recognition to organized groups of navy yard employees.
Regulations provided that, with the approval of the shipyard
commander, employees could organize any association among their
members for the purposes of operating cafeterias or for
recreation, welfare, hospital funds, relief, and related employee
matters. As implemented, the regulation permitted labor
unions, veterans' associations, and professional and fraternal
organizations. Formal recognition granted groups such rights as
posting notices in the yard, using yard facilities to hold
meetings, and conferring with management about personnel
policies, problems, and grievances. Employee groups could meet
during working hours only on matters of employee welfare,
recreation, and cafeteria control. Recognition did not mean
acknowledgment by the Navy of the right to strike or to bargain
collectively. In 1955, Congress explicitly prohibited government
63
employees from striking or asserting the right to strike.
The Navy's position was that workers had a right to join or
63. Furer p. 909: Standard Shipyard Regulations, Aug. 5, 1946,
181-40, Box 365, A3-1 .
693
refrain from joining an organized employee group. This
understanding applied to the Navy's own shop committees as well
as other organizations. A guiding principle appeared to be that
exchanges of views between management and workers were beneficial
to both and that workers were more likely to express themselves
freely through an organized group than in an individual exchange
with a yard administrator. The recognition of groups did not re-
move the right any employee had to approach management as an
64
individual .
Unions based on the Boston Naval Shipyard tended to reject
the shop committee system established by the Navy. For example,
in December 1946, the United Public Workers of America, Local
259, regarded itself as a yard-wide organization, each trade
having a shop group empowered to deal with conditions affecting
that trade. In other words, the union held that its various
components should represent the shops, not the Navy's shop
committees. In similar fashion, the Metal Workers local, No.
395, claimed that its members could not participate in a shop
65
committee which included nonunion employees.
As in the past, craft unions sought to insure work for their
members by vigilance in guarding or expanding the jurisdiction of
their trades. In the autumn of 1946, at which time layoffs were
continuing, a many-sided dispute arose, apparently because of
the claims of sheet metal workers, claims which were resisted by
64. Boston Naval Shipyard News , Sep. 26, 1949; Furer, p. 909.
65. United Public Workers of America to Commander, Dec. 12, 1946;
Sheet Metal Workers' International Association to Master Sheet
Metal Worker, Dec, 30, 1946, both in 181-40, Box 365, A3-1.
694
coppersmiths, boilermakers , and pipefitters. In part, problems
developed because different materials were being used for stand-
ard items. For example, ships' wash basins, traditionally made
of copper, were fitted and installed by coppersmiths. However,
who should perform the work in the case of basins made of alloys
of which copper constituted only a small part? The shipyard
encouraged the unions to urge their national headquarters to take
66
up such matters directly with the Navy Department.
In the five years following institution of the new policy,
the number of formally recognized groups in the Boston Naval
Shipyard rose from the original eleven to almost fifty. By
1951, recognition had been granted to forty-nine organizations,
among them being twenty-eight trade groups and labor unions; four
veterans' associations; and seventeen miscellaneous clubs, fed-
erations, and societies. This last category included the Ap-
prentice and Alumni Association; Credit Union; Recreation Asso-
ciation; and local or national associations for pilots, firemen,
Fiscal Department employees, master mechanics and foremen, quar-
termen and leadingingmen, police, and shop planners. The
veterans' groups were local chapters or posts of AmVets, War
Veterans, Disabled American Veterans, and Federal Employee
67
Veterans .
Twenty-three of the twenty-eight trade groups had
66. Commander to Bureau of Ships, Oct. 28, 1946; Coppersmiths'
Shop Committee to Commander, Dec. 5, 1946; Brotherhood of Boiler-
makers to Commander, Dec. 11, 1946; Commander to Brotherhood of
Boilermakers, Dec. 23, 1946; and Commander to United Public
Workers, Dec. 26, 1946, all in 181-40, Box 365, A3-1.
67. Mansfield, p. 36; Boston Naval Shipyard News , May 7, 1951.
695
affiliation with the American Federation of Labor. Some trade
organizations were locals of traditional craft-type unions, such
as brotherhoods of railroad trainmen, electrical workers,
molders, foundry workers, and machinists. Ten others were
separate lodges of the American Federation of Government
Employees .
The numerical increase in the employee organizations in the
second half of the 1940s probably resulted from the frequent
reductions in force, increasing job specialization, and the
favorable attitude pf the Navy Department. In 1949, the Navy
revised its policies, which previously had limited civilian
supervisors to passive membership in labor organizations.
Henceforth, they could be active participants, holding office and
becoming involved in the conduct of business meetings.
Relations between the management of the Boston Naval
Shipyard and the various employee groups appear to have been
satisfactory until 1954. At that time, the Charlestown Metal
Trades Council was the most active union in the yard and the
chief spokesman for employees. However, Post No. 1 of the
national organization known as the Federal Employees Veterans
Association ( FEVA ) seemed to be engaging in a campaign of
criticism of the yard administration. Because of that campaign,
the shipyard commander took unprecedented action..
FEVA made its appearance at the Boston Naval Shipyard in
1946 and became the parent organization of the national
association of the same name. As required of recognized groups,
the organization informed the administration of its officers.
The first such roster, dated February 16, 1948, listed Kenneth
696
T. Lyons, a leadingman welder, as Adjutant. FEVA's initial
meeting with the shipyard commander occurred in July 1949. An
"Employee Organization Information" form was executed on behalf
of the group in August of the same year. At some point, a copy of
FEVA's constitution and by-laws were also entered into the
shipyard files. Later, no records could be found which indicated
that FEVA had been accorded official recognition as an employee
group. However, since such recognition could be granted orally,
it appears that FEVA had received such status, especially in view
of the several documents pertaining to the organization deposited
with the shipyard, including a record of its July 1949 meeting
68
with the shipyard commander.
At that meeting, the shipyard management was informed that
Lyons had been elected commander or head of the local group.
Subsequently, he became commander of the national organization.
This created a slightly unusual, but by no means improper
situation, since among the yard's employees were the officers of
the local FEVA branch, Post No. 1, and also Lyons, national
commander .
Although it did not equal the Charlestown Metal Trades
Council in membership and activity at the Boston Naval Shipyard,
FEVA became an aggressive champion of veterans employed by the
federal government. It provided personal representation at
grievance and disciplinary hearings and took civil action on
behalf of its members and veterans in federal courts. The group
68. Documents pertaining to the dispute between FEVA and the
yard management, including copies of the group's publication and
court records, are in BNHP, RG 1, Series 11, Information Files,
1955-1959.
697
also communicated its activities and complaints to members of
Congress .
According to the management of the Boston Naval Shipyard,
beginning in 1954, FEVA's criticism of yard administrators became
steadily harsher. A mimeographed newsletter, published monthly
and bearing the name "Boston Naval Shipyard Post 1, Federal
Employees Veterans Association, Inc.," served as the chief
vehicle for the dissemination of the group's views. The shipyard
commander characterized the newsletter's contents as
"increasingly defamatory of shipyard administration"; bordering
"closely upon, if they are not actually libel"; "allegations,
innuendoes, and indictments"; "vitriolic propaganda"; and
"editorial expletives." A perusal of the newsletter indicates
the accuracy of at least some of these descriptions.
The issue of January 1955 contained the statement: "The
present Shipyard Commander [Capt. Philip W. Snyder], his
Production and Industrial Relations Officers [Capt. J. E. Flynn
and Capt. G. C. Wells] are totally unfit to fill their present
positions or any other of like responsibility." The same issue
alleged that Captain Snyder made most of his important decisions
in the bathroom. The authors of the newsletter regularly
maligned the motives of the shipyard management. For example,
administrators were said to play politics with respect to layoffs
and to have delayed them until after the congressional elections
of 1954.
Both the language of the newsletter and its charges of
specific wrongdoing doubtless angered yard administrators. FEVA's
publication of December 1954 is notable in this respect. That
698
issue contained six allegations. Allegedly, the shipyard
management ignored or circumvented registers in making
promotions; it was arbitrary in instituting demotions; it
discriminated against physically handicapped workers; it
deliberately misled the public and workers about layoffs and
waited until after the election to effect them; it created
bureaucratic roadblocks for employee groups seeking to meet with
officials of the Industrial Relations Department; and it engaged
in "wholesale destruction of government property." FEVA provided
Massachusetts congressmen and senators with copies of this
indictment and succeeded in having one of them exert pressure on
the Navy to conduct an investigation of the management of the
Boston Naval Shipyard.
The manner in which that investigation was conducted, the
behavior of Boston administrators during its proceedings, and the
conclusions it reached provided FEVA with the grounds for
additional charges against the yard officers and against the Navy
Department. To head the investigation, the Navy named the
commander of the naval shipyard at New York, Rear Adm. Ray T.
Cowdrey. FEVA pictured the selection of Cowdrey as "the equiva-
lent of being on trial for murder and having your brother as
judge." The veterans' group charged that the Production Officer,
shop masters, and others administrators and supervisors applied
pressure to employees who testified at the hearings. Essentially,
the Cowdrey inquiry concluded that no substantiation existed for
FEVA's charges against the shipyard, but the newsletter, in
serial form, printed the report given by the Navy to the
Massachusetts congressional delegation. This had the effect of
699
keeping the pot boiling and implied that, regardless of Cowdrey 's
conclusions, the shipyard was in serious trouble. In the spring
of 1955, Captain Snyder was promoted to rear admiral and was
later replaced as commander by Capt . W. F. Howard, Jr. Despite
the change in management, FEVA's newsletter continued its tirade.
Effective September 9, 1955, Howard took the unprecedented
step of withdrawing recognition of Post 1, Federal Employees
Veterans Association, as an organized employee group at the
Boston Naval Shipyard. He explained his action in a letter to the
Bureau of Ships. That explanation included his conclusion that
the purpose of the FEVA newsletter was "to thwart the aims of
shipyard administration in the accomplishment of its mission" and
"to further personal aims and self interests of those guiding
hands" of FEVA, "who, coincidental ly , are shipyard employees...."
He claimed the newsletter constituted "overt subversion" and that
its circulation created bewilderment and low morale among
employees of the yard. Howard took note of the novelty of
withdrawing recognition of an employee group and the absence of
any directives for such in the Navy's existing instructions
regarding civilian employees. The commander offered a persuasive
argument on behalf of his implied or inherent authority to cancel
the recognition of an employee group. Copies of the letter to
the Bureau of Ships were sent by Howard to all members of the
Massachusetts congressional delegation and to the Commandant,
First Naval District, who informed the press and the wire
services of the shipyard's action. Howard prepared and sent a
separate letter to Joseph S. McAteer, Commander, Post No. 1,
FEVA, notifying the organization of withdrawal of its
700
69
recognition .
John W. McCormack, Massachusetts Congressman and House
Majority Leader, reacted immediately and heatedly to the news of
Howard's action. In a telegram to Charles S. Thomas, Secretary
of the Navy, McCormack declared he received the information "with
amazement." The majority leader further stated that he "had a
number of years ' experience with the officers of this
organization [FEVA] and [had] a deep respect for them and their
organization." He "vigorously protested Howard's "drastic and
dictatorial" action, and he called upon Secretary Thomas to
disapprove the decision of the Boston commander. Apparently,
Thomas agreed to review the situation, but there was no change in
70
the decision to cancel FEVA's recognition.
The aftermath of the decision included a civil suit filed by
Lyons and McAteer against Howard, claiming he had defamed them in
his letter to the Bureau of Ships, the copies sent to the
congressmen and the First Naval District, and in informing the
press. The shipyard commander claimed immunity from such legal
redress, since he had acted in an official capacity. A district
court granted judgment for Howard. Lyons and McAteer appealed
to the U.S. Court of Appeals, which decided Howard had not been
acting in an official capacity in sending copies of the report to
Massachusetts congressmen and senators. In passing, the Court of
69. Commander to Chief, Bureau of Ships, Sep. 8, 1955; Commander
to Boston Naval Shipyard Post No. 1, Sep. 9, 1955, both in BNHP,
RG 1, Series 8.
70. McCormack to Thomas, Sep. 9, 1955; McCormack to Assistant
Secretary of Navy, Sep. 12, 1955, both in BNHP, RG 1, Series 8.
701
Appeals characterized Howard's statements about FEVA's leadership
as "undoubtedly defamatory," although that was not the issue
before the tribunal. Howard next sought a ruling by the Supreme
Court of the United States. Because the justices had under
consideration a similar case, Howard v . Lyons and McAteer was
argued twice before the Supreme Court. In June 1959 and by a
seven-to-two decision, the court rendered a judgment for Howard.
Two liberals, Chief Justice Earl Warren and Associate Justice
71
William Douglas, dissented.
On June 3, 1959, several weeks before the Supreme Court made
its decision, the Commander, Boston Naval Shipyard, now Capt.
Fred L. Ruhlman, rerecognized the local post of FEVA. Although
Post No. 1 had been silenced since September 1955, Kenneth Lyons,
in his capacity as head of the national FEVA organization, had
continued to bring developments in the shipyard 's industrial
relations to the attention of the Navy Department and
congressman. In December 1959, Lyons gave an address at the
Boston Chamber of Commerce, in which he described how the
policies and the decisions of the Navy were undermining the
Boston Naval Shipyard as an important industrial activity.
Subsequently, FEVA evolved into the National Association of
Government Employees, with Kenneth Lyons, still a Boston yard
employee, as national president. A later shipyard commander found
71. Informal Turnover Memorandum for Capt. W. E. Howard, Jr.,
n.d. [Jun. 1955], BNHP, RG 1, Series 5; Commander to Director
Litigation Division, Dec. 22, 1958, 181-40, Box 63A0377, A-17;
Counsel for the Bureau of Ships, Memorandum, Nov. 26, 1958, BNHP,
RG 1, Series 8; Acting Counsel, Bureau of Ships, Memorandum, Mar.
31, 1959, BNHP, RG 1, Series 8; Lyons v. Howard, Federal
Reporter, 2d Series, 912-916.
702
Lyons to be reasonable and helpful in dealing with employee
72
organizations .
The ruckus in the mid-1950s between FEVA and the yard
administration does not seem to reflect employee-management
relations at large at the Boston Naval Shipyard. During the
dramatic developments, commanders had spoken highly of workers'
organizations generally, and no questions were raised about the
policy of officially recognizing employee groups.
That policy did not accord any of those groups a role in
decisions respecting a major aspect of industrial relations, the
fixing of wages and salaries. Determination of wages after 1946
represented a mixture of old practices and principles with new
federal agencies. The general concept of the 1862 congressional
enactment endured, and procedures aimed at assigning navy yard
blue-collar workers wages comparable to those paid by private
firms in the area, from whom data was obtained. Yard personnel
participated in the collection of information. However, the
Great Depression and World War II had eliminated once and for all
the annual preparation of a proposed wage schedule by a board of
yard officers. Data collected locally was forwarded to
Washington for analysis and processing by a number of offices and
agencies within the Navy. As in the past, the Secretary of the
Navy had final authority in setting wages. Other parts of the
federal government played a role in wage determinations. The
creation of the Department of Defense in 1947 resulted in local
72. Lyons, "A Report on the Boston Naval Shipyard to the
Businessmen of Boston ...," Dec. 15, 1959, BNHP, RG 1, Series 11.
For the rerecognition of FEVA, see cover sheet for Bureau of
Ships to Commander, May 18, 1959, 181-40, Box 64A300, P-8.
703
wage surveys being conducted by and on behalf of all three
military services. During the war in Korea, a national Wage
Stabilization Board had authority to approve or disapprove
proposed wage increases. Surprisingly the system could operate
with relative speed.
Such was the case in 1948. In mid-August, the Office of
Industrial Relations of the Navy Department authorized the yard
to participate in a joint Army-Air Force-Navy wage survey of the
Boston area. The navy shipyard personnel consisted of three
officers, ten people appointed by the commander from the yard's
Wage Study Office, eight IV(a) supervisors from the Production
Department shops appointed by the Production Officer, and two
supervisors designated by the Public Works Officer from his three
shops. The Wage Study Office correlated the data and forwarded
it to Washington. There, the information was processed by the
Wage and Classification Division of the Office of Industrial
Relations. The schedules prepared by that office were reviewed by
a newly established Navy Wage Committee, consisting of five
members, two of whom were labor spokesmen. A new wage scale was
announced in early November that provided for an increase of
eighteen cents an hour for all trades. According to the new
schedule, helpers generally received $1.30 per hour, laborers
73
$1.21, and most basic shipyard trades $1.60 or $1.63.
Wage surveys were made annually from 1947 through 1950.
73. Boston Naval Shipyard News , Aug. 8, 1948, Aug. 30, 1949,
Sept. 27, 1948, and Nov. 11, 1948; Chief, Office of Industrial
Relations, Circular Letter, Oct. 12, 1949, 181-40, Box 390, A2-
11. A general statement about wage-fixing appears in Office of
Industrial Relations, Circular Letter, Jul. 22, 1948, 181-40, Box
385, A2-11.
704
spot check and approval by the Wage Stabilization Board resulted
in a seven percent increase late in 1951. In March of 1952, the
Bureau of Labor Statistics began a study of Boston-area wages,
utilizing collectors provided by the yard and other Defense
Department employers in the vicinity. That data became obsolete
by the time it was processed, and in September, the Office of
Industrial Relations of the Navy Department made its own study.
Subsequently, the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the three
74
military services conducted joint investigations of area wages.
As in the past, Congress played the major role in
establishing salaries for white-collar or IV(b) employees of navy
yards. After two years without a raise, the Boston yard's 1610
IV(b) workers received a $330 increase in July 1948. In the
following year, as part of a new Classification Revision Act,
those employees obtained an additional raise averaging $140
annually. That act also simplified the classification system.
Congress again voted an increase in IV(b) salaries in October
75
1951, amounting to ten percent.
THE SHIPYARD AT WORK
A 1950 updating by the Bureau of Ships of the mission of the
Boston Naval Shipyard cited:
logistic support for assigned service craft and vessels
of the Fleet, including conversion, overhaul,
alteration, and drydocking of various types of ships up
to aircraft carriers (CV's), including submarines, with
74. Boston Naval Shipyar d News, Oct. 3, 1951; Jan. 4, 1952; Mar.
14, 1952; Sep. 10, 1952; and Mar. 19, 1954.
75. B oston Naval S hipyard N ews , Jul. 19, 1948, Oct. 14, 1949,
and Oct. 3, 1951; Chief, Office of Industrial Relations, Circular
Letter, Oct. 25, 1949, 181-40, Box 390, A2-11.
705
emphasis on destroyers and auxiliaries; design and
construction of destroyers; drydocking local reserve
ships, mostly escort carriers; manufacturing, research,
development, and test work as assigned....
In a detailed statement, the bureau listed the specific functions
of planning yard for ship alterations for destroyers, cruisers,
escort carriers, LSTs , and a number of auxiliary types; the
manufacture of cordage and ground tackle; and overhaul and repair
76
of sonar transducers. The Bureau of Ships' definition and
statement points to the principal industrial activities of the
Boston yard in the postwar decade: all types of work on ships;
planning and design; and manufacture and repair of equipment
used aboard naval vessels. In addition, the yard completed new
construction left over from the war.
Throughout much of its history, the Boston Navy Yard had
manufactured items needed by the Navy at large. The best known
manufacturing shops were those associated with the former Bureau
of Equipment, namely the ropewalk and the chain and anchor forge.
In the postwar era, other shops engaged in manufacturing. Also,
the yard became a repair center for a number of important types
of equipment.
In the early 1950s, the yard manufactured a variety of
items for ships or other Navy or Department of Defense
activities. They included chain and other ground tackle, dies
and forgings for the Watertown Arsenal, deep-depth mooring
equipment, debarkation ladders, airports (portholes), carpenter
stoppers, cordage, anchors, propellers, special high-pressure
76. Bureau of Ships to Commander, Oct. 10, 1950, 181-40, Box 46,
A3-1.
706
steam fittings, valves, bearings, castings for hull components,
message coding vans, and ammunition hoists. The structural shop
fabricated radio towers for use at various locations. In June
1950 of the 5500 workers in the shipyard's Production
77
Department, 350 to 400 were engaged in manufacturing.
In response to a directive from the Bureau of Ships in 1949,
the chain forge began to acquire the equipment and tools for the
manufacture of large anchor chain for the proposed Forrestal
class of super carriers. Production commenced in the mid-1950s.
Each link weighed approximately 360 pounds and measured two feet,
four and one-half inches in length and seventeen and one-quarter
inches in width. The breaking strength of the chain was in
excess of two and a half million pounds, and a completed cable
78
and anchor weighed roughly 320 tons.
After World War II, the Boston Naval Shipyard became a
center for the repair of electronic equipment sent from active
and reserve ships based on the Atlantic Coast. In 1947, the
Bureau of Ships ordered the establishment within the yard s
electronics shop of a facility for the repair of transducers and
hydrophones. A transducer is any devise for converting electri-
cal energy into mechanical energy. Sonar transducers transmit
mechanical energy as a beam of supersonic vibrations underwater.
Transducers also receive the beam's echo. Hyrdophones are essen-
tially underwater listening devices. Transducers and hydrophones
77^ Actual and Projected Ship Workload, Jun. 1950; Estimate of
Civilian Personnel Distribution, Jun. 1950, both in 181-40, Box
399, Ll-1; Annual Report, Calendar Year 1955.
78. "Mammoth Hammer Forges New Carrier Chain," n.d. BNHP, RG 1,
Series 27, Forge Shop.
707
are vital components of sonar installations and other
antisubmarine equipment. To service these components, the Navy
maintained repair centers at Pearl Harbor, Mare Island, and
Boston. The Boston center, known as the East Coast Sonar
Transducer and Hydrophone Pool and Repair Facility, served ships
operating from bases along the entire Atlantic seaboard and in
the Mediterranean. Its activity consisted of repairing,
79
maintaining, testing, and stocking transducers and hydrophones.
When first inaugurated, the Boston transducer facility ser-
viced twenty-five units a month, but by 1958 it was handling 250.
In that year the agency relocated from Building No. 10 in the
main yard to the South Boston Annex, because of more adequate
space and the lower noise level. An eight-foot by seven-foot
hydrostatic tank provided the means to pressure test large trans-
ducers. However, technological advances in sonar produced lower
frequency transducers, which had greater range and accuracy. The
new units were also heavier and larger, too big for the Boston
tank or any other tank then possessed by the Navy. The testing
80
problem was ultimately solved by use of a special barge.
Another division of the electronics shop provided the
manpower for a project originally known as ZEBRA and later
redesignated SERAD, Special Electronics Restoration and
Distribution Program. SERAD refurbished thousands of tons of
electrical equipment, including radio, sonar, and measuring
devices, which otherwise would have been discarded. Each unit
79. Boston Naval Shipyard News , Sep. 22, 1951.
80. Commander to Chief, Bureau of Ships, Jan. 2, 1958, 181-40,
Box 63A0377, Al-2.
708
arriving at the yard was screened, disassembled, cleaned,
repaired, reassembled, and refinished. At times, 180 employees
81
manned the work benches of the SERAD division.
The ordnance division of the Boston electronics shop
repaired bathythermographs utilized by East Coast naval activ-
ities. The effective operation of antisubmarine weapons and
equipment required an extensive knowledge of ocean currents and
thermal layers. To provide that information, all Navy vessels on
the high seas were ordered to take bathythermograph readings
every six hours. Bathythermographs, instruments for registering
ocean temperatures, were reeled out by a wire cable over a ship's
stern to various depths. Information recorded was sent to the
Navy's Oceanographic Office in Washington, which processed the
data and periodically published its findings regarding ocean
currents and temperatures at different times of the year. Such
82
information was used by ASW commanders.
The office work equivalent of this type of manufacturing and
repair, that is not specifically for ships in the yard, was in
the area of planning and particularly in design. According to
the Bureau of Ships' description of its mission, the Boston Naval
Shipyard in 1950 was the planning yard for alterations to
cruisers, destroyers, escort carriers, LSTs , and nine types of
auxiliaries. In 1955, that planning yard function extended to
390 specific vessels. Some of those vessels were then in fact in
the yard and others had come or would come in the future. But
81. Boston Naval Shipyard News , Jun. 25, 1953.
82. Baldwin, pp. 116-7.
709
regardless of where the ships went for alterations or
modifications, the Boston yard had to be prepared to furnish
complete planning data, including breakdown of job orders and
83
cost analysis.
In addition, the yard's Design Division of the Planning
Department had responsibility for designing the modifications and
alterations that might be made on any of the 390 vessels. This
was an enormous task at a time when engineers were becoming
relatively scarce. The Design Division served the Navy as a
whole when the yard functioned as the lead yard in the
construction of the De Soto class of LSTs . At the same time,
Boston engineers and draftsmen were preparing detailed drawings
for the installation of a gas turbine drive in a destroyer
escort, originally equipped with a Fairbanks Morse diesel . The
first of a kind, this installation was intended to evaluate the
use of gas turbines for ship propulsion. The most important
project of the Design Division in the mid-1950s was planning the
conversion of destroyers of the 710 class into guided missile
destroyers. The missile age had its first important impact on
84
the Boston Naval Shipyard primarily in the design room.
The actual shipwork of the Boston Naval Shipyard after
World War II included a new feature, work on a decommissioned
flotilla berthed at South Boston. When the war ended, the United
83. Program for Review of Commercial and Industrial-Type
Facilities, 4th Increment: Factors Which Warrant Continued
Operation of Boston Naval Shipyard, n.d. [1955], BNHP, RG 1,
Series 37.
84. Program for Review of Commercial and Industrial-Type
Facilities, 4th Increment.
710
States possessed the largest, most powerful, and most versatile
fleet in the history of the world. Quite obviously, all of that
fleet could not be retained in use. It was equally obvious that
economy and national security would be ill served by scrapping
all units not assigned active duty. The solution was the
creation of inactive reserve fleets, consisting of
decommissioned and inactivated ships, kept in such condition they
could readily be placed in service. Two such fleets were
organized, one for the Atlantic and the other the Pacific, and
ultimately their combined strength was more than 2200 ships.
The Atlantic Reserve Fleet was divided into eight groups, each
assigned to one of the following berthing areas: Orange, Texas;
Green Cove Springs, Florida; Charleston; Norfolk; Philadelphia;
85
New York; New London; and Boston.
Preservation of ships in the inactive fleet required dry-
docking and urgent repairs at a naval shipyard. Hulls were given
a coat of a special antifouling hot plastic paint, which would
provide five years of protection for ships berthed in salt water.
Other steps in the preservation process were removal of
perishable or highly combustible substances and ammunition;
cleaning and painting of all corrodible, exposed surfaces;
dehumidif ying interiors; and "packaging" with moisture-proof
covers topside equipment that could not removed to dehumidified
interiors .
The Boston Group, Atlantic Reserve Fleet, was primarily
85. U. S, Naval Administration in World War II : An Administrative
History of the Bureau of Ship s , vol. IV, pp. 445-72.
711
berthed at the South Boston Annex, where it occupied seven piers.
In July 1950, the Boston Group consisted of thirty-seven vessels.
Twenty-one were escort carriers (CVEs), and the remainder a
destroyer, a light cruiser, two destroyer escorts, six submarine
chasers, two barracks ships, an attack cargo vessel, a tug, a
86
floating workshop, and a lighter. For a period, the
battleship New Mexico was part of the Boston Group. Several of
the reserve fleet escort carriers, such as Chenango occupied
berths at the main yard.
One of the shipyard's commanders described the relationship
between his facility and the Boston Group, Atlantic Reserve
Fleet, as "very close." Officially, the fleet was one of the
several tenants of the yard and as such used the piers and
buildings of the annex as well as Dry Dock No. 3. It also was a
customer, in the sense that it utilized services of the shipyard,
including work on ships. The Atlantic Fleet had its own
personnel, and at times more than one thousand enlisted men were
assigned to the Boston Group. They performed much of the work in
inactivating and maintaining the ships in the group, but
occasionally the yard became involved. For example, in October
1948, the shipyard performed a thirty-day overhaul of a barracks
ship; inactivated and did preservation work on a lighter; worked
on topside preservation of five escort carriers; and removed
industrial gas cylinders from a carrier. In addition, yard
divers removed a flange covering a sea valve in the hull of
86. Atlantic Reserve Fleet Organization and Berthing Areas, Jul.
7, 1950, 181-40, Box 46, A3-1; Boston Naval Shipyard News , Jul 1,
1946.
712
Chenango . In June 1950, one hundred yard workers were assigned
tasks on five carriers, a destroyer escort, a minesweeper, and
87
three patrol escorts.
The mission of the Boston Naval Shipyard included providing
berthing and logistical support for the reserve fleet units and
the maintenance of facilities for placing such ships in
commission. The yard and not personnel of the reserve fleet
performed the work necessary when units in the reserve fleet
groups, that at Boston and those elsewhere, were activated and
recommissioned. Reactivations became common with the outbreak of
war in Korea.
Probably the most important meaning of the Navy 's decision
to assign a group of the inactive fleet to Boston was the
recognition that the shipyard had excess berthing and anchorage
and that the South Boston Annex would play a much reduced role in
the peacetime operations of the shipyard than had been the case
during the war.
In the months and years after V-J Day, the Boston Naval
Shipyard completed building fourteen vessels whose keels had been
laid during the war and which, at its end, were at various
stages of construction. Work continued on seven which were
completed in the remainder of 1945 or in 1946. These consisted
of one destroyer escort, one submarine, three barracks ships, and
two LSDs. The remainder were not finished until from two to ten
years after the war. In addition, the yard laid the keel and
87. Commander Boston Group, to Commander, Atlantic Reserve
Fleet, Oct. 26, 1948, 181-40, Box 388, A4-10; Actual and
Projected Ship Workload, Jun. 1950; Estimate of Civilian
Personnel Distribution, Jun. 1950, both in 181-40, Box 399, Ll-1.
713
completed an entirely new vessel.
Only one of the ships in the yard 's new construction left
over from World War II was completed according to the original
design. The shipyard finished Echols , a self-propelled lighter,
in December 1947. The ship then joined the reserve fleet in
88
Florida .
Two submarines, Grampus and Grenadie r , were launched by the
shipyard in December 1944 and, still uncompleted, were towed to
Portsmouth in October 1945. The Portsmouth yard did little if
any work on the boats, and both returned to Boston in 1948.
Construction resumed, but in an irregular fashion, since the
submarines did not have a high priority. For example, only ninety
men were assigned to Grenadier in June 1950. Both vessels became
prototypes for the "Guppy"-class submarines, with snorkels which
permitted them to run indefinitely in an awash condition. The
yard finished Grampus in May of 1950 and Grenadier twelve months
later. Grenadier demonstrated the workability of the snorkel
device in the last phase of her shakedown cruise to the
Caribbean. The new submarine completed the entire seven-day
89
voyage from Guantanamo Bay to New London submerged.
During World War II, the Boston Navy Yard completed forty-
four LSTs, and in the remainder of its career, it built three
more. Two of these were started in the last months of the war,
the keels of LST-1154 and LST-1153 having been laid in July and
88. DANFS, vol. II, p. 322.
89. Data on Submarine New Construction at Boston Naval Shipyard
Since the Beginning of World War II, BNHP, RG 1, Series 12, Box
4; DANFS, vol. Ill, pp. 132, 157.
714
August 1945. Since the Navy had a huge flotilla of roughly 1000
LSTs when Japan surrendered, no necessity existed for rushing the
completion of the two under construction at Boston. LST-1154 was
finished in September 1947 and LST-1153 in January 1949.
Essentially World War II landing craft in terms of their
dimensions, they were unique chiefly in that they had steam-
driven propulsion systems instead of diesel engines.
The Boston Naval Shipyard's only entirely new construction
after the World War II era was an LST. Because of the success of
the American amphibious assault on Inchon during the Korean
Conflict, the utility of LSTs was again established, despite the
advent of nuclear warfare. In the early 1950s, the Navy built
fifteen new and larger LSTs, and, in the second half of the
decade, it added seven more of a different type, the De Soto
County class. The Boston Naval Shipyard was selected to construct
one of these, LST-1173, and to be the lead design and
construction yard. Private contractors built the other six De
Sotos , benefitting from the solutions devised by Boston's Design
Division and shops in overcoming problems encountered in building
90
the first vessel in the class.
Construction of LST-1173, named Suffol k County , began in
July 1955. The launching occurred in September 1956, and the
ship was commissioned in August 1957. Suffolk County was longer,
wider, faster, and more comfortable for crew and troops than the
LSTs built by the yard during the war. It measured 442 feet in
length and sixty-one in width, having a light-load displacement
90. DANFS, vol. VII, p. 571; Informal Turnover Memorandum, Jun
1955.
715
of 3800 tons and a full-load displacement of 7800. Its engines
produced eight times the horsepower of World War II LSTs and gave
the ship a top speed of 17.5 knots. Suffolk County 's fifteen-
year-long active career consisted of service with the Amphibious
Force, Atlantic Fleet, in operations off the East Coast and
92
occasional deployment in the Caribbean and Mediterranean.
LST-1173 was the last ship built by the Boston Naval Shipyard.
Of the Boston yard's World War II construction, the last to
be finished were two ships originally begun as destroyer escorts,
Wagner (DE-539) and Vandiver (DE-540). Built in tandem, the
keels of both were laid on November 11, 1943, and the ships were
launched on the twenty-seventh day of the following month. The
yard's labor force declined in 1944, and priority was given to
other types of ship work. The Navy Department suspended
construction of the two vessels in February 1947, at which time
they were approximately sixty percent finished. Towed to South
Boston, they underwent preservation and entered the Boston Group,
Atlantic Reserve Fleet. In July 1954, after an interval of seven
years, the two vessels returned to the main yard, where work on
them resumed. That work included conversion into destroyer
escort radar picket ships. Vandiver , now designated DER-540, was
commissioned in October 1955, and Wagner (DER-539) the following
93
month .
DERs were equipped to provide mid-ocean radar warning of
enemy aircraft to the North American Air Defense Command. To
91. Mansfield, pp. 34; DANFS, vol. VII, p. 727.
92. DANFS, vol. VII, pp. 466-7; vol. VIII, pp. 27-8.
716
accomodate the enlarged combat information centers and powerful
radars, the destroyer escorts were virtually rebuilt. Aluminum
replaced steel in the vessels' superstructures, but sixty tons of
pig iron were added to the ballast to offset the additional
weight of radar antennas and communication equipment. Conversion
of the two escorts by the Boston Naval Shipyard also included
installation of additional refrigerating plants and new
93
generators to carry the greater electrical loads.
Throughout its history after World War II, the Boston Naval
Shipyard served the conventional function of making repairs,
overhauls, conversions, and alterations on existing ships.
Between the beginning of 1946 and the end of 1955, the yard
performed 1050 overhauls, sixty percent of them being in the
first three years of the period. In the postwar decade, the yard
also engaged in thirteen conversions, including those on Vandi ver
and Wagner . Another type of activity resulted from the nation's
efforts to strengthen its allies. In the Mutual Defense
Assistance Act of 1949, Congress authorized a general program of
peacetime military aid. That program included the transfer of
ships from the American Navy to friendly nations. During the
next six years, the Boston Naval Shipyard made ready thirty-three
vessels under this program. Between 1946 and 1955, Bath Iron
Works and Bethlehem Steel delivered thirty-two new ships to the
Boston Naval Shipyard, which engaged in the work incident to the
commissioning of these vessels. Also, thirteen ships which had
been converted or which were being reactivated were
93. Annual Report, Calendar year 1955; Baldwin, pp. 96-7
717
recommissioned at the yard. Finally, during the decade, the yard
performed 1199 dry-dockings. This summary does not include other
types of shipwork. For example in 1955, the yard completed 101
restricted availabilities and ten fitting-out and post-shakedown
94
availabilities.
In the postwar era, naval shipyards organized their work on
ships according to several different types of "availabilities."
An official 1948 definition of that term reads:
Availability is the uninterrupted period of time
assigned by competent authority to a vessel at a Naval
Shipyard or other repair facility for the accomplishment
of work.
The Chief of Naval Operations and the commanders of fleets,
forces, and divisions had authority to assign a ship an
availability. A "restricted availability" was defined as "the
availability assigned to a vessel for the accomplishment of
specific items of work." Such availabilities were "restricted"
both respecting time and work, that is a ship would be in a yard
only for as long as needed to receive repairs to a particular
mechanism, system, or piece of equipment. The destroyer Witek
arrived in the Boston yard in the spring of 1952 on a restricted
availability for repairs to her sonar equipment, which required a
month. An experimental submarine chaser, EPC (R) 849, suffered
a completely inoperative boiler in the spring of 1953. However,
in this instance, the problem proved a small one, and the
vessel's restricted availability at the yard lasted only a few
days. Post-shakedown and fitting-out availabilities were
94. Mansfield, pp. 98, 100, 105, 107-10; Annual Report, Calendar
Year 1955.
718
TABLE 22: SHIP OVERHAULS, BOSTON NAVAL SHIPYARD, 1946-1955
1946 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 TOTALS
Carriers
14
8
3
2
3
4
6
3
3
3
49
Cruisers
12
8
7
5
6
4
2
1
3
1
49
DD types
76
62
37
32
19
21
26
19
26
16
334
DE types
97
43
22
14
12
16
9
3
14
8
238
Submarines
2
3
4
9
PCs, SCs
12
8
3
3
3
4
1
34
Others
97
82
34
27
22
18
21
15
16
5
337
TOTALS 308 211 106 80
(SOURCE: Mansfield, p. 100)
62
65 70 48 66
34 1050
TABLE 23: DRYDOCKINGS, BOSTON NAVAL SHIPYARD, 1946-1955
Dock 1946 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 TOTALS
Dock No. 1
36
24
11
21
25
19
16
23
27
24
226
Dock No. 2
38
37
21
15
28
34
31
20
23
26
273
Dock No. 3
43
14
25
30
24
16
24
21
29
14
240
Dock No. 4
39
13
4
3
5
32
19
10
4
129
Dock No. 5
2
3
1
3
7
3
3
22
M/R No. 11
28
30
30
22
43
18
13
29
23
12
248
TOTALS
245 118
93
91 123
93 119 119 115
1199
(SOURCE: Mansfield, p. 100. Note: Totals for 1946 include sixty-
one dockings on the two marine railways (Nos. 12 and 13) at the
Chelsea Annex and two floating dry docks at South Boston. Use of
these facilities discontinued after 1946.)
719
considered as restricted availabilities in the 1950s. Later,
95
they constituted separate classifications.
"Technical availabilities" involved utilization of "the
manufacturing or shop facilities of a Naval Shipyard or repair
facility for the accomplishment of specific work when the ship is
not physically present." The yard performed this type of
availability by receiving defective equipment or parts sent from
the ship and sending back repaired items or replacements.
Occasionally, shop personnel traveled to the vessel to perform
repairs. The yard regularly provided repairs for the Coast Guard
vessel Casco on a technical availability basis, C asco never
96
appearing in the yard. "Voyage repairs" consisted of
"emergency work necessary to enable a vessel to continue on its
mission, and which can be accomplished without requiring a change
in the vessel 's operating schedule or the general steaming notice
in effect." These necessarily involved very brief visits to the
yard .
The longest and most extensive repair availability was a
"regular overhaul," described in the 1948 definition as:
The availability assigned to a naval vessel for the
periodic overhaul scheduled by competent authority for
the accomplishment of repairs and alterations that have
been properly approved and authorized. Regular
overhauls are normally scheduled well in advance, in
95. The availability definitions appear in Boston Naval Shipyard
Notice 152-47 (Supplement 3), Apr. 23, 1948, 181-40, Box 385, A2-
2. For information about the availabilities of Witek and EPC
(R) 849, see Boston Naval Shipyard News , May 22, 1952, and Apr.
16, 1953.
96. Boston Naval Shipyard News , Apr. 16, 1953.
720
accordance with an established cycle and for
predetermined periods of time....
Regulations further provided that an overhaul period include
necessary post-repair trials and post-trial repairs and
adjustments. The interval between a ship's regular overhauls
varied according to its type and assignment. In the early 1950s,
destroyers on active duty with the Atlantic Fleet were overhauled
biannually .
An appreciation of the Boston Naval Shipyard's activity
during the decade after World War II can be gained by
consideration of its ship work during the calendar year 1951, the
height of the Korean War. In that year, the yard overhauled
sixty-five vessels and dry-docked ninety-three. Counting
restricted availabilities, voyage repairs, and all other types
of work, the yard serviced more than 200 ships. Nineteen-f if ty-
one saw a variety of types of vessels come to the yard, from a
tug and nonself-propelled barges and lighters to cruisers and
escort carriers. The kind of work performed extended from brief
97
availabilities to major conversions.
In the early 1950s, the Boston Naval Shipyard served as home
yard for 121 vessels. They included one fast carrier and fifteen
escort carriers; five heavy cruisers and three light cruisers;
thirty-one destroyers and three destroyer escorts; and sixty-
»98
three auxiliaries. As in the past, some of these assignments
represented administrative and planning arrangements, and the
97. Mansfield, pp. 96, 100; Boston Naval Shipyard News,. Mar. 14
1952.
98. Boston Naval Shipyard News , Nov. 7, 1949.
721
ships never actually arrived in the yard. Others were units in
the inactive fleet. Nevertheless, the facility was home yard to
a large number of vessels on active duty, particularly with the
Atlantic Fleet.
Ships of the Atlantic Fleet were organized into "forces" for
carriers, amphibious operations, cruisers, submarines,
destroyers, minewarfare, and service and logistics. Many of the
ships served by the Boston yard during 1951 were then part of,
were being assigned to, or were being detached from components of
the Atlantic Fleet. Boston was home yard for Worceste r and
Salem , the two units of Division Four, Cruiser Force (CRULANT).
That force included Pes Moines and Columbus , which also came to
the Boston yard in 1951. After Boston completed Grenadier , the
boat joined Submarine Division Eighty-One, Squadron Six, of the
Atlantic Fleet's Submarine Force (SUBLANT). The yard also
99
worked on Atule (SS-403), in Squadron Eight.
At least twenty-three ships overhauled, repaired, or
otherwise serviced by the Boston shipyard in 1951 had assignments
with the fleet's Destroyer Force (DESLANT). Boston was home yard
for two entire DESLANT divisions: Division Twenty-One, made up of
Berry , Keppler , Norris , McCaffrey , and Harwood ; and Division One-
Hundred-One, consisting of Brownson , McCard , Roberts , and Roan .
In addition, twelve other destroyers, the destroyer tender
Yosemite , and the escort Conway , all DESLANT ships, came to the
yard in 1951. In the eighteen months beginning January 1, 1951,
99. The composition of the Atlantic Fleet is found in Commander
in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Apr. 1, 1950, 181-40, Box 405,
A3-1.
722
the work performed by the Boston Naval Shipyard for DESLANT
consisted of fifty-eight biannual overhauls; eight conversions
and fitting-out availabilities; sixty-eight restricted
availabilities; and 450 technical availabilities. This
100
represents $55 million in repairs and other shipwork.
Further service rendered by the Boston Naval Shipyard in
1951 to the Atlantic Fleet consisted of work on LST-1153 and the
high-speed transport Bassett , parts of the Amphibious Force
(PHIBLANT), and on auxiliaries connected with the Service Force
(SERVLANT). Among the SERVLANT ships in the yard were Great
Sitkin , an ammunition ship; Vulcan and Briareus , repair ships;
Corduba and Redbud , both store ships; the icebreaker Edisto ;
Al lagash and Waccamaw , tankers; and an ocean-going tug, Nipmuc .
Some of the vessels serviced by the Boston Naval Shipyard in
1951 were in the Boston Group, Reserve Fleet, and the work
performed was part of the preservation and maintenance program.
This included work on the escort carriers Chenango , Marcus
Island , Natoma Bay , Sargeant Bay , Santee , Savo Island , Shamrock
Bay , and Kasaan Bay ; the cruiser D ayton ; the tender Barnes ; the
barracks ship Col leton ; and the then incompleted escort
Vandi ver . Two of the Boston Group's escort carriers were
activated by the Boston Naval Shipyard in 1951.
In the two years after World War II, Kula Gulf and Salerno
Bay had been taken out of commission, inactivated, and assigned
to the Boston Group, Atlantic Reserve Fleet. Because of the
demands of the Korean War, both were "unwrapped" and
100. Boston Naval Shipyard News , Sep. 19, 1952
723
recommissioned in 1951. The yard discovered that the
"mothballing" had been generally effective, and no serious
deterioration had occurred. Small pipework, however, had
corroded because of the difficulty in eliminating all moisture.
The original plans for the reserve fleet had been to make
continual structural improvements to the inactivated ships, so as
to increase their state of readiness. Budget cuts by the Defense
Department had removed that part of the maintenance program.
Accordingly, although in reasonably good condition, the two
carriers were not ready to accomodate the new, heavier aircraft
that had evolved since the end of World War II. Work on Kula
Gulf and Salerno Bay included strengthening flight decks and
elevators and enlarging the catapults. Antiaircraft guns and
other equipment which had been stored in the dehumidified
interiors of the ships had to be reinstalled. The yard also made
101
changes in radar and communications systems. Similar work was
performed on Shangri-La , which had been part of the San Diego
Group, Pacific Reserve Fleet.
During the Korean Conflict, the Navy activated a number of
vessels in the reserve fleets, assigning some to active duty with
American naval forces and transferring others to friendly
nations, under the provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance
Act. In 1951, the Boston Naval Shipyard prepared eight vessels,
previously in reserve status, for transfer to foreign
governments. The Greek navy received six destroyer escorts and a
destroyer, and the Dutch one destroyer escort. Most had been in
101. Boston Naval Shipyard New s, Feb. 26, 1951.
724
the Reserve Fleet group at Green Cove Spring, Florida, and were
towed from that location to Boston.
In a letter to a Greek naval officer concerning preparation
of Garfield Thomas (DE-193), the shipyard commander noted the
restrictions imposed by the Bureau of Ships on the yard's work on
the vessel. Electrical equipment, main and auxiliary machinery,
and associated pipe lines were to be activated and tested, and
repairs made on the basis of those tests. To remain within
budgetary constraints, work was not to be performed "for the sake
of appearance only." The yard, however, departed from those
limitations. Prior to testing, the main and auxiliary engines
were overhauled. Also, to promote "the morale of the ship's
personnel," the crew's living quarters, messing compartment, the
galley, "officers' country," all washrooms, and the
102
superstructure area were painted.
The Boston yard's ship work in 1951 included readying eight
reserve fleet destroyers, all but one of the Fletcher class, for
active duty with the American Navy. Three, formerly with the
Charleston Group, Atlantic Reserve Fleet, were converted to
escort destroyers (DDE), being fitted with improved antisubmarine
armament .
The yard's conversion activities also involved transforming
three other conventional destroyers, W illiam R. R ush , Fiske , and
W_^ NL_ Wood , into radar picket destroyers. Wil liam R. R ush , named
after the commandant of the Boston Navy Yard during World War I,
was a Gearing -class destroyer, launched late in 1945. . The ship
102. Shipyard Commander to Cdr. G. Petritis, Dec. 22, 1950, 181
40, Box 397, A4-1.
725
had remained on active duty and had arrived at the yard in
December 1951 after service off Korea. The yard converted the
ship to a picket destroyer (DDR), the conversion being completed
in August 1952. The shipyard installed improved radar and
communications equipment, removed the five torpedo tubes, and
replaced the twelve 40mm batteries with rapid-fire, three-inch
guns .
The Boston Naval Shipyard performed most of its ship work at
the main Charlestown site. Aircraft carriers, cruisers, and some
of the larger auxiliaries, such as Grea t Sitkin , went to the
South Boston Annex. The worst fire in the history of the yard
involved an aircraft carrier at the annex. Leyte arrived at
South Boston in October 1952 for deactivation. In August of the
following year, the Navy issued orders for retention of Leyte in
the active fleet and for conversion to an ASW support carrier.
By mid-October, the ship was almost ready for sea, and on the
15th went out for a trial run. At 3:15 the following afternoon,
while the ship was berthed at the annex, an explosion occurred in
the port catapult room, probably caused by leaking hydraulic
fluid. Most of the ship's 1400 officers and crew were on board
as well as personnel from the shipyard. The explosion caused a
fire, which burned for almost five hours. The accident resulted
in thirty-seven deaths, five of the fatalities being shipyard
103
personnel. Forty others were injured.
Following the end of World War II, the Boston Naval Shipyard
103. Articles in local newspapers about the Leyte incident were
collected by the yard's Public Information Officer and are in
BNHP, RG 1, Series 16, Box 3.
726
experienced the general demobilization, as the Navy cancelled
plans for most of its new construction. The President and
Congress practiced budget cutting in order to maintain the
nation's economic health, and the number of government workers
was greatly reduced. The Korean War demonstrated the need for
conventional military and naval forces in the age of nuclear
warfare. At the same time he committed American forces to the
defense of South Korea, President Harry S Truman sent the Seventh
Fleet to the Formosa Straits and began American aid to the French
forces in Indo-China. All of these actions necessitated
increased naval strength, which meant more work for naval
shipyards. Congress did not embark on a large program of naval
expansion, but authorized conversion of 170 ships and the
construction of an equal number of small vessels, such as landing
craft and minesweepers. The new construction went primarily to
private shipyards.
Events of 1950 temporarily halted the reduction in the labor
force and in ship work at the Boston Naval Shipyard. Beginning
approximately in 1953, the yard seemed to settle into a postwar
mode, employment figures and the volume of ship work remaining
fairly constant. Nevertheless, important developments were
occurring. A new age of naval technology was emerging with the
development of missiles for surface ships and with the advent of
nuclear-powered, missile ladened submarines. The new technology
and weapons proved enormously expensive, and the Navy encountered
greater problems in making financial ends meet.
In 1949, the Navy all but closed its industrial facility at
Long Beach, California, resulting in the discharge or transfer of
727
5500 out of 5900 employees. The possibility of closing other
yards persisted, and in 1955, the Bureau of Ships called upon
naval shipyard commanders to justify the continued operation of
their particular yard and to explain the advantages of retaining
government yards instead of contracting out more work to private
firms. Although there were no immediate shipyard closings, the
1955 review by the Bureau of Ships had ominous overtones,
especially for a yard such as Boston, because of the age of many
of its structures, its congestion, and its division of work
104
between two geographic locations.
104. Program for Review of Commercial and Industrial-Type
Facilities, 4th Increment.
728
Chapter IX
THE BOSTON NAVAL SHIPYARD
IN THE AGE OF MISSILES AND THE VIETNAM WAR, 1956-1973
In 1955, the Boston Naval Shipyard was an active Navy shore
establishment with more than 10,000 civilian personnel. During
the year, the yard completed work on 150 ships, and on December
31, twenty-three vessels were undergoing repairs, overhauls, or
other types of servicing. At that time, the yard was pioneering
the conversion of a World War II destroyer, Gyatt , for the
launching of guided missiles. By contrast, in 1972, the shipyard
employed 5500 people and performed significant work on a mere
dozen vessels. The ropewalk and the foundry had been closed. In
April 1973, the Department of Defense announced that the Boston
Naval Shipyard itself was to be disestablished and that all
industrial activity would cease by the end of the year. The
closing resulted from several general developments and certain
1
conditions peculiar to the Boston yard.
During the years 1956 to 1973, the United States experienced
a series of international crises, from Arab-Israeli wars to the
tense American-Soviet confrontation over missiles in Cuba. In
many respects, the most important development proved to be the
war in Vietnam. Participation in that struggle sapped the
nation's resources and caused the Department of Defense to adopt
stringent measures in allocations of its funds.
The period also witnessed tremendous achievements in
1. Boston Naval Shipyard, Annual Report, Calendar Year 1955,
BNHP, RG 1, Series 4; Command History, Jan. 1 - Dec. 1, 1972.
BNHP, RG 1, Series 11.
729
military technology. The Navy developed nuclear propulsion and
a number of guided-missile systems for use by surface vessels as
well as submarines. Improved sonar and larger ship designs
demonstrated the limits of older repair facilities, such as
Boston's Dry Dock No. 1. In addition, the technological
innovations proved extremely expensive and combined with the war
in Southeast Asia to elevate the cost of military defense to
seemingly astronomical proportions. This budgetary crunch had
important ramifications, particularly for the Boston Naval
Shipyard. Since the Navy had a large inventory of ships built in
World War II, new construction programs emphasized quality, not
quantity. A reasonable approach in the 1950s, the ultimate
effect was to reduce the size of the fleet in the late 1960s and
early 1970s. Then the Navy had to retire thirty-year-old ships at
2
a faster rate than they could be replaced.
Plans for ship replenishment were crippled by the enormous
expenditures occasioned by the conflict in Vietnam, which
ultimately reached a cost of thirty billion dollars a year. To
save funds, the existing fleet shrank in size. For example, in
August 1969, orders were given to decommission one hundred
vessels. The contraction was particularly marked in destroyers,
3
the fleet having 226 in 1960 and only 131 in 1972. Since the
2. Floyd D. Kennedy, Jr., "The Creation of the Cold War Navy,
1953-1962," in Kenneth J. Hagan ( ed . ) , I_n Peace and War :
Interpretations of American Naval History, 1775-1978 (Westport,
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978), p. 314.
3. Lawrence J. Korb, "The Erosion of American Naval Preeminence,
1962-1978," in Hagan, p. 331; Paul B. Ryan, First Line of
Defense: The U.S. Navy Since 1945 (Stanford, Cali.: Hoover
Institution Press, 1981), p. 47.
730
beginning of the century, work on destroyers had been a mainstay
of the Boston Naval Shipyard. The decline in numbers of that
type of ship undermined the mission of the yard. Moreover, to
conserve its funds for the fleet, the Navy shut down several of
its shore installations, including the Boston Naval Shipyard.
YARD ADMINISTRATION IN AN AGE OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
No major alterations occurred in the basic organizational
structure of the Boston Naval Shipyard during the two decades
preceding its disestablishment. However, the administration was
far from static. Advances in management control and naval
technology resulted in the addition of new units and offices.
Furthermore, the administrative structure of the Navy at large
experienced an important change.
The Department of the Navy underwent a reorganization in
1966 that modernized the service's administration consistent with
the systems approach favored by the Secretary of Defense, Robert
McNamara. Henceforth, the main parts of the Navy Department were
the Office of Secretary of the Navy; Office of Chief of Naval
Operations; Naval Facilities Engineering Command, the former
Bureau of Yards and Docks; Naval Supply Systems Command, the
former Bureau of Supplies and Accounts; Naval Ships Systems
Command, the former Bureau of Ships; Naval Electronics Systems
Command; Naval Ordnance Systems Command, the former Bureau of
Weapons; and Naval Air Systems Command. Other units in the
department were the Office of Comptroller of the Navy and the
Bureaus of Naval Personnel and of Medicine and Surgery.
The Naval Ships Systems Command (NAVSHIPS) had management
731
control of naval shipyards. Its authority exceeded that of the
former Bureau of Ships, which it replaced, and extended to all
major aspects of the yards, including shipwork and other
industrial operations, civilian personnel, and plant
development. From the perspective of naval shipyards, little
remained of the decentralization and conflicting cognizance
associated with the old bureau system.
From November 1945 until its closing in 1974, the
administrative structure of the Boston Naval Shipyard remained
basically the same. The shipyard commander, as chief executive,
directed an organization usually divided into eight departments
and a number of offices. Those departments consisted of
Planning, Production, Public Works, Supply, Comptroller, Medical,
Dental, and Administrative. Some other units temporarily achieved
departmental status, but most changes occurred on a lower level.
Consideration of the additions and alterations in the yard 's
administration indicate the general trends in technology and in
industrial management techniques. The new units in the yard
included the Combat Weapons Systems Division; the Quality and
Reliability Assurance Division; PERA (ASW) , a special planning
unit for antisubmarine vessels; and CASDO, Computer Applications
Support and Development Office.
In 1954, an Ordnance Division appeared within the Planning
Department, replacing the former Ordnance Office. Six years
later, the Navy disestablished the Ordnance Division at the
Boston Naval Shipyard, on a trial basis, integrating that unit's
personnel into the Design Division of the same department. Fol-
732
lowing further experimentation, the Combat Weapons Systems
Division emerged in 1962, which combined a number of offices.
The new division came under the general supervision of the
Planning Officer, but it was involved in both planning and
production. The main purpose of the change was to insure that
complete ships ' combat systems would be properly planned and
installed. The branches of the Combat Weapons Systems Division
reflected the developments in ordnance technology. Those
branches were: Ballistic Weapons Systems, for conventional
armament; Missile Systems Engineering, for the Navy's Tartar,
Talos, and Terrier missiles; ASROC, Radar and Sonar, for the
antisubmarine rocket and related search equipment; and
Communications, Electronic Countermeasures and Navigational
4
Aids .
Another new division appearing in 1962 was the Quality and
Reliability Assurance Division, established in the Production
Department. Of the division's four branches, two had already
been in existence, the Laboratory Branch and the Metals Fabri-
cation Branch, and two were new units, the Engineering and
Testing Branch and the Inspection Branch. During the next ten
years, the quality assurance organization shifted in structure
and status, briefly being elevated to a department. Whatever its
administrative position, the unit and its various components
performed a variety of testing, inspection, laboratory, internal
4. Informal Turnover Memorandum for Capt. W. A. Brockett, USN,
n.d. [1960], BNHP, RG 1, Series 5; History of the Combat Systems
Office, Boston Naval Shipyard, 1948-1973, May 22, 1975, BNHP, RG
1, Series 11; Bosto n Naval S hipyard N ews , July 6, 1962.
733
5
audit, and quality control functions.
Quality and Reliability Assurance's Laboratory Branch
included the Chemical and Materials Laboratories, which had been
in operation since the early twentieth century. The Materials
Laboratory had contributed to research and development in
ropemaking, foundry technology, and chain making, including die-
lock anchor chain. In the decades after World War II,
laboratories in the Boston shipyard were involved in the
development of nylon anchor cord, nylon webbing and stuffing
tubes for electrical wiring, and cathodic protection techniques
for anticorrosion applications. In 1972, the Quality Assurance
Office produced a strippable latex-type coating for preserving
propellers in storage, superior to existing coatings in that it
was nonflammable and could be applied in a variety of outside
temperatures. The Navy adopted the coating for use by other
shipyards .
Other Quality Assurance accomplishments included development
of techniques for welding hull plates below water, thus
eliminating the need of dry-docking; redesign of welded boiler
joints to insure effective repair of boiler bottom blow-down
systems; and establishment of environmental standards for gyro
disassembly areas. The Bureau of Ships accepted the standards
for use throughout the Navy.
Quality Assurance occupied several buildings in the yard.
The director and Engineering Analysis, Inspection, Meteorologic
Laboratory, and Welding Engineering (formerly Metals Fabri-
5. History of Quality Assurance Organization of Former Boston
Naval Shipyard, Dec. 31, 1974, BNHP, RG 1, Series 11.
734
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cation) Divisions were located in Building No. 28. Welding
Engineering also had a laboratory at the north side of Building
No. 195. Building No. 34 housed the Materials and the Chemical
Laboratories, and Building No. 42, the Nondestructve Test
Division. In 1974, the staff of Quality Assurance numbered
ninety persons.
In its quest for efficiency and reduced costs and because of
the difficulty in obtaining a sufficient number of engineers, the
Navy introduced the PERA program into its shipyards. PERA,
Planning and Engineering for Repairs and Alterations, grew out of
a proposal from the Portsmouth shipyard for a "one-time-think,
many-times-do" approach to the complete planning and execution of
all aspects of ship overhauls. The Portsmouth proposal dealt
with submarines, and a PERA ( SS ) was established at that yard in
1967. Subsequently, three other yards received assignments to
make feasibility studies of application of the premise to complex
overhauls of additional types of warships. Puget Sound was
assigned the task of application of the approach to attack
carriers, PERA (CVA); Philadelphia, missile ships, PERA (AAW);
and Boston, antisubmarine vessels, PERA (ASW). The selection of
Boston resulted from its being considered as having the best
6
potential as an engineering center for ASW-type ships.
In 1968, the Naval Ships Systems Command accepted Boston's
proposal that PERA (ASW) be established within the yard's Design
Division. Like other new units, PERA (ASW)'s administrative
6. Informal Turnover Memorandum for Captain R. W. Burk, USN,
Oct. 1969, BNHP, RG 1, Series 5; History of PERA (ASW)
Organization in Boston Naval Shipyard, n.d. [1973], BNHP, RG 1,
Series 11 .
736
status and position went through several changes. The essential
PERA mission remained the same:
To act as NAVSHIPS ' principal management agents in
providing integrated planning for overhauls of
... assigned complex ship types; integrating
requirements and managing the planning and engineering
efforts for designated overhauls, and for vital
interrelated programs pertaining thereto, for the
various Systems Commands and the Fleet.
Ultimately, PERA (ASW) had a staff of forty-six people, mostly
engineers and planners. Its main function was to provide
shipyards, both government and private, with complete "pre-
packaged" planning for overhauls of destroyers and other vessels
with ASW installations.
CASDO, the acronym for Computer Applications Support and
Development Office, was established at the Boston Naval Shipyard
in July 1965. By that time, the yard had ten years of experience
with computers. In 1954, the Production Department had requested
an electronic computer as an aid in the work-load scheduling
aspects of the Production and Planning Control Program.
Subsequently, computer applications at the yard were studied by
the Comptroller, the Industrial Engineer Officer, and an ad hoc
committee representing all departments. In May 1957, an
Electronic Data Processing Division was established in the
Management Planning and Review Division, which planned for the
7
installation of a computer in 1958.
As in the case of PERA (ASW), CASDO had responsibilities
transcending the yard. In fact, the shipyard commander provided
only administrative support services for CASDO, which was
7. Mansfield, pp. 46-7.
737
responsible directly to NAVSHIPS. CASDO'S mission consisted of
developing optimum standardization of the Shipyard Management
Information System (MIS) for all yards, through centralized
office design, computer analysis, programming, and maintenance
8
efforts. CASDO was quartered in the Supply Building (No. 149).
Doubtless, the addition of such units as Quality Assurance
and PERA changed not only the organizational outline of the
Boston Naval Shipyard, but also indicates alterations in adminis-
trative style, with much more emphasis placed on detailed plan-
ning, scheduling, cost analysis, and inspection of work in
progress. That emphasis in part is evident in the increase in the
proportion of yard personnel not engaged in productive work in
the shops. Such personnel consisted essentially of naval offi-
cers and IV(b) employees. As the size of the yard's work force
contracted, the number of officers declined, but not at the same
rate. In 1958, the eighty-three officers constituted slightly
more than eight percent of all persons, civilian and military, at
work in the yard. In 1970, there were seventy officers, repre-
senting eleven percent of all personnel. The number of IV(b)
workers actually increased during the 1960s. Early in the
decade, such workers constituted eighteen percent of the civilian
9
work force and by 1971 had risen to twenty-six percent.
Another shift in personnel affecting the yard's
8. Naval Ship Systems Command Programs at CASDO, in Command
History, Jan. 1 - Dec 31, 1970, BNHP, RG 1, Series 11.
9. During the summers, the officer corps increased, as
approximately twenty-five officer-students in naval construction
and engineering at MIT received temporary duty assignments to the
shipyard; Informal Turnover Memorandum, 1960, p. 26.
738
administration was an increase in the number of civilians in
managerial and mid-management positions, positions which in an
earlier day would have been staffed by commissioned officers. In
1972, several offices in the yard had no naval personnel
whatsoever. These included Data Processing, Quality Assurance,
Management Engineering, and Industrial Relations. A number of
other departments and offices had only a few officers, such as
Combat Weapons Systems, Comptroller, CASDO, and PERA (ASW). A
mere eighteen officers staffed the Production Department, which
had a total force of 3309 people. The chief administrators in
the Production Department continued to be officers, namely the
Production Officer, Repair Officer, Ship Superintendents, and
Assistant Ship Superintendents. But civilians with Civil Service
grades of GS-14 or GS-13 served as Administrative Officer,
Supervisory Production Controllers, Supervisory Industrial
Engineers, and Production Superintendents and headed such units
within the Production Division as the Office of the
Administrative Assistant, Production Control Branch, Work Status
Section, Scheduling Section, Progress Section, Methods and
Standards Branch, Structural and Service Section, Mechanical and
10
Systems Section, and Facilities and Equipment Branch.
No longer did the shipyard's shops function directly under a
naval officer, the position of Shop Superintendent having been
abandoned. In 1967, management of the shops of the Production
Departments underwent a streamlining and consolidation, which
resulted in the shops being organized into four groups, each
10. Manpower Listing, Boston Naval Shipyard, Dec. 31, 1972,
BNHP, RG 1, Series 22.
739
group in the charge of a civilian Production Superintendent. The
Structural Group included the Shipfitting, Sheet Metal, and
Welding Shops; the Mechanical Group, the Central Tool, Forge,
Inside Machine, Outside Machine, Boiler, Pipe and Copper,
Foundry, and Pattern Shops; the Service Group, the Paint,
Woodworking, Rigging, and Temporary Service Shops; and the
Electrical/Electronics Group, the Electrical, Electronic, and
Weapons Shops. A new unit, the Weapons Shop (No. 38) had
responsibility for all ordnance and weapons work, including gun
sights, range finders, torpedo directors, and navigational
equipment. Because of its unique activity and peculiar status,
11
the ropewalk was not included in the new shop groupings.
Prior to 1967, each shop contained its own administrative
section and shop planning section. The reorganization
consolidated all of the clerical sections for shops in the same
group. For example, there was one administrative "staff" and one
shop planning "staff" for the three shops of the Structural
Group, that is the Shipfitting, Sheet Metal, and Welding Shops.
Another alteration saw the elimination of the traditional titles
of "shop master," "quarterman, " and " leadingman, " and the
substitution of "production superintendent," "general foreman,"
and "foreman. "
An alteration also occurred in the title of the additional
duty assignment of the shipyard commander. In 1966, the
designation Industrial Manager was changed to Supervisor of
Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair. Since 1950, the Commander,
11. Informal Turnover Memorandum, 1969; Boston Naval Shipyard,
Command History, Jan. 1 - Dec. 31, 1967, BNHP, RG 1, Series 11.
740
Boston Naval Shipyard, had served as the Industrial Manager
(INDMAN), First Naval District. INDMAN's chief mission was "to
award and administer repairs, alterations, conversions,
activations, and inacti vations performed on Naval ships at
private shipyards under BUSHIPS MSR (Master Ship Repair)
contracts." In 1962, twenty commercial yards in the Boston area
had contracts with the Navy and were eligible to perform work for
INDMAN. Most had only small boat capacities and did work on
tugs, barges, and other small yard and district craft. Five
others were classified as major repair yards, the most important
being Bethlehem Steel in East Boston, the only one with a
significant dry-docking capability. In the second half of 1962,
commercial yards under INDMAN performed nine regular overhauls of
ships; fifteen overhauls of small craft and boats; seven tech-
12
nical availabilities; and sixteen restricted availabilities.
INDMAN's staff in 1962 consisted of sixty-nine civilians and
two officers. Previously, personnel employed by or assigned to
the shipyard constituted the INDMAN staff. As of July 1, 1962,
the INDMAN office became an entity separate from the Boston Naval
Shipyard, although it continued to be housed in Building No. 39.
That separation in part resulted from an act of Congress, which
required an enlargement in the amount of the Navy's repair work
assigned to private yards. This increased the work performed
under the Industrial Manager, First Naval District, from
$5 million a year to $11 million. The continued growth in the
private yards' share of the Navy's shipwork led to a
12. Historical Report, Industrial Manager, First Naval District,
Jun. 29 to Dec. 31, 1962, BNHP, RG 1, Series 11.
741
reorganization in 1966, which converted INDMAN into the
Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, First Naval
District (SupShip One). By 1973, SupShip One had become a
sizeable organization, with hundreds of workers, many of them
13
formerly employees of the shipyard.
The Boston Naval Shipyard continued to provide a variety of
administrative and other support services to a large number of
activities of the federal government in the general area of
Boston and in New England. For example, the Production
Department did laboratory analyses and other work for the
Inspector of Navy Material, Boston; Supervisor of Shipbuilding,
Quincy; Industrial Manager, First Naval District; U.S. Submarine
Base, New London; and the Boston and New London Groups of the
Atlantic Reserve Fleet. The Public Works Department furnished
maintenance, repair, and similar services to several of the same
agencies and also to the United States Weather Bureau, Naval
Reserve Training Facility, and other tenants of the shipyard.
Probably, the Supply and Comptroller Departments were most active
in assisting off-yard activities. The Supply Department
supported the headquarters and fifteen other components of the
First Naval District and also the Naval Ammunition Depot,
Hingham; the Naval Air Station, South Weymouth; the Naval
Hospital, Chelsea; Supervisors of Shipbuilding and Inspectors of
Ordnance at Quincy and Bath; Coast Guard units throughout
Massachusetts; and twenty-two Naval and Marine Reserve Training
13. Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion & Repair, First Naval
District, Boston, Massachusetts, Oct. 10, 1968, BNHP, RG 1,
Series 12.
742
Centers. Acquisition of a computer competency enabled the
Comptroller to assist several hundred military organizations and
government contractors in preparation of a variety of types of
14
payrolls and accounts.
To an extent, a description of the yard's services rendered
other agencies is misleading, since it suggests an expansion of a
military presence in the Boston area. The fact is that in the
decades after the war in Korea, the government sought to reduce
the number of its military bases and operations within the conti-
nental United States in an effort to economize in defense expend-
itures. Such a policy indirectly and directly affected the
Boston Naval Shipyard in several ways. In certain instances, the
yard acquired or sought to acquire sites abandoned by other
agencies. On the other hand, the government's campaign aimed at
terminating several activities at the shipyard or at off-yard
locations, principally at South Boston. In the mid-1960s, the
Boston Naval Shipyard itself came close to being disestablished.
In 1955, the Boston Naval Shipyard consisted of the main
Charlestown site; the South Boston Annex, and its two appendages
on "E" Street and "K" Street; and the Fuel Annex in East Boston.
Another annex was acquired in 1957 in response to a Bureau of
Ships' directive to provide, in "austere" fashion, for adequate
facilities to test and calibrate shipboard electronic equipment,
including that on the Navy's new missile-carrying vessels.
The Boston Naval Shipyard made arrangements with the Coast Guard
for the use of a tower at Nahant, Massachusetts. Eight years
14. Commander to Chief, Bureau of Ships, Jun. 24, 1959, 181-40,
64A300, A3/3.
743
later, the Navy acquired eight and a half acres adjacent to the
property containing the tower. That tract was part of a former
Army NIKE-AJAX installation. However, the Navy provided no funds
for the necessary structural and electrical modifications
required to develop the tower as an electronics test and
calibration facility, and the shipyard's function respecting the
15
Nahant Annex essentially consisted of caretaking.
Nahant was the only potentially significant property added
to the shipyard. By the end of the 1950s, disestablishment had
overtaken the Naval Ammunition Depot, Hingham, and the Harbor
Defense Unit, which operated out of South Boston. The Commander,
Boston Naval Shipyard, was placed in charge of the discontinued
facilities of these two activities, but the shipyard made no
plans to utilize those properties in its own undertakings.
Other efforts of the government to reduce its military bases
or diminish activity at military establishments affected the
Boston shipyard in a negative way. The Eisenhower administration
revealed a dislike for the performance by the military of
operations that could be accomplished by commercial firms,
particularly in the area of manufacturing. Such a policy brought
attention to the Boston yard's ropewalk and chain and anchor
forge. In February 1955, the Bureau of Ships directed the
shipyard to close the ropewalk as of May 1. The bureau later
changed its directive, but in January of 1956, the House
Subcommittee on Military Appropriations conducted hearings on
Boston's ropewalk and forge. Out of those proceedings emerged an
15. Informal Turnover Memorandum, 1969, p. 4; Commander to Chief,
Bureau of Ships, Jan. 2, 1958, 181-102, Box 63A0377, Al-2.
744
understanding that they continue operations, but only in a way
that would allow private industry to supply the Navy with the
bulk of its cordage and anchor chain. Henceforth, the ropewalk
had the mission of providing the Navy with adequate cordage
research, development, and testing facilities. Production was
to be at a level sufficient to meet the costs of operations. This
16
amounted to approximately one million pounds of cordage yearly.
The Navy Department conducted another study of the ropewalk
operations in 1965, but did not communicate to the shipyard any
decisions reached as to the future of the shop. During the
Vietnam War, the Defense Department found that commercial
suppliers could not meet the demand for cordage, and it asked the
Navy to expand the ropewalk 's production by 600,000 pounds per
year. By that time, the work force of the facility had
diminished considerably. Utilizing a six-day work week, the shop
was able to increase its output by 300,000 pounds.
The government's policy of favoring commercial manufacturers
also had an impact on the forge. The shop concentrated on the
production of chain and chain appendage that private industry
regarded as unprofitable to produce, particularly cable for super
carriers. At the direction of the Navy, the shipyard made sur-
veys of its other manufacturing activities, such as the foundry
and sail loft, to determine the feasibility of terminating them
17
and securing their products from commercial sources.
The ropewalk was finally ordered closed as of December 31,
16. Informal Turnover Memorandum, 1969.
17. Informal Turnover Memorandum, 1960.
745
1971, and its equipment disposed of, except for artifacts being
retained for museum purposes. By that time, the shop had only
nineteen employees, who were assigned to other jobs in the
18
yard .
In the late 1950s, the Boston Naval Shipyard began
physically to shrink in size, with the elimination of several
properties. The first of these was the "K" Street Annex,
adjacent to the South Boston Annex. In December 1958, the "K"
Street property was sold as surplus. The "E" Street Annex at
South Boston, a tract of approximately twenty-five acres, had
been used during World War II mainly for open storage. In the
postwar period, it was declared excess to the operations of the
shipyard, and, in 1969, Congress transferred it to the
Massachusetts Port Authority.
In 1960, the East Boston Fuel Annex ceased operations and
was placed in a maintenance status. Henceforth, Navy ships in
the Boston area received their fuel through contractors,
utilizing three Navy barges. "Firm mobilization" requirements
prevented the permanent disposal of the Fuel Annex, and the Navy
19
sought a tenant for the property. The most important
deactivation, prior to the close of the main yard itself, was the
suspending of most of the ship work at the South Boston Annex.
A major event in the modern history of the Boston Naval
Shipyard had been the Navy's acquisition in the World War I era
of the Commonwealth Dry Dock at South Boston and its attachment
18. Events During Calendar Year 1971, BNHP, RG 1, Series 11;
Boston Nava l Shipyard News , Jul. 9, 1971.
19. Informal Turnover Memorandum, 1960.
746
as an annex to the yard. At that time, Dry Dock No. 3 was the
largest in the world. During the 1920s and 1930s, few improve-
ments were made in the dock and the adjacent area, also part of
the annex, and the facility was used by the yard primarily to
dock large passenger liners and other nonmilitary vessels. The
annex came into its own during World War II, when a cruiser dry
dock was added, other improvements were made, and a considerable
amount of the Boston yard 's ship repair work was performed at the
site. In the postwar decade, activity at the annex declined,
except by the Atlantic Reserve Fleet. Occasionally, work by the
shipyard at the annex increased to the extent of requiring the
labor of as many as 1200 of the yard employees. But, except for
its two dry docks, the annex constituted excess plant.
The excess shipyard capacity constituted a fiscal drain,
since, although not heavily used, the annex required maintenance
and provision for utilities. Moreover, transporting personnel
and material from one site to the other increased the cost of
industrial operations. The administrators of the shipyard held
that its mission required the continuation of the South Boston
Annex in an active status. They also argued that the separation
of the yard's two industrial sites by several miles had
advantages, since in the event an atomic bomb fell on the area,
20
it was unlikely that both locations would be damaged.
In December of 1958, the Bureau of Ships ordered the
20. Program for Review of Commercial and Industrial-Type
Facilities, 4th Increment, Factors Which Warrant the Continued
Operation of Boston Naval Shipyard, n.d [1955], BNHP, RG 1,
Series 37; Commander to Chief, Bureau of Ships, Mar. 14, 1958,
181-40, Box 63A0377, A-l.
747
inactivation of the South Boston Annex. All shops were to be
transferred to the main yard by January 1, 1960. The Bureau of
Ships' directive stated that: "It is desired that the annex be
inactivated on a most austere bases." The site would continue to
provide berthing space and offices to the Reserve Fleet, and Dry
Dock No. 3 was retained for emergencies. The Bureau of Ships
advised the shipyard that future work-load assignments would
include no vessels that could not be accomodated by the
21
facilities at the Charlestown location.
Implementation of the inactivation proved impossible before
1962, because of maintenance and repair work being performed on
Dry Dock No. 2. That work required utilization of Dry Dock No. 4
for ships that otherwise would have been accomodated at the
larger dock in the main yard. Although, yard administrators
fought to retain both Dry Docks No. 3 and 4 in active status,
they made the arrangements necessary to relocate to Charlestown
operations formerly conducted at the annex. These included
facilities for the repair, testing, or restoration of
transducers, bathythermographs, and electronic and radiac
22
equipment .
In the remainder of the 1960s and in the early 1970s, the
shipyard continued to work on carriers docked in No. 3 at the
annex, but the partial inactivation of South Boston had an impact
on the activities of the yard as a whole. The number of dry-
21. Bureau of Ships to Commander, Dec. 18, 1958, 181-40, Box
63A0377, A-3.
22. Informal Turnover Memorandum, 1960; Commander to Chief,
Bureau of Ships, Dec. 23, 1959, 181-40, Box 64A300, A3.
748
dockings dropped from eighty-one in 1961 to forty-nine in 1963,
and the labor force decreased by roughly one thousand workers.
Although used sparingly, the South Boston Annex remained as an
important element in the long-range plans for the shipyard.
In 1963 and 1964, the Navy Department announced its
intention to close one or more of its shipyards. Boston appeared
as a candidate for deactivation, and a closing scare swept
through the yard and adjacent communities. As it turned out,
Boston was spared, and the ax fell on the New York Naval Shipyard
in Brooklyn and the repair facility at San Diego. In 1966, the
Navy undertook another review of its yards, which resulted in two
alternatives for Boston, to modernize the main site at
Charlestown or to to close it down and move practically the
entire operation to an enlarged South Boston Annex. In 1968, the
Department of Defense accepted the recommendation to relocate the
yard to South Boston. Even before that date, the Navy had pursued
a policy of allocating only minimal funds for plant expansion and
improvement at the Charlestown yard.
THE DECLINE OF THE YARD'S PLANT
The history of the ship repair facilities of the Boston
Naval Shipyard since 1890 in part is an account of efforts to
keep the yard's plant abreast of changes in the design of naval
vessels. Generally, ships became larger, requiring longer piers
and longer, deeper, and wider dry docks. Essentially, this theme
appears in the decades after World War II. Particularly in the
1950s, modernization of warships included the installation of
large sonar domes at the forward end of keels, thus increasing
749
CHART NO. 6: MAP OF BOSTON NAVAL SHIPYARD, BOSTON, MASS
SHOWING CONDITIONS ON JAN. 1, 1963
NOTE: Chart No. 6 and Chart No. 7 indicate the relatively modest
additions to the physical plant of the main yard of the Boston
Naval Shipyard in the decades after World War II. Pier
improvements completed by early 1963 included rebuilding Pier No.
6; rebuilding and enlarging Pier No. 7; the installation of crane
tracks on Pier No. 4; and the integration of that trackage with
the tracks on Pier No. 5 and the new Piers Nos . 6 and 7 into a
system connected to the crane tracks serving Dry Docks No. 1
and 2 .
None of the buildings erected since World War II constituted
major additions to the yard. The new plant consisted of
Industrial Service Buildings on Piers Nos. 4, 6, and 7; light
towers; fire pump houses; garages; and other small buildings and
structures .
The absence of new ship construction activity is manifest in
the utilization of Shipbuilding Ways No. 2 for parking.
T*.
V
v
LEGEND
RAILROAD TRACKS — . _
CRANE TRACKS r I T ITT : '
HYDRANTS •
CAPSTANS
STREET LIGHTS
FIRE ALARMS (FA ) I
FLOODLIGHTS Fl ■
CIRCUIT BREAKER HOUSE CBH
MAP OF
BOSTON NAVAL SHIPYARD
BOSTON. MASS.
SHOWING CONDITIONS ON
JAN.1.1963
-S$° "/Captain etc oiS
t\mjc wo«w orncc*
399-144
INDEX OF STRUCTURES
NO I OCPT
: I :
HO: DEFT
wo" DIPT
L" rr?
?: Z"
= JEL
SjS.
?
si
LOC
„
-
i
OTFicCftS oo*in t«i
We [ OCPT kjDcJ »m, OFFICES. ETC
u s manine co*»s
shops, offices, etc ~"
ice f«o vt»« an 41) Mti
3 omlt HMDo uUW.1 FotrrnM of m«.«m
TIUCF 1* **■" FOB COM»Lf H TMtl PI'tl
the depth required in dry-docking. Also, the Navy began to
acquire a new generation of destroyers. Conversion by the Boston
yard of the World War II destroyer Gyatt into the Navy's first
guided missile destroyer produced a ship with a draft of
nineteen feet. Completely new DDGs had drafts of more than
twenty-one feet, and guided missile frigates, DLGs , drafts in
excess of twenty-five feet. The aircraft carrier Forresta l ,
launched in 1954 had a length of 1,046 feet, a flight deck width
of 249 feet, six inches, and a draft of thirty-seven feet. Ships
with such dimensions made obsolete many of the Navy 's older
repair facilities.
In the decades after V-J Day, the plant of the Boston Naval
Shipyard was not improved and updated so as to insure the yard
could readily engage in work on the new generation of ships then
being built. Utilizing the Navy's own figures, critics of the
1973 decision to disestablish Boston pointed out that
expenditures for major plant construction projects at each of the
other East Coast yards had substantially exceeded the funds
assigned Boston. Between 1965 and 1973, Portsmouth had received
$12.3 million, Philadelphia $24.6, Norfolk $34.0, and Charleston
$40.8. During the same period, only $1.4 million had been
expended on the Boston Naval Shipyard. These figures represent
"Military Construction" funds. Improvements costing less than
$5000 could be approved by the shipyard commander. Projects
involving expenditures between $5000 and $25,000 required
authorization by the Bureau of Ships or its replacement, the
Ships System Command, which would provide the funds. "Military
Construction" funds were available, when approved by the
750
Secretary of the Navy, to finance plant improvements costing
between $25,000 and $250,000. Projects more than $250,000 in
value required congressional action. As far as can be determined,
Congress appropriated no monies for projects at Boston, after
authorizing reconstruction of several piers in the mid-1950s.
Moreover, the Secretary of the Navy proved reluctant to approve
Military Construction projects. It also appears that the Bureau
of Ships and its successor were less than eager to sanction even
23
limited plant improvements at Boston.
Following the construction of the cruiser dock at South
Boston and the building dock at the main site during World War
II, no major additions were made to the plant of the Boston Naval
Shipyard. During the first postwar decade, the principal
improvements consisted of enlarging Building No. 198 and the
beginning of programs to replace piers and to modernize the
central power plant. In the years after 1955, shipyard
administrators recommended several major public works, including
modernizing and extending existing dry docks, building several
new ones, and constructing greatly enlarged piers. Such
recommendations remained in the planning stage, pending the
resolution of important questions concerning the future of the
yard. Thus the yard had to fulfill its mission with a plant that
revealed more and more defects.
The major deficiencies in the Charlestown site were the
23. Base Closures or Realignment Program, Massachusetts, Hearing
Before the Subcommittee on Military Construction of the Committee
on Armed Services, United States Senate, Ninety-Third Congress,
First Session, Jun . 21 and 22, 1973, p. 85; Informal Turnover
Memorandum, 1960.
751
congestion of buildings and waterfront facilities, the age of
many structures, and the inability of the dry docks to accomodate
the ever increasing size of warships, including destroyers. Also
many of the buildings were being utilized for purposes other than
the uses originally intended.
The situation for storage of gas cylinders illustrates
several of the difficulties. The yard had become a primary stock
point for the distribution to Navy ships and shore activities of
industrial gas. This function required having on hand a large
pool of gas cylinders, stored in Buildings Nos . 165 and 165A.
Both structures had been erected as parts of a gas generating
plant, and both were unsuited for cylinder storage. The loading
platforms were thirty inches below standard height and were too
narrow to accomodate forklifts or other mechanical equipment.
Containers being unloaded from trucks had to be dropped onto an
improvised rubber pad, a dubious practice when the cylinders
contained pressurized gas. To load cylinders onto trucks,
24
workmen had to lift them manually. Injuries became frequent.
An obvious need prevailed for a proper gas cylinder storage
building, and a plan was proposed for moving the cordage
operation to South Boston, razing the ropewalk structure, and
using that location for building a gas cylinder storage
facility. However, the Bureau of Ships opposed any scheme
involving development of the annex, since it had ordered the
deactivation of that site. As an alternative, the bureau
24. Commander to Chief, Bureau of Ships, Jan. 2, 1958, 181-40,
Box 63A0377, Al-2.
752
suggested the yard consider utilization of piping to deliver
industrial gases, perhaps a feasible course for shore-based
25
activities, but not for delivering cylinders aboard ships.
Several of the yard's buildings demonstrate difficulties
resulting from altering their use from that originally intended.
No. 114 had been constructed as a sawmill. Over the years,
modifications occurred in its usage so that ultimately it served
as a sawmill and a combined joiner, shipwright, and boat shop.
The boat shop, housed on the second floor, had a ceiling so low
as to prevent ready movement of boats into or out of the shop.
This became more apparent as ship's boats grew larger and
heavier. In the shop, one boat could not be lifted over the
others, so that oftentimes, to remove a boat which had been
completed, many of the rest had to be lowered to the floor, moved
to the side, or somehow gotten out of the way. Obsolete cranes
in the shop compounded the difficulty. These conditions resulted
26
in larger boats being worked on out-of-doors.
Building No. 103 had been erected in 1901 as a storehouse
for finished chain. Shortly before World War II, the sheet metal
shop moved to No. 103 from its restricted quarters in No. 104.
However, the former chain storage building had only one small
elevator, located at its south end. Since the ventilator and
furniture sections of the sheet metal shop were in the north end
25. Commander to Chief of Naval Operations (Shore Station
Development Board), Mar. 5, 1958; Commander to Chief, Bureau of
Ships, Nov. 12, 1958, both in 181-40, Box 63A0377, A-l; Chief,
Bureau of Ships to Chief of Naval Operations, Sep. 4, 1958, 181-
40 Box 63A0377, Al-2.
26. Commander to Chief, Bureau of Ships, Jan. 2, 1958, 181-40,
Box 63A0377, Al-2.
753
of the second floor, finished pieces had to be carried the length
of the shop. Moreover, the elevator was too restricted to handle
large units, and even moderately long lengths of sheet metal had
27
to be bent to fit into the elevator.
The waterfront of the Charlestown yard presented a variety
of problems. Work continued on pier improvement, but not rapidly
enough to keep ahead of deterioration. In 1958, all railroad and
mobile cranes were prohibited from Pier No. 2, and it was
anticipated that Pier No. 3 would shortly be in the same
condition. Both of these as well as Piers Nos . 8, 9, and 10 were
wooden structures and thus costly to maintain. The system for
distributing utility services to the piers was defective, since
water covered the pipes and wiring at high tide. In 1968, all of
Pier No. 10 and the outboard end of No. 3 were no longer usable.
Long-range plans called for replacing existing Piers Nos. 2 and 3
with a single 130-foot wide wharf and for reconstruction of
28
Piers Nos. 8 and 9.
In 1958, Shipways No. 2 suffered from decay and could not be
used because of inadequate crane service. The ways had a twenty-
ton hammerhead crane, but there were no facilities for portal or
railroad cranes. Also, the ways lacked the length required by
modern ships. Utilization of Shipways No. 2 for ship
construction would require the demolition of a large part of
27. Commander to Chief, Bureau of Ships, Jan. 2, 1958, 181-40,
Box 63A0377, Al-2.
28. Commander to Chief, Bureau of Ships (Attn. Code 770),
Nov. 12, 1958, 181-40, Box 63A0377, Al-1; . Informal Turnover
Memorandum for Captain R. C. Gooding, USN, Aug. 1968, BNHP, RG 1,
Series 5.
754
Building No. 104, another demonstration of the congestion of the
yard. The yard's master plan for development of the waterfront
proposed the elimination of both building ways because of the
need to construct a bulkhead between Piers Nos . 7 and 8 so as to
extend traveling crane service to the east end of the waterfront.
By 1968, Shipways Nos. 1 and 2 had become parking lots and their
wet slip portions filled with waste material generated by the
29
shipyard .
Although the Navy was building few of its own ships and the
immediate prospects for new construction at Boston were remote,
Navy authorities had to look ahead and consider the requirements
should there be a full mobilization, such as had occurred in
World War II. Mobilization plans for the Boston Naval Shipyard
assigned it the role of shipbuilding. However, the abandonment
of the two shipbuilding ways and plans to enclose that area with
a bulkhead diminished the yard 's prospective mission in an
emergency situation.
At the end of 1958, plans to replace Marine Railway No. 11
were deleted. The scheme to remove Piers Nos. 2 and 3 and
construct a 130-foot wide wharf would mean the abandonment of the
hauling-out ways. A replacement elsewhere in the yard appeared
unwarranted in view of the low utilization rate of the existing
device. In 1957, for example, Marine Railway No. 11 docked only
two vessels. The reduced use in part resulted from defects in
the mechanism. Excessive slack in the hauling chains had
29. Informal Turnover Memorandum, 1968; Commander to Chief,
Bureau of Ships (Code 770), Jan. 2, 1958, 181-40, Box 63A0377.
Al-2.
755
developed and become progressively worse. Even small vessels,
such as yard tugs, could be hauled out only by using methods
considered dangerous. Beginning in 1963, the railway saw little
service, except for test runs and repairs. In July 1965, the Navy
ordered the railway be employed only when other docking
facilities were unavailable In 1970, the yard's docking officer
regarded the marine railway as unusable, a conclusion with which
30
the Navy concurred the following year.
Crucial to a modern ship repair activity was possession of
adequate dry-docking facilities. In 1945, the Boston Naval
Shipyard had five dry docks. At the main yard were Dry Dock No.
1, built in the 1830s; Dry Dock No. 2, constructed in the early
twentieth century; and Dry Dock No. 5, erected during World War
II for purposes of ship construction. The annex at South Boston
had Dock No. 3, the large, 1000-foot facility constructed in the
World War I era, and Dry Dock No. 4, the cruiser dock completed
in 1944. It might appear that these five docks would be
sufficient for the yard to fulfill its mission, but such was not
the case. If the yard were to have a future, existing docks
needed modification, and new ones seemed desirable.
Least useful was No. 5, the building dock, which had a draft
of only seventeen feet. No. 5 could readily accomodate World War
30. Chief, Bureau of Ships to Chief of Naval Operations, Sep. 4,
1958, 181-40, Box 63A0377, Al-2; Commander to Chief, Bureau of
Ships (Attn. Code 770), Nov, 12, 1958, 181-40, Box 63A0377, Al;
Brady and Crandall, pp. 17-21; Group Master, Service Shops, to
Public Works Officer, Jun. 20, 1966; Docking Officer to Repair
Superintendent, Oct. 6, 1970; Acting Service Group Superintendent
to Production Officer, Feb. 19, 1971, all in BNHP, RG 1, Series
37. Frequency of usage of this facility is recorded in an
untitled rough draft of the docking log, BNHP, RG 1, Series 53,
Box 4, Marine Railway, Feb. 3, 1957-Apr. 10, 1973.
756
II destroyer escorts and submarines undergoing modest
conversions. Unorthodox methods were required to dock larger
vessels or those receiving radical alteration. In 1962, the
yard used No. 5 in the modernization of the destroyer Green e . The
ship entered the dock stern first, and the keel blocks were so
arranged as to elevate the bow. This was necessary in order to
install the huge sonar dome. Such methods demonstrate the
ingenuity of shipyard personnel, but also reveal the shortcomings
of Dock No. 5. The yard's master plan called for modification of
the dock to enable it to receive in conventional fashion the
first postwar destroyers, those of the Forrest Sherman class. In
1960, the Bureau of Ships estimated the cost of those
modifications as $6 million. By 1968, the figure had increased to
31
almost $7,400,000.
Much lower were the estimates for needed improvements in the
two graving docks at Charlestown. One common deficiency was the
pumping or dewatering system, which served both facilities. When
first installed in 1903, that system could empty Dry Dock No. 1
in forty-five minutes and Dry Dock No. 2 in 138. In 1958, the
time consumed in dewatering was seventy-five minutes for the
small dock and almost 200 for the large one. Much of the
deterioration of the dewatering system had occurred because of
sandblasting techniques introduced during World War II. The sand
could not be filtered out and damaged the pumps. The Bureau of
Ships objected to replacing the pumps and suggested their repair
by epoxy resins. The yard successfully argued that such repairs
31. Informal Turnover Memorandum, 1960; Bos ton Naval Shipyard
News , Feb. 2, 1963; Turnover Memorandum, 1968.
757
would not be effective, and in 1960, a contract was awarded to
32
replace the pumps.
The same contract covered a new caisson for Dry Dock No. 2.
In 1958, the original caisson was nearly sixty years old.
Repairs, made between 1954 and 1956 and costing almost $50,000,
failed to improve the caisson's performance, and it was estimated
that further work would take six months and require $121,000.
Deactivating the dock for that length of time would create major
problems in the docking schedule, and there were no guarantees
that the repairs would succeed. The caisson's framework had
become twisted, with the result that the mechanism did not seat
properly in the dock's entry. The poor seating allowed water
into the dock, necessitating constant use of the pumps. Thus,
the contract for a new caisson, which, after some delay, was
33
delivered in 1961.
A 1964 study reported the poor condition of the caisson for
Dry Dock No. 1. Repairs and even the regular overhauls were not
performed because of the expectation that funds would become
available for a replacement. When such funds were not forth-
34
coming, repairs were made and the caisson continued in service.
Another defect of the yard's dry dock area was remedied in
the early 1960s, when floodlights were installed on building
32. Commander to Chief, Bureau of Ships (Code 770), Mar. 28,
1958, 181-40, Box 63A0377, Al-2; Chief, Bureau of Ships to
Commander, Jun . 16, 1959, and Commander to Chief, Bureau of
Ships, Jul. 10, 1959, both in 181-40, Box 64A300, N-16; Informal
Turnover Memorandum, 1960.
33. Commander to Chief, Bureau of Ships, Mar. 28, 1958; Informal
Turnover Memorandum, 1968.
34. Brady and Christopher J. Foster, Inc. pp. 29-30.
758
roofs and towers to provide more adequate illumination in hours
of darkness .
Replacing the dry dock pumps, providing a new caisson for
Dry Dock No. 2, and installing additional lighting filled obvious
needs. Far less clear was the appropriate course for dealing
with the limitations of Dry Dock No. 1. The yard required more
than one dock large enough to receive the new destroyers
beginning to appear in the late 1950s. Certainly, modifying Dry
Dock No. 1 was more feasible than rebuilding No. 5. Cutting some
of the stones in the head of No. 1 had given the dock a length of
415 feet, but the depth of the dock limited its use to ships 403
feet long, forty-nine feet, seven inches in width, and with
drafts of twenty-one feet. Thus the dock could not be used for
destroyers of the Forrest S herman class or the even more sizeable
DDGs and DLGs . Nor could it accept larger World War II destroyers
35
equipped with SQS 23 sonar installations.
In 1960, the Bureau of Ships worked on a modest plan,
estimated at $250,000, to modify Dry Dock No. 1 's caisson and to
extend the niche in the head. That scheme apparently proved not
to be feasible, and two years later the bureau approved a bolder
proposal to enlarge and modernize the dock. It would be extended
fifty feet seaward, and its floor deepened by five feet. Other
projected improvements included an automatic bilge block seating
36
system and a new lock-type caisson with built-in pumps. . Those
35. Commander to Chief, Bureau of Ships (Code»770), Jan. 2,
1958; Informal Turnover Memorandum, 1960.
36. Informal Turnover Memorandum, 1960; Informal Turnover
Memorandum for Capt . F. C. Jones, Jun . 1962, BNHP, RG 1, Series
5.
759
CHART NO. 7: MAP OF BOSTON NAVAL SHIPYARD, BOSTON, MASS., SHOWING
CONDITIONS ON JAN. 1, 19 73.
NOTE: Comparison of Charts No. 6 and 7 indicate that virtually
no major improvements were made in the Charlestown site of the
Boston Naval Shipyard during the ten years prior to its
deactivation. Dry docks, piers, and buildings remained
unchanged. By 1973, both of the two shipbuilding ways served as
parking lots, two cranes at Shipbuilding Ways No. 1 were removed,
and the marine railway no longer was operational. Of the five
new structures appearing since 1963, three were electrical
substations (Nos. 274, 275, and 278), one a sand hopper (No.
273), and the other a facility for the filling and storage of
oxygen bottles (No. 277).
s
RAJLROAO TRACKS
CRANE TRACKS
HYDRANTS
CAPSTANS
STREET LIGHTS
FIRE ALARMS (FA) a
FLOOOLICHTS FL ■
CIRCUIT BREAKER HOUSE C §.H
I n 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ITTTI
MAP OF
BOSTON NAVAL SHIPYARD
BOSTON. MASS.
SHOWING CONDITIONS ON
JAN. 1,1973
399-B5
INDIX OF STRUCTURRS
im_k.
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MAP OF
BOSTON NAVAL SHIPYARD
BOSTON. MASS.
SHOWING CONDITIONS ON
JAN. 1.1973
*&%£&&, 399-65
plans were never carried out.
The South Boston Annex remained only partially deactivated
in the 1960s, because Dry Docks Nos . 3 and 4 were needed for work
on the most recently constructed destroyers, destroyers equipped
with large sonar domes, and guided missile ships, such as Albany ,
for which Boston served as home yard. Until 1954, the Boston
Naval Shipyard could dock any ship in the fleet. Then there
appeared the first of the super carriers of the Forrestal class,
which had dimensions exceeding the capacity of Dry Dock No. 3.
Even some of the smaller post-World War II carriers could barely
fit in the dock. in May 1966, No. 3 was used for the twenty-
year-old carrier Franklin D^ Roosevelt . The dock had a width at
the sill of 133 feet, and the ship's width at the elevator rails
37
measured 131 feet, six inches. Thus the docking was accom-
plished with a mere nine inches of clearance on either side. Had
the vessel listed, it probably could not have entered the dock.
The point is that even Dry Dock No. 3 was beginning to show its
age .
The Navy required administrators of its shipyards to
maintain master plans for the future development of their
activities. in the mid-1950s, there were plans for enlarging Dry
Dock No. 3 to take Forrestal -class carriers. Subsequent master
plans called for one or two entirely new docks. No. 6 was to be
693 feet in length, 140 in width, with a clear depth of forty-
five feet over the sill at mean high water. it was to be built
at the the main yard and at the east end of the waterfront. Those
37. Command History, Jan. 1 - Dec. 31, 1966, BNHP, RG 1, Series
11 , p. 27 .
760
plans also included replacing Piers Nos . 8 and 9 with new
structures, so spaced as to allow room for the new dock between
them. The Bureau of Ships rejected the proposal for Dry Dock No.
6 and also for No. 7, planned for South Boston in lieu of
enlarging No. 3. Subsequent plans had a more modest character
and included modernization and extending Dry Dock No. 1 and
rebuilding No. 5. Realization of those projects had to await
decisions as to whether the ship yard would be consolidated at
Charlestown or South Boston and, indeed, whether the yard would
38
continue at all.
CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES: TRAINING, RIFS, UNION CONTRACTS
In June of 1956, slightly more than 10,000 civilians worked
at the Boston Naval Shipyard. Except for temporary reversals in
1962 and 1967, the number of workers steadily declined, reaching
5,000 in the spring of 1973. Lower employment rolls were achieved
through attrition and by reductions in force. Although the labor
force contracted, there was increasing need for diverse highly
specialized skills, resulting in an expansion of the shipyard's
training programs. One such program addressed itself to the
continued dearth of qualified engineers. Another important
development in the area of civilian workers was the institution
of a new policy concerning unions. Workers employed by the
federal government received the right to select organizations to
38. Commander to Chief, Bureau of Ships, Jan. 2, 1958; Informal
Turnover Memorandum, 1960; Chief, Bureau of Ships to Chief of
Naval Operations, Sep. 4, 1958, 181-40, Box 63A0377, Al-2;
Commander to Chief of Naval Operations (Shore Station Development
Board), Dec. 12, 1958; Commander to Chief, Bureau of Ships (Attn.
Code 770), Nov. 12, 1958; and Commander to Chief, Bureau of
Ships, Mar. 14, 1958, all in 181-40, Box 63A0377, Al.
761
negotiate contracts, which primarily covered procedures in
personnel policies.
The composition of the work force of the Boston Naval
Shipyard changed slightly in the period 1956 to 1973. Consistent
with federal policies instituted in the 1960s, the yard made
efforts to recruit members of ethnic minorities and women, and by
the end of the decade, 5.6 percent of the employees were in such
groups. Veterans continued to constitute a significant
proportion of the work force, being sixty-three percent in 1960.
However, all workers received some rights formerly enjoyed only
by veterans, such as the same procedures for appeal in cases of
suspension. Reductions in force tended to increase the proportion
of veterans and also of older workers. Other circumstances
resulted in a relatively greater number of IV(b) or classified
39
employees .
Primarily for public relations purposes, the shipyard made
an analysis of its work force in 1967. At that time the yard's
7250 civilian workers constituted fourteen percent of all federal
employment in Massachusetts. The average age of employees was
forty-eight, and nearly seventy percent had worked in the yard
for more than fifteen years. Almost three-fourths of the
workers lived within ten miles of the yard, and the same
proportion commuted to work by private vehicle. More than 1600
of the yard's employees had received college-level educations,
more than 3000 had attended technical schools above the high
39. Command History, Jan. 1 - Dec. 31, 1967, BNHP, RG 1, Series
11; Informal Turnover Memorandum, 1969, BNHP, RG 1, Series 5;
Boston Naval Shipyard New s , Aug. 31, 1962.
762
Table No. 24: TOTAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES, BOSTON NAVAL
SHIPYARD, 1954-1973
19 19
54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73
11,500
11,000
10, 500
10,000
9,500
9,000
8, 500
8,000
7, 500
7,000
6, 500
6,000
5, 500
5,000
4, 500
4,000
3, 500
3,000
2, 500
2,000
1, 500
1,000
500
(SOURCE: Average Employment Levels,
1950-1963, BNHP, RG 1, Series 22;
Command Histories, 1964-1974, BNHP,
RG 1 , Series 11 )
19
54
19
55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73
763
40
school level, and more than 800 were graduate apprentices.
During World War II, training programs had emerged as a
significant undertaking at the Boston Naval Shipyard, essentially
because of the necessity to equip new, inexperienced workers with
basic competencies needed for the yard to fulfill its industrial
mission. After the war, training continued to be an important
activity, for somewhat different reasons. Advances in naval
technology and in industrial management required highly
specialized skills. This resulted in the yard's involvement in a
great variety of training programs. In certain instances, the
shipyard provided the instruction, either for members of its own
population or for outside parties. In other cases, employees of
the yard received instruction from educational institutions,
other units of the Navy, or commercial firms which had developed
or produced particular equipment in use at the yard or on ships.
A sample of off-yard training programs in the late 1950s
suggests the great range of expertise required to service the
postwar fleet. Twenty-three employees in 1956 were enrolled in
engineering drawing courses at Northeastern University. During
1959, small groups of Boston Naval Shipyard employees partici-
pated in numerous training programs: at Sciaky Bros. Inc.,
Chicago, for instruction in the care and operation of the com-
pany's welding equipment; Colby College, occupational hearing
loss; United States Naval Boiler and Turbine Laboratory,
Philadelphia, automatic combustion control; Sangamo Electric
Company, Springfield, Illinois, RDT modification to AN/SS-4 sonar
40. "Stockholders" Journal Data Sheet, Aug. 29, 1967, BNHP, RG 1,
Series 11 .
764
checkout; and General Precision Laboratory, Inc., Pleasantville ,
New York, AN/SXQ-2 high resolution television installation
41
design.
In the same period, 350 supervisors in the Production
Department completed a course in the operation of production
planning and control systems, conducted by the staff of Clark
University, and top-level supervisors participated in a formal
series of case studies in administrative practices under the
direction of members of the faculty of the Graduate School of
Business, Harvard University. In 1958 and 1959, instructional
programs given by the yard included training in aluminum and
high-pressure welding for Navy enlisted men and training of a
cordage fiber inspector for the General Services Administration.
Even the senior administrator pursued a program of instruction,
the Navy paying the cost of study of Russian by Capt. F. L.
42
Ruhland, shipyard commander.
There continued to be difficulties in hiring sufficient
numbers of qualified engineers, and in the late 1950s and early
41. Correspondence concerning training programs in 1959 is
collected in 181-40, Box 64A300, P-ll 1/1. Among those documents
are Commander to Director of Summer Session, MIT, Apr. 16, 1959;
Commander to Chief, Bureau of Ships, Jun. 22 and 26, 1959;
Commander to Director of Adult Education, Colby College, Jun. 4,
1959; Commander to Sciaky Bros. Inc., Apr. 24, 1959; Deputy
Industrial Relations Officer to Commanding Officer, US Naval
Boiler and Turbine Laboratory, Feb. 18, 1959; Chief, Bureau of
Ships, High Resolution Television AN/SXQ-2 - Installation Design,
Aug. 10, 1959; Chief, Bureau of Ships to Commander, Jan. 22,
1959.
42. Annual Report, Calendar Year 1956, BNHP, RG 1, Series 4;
Commander to Regional Commissioner, Region I, General Services
Administration, Oct. 2, 1959; Chief of Naval Personnel to
Commander, Dec. 15, 1959; Commander to Commanding Officer,
Blandy , Dec. 8, 1959, all in 181-40, Box 64A300, P-ll 1/1.
765
1960s, it became practically impossible to recruit persons with
degrees in naval architecture. To be sure, the yard increased
its efforts to hire engineering graduates from the region's many
colleges and universities. During those years, the yard's design
work load far exceeded the available manpower, primarily owing
to the cruiser conversion program. Because of the lack of quali-
fied personnel at Boston and other naval shipyards, an increas-
ingly large amount of design work had to be farmed out. Shortages
43
also existed in other engineering and technical disciplines.
Nineteen-f if ty six saw the appearance of a cooperative
training program, whereby competent graduating high school
seniors embarked on a five-year work-study program administered
by several colleges and universities and the Boston Naval
Shipyard. The student-trainees pursued degree programs in
engineering, chemistry, mathematics, metallurgy, or physics. If
accepted by both the naval shipyard and the cooperating college,
a young man or women began the program shortly after high school
graduation, the first stage being full-time employment at the
yard for a summer. Given the classification of GS-2 , the student-
trainees went on educational leave in the fall, when they were
enrolled as freshmen in a cooperating college. They returned to
the shipyard the following April and worked until August, before
resuming classroom instruction. This alteration between the yard
and college continued until the end of the fifth year. During
that time, they were advanced in classification to the position
of GS-4. Upon completion of the program, they received their
43. Boston Naval Shipyard, Annual Report, 1956, BNHP, RG 1,
Series 4; Informal Turnover Memorandum, 1962.
766
degree and were appointed as engineers in the shipyard. Among
the institutions participating in the program were Northeastern,
44
University of Michigan, and Virginia Polytechnic.
With respect to civilian employees at large, the most common
problem for the Boston Naval Shipyard was not too few, but too
many workers. Significant reductions in force occurred in 1957,
1959-1960, and 1964. A series of RIFs, beginning in 1970,
preceded the closing of the yard four years later. Essentially,
the Navy steadily cut back the number of civilian employees in
its shore establishments. In 1972, for example, the service
decided to reduce its employment around the world by 17,000.
Each major command, such as the Naval Ships Systems Command, was
assigned a specific ceiling or maximum number of employees, which
was divided among subordinate echelons. The Boston Naval
Shipyard received orders in February 1972 to reduce its
employment level to 5317 by June 30, the end of the fiscal year.
This meant a reduction of 418 workers. The yard administration
calculated that normal attrition would result in the separation
of approximately seventy workers and that 340 employees would
45
have to be discharged as part of the RIF.
When pursuing a reduction in force, the yard management
decided on the specific positions to be eliminated, the list
44. Deputy Industrial Relations Officer to Director of Guidance
and Placement, Milford High School, Feb. 11, 1959; Deputy
Industrial Relations Officer to Director of Admissions,
Northeastern University, Jun. 12, 1959, and Aug. 10, 1959; Deputy
Industrial Relations Officer to Director, Co-operative Program,
Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Jun. 15, 1959; Commander to
Chief, Bureau of Ships, Aug. 10, 1959, all in 181-40, Box 64A300,
P-ll 1/1.
4 5 . Boston Naval Shipyard News , Mar. 3 , 197 2.
767
being published in the Boston Nava l Shipyard News . Working from a
Retention Register, the Industrial Relations Office sent notices
to the particular individuals to be discharged. As in earlier
RIFs , retention rights depended on the type of appointment,
efficiency rating, status as veteran or nonveteran, and years of
service in the yard. Provisions for "bumping" and "retreating"
allowed a worker receiving a RIF notice to move to a lower
position for which he was qualified and to displace another
46
employee with fewer retention rights.
The frequent reductions in force at the Boston Naval Ship-
yard affected the work force in many ways other than reducing its
size. The average age of employees went up, as did the pro-
portion of veterans. Doubtless, discharging large numbers
adversely affected worker morale. One manifestation of this was
the incidence of sick leave. In 1969, the shipyard commander
noted that Boston was generally recognized as "a high sick leave
yard," consistently being above the average of all yards. He
attributed this to the New England weather, but also reported
that the frequency of sick leave rose in periods of declining
workload and employment. Management encouraged workers to
retire early and indeed to seek work elsewhere. In September
1971, the yard newspaper reported 120 recently separated
employees who had taken jobs with the Supervisor of Shipbuilding
47
at the Shipbuilding Division of General Dynamics, Quincy.
Employment at the Boston Naval Shipyard continued to be a
46. Boston Naval Shipyard News , Mar. 17, 1972.
47_j_ Informal Turnover Memorandum, 1969; Boston Naval Shipyard
News , Jul. 23, 1971, and Sep. 3, 1971.
768
matter of interest to parties other than the yard management and
its employees. As in the past, political figures displayed
concern with various aspects of civilian employees. For example,
in 1959, Senator John F. Kennedy made inquiries as to the
possibility of an appointment for a brother of a constituent. On
another occasion, he sought information concerning employment
prospects at the yard in general. In the fall of the same year,
the Charlestown Metal Trades Council sent a telegram to the
senator, alleging that the yard was employing Navy prisoners in
work which rightfully should have been performed by civilian
employees. When Kennedy brought the matter to the attention of
shipyard administrators, he was advised that the captain of
Aucil la , in for repairs, had arranged for using Navy prisoners in
some cleaning and chipping, work usually done by the ship's crew
48
and not the yard work force.
Unions communicated their grievances to other public figures
as well as the future president. Congressman John W. McCormack
continued his interest in the yard and relayed to the shipyard
commander a protest arising from the Navy's contracting with
General Electric for repair of ships ' generators instead of using
the yard's electrical shop. Another member of the House of
Representatives, Silvio 0. Conte, approached the Department of
the Navy on behalf of a local of the International Hod Carriers,
Building and Common Laborers, which had complaints regarding the
48. See Endorsement, Re ltr from Sen. Kennedy, 2/4/59, on behalf
of A. Magdalene Grubert; Bureau of Ships to John F. Kennedy, Mar.
12, 1959, both in 181-40, Box 64A300, P-14; Bureau of Ships to
the Hon. John F. Kennedy, Oct. 27, 1959, 181-40, Box 64A300, P-8.
769
49
wage levels for laborers in supervisory positions.
Of course, labor organizations based on the shipyard or
whose members included yard employees continued to approach
management directly, without going through a political
intermediary. For example, the Greater Boston Labor Council
expressed its dismay on the occasion of a 500-man reduction in
force in 1959, and the Sheet Metal Workers' local complained
about the failure of the yard to maintain a register for the
50
position of Planner and Estimator (Coppersmith). In the 1960s,
a new method was established whereby labor could communicate its
concerns to the administrations of the nation's naval shipyards.
In 1961, the newly elected President Kennedy issued
Executive Order 10988, which was designed to extend to government
employees some of the collective bargaining rights enjoyed by
workers in the private sector. The order and implementation of
it by the Defense Department, Navy Department, and Bureau of
Ships created three categories for employee groups in Navy shore
establishments, enabled workers to decide the scope of their
bargaining unit, and made provision for the selection of one
51
employee group in each unit to negotiate with management.
To be recognized by the government, an employee group had to
49. Chief, Bureau of Ships to Hon. John W. McCormack, Jul. 30,
1959, 181-40, Box 64A300, P-8; Office of Industrial Relations
Department of the Navy, to Hon. Silvio 0. Conte, n.d. [1959],
181-40, Box 64A300, L16-1
50. Planning Officer to Sheet Metal Workers' International, Local
No. 500, Mar. 13, 1959, 181-40, Box 64A300, P18-2.
51. Executive Order 10988, Employee-Management Cooperation in the
Federal Service, Code of Federal Regulation, Title 3-The
President; 1959-1963 C ompilation (Washington: GPO, 1964), pp.
521-8.
770
acknowledge that it did not advocate the right to strike against
or to overthrow the government of the United States and that it
did not practice discrimination. Any group subscribing to these
positions could receive "informal" recognition from management.
Such recognition entitled the group to present to shipyard
managers matters of concern to its members. To be granted
"formal" recognition, an organization had to submit evidence that
it "has a substantial and stable membership" of at least ten
percent of the employees in a unit. Formal recognition entitled
an organization to be consulted by management in the formulation
of personnel policies. To be given "exclusive" recognition, an
employee group had to provide evidence that it represented more
than fifty percent of eligible employees. Exclusive recognition
carried the right to negotiate contracts with management. If no
organization could legitimately claim to speak for half of the
workers in a unit, then any formally recognized group which
demonstrated it represented at least thirty percent of the
52
employees could seek exclusive recognition through an election.
Prior to Executive Order 10988, there were forty-seven
employee groups in the Boston Naval Shipyard which had official
standing. Twenty were labor groups, most of which had
affiliations with the AFL-CIO. The largest single group was an
independent union, Machinists Local 634 of the International
Association of Machinists. Local 634 and sixteen other labor
organizations were federated as the Charlestown Metal Trades
Council, which itself was a branch of the East Coast District
52. Executive Order 10988; Boston Naval Shipyard News , Jul. 20,
1962.
771
Metal Trades Council. The local council generally spoke for the
employees of the yard and regularly met once a month with the
shipyard commander. The regional organization was also active in
representing shipyard workers. For example, in 1960, the East
Coast District Metal Trades Council stated its opposition to the
proposal by the Bureau of Ships to achieve greater efficiency in
53
naval shipyards by organizing shops into groups.
Among other important workers ' groups in the Boston yard was
Lodge 82 of the American Federation of Government Employees.
That organization represented many of the office workers. In
1955, the shipyard commander had withdrawn official recognition
of the Federal Employees Veterans Association. FEVA reorganized
itself as the National Association of Government Employees, which
in 1959 regained the official recognition lost four years
earlier. NAGE conducted itself in a moderate fashion, and
although active in the yard, it only had infrequent meetings with
the shipyard commander. The Navy-sponsored employees
organization, the shop committees and the Joint Council,
54
represented only a small portion of the yard's work force.
Implementation of Executive Order 10988 at the Boston Naval
Shipyard required a decade of elections, adjudications, and
arbitrations. A poll taken in the summer of 1962 by the
Industrial Relations Office among existing employee groups was
interpreted as indicating most workers favored having the entire
53. Fact Sheet on Boston Naval Shipyard for Possible Use in
Replying to Press Queries, Jun . 6, 1960, BNHP, RG 1 Series 11;
Informal Turnover Memorandum, 1960.
54. Informal Turnover Memorandum, 1960.
772
shipyard declared the bargaining unit. As subsequent events
demonstrated, that poll was somewhat misleading. However, the
yard administration's recommendation of a single unit was
accepted by the Bureau of Ships, which led to a contest to
determine which employee group would obtain exclusive
recognition. Fifteen organizations sought to become spokesman
for yard workers, but the foremost contenders in the early 1960s
were the Charlestown Metal Trades Council and the National
Association of Government Employees. However, no group could
establish that it represented more than fifty percent of the work
force, and an election was scheduled for early 1963 to determine
if exclusive recognition should be given to the Metal Trades
55
Council or to NAGE or to neither.
The election did not take place as scheduled. Professional
employees voted to be excluded from the shipyard unit, and three
other groups filed appeals challenging the decision to have the
entire yard included in a single bargaining unit. The exclusive
recognition election was postponed indefinitely, pending the
outcome of those appeals. The Secretary of Labor appointed a
Professor of Economics of Brown University as arbitrator to
conduct hearings and render an advisory opinion to the Secretary
56
of the Navy.
Those appeals were sustained and additional groups received
the right to be considered apart from the rest of the yard. A
showdown unit election between the Charlestown Metal Trades
55. Informal Turnover Memorandum, 1962; Boston Naval Shipyard
News , Aug. 3, 1962; Nov. 23, 1962; and Dec. 21, 1962.
56. Boston Naval Shipyard News , Jan. 11, 1963, and Mar 1, 1963.
773
Council and NAGE occurred in 1964 to decide which would represent
the yard's ungraded or blue-collar workers. In something of an
upset, NAGE emerged the winner and became the exclusive spokesman
for 5500 manual workers, the largest unit in the yard. However,
by 1968 seven smaller units had been established, two of which
were represented by NAGE and others by their own organizations.
Lodge No. 82, American Federation of Government Employees,
represented most graded or white-collar workers. Technical
workers, pattern makers, firefighters, employees in Production
Planning and Control, security guards, and ungraded supervisors
had their own units. In 1969, the cafeteria workers were
established as a ninth unit. The system underwent some
modification, when President Richard Nixon issued new regulations
57
and revoked Kennedy's executive order.
The yard 's management had to negotiate contracts with each
of the nine bargaining units in the yard. That proved a lengthy
process because of the number involved and also because of
infighting among the labor groups. Particularly, NAGE sought to
have Lodge 82, American Federation of Government Employees,
decertified, a process which delayed negotiations with the graded
employees. By 1969, management had worked out contracts with
seven units .
Management maintained good relations with NAGE in the mid-
1960s. The contract with the ungraded workers was one of the
57. Informal Turnover Memorandum, 1968; Informal Turnover
Memorandum, 1969; Executive Order 11491, Labor-Management
Relations in the Federal Service, Oct. 29, 1969, Code of Federal
Regulations , Title 3-The President, 1966-1970 Compilation
(Washington: GPO, 1971), pp. 861-75.
774
first to be negotiated. An election of NAGE officers in the fall
of 1967 produced a new set of union leaders, who were both more
militant and less informed than their predecessors. At the end
of the decade, the shipyard commander, Rear Adm . R. C. Gooding,
took note of "a slow and perceptible emergence among the larger
unions of a more aggressive approach to matters traditionally
accepted as fully within the sphere of management prerogative."
His successor, Capt. R. W. Burk, found the national leadership of
NAGE more reasonable and moderate than the local union. Kenneth
Lyons, who as head of FEVA in the 1950s had been the Boston
administrators' bet e noir , had become national president of NAGE.
Burk's method of dealing with intransigence on the part of NAGE's
yard officers was to telephone Lyons, who would then persuade
58
them to adopt a more flexible position.
Contracts between federal agencies and unions composed of
their employees appear as unique documents when compared with the
agreements produced by bargaining between private employers and
conventional labor organizations. This results from the fact that
important elements, such as wages, salaries, and benefits, are
not covered, being matters controlled by Congress and other parts
of the government. The management of the Boston Naval Shipyard
could not grant to its workers any concrete concessions not
already authorized by a higher echelon in the government. Nor
could existing wage schedules, salaries, and benefits be recited
in a contract, since they could be changed by decisions reached
58. Informal Turnover Memorandum, 1968; Informal Turnover
Memorandum, 1969; Oral History Interview, Rear. Adm. and Mrs.
Burk, BNHP, p. 43.
775
in Washington. Agreements worked out by the Boston Naval Shipyard
and its employee groups tended to focus on procedures. Also they
contained numerous statements of a highly general nature, in
which one or both parties promised to be cooperative or
reasonable or to be vigorous in the pursuit of a common goal.
In the agreement signed by NAGE in July 1971 on behalf of
the yard's blue-collar workers, the union formally recognized the
broad authority of management to make rules and regulations; to
direct the work of employees; to hire, promote, and transfer
workers; to take disciplinary action against them, including
suspension, demotion, and discharge; and to lay off employees
because of lack of work or for other reasons. NAGE also
acknowledged that all matters covered by the agreement were
governed by existing and future laws and by regulations adopted
by the federal government. Management agreed to consult with the
union about personnel policies and practices and working
conditions, which were within the discretion of commander. These
included safety, training, employee services, methods of
adjusting grievances, leave, promotion plans, and practices
respecting demotion, pay, reductions in force, and hours of
59
work .
For every seventy-five unit members, NAGE received the right
to appoint stewards, who generally would be employees in the
shops they represented. A steward could use government time to
consult with members of the unit within his shop, so long as
59. Agreement Between Boston Naval Shipyard and National
Association of Government Employees, Local Rl-1, July 2, 1971.
This document was published in Boston Naval Shipyard News , Sep.
17, 1971, and Oct. 1, 1971.
776
approval was obtained from the appropriate supervisors. Both
parties agreed to seek resolution of differences at the lowest
level. However, the longest article in the document was devoted
to grievance procedures.
The shipyard and NAGE accepted the basic work week of eight
hours a day and five days a week. Management agreed to consult
in advance with the union about any changes in the basic schedule
or in shift hours. Parts of the agreement covering overtime,
holidays, annual leave, and sick leave confirmed existing
regulations, without giving particulars of their contents, and
dealt with the manner in which these matters were to be
administered .
In the contract, NAGE secured the right to be consulted
about personnel decisions and actions to be taken by the
administration. It also obtained promises from management to
administer personnel matters in a reasonable and fair fashion,
providing employees and the union with ample notice and
information .
For its part, the shipyard obtained NAGE's pledge of
cooperation and support in furthering the efficient
accomplishment of the mission of the yard. For example, NAGE
agreed "to use its facilities to assist in vigorously promoting
the need for conscientious and prudent use of sick leave
benefits." In the contract's preamble, the two parties affirmed
"that they will cooperate in all efforts to ensure a full day's
work on the part of employees...; to improve the quality of
workmanship; to encourage the submission of constructive work
improvement and cost reduction ideas; [and] to vigorously promote
777
accident prevention ...." Probably, the preamble represents what
the Navy hoped to gain through the formal introduction of unions
and labor contracts into the shipyard.
The determination of wages and salaries was a matter not
included in the agreements worked out by the shipyard and
employee groups. Classified or white-collar employees received
increases in earnings when promoted according to the system
established by Congress. Also, occasionally Congress raised
salaries of all classified employees.
Wage schedules for manual workers continued to be determined
on the basis of data collected from private employers. Generally,
full-scale wage surveys were conducted every two or three years.
More frequent adjustments were made on the basis of so-called
"wage change surveys." After Bethlehem Shipbuilding workers won
an increase by virtue of a strike in 1960, the Navy Department
made an adjustment, which raised the wages of Boston shipyard
60
workers by approximately one percent.
A full-scale wage survey for the Boston area was conducted
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Navy in August 1967.
Representatives of the two agencies jointly visited private
firms in the area, but each compiled data best suited for their
own purposes. As had long been the practice, employees and
employee groups had the right to recommend firms to be contacted.
Also workers and recognized employee groups could appear before
the Area Wage Committee. The data collected was forwarded to the
Office of Civilian Manpower Management in Washington, and by
60. Informal Turnover Memorandum, 1960.
778
early November the new schedule went into effect. That provided
for three wage steps for each rating. Boilermakers, chain
makers, coopersmiths , flange turners, machinists, molders,
shipfitters, and most other basic shipyard trades were assigned
minimum, middle, and maximum hourly rates of $3.34, $3.48, and
61
$3.62.
Innovations occurring in the 1969 survey included the
involvement of the Civil Service in an effort to eliminate pay
differences among Boston-area government agencies for the same
trade and labor. Also the shipyard Local Wage Survey Committee
included representatives of unions with exclusive recognition for
blue-coilar employees. The survey originally scheduled for 1971
was deferred because of the ninety-day wage freeze imposed by
President Nixon to combat the high rate of inflation. A new
schedule for the yard went into effect in the following year,
which provided a maximum rate for shipfitters, shipwrights, and
several other trades of $4.59. This represents almost a twenty-
62
five percent increase over the wages of 1967.
At the end of the 1960s, the total annual civilian payroll
of the Boston Naval Shipyard was approximately $65 million. The
yard also expended locally each year $35 million for material and
services. Thus, the yard had an annual impact on the regional
economy of $100 million, not including expenditures by military
personnel assigned to the yard. This represents the economic
61. Boston Naval Shipyard News , Nov. 6, 1967; BOSNAVSHIPYD Notice
12531, Aug. 2, 1967, BNHP, RG 1, Series 10.
62. Informal Turnover Memorandum, 1969; Bosto n N aval S hipyard
News , Sep. 17, 1969.
779
loss to the greater Boston area when the yard's industrial
63
activities were terminated.
INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY: FINAL YEARS
The Boston Naval Shipyard continued as an active industrial
facility, on a somewhat reduced scale, until the formal
announcement of its closing in the early 1970s. In 1961 and
1962, it performed significant work on ninety-one and ninety-four
ships respectively, and in 1970 and 1971 on fifty-seven and
sixty-one. Ships arrived in the yard for regular overhauls;
restricted, fitting-out, and post-shakedown availabilities;
Military Assistance Program preparations; conversions;
modernizations; inactivations ; and commissionings .
In the second half of the 1950s, the Boston Naval Yard moved
into a new age of warfare when it converted several
conventionally armed vessels into guided missile ships. Major
milestones in the progress of the yard were the conversions of
the destroyer Gyatt , the light cruiser Providence , and the heavy
cruiser Albany . The shipyard not only made the conversions, but
performed the considerable design work required by these
pioneering projects.
Conversion to missile ships involved much more than simply
fixing launchers on existing decks. Arrangements had to be
devised and installed for the proper storage of the weapons in
special magazines, for moving the devices from the magazines to
the launchers, and for reinforcing decks and providing them with
protection to withstand the blast. Moreover, missiles required
63. Informal Turnover Memorandum, 1969, p. 47
780
provision for complex guidance and computer systems.
Gyatt (DD-712) had originally been commissioned in July
1945. Of the Gearing class, the ship had a length of 390 feet
and a displacement of 2425 tons. Between 1945 and 1951, Gyatt
served with the Sixth Fleet. In September 1955, she entered the
Boston Naval Shipyard, was decommissioned, and began conversion
into the world's first guided missile destroyer. The destroyer's
aft 5/38 guns were replaced with twin Terrier missile launchers.
The Boston yard designed the special handling mechanisms to
secure the missile to the booster charge and to transfer the
entire assembly from stowage to launcher. Missiles were both more
powerful and more sensitive than conventional weaponry, and
Gyatt required air-conditioned missile magazines. To minimize
and localize damage and injury in the event of a premature
explosion, Boston designers produced a system of ducts and
blowout plates. The ship's steel deck and aluminum
superstructure had to be made capable of withstanding the high
dynamic loads of missile firing, which produced temperatures in
excess of 3000 degrees Fahrenheit.
Terrier, with which Gyatt was armed, was the Navy's first
operational antiaircraft missile. A larger version of Tartar,
this intermediate weapon was fifteen feet long, weighed more than
one and a half tons, and had a range of twenty miles. Like the
later Talos, it required the attachment of fins before launching.
In addition to its missiles, Gyatt acquired several other
unique features during its conversion. The ship received a salt
water washdown system as a countermeasure for an atomic blast.
Boston yard workmen became familiar with the techniques for
781
working plastic piping, used in the washdown arrangement because
of the easier installation and to reduce topside weight.
Gyatt represented another significant innovation, since she
was the first ship to receive the Navy's Denny-Brown
stabilization system. This consisted of two forty-five-square-
foot retractable fins, which extended out from midships well
below the water line. Installation of the fins required
conversion of the midships oil tanks to machinery spaces. The
stabilizers decreased the roll of the vessel to a maximum of
three degrees .
Recommissioned in December 1956, Gyatt 's designation was
changed to DDG-712 and then, appropriately, to DDG-1 . After
leaving the Boston yard, the destroyer spent the next three years
in intensive evaluation and development work along the Atlantic
Coast, during which data was assembled for improvements in
subsequent DDG conversions.
Providence was the first of three light cruisers converted
by the Navy to launch guided missiles. The ship, orginally built
in 1944 at the cost of $30 million, underwent conversion at the
Boston yard between 1957 and 1960. The yard installed a Terrier
launcher aft, and the cruiser retained its forward guns.
Of the three projects, conversion of Albany was the longest,
largest, most expensive, and most important. Boston functioned
as the lead design yard, six other heavy cruisers being converted
at the same time by other facilities. The Bureau of Ships
carefully monitored and coordinated the work on the cruisers,
arranging for frequent conferences attended by representatives of
the planning and production personnel of the various yards
782
involved and by engineers of the commercial firms producing the
missiles and other equipment being installed. In these
Production Progress Conferences, the Boston yard played a major
64
role.
Albany , commissioned in 1946 as CA-123, originally had nine
eight-inch guns in three turrets, twelve five-inch guns in six
double mounts, and numerous 40mm antiaircraft batteries. Within
a few years, twenty quick-firing three-inch guns, developed late
in World War II for use against kamikaze attacks, replaced the
40mm weapons. Albany , displacing 18000 tons, had been
constructed at a cost of $40 million. The ship arrived at the
Boston Naval Shipyard in 1958 to undergo conversion, which took
four years and four months and the expenditure of $175 million.
The yard's share of the cost was $40 million, the rest being for
65
the missiles, electronic systems, and other new equipment.
Recommissioned CG-10, the new Albany at first did not have a
single gun. Subsequently, concern about attack by small surface
64. For examples of correspondence and reports demonstrating
Boston's role in the cruiser conversion program, see Commander to
Commanding Officer and Director, U.S. Navy Shipbuilding
Scheduling Activity, Jun . 13, 1958; Coordination Meeting, GMLS mk
12, Mar. 18, 1958; Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Quincy, to CO and
Director, U.S. Navy Shipbuilding and Scheduling Activity, Jun.
12, 1958; GMLS MK 12 Mod O, Minutes of Meetings, Nov. 13 and 14,
1958, Cruiser Conversion, Quarterly Production Progress
Conference Agenda, Apr. 7, 1959, all in 181-40, 63A0377, A19;
General Electric to Boston Naval Shipyard, n.d. [1959], 181-40,
Box 64A300 (1959), CGN/SHIP; Howard Macway, San Francisco Naval
Shipyard, Trip Report of CG-10 Structural Conference at Boston
Naval Shipyard, May 27, 1959; Commander, San Francisco Naval
Shipyard, to Commander, Boston Naval Shipyard, May 28, 1959, both
in 181-40, 64A300, CG-10.
65. This discussion of Albany is based on Hanson W. Baldwin, The
New Navy (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1964), pp. 124-30.
783
craft, such as deployed by the Soviets, led to the installation
of two 5/38 guns, one on each beam. Main armament consisted of
twin Talos missile launchers forward and aft; twin Tartar
missile launchers on either side; an ASROC launcher amidships,
two triple torpedo tubes on each beam for launching Mark 43 or
Mark 44 acoustic homing torpedoes; and two helicopters carrying
homing torpedoes.
Below deck the ship remained much the same as when first
constructed. A modern steam turbine propulsion system gave the
vessel a top speed of thirty-two knots. Living spaces were
altered, since the missile cruiser required a crew of roughly one
thousand men, whereas 1,232 men had made up the complement prior
to conversion. This reduction resulted from greater automation.
Above deck was a new ship, constructed largely of aluminum.
In addition to the removal of the guns and the installation of
the missile launchers, the most striking change in the appearance
of the cruiser was a towering fore "mack," eight levels high, the
distance between the water line and the top of the mast towers
being almost 200 feet. Heavy aluminum "armor" was installed
around the bridge and missile handling compartments as protection
against splinters. Forward was what the crew came to call the
"pizza tower," a squat structure supporting the Talos tracking
and guidance radars. The surface of the tower was a rougn
textured insulation, like a pizza pie crust, required to maintain
a constant temperature for the radar and electrical connections.
At the time of Albany "s conversion, the Navy had three
missiles for surface ships, Talos, Tartar, and Terrier. All
three were antiaircraft weapons with varying ranges and guidance
784
systems, although each had a potential for use against surface
targets, ships, or land installations. In different configur-
ations, the three missiles appeared on many ships of the fleet.
Talos was the largest antiaircraft shipboard missile in
service. With its booster or first stage, the thirty-three-foot
missile weighed almost four tons. It had a range of sixty-five
miles and could reach aircraft at high altitudes. Talos was
controlled by a command guidance system, which included two
powerful radars. From data provided by the radars, computers
determined the point of interception, and commands were flashed
to the missile in flight, altering its trajectory until close
enough to the target for the homing guidance mechanism to
function. Talos could carry either a conventional or atomic
warhead .
Much of the challenge for the Design Division of the Boston
Naval Shipyard in converting Albany was to work out systems for
storing the Talos missiles and moving them to the launchers.
Almost the entire system for handling the 8000 pound missiles was
automated. Each missile, with its booster already connected, was
attached to a metal tray and stowed in one of two magazines. The
magazines were located below large deckhouses forward and aft,
which were mating and check-out spaces. The two launchers were
on the open deck forward and aft of the deckhouses. With the
pushing of a button, the automatic loading cycle began. The
magazine hatches opened, and two trays simultaneously moved up in
the port and starboard sides, carrying the missiles to monorails.
After releasing their burdens to the monorails, the trays
returned to the magazine and the hatches closed. The missiles
785
were carried forward to the wing and fin assembly area, where
twenty-four assemblymen, twelve for each missile, locked on wings
and fins to the missiles and their boosters. This was the only
stage in the loading or firing system requiring human hands other
than button pushing. The heavy blast doors of the deckhouses
then automatically opened, and the twin rail loaders transported
the missiles to the launchers. When the missiles were locked on
the launchers, the two loaders retracted back into the
deckhouses, the blast doors closed, and the Talos missiles were
ready to be fired.
Tartar, the other missile carried by Albany , was much
smaller, being 1300 pounds, and its loading was even more
automatic, since no human hands were required at any stage. The
thirteen-foot-long missiles were stored vertically in circular
magazines. From the magazines, the missiles were automatically
carried to one of the twin launchers located on either side of
the forward deck of the ship. Tartar required only one radar and
was connected to the fire control system by an electrical
umbilical cord. As the target was tracked by the radar, the
missile received continuous orders from the computer. After
launching, the cable disconnected and Tartar "looked" and locked
onto its target, utilizing a homing system. The missile had a
range of ten nautical miles. Cruisers other than Albany were
equipped with Terrier, the intermediate-range missile.
Prior to the completion of Alban y, the Boston Naval Shipyard
worked on one of the other heavy cruisers then under conversion.
Bethlehem Steel at Quincy had the contract for converting
Springfield . In January 1960, when the conversion was ninety-
786
five percent complete, a strike at the plant threatened to
prevent the ship from beginning its trials as scheduled by the
Navy. After the strike dragged on into March, the Navy had
Springfield towed to Boston for completion. That yard's
Planning Department already had familiarity with Springfield , as
lead design yard for the cruiser conversion program. Unlike the
Albany conversion, the new Springfield retained a turret of six-
inch guns and carried only Terrier missiles. The yard completed
Springfield in time for her preliminary acceptance trials in July
66
1960.
The Navy's shipwork in the postwar era required great
activity by the Planning Departments of naval shipyards,
respecting both design work and estimating, issuance of job
orders, and other aspects of "planning" for work on particular
ships. Moreover, quite frequently several yards, both commercial
and government, were engaged in design and planning activities
for the same vessel. This was particularly true for the cruiser
conversion program. As lead design yard, Boston prepared working
plans for the six cruisers.
A design work load analysis and forecast prepared in early
1959 revealed that almost half of the design work of the Boston
Naval Shipyard for the month of February was farmed out to
commercial firms. This apparently resulted from the shortage of
design engineers and also from a desire in the government to
66. New York Times , Feb. 6, 1960, p. 38; New York Times , Mar.
20, 1960; Supervisor of Shipbuilding and Naval Inspector of
Ordnance, Quincy, to Commanding Officer and Director, U.S. Navy
Shipbuilding Scheduling Activity, Jun. 12, 1958, 181-40, Box
63A0377, A19.
787
include private business in its industrial activities. At any
rate, the Boston yard's own designers expended 245 man-days on
design work in that month, and seven private design firms engaged
in work for the yard totaling 237 man-days. One of the
commercial firms was Washington Technological Associates of
Rockville, Maryland. Later in the same year, the Navy indicated
its dismay with the inability of the Rockville firm to meet
production schedules. The Navy's review of the performance of
the company "produced a pattern of slippages that is somewhat
appalling." Complicating the situation was that fact that
although Washington Technological Associates was under contract
with the Boston Naval Shipyard, its work involved plans for Long
Beach , under construction by Bethlehem Steel, Quincy. Because
of the numerous parties involved, shipwork planning became
67
increasingly complicated.
In the early 1960s, the Navy introduced a major program of
updating its older ships. Fleet Rehabilitation and Modernization
(FRAM) aimed at extending a warship's useful life from five to
eight years by stripping her down and rebuilding her with the
latest machinery, weapons, and equipment. Consistent with its
specialization, Boston performed FRAMs on destroyers. The Boston
Naval Shipyard's first FRAM was prototype work in 1960 on the
World War II destroyer Perry . Essentially, this amounted to a
$10 million conversion to increase the vessel 's ASW capability.
A typical FRAM operation occurred in 1963, when the yard
67. Commander to Chief, Bureau of Ships, Mar. 20, 1959, 181-40,
Box 64A300, P-16; Bureau of Ships to Julian Ray, Washington
Technological Associates, Nov. 23, 1959, 181-40, Box 64A300,
CGN/SHIP.
788
modernized Green e. Originally built in 1944 and 1945, the ship
was converted to a destroyer picket in the early 1950s. The
Boston yard performed a FRAM modernization in 1963, which
reconverted the almost twenty-year-old vessel back to a
68
destroyer .
The entire superstructure and most of the machinery of
Greene was removed before the vessel went into dry dock for a
two-month stay. In the dock, the hull was sandblasted, repaired,
and given two coats of hot plastic. Shaft bearings were repaired
or replaced. In the meantime, new machinery was prepared and a
superstructure prefabricated for installation in the ship. By
the end of its FRAM, Greene also had received new weapons, such
as ASROC and DASH. FRAM I modernizations took about eleven
months, and FRAM II, somewhat less intensive, about seven. The
FRAM II work performed by the yard on Hugh Purvis in 1960 cost
69
$5 million and lasted from early March to mid-October.
During its existence, the FRAM program provided considerable
work for the Boston Naval Shipyard. In the second half of 1962,
the yard performed FRAM modernizations simultaneously on seven
destroyers, which constituted seventy-five percent of the yard's
70
work load.
In the mid-1960s, with the completion of major conversions
68. Boston Naval Shipyard New s , Aug. 17, 1962.
69. Boston Naval Shipyard News , Feb. 2, 1963. DASH stood for
"drone antisubmarine helicopter." The remote controlled
helicopter could hover and pursue, deliver torpedoes or nuclear
depth charges to the vicinity of an enemy submarine, and return
to the mother ship.
70. Boston Naval Shipyard News , Aug. 17, 1962.
789
and a decline in the number of FRAMs , the Boston Naval Ship-
yard's main ship work consisted of regular and interim overhauls
and restricted, fitting-out, and post-shakedown availabilities,
with an occasional conversion and modernization. Most of the
warships coming to the yard were destroyer types or destroyer
escorts, although the presence of larger ships was not uncommon.
Except for voyage repairs and technical availabilities, the
most limited work by a yard on a ship was an interim
availability. On such a basis, the destroyer Cassin Young spent
three weeks at the Boston Naval Shipyard in November 1959. Work
scheduled by the yard included a number of inspections, such as
water boiler feed analysis; hull vibration survey; testing the
integrity of watertight compartments; inspections of sonar,
transducers, hydrophones, video scanning switches, hull, sea
valves, outboard shafting, propellers, magnetic compasses,
degaussing, and boiler tubes; and testing radial davits and
fueling station padeyes . The yard performed such repairs as
these and other inspections indicated. In addition, during the
docking the hull was cleaned, the underwater body touched up, and
the water line and boot-top area completely painted. Other work
included tumbling and dipping the anchor chain, spray painting
the chain locker, servicing the cruising turbine thrust bearing,
and ordnance repairs. The estimate for Cassin Young's interim
71
availability was $87,000.
Regular overhauls of destroyers usually took three months,
although frequently a longer period was needed. In the second
71. Commander to Commanding Officer, Cassin Youn g, Nov. 6, 1959,
181-40, Box 64A300, DD-793.
790
PHOTOGRAPH NO. 23: The destroyer leader Willis A Lee , in dry
dock, Boston Naval Shipyard, 1966, for outfitting with a rubber
dome for her SQS-26 sonar
791
half of 1968, for example, the overhauls of Ingraham , Keppler ,
and Moale included extensive boiler work, which required
extending their availabilities. Conversions were the most time-
consuming, the destroyers Davis and DuPont being assigned
fourteen-month availabilities for changes into ASW ships. The
conversion of these two vessels included installation of ASROC
fire control systems and improved radar and communications, and
extensive habitability modernization. In the 1960s, the Navy
began to emphasize habitability or living comfort. New ships as
well as those undergoing modernization, such as Davis and DuPont ,
were given crews' living spaces painted, not with the old flat
whites or greens, but in colors and color combinations designed
to promote greater restfulness and psychic relaxation. Improved
habitability meant special attention to the colors of table tops
and upholstery; wall decorations; libraries; air conditioning;
72
ships' stores; and galleys.
Although the Boston Naval Shipyard continued to specialize
in work on destroyers, other types of ships were frequently in
the yard. In early March 1963, the guided missile cruiser Boston
received a regular overhaul at the yard of the same name. Work on
the vessel during the overhaul included missile system check-out
and collimation; installation of a ANSOS-30 three dimensional
long-range air search radar; reinforcement of the main mast to
support the exotic electronics equipment; renewal of about half
of the teakwood decking; and rebricking and shock-hardening all
boilers. Boston spent four weeks in Dry Dock No. 2, during which
72. Baldwin, p. 9!
792
her four propellers were removed, renewed, and replaced; two
shafts were overhauled; sea valves repaired; and extensive rudder
and hull work performed. The overhaul lasted three and a half
73
months and cost $2 million.
Albany returned to Boston in the summer of 1968 for a stay
of approximately a year, during which modifications were made on
her missile systems. For a period of three months, 850 men per
day worked on the cruiser. Carriers at the yard included Frankl in
D. Roosevelt , Wasp , and Lexington . The overhaul of Lexington ,
beginning October 1969, required 900 men a day for seven days a
week. Because of the Boston yard's reduced work force, it was
necessary for administrators to negotiate "borrows" from other
yards to acquire the manpower to complete Lexington as scheduled.
The Boston Naval Shipyard rendered outfitting services to
newly constructed vessels and older ships after conversion or
otherwise being reactivated. Particularly for the first of new
types of ships, outfitting could be a lengthy and difficult
procedure. Bath Iron Works constructed Dewey (DLG-14), the first
ship built from the keel up as a guided missile vessel. The
prototype of the Navy's largest class of destroyers, Dewey
incorporated the latest advances in antisubmarine warfare. On
December 7, 1959, the ship entered commission and was turned over
to its commanding officer, Capt . Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., who later
became a somewhat controversial Chief of Naval Operations.
Three weeks after the shipyard began outfitting Dewey ,
Zumwalt complained of the unsatisfactory progress. He charged
73. Bosto n Naval Shipyard News , Mar. 8, 1963, and Jun 14, 1963
793
that poor coordination between the yard 's Planning and Production
Departments and the failure to put pressure on manufacturers and
the design agents had resulted in needless delays. For example,
the electronics shop undertook installation of the sound-powered
telephones and cables. However, the plans for the system had
not been obtained from Gibbs and Cox, design agents. The
Planning Department insisted that the work could not start,
although Production claimed it was possible to proceed without
the plans. Prints were on hand for installation of the AN/SPS-T2a
radar, but the Planning Department had not issued the proper
papers. Planning claimed on December 17, it had completed the
paper work for some electronics work on the open bridge, but
Production reported not having received the documents as of ten
days later. Zumwalt recited numerous other instances wherein the
outfitting was being delayed because of the absence of the
necessary estimates, plans, or work orders. Dewey finally
completed her outfitting, and after the ship's initial cruise,
she returned to the Boston Naval Shipyard in the spring of 1960
74
for a two-month post-shakedown availability.
Although the fleet was becoming smaller, the Boston Naval
Shipyard had a reasonable volume of ship work until 1972. In
1971, the yard performed twelve regular overhauls, eighteen
restricted availabilities, eleven fitting-out availabilities,
75
seven post-shakedown availabilities, and three inacti vations .
The shipyard continued to display a high level of competence
74. Commanding Officer, Dewey , to Commander, Dec. 28, 1959, 181
40, Box 64A300, DLG 14.
75. Shipyard Command History, 1 Jan. 1971-31 Dec. 1971.
794
in the designing and installation of new missile and electronic
systems. Several innovations appeared in the yard's work on
Trippe (DE-1075), which underwent a post-shakedown availability
in the second half of 1971. During that availability, the yard
installed the first Inter im-Surf ace-to-Sur face Missile (ISSM)
aboard an operational ship of the Navy. This was accomplished
by modifying an ASROC launcher to accomodate two STANDARD
missiles. The installation required adding missile control and
computational equipment to T rippe "s existing command and control
system, altering the power supply, and modifying the air
conditioning. Trippe also received a surface missile defense
system, consisting mainly of a Sparrow III missile, target
acquisition and tracking equipment, and a launcher.
Another sophisticated installation was made on Josep h Hewes
(DE-1078), which was fitted out and commissioned at the Boston
yard in the spring of 1971. The yard equipped the ship with a
TEAMS (Test, Evaluations, and Monitoring System), which provided
for the automatic maintenance and testing of advanced electronics
equipment, with practically no interruption in normal ship
functions. This assured the early detection of marginal and
deteriorated performance, thus assuring repairs before equipment
became unusable.
Although the Navy did not announce the disestablishment of
the Boston Naval Shipyard until April 1973, a decided decline in
shipwork in the previous sixteen months indicated that the future
of the yard was uncertain. During 1972, only three ships
received overhauls. In addition, the yard installed an
innovative controllable-pitch propeller system on Patterson . The
795
remainder of the 1972 shipwork consisted of several fitting-out
availabilites , participation in the commissioning of four
vessels, a post-shakedown availability, and repair of the caisson
for Dry Dock 3. The caisson repairs were made in Dry Dock No. 2
and lasted for two months. That the yard's work load permitted
having two dry docks tied up for a substantial period indicates
the decline in activity.
In 1973, the last year it functioned as an industrial
facility, the yard worked on fourteen ships, including four
overhauls, one fitting out, and three commissionings . During its
entire career, the Boston Naval Shipyard had been the site for
the commissioning of approximately 500 ships. The final
commissioning ceremony occurred on August 3, when Kalamazoo , a
replenishment oiler, was placed in service. Shortly thereafter,
the yard contained only two ships, Constitution , undergoing a
long overhaul, and Talbot ( DEG 4), Boston's last active customer.
Constructed by Bath Iron Works, Talbot made her initial
appearance at Boston in April 1967 to be commissioned and fitted
out. At that time, she was equipped with a new, long-range
sonar; antisubmarine rockets; DASH; modern torpedoes; a three-
dimensional radar; and a Tartar surface-to-air missile system.
Talbot returned to Boston in 1970 for a regular overhaul. The
ship's final visit to the yard began in February 1973 and
consisted of an extensive overhaul. That included a six-month
stay in Dry Dock No. 4 at South Boston, where she was fitted with
a new custom-made sonar dome. The major part of the overhaul
involved removing the original boilers and replacing them with
the latest pressure-fired equipment. The yard also converted
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the Tartar missile system from analog to digital computers and
provided the ship with a LAMPS manned helicopter system. That
installation included building a landing deck on the after-deck,
complete with lights, landing nets, and a retractable hanger. In
September, the ship was moved from South Boston to Pier No. 5 at
Charlestown for the completion of the overhaul. Talbot departed
76
the yard on December 14.
At approximately the same time, the forge shop was
completing its last job, the manufacture of a f our-and-one-half-
inch dielock anchor chain for the new carrier Eisenhower , then
under construction at the Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock
77
Company. When Talbot sailed off to join the fleet and the forge
finished the Eisenhower cable, the Boston Naval Shipyard
terminated its 174 years of industrial activity.
THE CLOSING OF THE YARD
An institution as old as the United States Navy itself,
which it served for one and three-quarter centuries, the Boston
Naval Shipyard deserves to remembered as an active, ongoing
enterprise. Nevertheless, an account of the background for its
closing in 1973 is important in itself and also provides a useful
insight into the conditions in the yard and its relationship to
the defense establishment.
Although the closing scares of the post-World War II period
76. Boston Naval Shipyar d News , Sep. 14, 1973, and Nov. 22,
1973.
77. Boston Naval Shipyard Command History for Calendar Year 1973,
Mar. 1, 1974, BNHP, RG 1, Series 11.
798
contained a more momentous quality because of the numbers of
people who would be adversely affected, talk of shutting down
the Boston Naval Shipyard represented no novelty. The yard came
perilously near deactivation in the 1880s, and in the following
decade, bills were occasionally suggested or proposed to
accomplish its demise. The appearance of the New Navy and the
activity of the yard in the Spanish-American War argued strongly
against, but did not end, proposals to close the facility. Prior
to World War I, Pensacola concluded its career as a navy
industrial activity. The possibility of a general cut-back in
Navy shore installations in the 1920s became a reality with the
shutting down of the yard at New Orleans. Fears of other
closings lingered into the early years of the Great Depression,
and a concrete proposal to deactivate the Boston Navy Yard
emerged from a White House conference in October 1931. Not until
the nation embarked on a definite program of fleet expansion were
fears for the future of the Boston facility laid to rest.
Upon the conclusion of World War II, many military instal-
lations across the country came to an end, but there appeared no
threat to well-established activities such as the Boston Naval
Shipyard. The late 1940s saw reductions in employment at Boston
by approximately one thousand workers, but Long Beach lost 5400
out of 5900 workers, which all but ended that facility as an
industrial activity, at least temporarily. The conclusion is
warranted that at several times prior to the 1950s, the Boston
Naval Shipyard was confronted with a likelihood, in some
instances not well-founded, that its days might be numbered.
Since the late nineteenth century, various naval, political,
799
fiscal, and ideological developments produced interest in
eliminating one or more of the nation's navy yards. Contraction
of the fleet appears as the most important consideration. The
reduction in the number of ships in active commission after the
Civil War brought an official termination of the Boston yard as a
repair facility. Similarly, the naval disarmanent treaty of 1922
fed suspicions that the fleet might shrink to a point which would
make some yards superfluous.
During the Gilded Age, partisan politics played a role in
the fate of navy yards, as parties out of power regarded them
essentially as engines for patronage, operating on behalf of
incumbents. The political arguments were often joined with the
contention that navy yards were inefficient and constituted
unnecessary drains on the national treasury. Generally, navy
yards could count on local groups and interests to defend them
against proposals they be terminated. However, in the early
twentieth century, one Boston-area newspaper argued that the yard
hindered development of Boston Harbor and that sale of the yard
would promote the region's prosperity.
At least since the appearance of the New Navy at the end of
the nineteenth century, navy yards have been in competition with
commercial shipbuilders. Until the 1950s, that competition
existed almost exclusively respecting new construction, since the
Navy's policy was to have all repair work done in its own
facilities and to divide its new construction between government
yards and private contractors. During emergency situations, such
as World War I and World War II, as seen in the history of the
Boston yard, repairs and conversions were contracted out by the
800
yards themselves to private firms. But no intense rivalry then
existed because of the abundance of work. However, after the
Second World War, during which the federal government had
encouraged expansion of the private shipbuilding sector, a
shortage of work for commercial yards developed. The argument
was advanced that national authorities had a responsibility for
contributing to the health of an important segment of the economy
and that the Navy should provide more work for the private
sector .
That argument underscores an unusual aspect of the Navy 's
industrial activities and one which, in some eyes, constituted an
ideological defect. American ideas respecting free enterprise
uphold the desirability of the government's utilizing private
companies to meet its industrial needs, including material
provision for the military services. Generally, corporations
manufacture the planes, tanks, and most of the other items
required by the nation's land, air, and sea forces. Especially
after World War II, many regarded the government's involvement
in industrial work as an unfair, unhealthy, and undesirable form
of competiton with private enterprise. Since its inception, the
Navy maintained its own yards for repair of its ships, perhaps
the most sizeable industrial activity of any part of the federal
government and the most conspicuous violation of the principle
of private enterprise. That this argument had an impact on the
Boston Naval Shipyard is evident in the assault made on the
ropewalk in the 1950s. That assault resulted in the curtailment
of cordage manufacturing on a production basis. The change came
as a result of congressional criticism of a government industrial
801
activity manufacturing a product available from commercial
sources. Henceforth, the Navy obtained its cordage from private
ropemakers .
Indeed, the Navy began to contract with private yards for
ship repair work as well as new construction. Those private
interests more vigorously advanced an old argument, that the
government's yards were inefficient and that the same work could
be accomplished by commercial firms at a lower cost. For
example, in 1960, the Atlantic and Gulf Coast Drydock Associ-
ation, which represented fourteen private yards, published a
report that concluded that ship repairs at navy yards cost
taxpayers thirty-three percent more than the expenses incurred by
utilizing private yards. The high costs at naval shipyards
allegedly resulted from excessively large employment rolls, which
lacked "any relationship" to work loads. Moreover, the report
claimed that private yards did not receive a fair share of the
Navy's repairs and conversions. In 1959, the Navy allocated five
times as much ship repair work, in terms of dollars, to its own
78
yards as assigned to private yards.
Support for the position of the private shipyards appeared
in the remarks of a naval inspector in the spring of 1963, who
said that the civilian employees of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
"just won't work." This caused a storm of protest among the
Portsmouth workers and the congressional delegations from Maine
and New Hampshire. A year later, the Secretary of Defense tried
to smooth the troubled waters by publically stating that the high
78. New York Times , Dec. 20, 1960, p. 48.
802
costs at the Portsmouth yard did not result from "the attitude
79
of the employees or lack of skill of the workers."
Congress responded to the pleas of the private shipbuilding
industry by stipulating in the Defense Appropriation Act of 1963
that thirty-five percent of the Navy's repair work be done in
commercial yards. By 1967, the share of the Navy's repairs,
alterations, and conversions assigned to commercial firms had
risen to 43.6 percent. In that year, such firms handled 99.7
percent of all new construction, giving commercial companies a
80
total of 78.1 percent of all of the Navy's shipwork.
One element, then, in the post-World War II pressures to
reduce the number of naval shipyards was the desire to provide a
larger share of shipwork to private yards. Several other
considerations also contributed to the trend toward fewer
government yards.
Without denying that the Navy Department had always been
cost conscious, it can be argued that a somewhat greater emphasis
followed the 1947 merger of the military services into a common
Department of Defense. Thereafter, Army, Navy, and Air Force
were funded by the same annual appropriation. Pressure increased
on the heads of any one service to make the most of the monies
allocated to them. That type thinking is evident in the study
made by the Navy Department in 1955, which called on naval
shipyards to explain why they should not be closed and why more
79. New York Times , Apr. 18, 1964, p. 12.
8 . Annual Report of the Secretary o f_ the Navy , July 1 , 1 962 , to
June 30, 1963 (Washington: GPO, 1963), p. 232; Annual Report of
the Secretary of the Navy, Jul . 1 , 1966 to Jun. 30, 1967
(Washington: GPO, 1967), p. 343.
803
work should not be given to private yards.
In the early 1960s, a number of bills were proposed in
Congress to terminate some naval shipyards. Perhaps that threat
as well as the increasing cost of the military establishment led
the Defense Department to conduct a study in 1964 of its
installations, with an eye to eliminating the least necessary
ones. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara made hurried visits
to naval shipyards, including one to Boston and Portsmouth on
April 17. During his trip, McNamara stated that preliminary
studies indicated that the combined capacity of government and
private yards exceeded the nation's need for ship construction
and that costs were higher in naval shipyards than in private
yards. He also revealed that closing one of the Navy's eleven
yards was under consideration. During the previous seventy years,
Secretaries of the Navy had occasionally made similar comments.
Especially, they had emphasized that the East Coast had too many
navy yards. Particularly when a reduction occurred in the
number of ships in active service and when funds were restricted,
questions arose about maintaining yards at Portsmouth, Boston,
81
New York, Philadelphia, Norfolk, and Charleston.
The announcement by the Department of Defense in the spring
of 1964 of its study to determine which military bases would be
closed created apprehension among workers at installations likely
to be affected. The Boston Naval Shipyard's unit of the National
Association of Government Employees directed a public campaign to
exert pressure on the Department of Defense to keep its facility
81. New York Times , Apr. 18, 1964, p. 12
804
open. NAGE's campaign included organizing a "Retain the Boston
Shipyard Committee" and running an advertizing supplement in a
Boston newspaper. Active in the campaign was Kenneth T. Lyons,
national president of NAGE, who explained the threat to the yard
in terms of the successful lobbying in Congress by private
82
shipbuilding interests.
On November 19, 1964, the Department of Defense made known
its decision about cloture of military bases. Eighty closings
would occur across the United States, in what was regarded as
the most sweeping elimination of defense installations since the
end of World War II. Among the casualties were the historic
Springfield Armory, a number of Army and Air Force bases, and the
New York Naval Shipyard. Portsmouth was to be phased out over a
ten-year period, and the Mare Island and San Francisco yards
83
combined .
Respecting naval shipyards, the Department of Defense had
followed the recomendations in a Pentagon report, "Study of Naval
Requirements for Shipyard Capacity." The study identified five
yards as "hard core" or indispensable facilities and thus not
eligible for closing. They were Norfolk, Charleston, Puget
Sound, Long Beach, and Pearl Harbor, and their "hard-core"
classification resulted from the number of ships based upon them,
the diversity of their capability, and their function in
important fleet operations, such as the Polaris Support Complex.
The study also held the essential needs of the Navy could be
82^ Boston Sunday Globe, Nov. 1, 1964, and December 6, 1964,
BNHP, RG 1, Series 12.
83. New York Times , Nov. 20, 1964, pp. 1, 26.
805
served by maintaining four naval shipyards on the Atlantic Coast.
Since Charleston and Norfolk enjoyed "hard-core" status, two of
the four remaining East Coast yards would be closed and two
continued. Portsmouth, Boston, New York, and Philadelphia were
thus considered for elimination. Philadelphia was retained
because of the range of its capability and because it had the
largest and most efficient layout. Portsmouth, the nation's
smallest yard, with the most limited capability and the most
inefficient layout, was the most obvious candidate for closing.
In a sense, a decision then had to be made whether to terminate
84
Boston or New York.
The Pentagon report noted that of the two yards, Boston was
the least efficient in terms of layout and general facilities,
except for its surface missile overhaul capability. On the other
hand, Boston's operational advantages included its proximity to
the large concentration of active ships homeported in the Boston
and Newport-Quonset area. Moreover, the savings to be obtained
by closing Boston would not be as great as by closing the larger
yard at New York. The report concluded that of the non-"hard-
core" East Coast yards, Philadelphia appeared as the best yard to
retain, and Portsmouth and New York as the best yards to close.
Thus, in the 1964 round of closings, Boston was spared.
However, the yard stood as the most likely candidate in the event
of a future move to reduce the Navy's industrial establishments,
especially . if improvements were not made in the yard's layout,
general facilities, and overall capabilities. Also, any reduction
84. Excerpts from a summary of the report appear in New York
Times , Nov. 20, 1964, p. 26.
806
in ships homeported in Massachusetts and Rhode Island would
jeopardize the position of the yard.
Consistent with a recommendation in the Pentagon report on
naval shipyards, the Navy awarded a contract to Kaiser Engineers
of Oakland, California, to prepare a five-year modernization
program for each of the remaining yards. In that connection, a
study was made of the Boston Naval Shipyard in 1966. A
preliminary Kaiser report pointed to two alternatives for the
future of the facility, modernization of the Charlestown site or
relocating the entire shipyard, except the ropewalk and
Constitution , to the South Boston Annex, which would be expanded
and enlarged by the acquisition of the adjacent Army Supply Base
85
property .
The cost of modernization of the main yard was set at almost
$89 million, not including $7.4 million for major alterations in
Dry Dock No. 5. Relocation to South Boston and building there
practically an entirely new shipyard was estimated as requiring
$179 million, later revised upward to almost $200 million. In
its final report, completed in 1968, Kaiser recommended
consolidation at South Boston, a program accepted by the Navy and
the Department of Defense.
Moving the entire shipyard to South Boston appeared to have
numerous advantages. Even if modernized, the Charlestown site
would still be congested because of the restricted acreage. In
fact that congestion would increase as a result of the need to
provide more adequate dry-docking facilities. In addition to
85. Informal Turnover Memorandum, 1969.
807
rebuilding Dry Dock No. 5, plans called for construction of an
entirely new dock on the site of Dry Dock No. 1. Consideration
was also given to another new dock, to be located in the eastern
half of the waterfront. If constructed, both of these docks
would require valuable space at their landward ends. Moreover,
economic efficiency would be impeded by the continued necessity
to perform some work at the annex.
In its existing state, the South Boston Annex already had
ample space, and the addition of fifty more acres by inclusion of
the Army Supply Base would afford room for two or three new dry
docks, new piers, and completely new buildings. Unlimited
anchorage gave the South Boston site a further advantage over the
main yard. It was estimated that it would take ten years to
complete the yard at South Boston, during which time, the mission
of the Boston Naval Shipyard would have to be fulfilled by
utilizing existing facilities, generally acknowledged as
inadequate .
The 1964 round of military base closings had triggered an
evaluation by the Navy of its remaining shipyards. With respect
to the the Boston yard, the conclusion had been reached that a
substantial expenditure was required to produce a modern
facility. No active steps were taken to implement the decision to
develop a single yard at South Boston. Approval was obtained to
transfer to the Navy the Boston Army Supply base. However, the
transfer, scheduled to be effective on July 1, 1970, was never
implemented. Three buildings at the base had been leased to the
Massachusetts Port Authority, which in turn had subleased the
structures to other parties. Loss of the lease would thus result
808
in loss of revenues for the MPA. This does not appear as a major
hindrance and simply called for negotiation of compensation.
Moreover, termination of the lease was planned for June 30, 1973.
The fact remains, however, that the process of moving the Boston
Naval Shipyard to South Boston was never initiated. In the
meantime, since it was slated to be abandoned, no improvements
were made in the Charlestown site. This left the yard in an
increasingly antiquated state and even more vulnerable in any
subsequent move by the Defense Department to eliminate military
bases. Such a move seemed required because of the costs of the
86
protracted war in Vietnam.
The continued contraction of the fleet suggested that one or
more naval shipyards would be included in any further
retrenchment programs instituted by the Pentagon. Secretary
McNamara cancelled plans for new ship construction to obtain the
funds to prosecute the war in Southeast Asia, leaving the Navy
without any adequate program of ship replenishment. President
Nixon's Guam Doctrine of July 1969 pointed to a smaller fleet,
which quickly became a reality when he ordered the
decommissioning of one hundred ships in the following month. In
1963, the United States had 917 major ships, in 1972 there were
87
447, and in 1978, only 289. Another trend evident in the
Nixon years resulted from the administration's "southern
strategy," which was evident in the partiality toward the
86. Command History, Jan. 1 - Dec. 31, 1968; Command History,
Jan. 1 - Dec. 31, 1970, both in BNHP, RG 1, Series 11.
87. Paul B. Ryan, First Line of Defense: The U.S. Navy Since
1945 (Stanford., Cali.: Hoover Institution Press, 1981), p. 73;
New York Time s, Apr. 22, 1973, Pt . IV, p. 3.
809
southern states, whose military bases enlarged while those
particularly in the northeast were reduced or terminated. For
example, the Charleston Naval Shipyard experienced remarkable
growth .
That the Boston Naval Shipyard might be nearing an end
became manifest in the closing of certain activities at that
yard. Since 1955, the ropewalk had existed on borrowed time, and
it was finally shut down in 1971. That facility was not central
to the operations of the rest of the yard. The foundry
constituted another matter, and the shipyard commander held that
no navy yard "dealing basically with repair work and faced with
tight completion dates should be without a Foundry."
Nevertheless, the Navy ordered the closing of the Boston yard
foundry in September 1971, as part of a scheme to consolidate
foundry work. Philadelphia was to become the foundry center for
88
the East Coast and Puget Sound for the West Coast.
Another round of base closings occurred in 1973, and early
in that year, the Defense Department gave preliminary indications
that 100,000 civilian jobs soon would be eliminated. Those
reductions in installations and personnel became necessary when
the administration promised Congress that the Department of
Defense would absorb $1.5 billion in budget cuts during fiscal
year 1973. The Pentagon announced in April 1973 that almost
forty major bases would be terminated during the next fiscal year
and that personnel at more than 200 additional ones would be
significantly reduced. Of the nation's various sections, New
88. Informal Turnover Memorandum, 1969, pp. 142-3; Boston Naval
Shipyard News , Aug. 20, 1971.
810
England suffered more than any other from the economy move, and
of the states in that section, Massachusetts was the biggest
loser. To be closed were the Strategic Air Force Base at
Westover, Otis Air Force Base on Cape Cod, and the Boston Naval
Shipyard. The termination of the shipyard was related to another
loss for New England. In 1964, a reason for retaining the Boston
Naval Shipyard had been the large number of ships based on Boston
and on the Newport-Quonset area. That reasoning no longer
operated in 1973 because of the decision to transfer the cruiser-
89
destroyer force from Newport to Norfolk.
An informal review of the closing of the Boston Naval
Shipyard is provided in an interview in 1979 given by Adm.
Raymond Burk, who was the next-to-last commander of the shipyard
and who served from October 1969 to August 1972. At the time he
received his assignment to the yard, Burk was pleased to be made
a shipyard commander. However, he "was not at all that thrilled
about Boston," since he "never thought of Boston as being a
particularly up-and-coming shipyard" and since "it had some
reputations that were not particularly attractive." After
assuming command, Burk changed his views. Ultimately, he took
great pride in the yard and contended:
We had very fine performance in the Shipyard, in terms
of completing ships on time. And our costs were
reasonable. And we gained a reputation among the Fleet
Commanders that Boston was a darn good place to send
your ship.
At the time of the closing, no one contradicted Burk 's general
appraisal of the yard and attributed the cloture to poor
89. New York Times , Jan. 3, 1973, p. 26; Apr. 14, 1973, pp. 1,
16; and Apr. 17, 197 3, pp. 1, 12.
811
90
performance .
During his tenure as commander, Burk had no indications that
the yard would actually be closed, although the yard did
experience a "calculated reduction, a very deliberate reduction"
in the number of its employees. This Burk attributed to the
decreased size of the fleet, resulting from the decommissioning
of older ships "in the interest of economy" and the decision to
modernize vessels rather than build new ones. The former
shipyard commander also noted that assignment of ships to Vietnam
contributed to the reduction of repair work at the continental
yards .
Because of the decline of activity at naval shipyards, "they
began to talk about the fact that the ten shipyards we had were
too many" and about "closing a shipyard or two." According to
Burk, in such discussions, "Boston was inevitably talked about as
a candidate." The candidacy of Boston in part was attributed to
its limited capability and its "not being one of those capable of
repairing nuclear ships." Burk assigned little weight to the
unique capabilities Boston did possess, such as the production of
anchor chain for aircraft carriers. The forge engaged in that
activity because it was shunned by commercial chain makers.
"Private industry was delighted to let the Navy make that very
high cost item...." In reference to a somewhat different matter,
Burk made another important point concerning the closing, when he
emphasized the subordinate role of the yard in the overall
defense establishment. He stated that "the only reason for the
90. Oral History Interview, Adm. and Mrs. Burk. For Burk 's
discussion of the closing, see pp. 20, 21, 25, 44, 63, 64.
812
shipyard's existence is to serve the floating Navy."
A lot of people get kind of blinded by the fact that the
Navy is all ashore. Well, that is not it. The only
part of the Navy that does the business is that that
floats and flies.
As a support facility, any shipyard was in a position to be
sacrificed to promote the well-being of the fighting Navy^.
In addition to considerations of the Boston yard's
capability, the decision for cloture was "based on politics."
Admiral Burk noted the advantages and disadvantages of the
Philadelphia shipyard, next to Boston, the most likely candidate
for closing in 1973. On the one hand, Philadelphia was a "fine
shipyard, a lot of capability, big dry docks and capability for
building ships...." On the other, it was one hundred miles from
the sea. However, Philadelphia
was unacceptable for closure, because of the political
considerations. Mr. Nixon was President, you see. And
Philadelphia was a stronghold, his political strength.
Whereas Boston, all of New England, had repudiated him
and as a matter of fact, the only state that McGovern
carried, I guess, was Massachusetts. So these things
come into play. I'm not saying that they were the
total determining factor, but you had to offer a yard
that would sell politically. So, Boston was
offered ....
Although able objectively to comprehend the various forces that
led to the end of the Boston Naval Shipyard, Burk also understood
other dimensions of the decision and observed: "It was a terrible
thing to have it phased out."
Burk was relieved in 1972 as shipyard commander by Capt.
Russell B. Arthur. Rumors continued to circulate in the yard
prior to the official announcement on April 16, 1973, but
apparently not even Captain Arthur, had been forewarned by the
Navy. The explanation for the yard's closing given to employees
813
was the necessity to reduce shore establishments so that funds
could be utilized for the fleet. The cloture schedule called for
the end of all industrial operations by December 31, 1973, and of
91
all other operations by July 1974.
Massachusetts congressmen and senators protested the
termination of the yard and the other military facilities in the
state, and the National Association of Government Employees went
to court and obtained a ten-day restraining order against
implementation of the closings. However, the Pentagon's decision
92
prevailed »
Many employees of the Boston Naval Shipyard responded to the
closing with anger, directed chiefly at political officeholders.
One mechanic claimed: "It's a malicious vengeful act on the part
of the Nixon Administration -- it's a political vendetta."
Several years later, another recalled the reaction in the yard:
...Everybody got down in the dumps and they started to
talk about Nixon letting us down, O'Neill letting us
down, Kennedy letting us down, and they seemed to think
that because Massachusetts voted for McGovern that Nixon
took it out on us.... They all ran out on us.
The criticism of members of the Massachusetts delegation to
Washington may have resulted from their restrained response to
the closings generally. The New York Times conjectured that the
"relatively muted" reaction could have been a consequence of the
timing. "Around income tax time, no prudent politician wants to
appear to be opposing economies in the defense budget." The
newspaper also suggested that perhaps political figures were
91. News Extra, Boston Naval Shipyard News , Apr. 17, 1973, BNHP,
RG 1, Series 7, Closing File.
92. New York Times , Jun . 13, 1973, p. 13.
814
learning that military closings were "not necessarily devastating
93
economic blows to local communities."
The communities adjacent to the Boston Naval Shipyard may
have been partially prepared for announcement of its closing.
The Navy's plans to relinquish the Charlestown site and move all
operations to South Boston had been made known to local
authorities. Consideration of the impact of that move and
planning for the future of the Charlestown yard had been
undertaken by the Massachusetts Port Authority, Boston
Redevelopment Authority, Metropolitan District Commission,
Massachusetts Department of Commerce and Development,
Metropolitan Planning Council, and the Eastern Massachusetts
Regional Planning Project. By 1971, if not before, both local and
federal agencies, particularly the Boston Redevelopment Authority
and the National Park Service had prepared plans for the
development of the older portion of the Charlestown yard as a
historic park. This was consistent with the designation in 1967
94
of the Boston Naval Shipyard as a national historic landmark.
That local and state government authorities had plans for
the Charlestown site may have produced acquiescence in the
termination of the entire shipyard and reduced the political
pressures to resist the closing. That the plans for a park were
93. New York Times , Apr. 22, 1973, Pt. IV, p. 3, and Apr. 23,
1973, p. 21; Oral History Interview, John Langan, pp. 28-9.
94. Command History, 1970; Boston Redevelopment Authority,
Planning Department, "Charlestown Naval Shipyard Re-Use Study,
Report III, Historic Park Proposal" (rev. Aug. 1971); Office of
Environmental Planning and Design, Eastern Service Center,
National Park Service, "Proposed Boston National Historic Sites,
Boston, Massachusetts" (Dec 1971). Copies of both documents are
in the office of the Park Historian, BNHP.
815
realized was small solace to 5200 men and women employed at the
yard. The closing saddened even former workers who had left the
yard years, and even decades, before. A retired shipfitter said
of the closing that "it was just... like I was losing a friend."
He further stated: "The best thing is to make it a showplace for
all the people of the country to come here and show them where
the Navy Yard was." Another old-timer described the yard as his
"lifeblood." He saw "its beautiful record of, not only loyalty to
the Navy, but the things that they produced to protect the
95
American f lag. ..."
95. Oral History Interviews, John Langan, Barbara Tuttle Green,
Albert Mostone.
816
APPENDIX
A GUIDE TO BUILDING USAGE AT BOSTON NAVY YARD, 1890-1973
The following list provides information about each of the
buildings, other than those used exclusely for quarters, at the
Charlestown site of the Boston Navy Yard during the years 1890 to
1973. Although extracted from a large number of diverse
documents, the information is far from complete. The intention is
to indicate in capsule form the function of the structures during
the general periods during which each existed. When known, the
dates of original construction and of removal are given.
No. 1. Built 1867. Y&D masons' shed for storage of lime, sand, cement, 1890-
1915; unoccupied, 1916-1918; officers' garage, 1920-1945; officer's garage,
yard police, 1946; garage, 1951; garage, gatehouse, 1963-1973.
No. 3. Built 1840. Storehouse, 1890-1905; eliminated 1906.
No. 4. Built 1827. C&R storehouse, 1890-1909; PW workshop, iron foundry,
1911; PW storage, 1912; Labor Board, 1918-1925; vacant, 1934; angle shop,
1935; Naval Reserves, 1937; Labor Board, 1940; yard police, 1946; CPO Club,
1963; Constitution office, CPO Club, visitors' toilet, 1973.
No. 5. Built 1813. Old Navy Stores, 1890; paymaster's office, dispensary,
Labor Board office, museum, apothecary, surgeon's private office, apothecary's
quarters, guardroom, sailors' waiting room, 1890s; pay office, Labor Board,
dispensary, court martial room, naval museum, lyceum, watchroom, hospital
steward's quarters, 1902; pay office, Labor Board, dental officer, Navy
museum, captain of watch, etc., 1906; pay office, storeroom for
officers 'luggage, band room, office of boatswain in charge of coaling plant,
PW quarterman laborer's office and storehouse, Labor Board, chaplain, museum,
court martial room, storage of officers' furniture, janitor's office,
denistry, marine's storeroom, sleeping quarters for wireless operator, vacant
storage, 1912; Labor Board, Receiving Ship office, commissary stores; court
martial room, chaplain's office, 1916; offices of First Naval District,
chaplain, museum, library, pay office, commissary stores, 1920; chaplain,
commissary stores, band room, marine rifle range, 1936; classroom, ASW
officers' mess, BOQ, 1946; BOQ, officers' club and mess, 1963; BOQ, officers'
mess, closed and open, 1973.
No. 6. Fire apparatus, 1890; Y&D paint shop, Y&D carpenters' office; Labor
Board, 1900.
No. 7. Coal shed, eliminated late 1880s.
No. 9. Furnace, 1890.
817
No. 10. Built 1852. Pitch house, 1890; C&R paint shop, 1900-1908; GSK
storehouse, 1908-1911; storehouse, wireless station, 1911; Inspection Depart.,
wireless room, washrooms for coaling plant workers, 1912; radio station,
quarters for radio operators, office of boatswain in charge of coaling plant,
1916; radio operators' quarters, 1918; laundry, 1920-1946; sonar repair
facility 1947-1958; battery charging facility, 1958-1960s; battery charging
facility, ship repair space (inactive), 1967-1973.
No. 12. Pitch boiling house, 1890-1897.
No. 16. Built 1868. C&R foundry and storage of machinery, 1890; C&R foundry,
1890-1908; GSK storage 1908; eliminated c. 1910.
No. 19. Built 1873. Yard Scale House/weighing facility, 1890-1973.
No. 20. Barn (commandant's), 1890-1 920s. Eliminated late 1920s.
No. 21. Built 1840. Watch house 1890; commandant's storehouse, 1902;
commandant's watch house, 1906; commandant's barn, 1911; greenhouse and
quarters for commandant's servants, 1912; greenhouse, 1916-1960s; carriage
house, 1963-1973.
No. 22. Built 1832, 1840, 1856. Dry dock engine house, 1890; C&R machine
shop, pumphouse, 1902; electrical repair shop, C&R testing and inspection
room, 1905; C&R machine shop and pumphouse 1906; GSK, 1909; electrical
storehouse, riggers & laborers, 1911; Hull Division laborers and laborers'
locker room; GSK electrical storehouse; storage for fire brick; unused
pumpwell for DD No. 1; office of foreman of laborers and riggers loft, tool
room, rigging loft, 1912; PW shops, 1916; PW laborers and mechanics, storage,
1920; storage, 1934; new shipwork, substation, 1946; shipwrights and
Production loft, substation, 1951; docking office, woodworking and sheet metal
shops, substation, 1963; disaster control space, woodworking shop, substation,
industrial hygiene lab, 1967-73.
No. 23. Built 1840. Chapel, 1890; steam box and galvanizing plant, 1902;
lunch room, 1906; washrooms for crews of ships in dry dock, 1908; water
closets, 1909-1940; eliminated early 1940s.
No. 24. Built 1847. C&R carpenter shop, 1890; rigging loft, naval
constructor's office, 1890s; fire, Jan. 15,- 1900; C&R offices, carpenters'
shop, 1906; fire, Sep. 25, 1910; not is use, partially burned, temporary drill
room for marines; rebuilt 1914-1916; riggers and laborers, radio offices,
1916; riggers and laborers loft, 1921-1934; riggers and laborers, new work
office, 1934; riggers loft, 1946-1951; riggers loft, offices, and crews' head,
1963; riggers and laborers' shop, docking office, marine railway operations
space, public toilet, cafeteria space, 1967-1973.
No. 25. Cart shed, 1890-1897; removed 1897.
No. 28. Built 1850, 1860. C&R tinners and plumbers' shop, 1890; half of
first floor used for dynamo room of electric light plant, 1895; entire
building used for electric light plant, 1897; old electric light plant, 1906;
yard employees' club and lunch room, 1909; restaurant, 1912-46; shipyard
printing shop, 1951; Reference Standards Lab and Methods and Standards Branch,
Industrial Hygiene Lab, 1963; Reference Standards Lab, Quality Reliability and
Assurance, 1973.
No. 29. Commandant's office, 1890-1895; demolished 1895.
No. 30. USMC officer of the day's quarters, 1890-1906.
No. 31. Built 1852, 1857. Muster house, 1890; muster house, captain of the
yard's office, civil engineer's office, 1892; telephone exchange established
1897; offices of captain of the yard and civil engineer, telephone exchange,
1902; offices of captain of the yard, Board of Inspection, telephone exchange,
chemical lab, 1906; telephone exchange, offices of captain of the yard and
captain of the watch, chemical lab, chemist's office and stores, 1912;
transportation office, telephone central, chemical lab, captain of the watch,
1916-1918; captain of the watch, telephone exchange, 1920; telephone exchange,
1934; telephone exchange and Red Cross office, 1940; telephone exchange,
industrial medicine, 1946; telephone exchange, telephone cable room, hearing
clinic, 1963; telephone exchange, telephone cable room, hearing clinic, clock
tower, 1967-1973.
No. 32. Built 1857. Shell house, 1890; commandant's office 1892-1912;
commandant's office, records and stationery storage, 1912; yard pay and
disbursing office, 1916-1940; safety engineer, compensation, safety shoe
store, credit union, 1946; shipyard credit union and employees' recreation
center, 1952; bank, credit union, 1963-1973.
No. 33. Built 1850. Sail loft, 1890-1900; sail loft, storehouse,
inspectors' office, 1902; sail loft, storehouse, 1904-1911; storehouse for
provisions, sail loft, storehouse for sails, clothes, and canvas, 1912; sail
loft and general storehouse, 1916-1920. Public Works offices; joiner,
plumbers', and roofing shops; laborers; storage for furniture and old building
materials; Production Division sail loft, upholstery shops, storage, 1934.
Public Works shops, 1935; receiving ship barracks, 1937; receiving ship
barracks, Marine Reserves, mold loft, 1940; Frazier Barracks, receiving
station, barber and tailor shops, 1946; Frazier Barracks, mess hall, galley,
barber and tailor shops, berthing, 1953; Frazier Barracks, general mess,
tailor shop, 1963; enlisted men's barracks with mess, 1967; enlisted men's
barracks with mess, enlisted men's lounge, tailor shop, 1973.
No. 33A. Enlisted men's dispensary; pre-ccmmissioning detail, 1946.
No. 34. Built 1837. Storehouse, 1890; storehouse, chaplain's office,
telegraph tripod, 1890s; storehouse, chaplain, carpenters' office, 1902; GSK
storage of acids, cooperage, empty containers; GSK shipping room and stores
assembled for ships; GSK storage of furniture; GSK storage of quartermaster
supplies; GSK storage of galley outfits, crucibles, glass, 1912; general
stores, 1916-1919; officer of the day, transportation office, post office,
trade school, storehouse, chemical lab, 1920; officer of the day,
transportation office, post office, storehouse, chemical lab, photo lab, 1921;
819
restaurant, 1925; post office, photo and materials lab, metallurgical lab,
trade school, storage, 1934; post office, labs, 1937-1940; storehouse, post
office, photo and materials labs, greeting center, 1946; blueprint and
reproduction rooms, photo lab, chemical and metallurgical labs, 1963-1973.
No. 36. Built 1866. Joiner shop, boiler house, 1890s; joiner and block shop,
engine and boiler house, 1902; joiner shop and pattern shop, 1907; joiner
shop, 1908-1911; block shop and planing mill, joiner shop, upholstery, paint
and cabinet shops, storeroom for furniture for quarters, 1912; joiner,
cabinet, shipsmith, block, upholsterers' shops, mold loft; storage, Naval
reserves, 1934; storage for new ship materials, mold loft, 1937-1940; template
storage, cafeteria, sail loft, substation, 1946; cafeteria, sail loft,
substaion, 1951; cafeteria, Industrial Relations services, sail loft, pattern
shop, Navy enlisted men's berthing, 1963; cafeteria, shoe store, sail loft,
enlisted men's barracks, 1967; cafeteria, shoe store, sail loft, MTS &
Standards, plant equipment and facility, enlisted men's barracks.
No. 36A. Electric substation, 1953-1973.
No. 37. Shed for returned stores, 1890. Removed 1890.
No. 38. Built 1854. Storehouse; prison, 1890-1912; prison unoccupied, 1916;
storehouse, chapel, prison, 1920; Ingram (EM) Club, prison (unused), 1934;
Ingram Club and yard garage, 1937; PW drafting room, Ingram Club, motion
picture theatre, yard garage, 1940; Ingram Club, chaplain, repair garage,
ships' services, movie hall, 1946; Ingram Club, chaplain, ships' services,
movie hall, library, bowling alley, barber shop, repair garage, 1963; library,
chaplain, theatre, bowling alley, Navy exchange, barber shop, repair garage,
1967; library, chapain, theatre, bowling alley, Navy exchange, enlisted men's
club, 1973.
No. 38A. Storehouse, 1917.
No. 39. Built 1866. Ordnance stores, offices; Equipment foundry, offices;
Y&D workshops, 1890s. Equipment machine shop, offices; Ordnance storage,
offices, Y&D workshops, office of Inspection Board, 1902. Equipment offices,
machine shop; Ordnance offices, shops, 1906. Ordnance maintenance shop,
Equipmenmt machine shop, Equipment machine and woodworking shop, Equipment
foundry, Equipment power plant, 1909. Accounting Depart.; Inspection office;
Hull Division office; drafting room, 1911. GSK storeroom, offices; Ordnance
stores; Hull Division offices; Inspection Depart.; armory; commandant's
office; office of captain of the yard, 1912. Central offices, GSK stores,
1914-1918; central offices (commandant, captain of yard, GSK, Inspection,
Accounting, Hull & Machinery Divisions), armory, locker room, metallurgical
lab, 1920; central offices (commandant, First Naval District, captain of yard,
manager, Accounting, Engineer, Production, PW) , Coast Guard, general court
martial, Labor Board, 1934; offices, shipyard commander, Planning Officer,
Administrative Officer, Ordnance Officer, Industrial Engineering Officer,
Fiscal Officer, radio station, communications office, bond office, substation,
1946; shipyard commander, Planning, Production, Administrative, Comptroller,
Manager, Indman offices, 1963-1973.
820
No. 40. Equipment heavy hammer house (rolling mill), forge shop, anchor shop,
galley shop, 1890s; anchor, chain shops, rolling mill, 1911, mold loft floor,
plate storage, bending slap, angle smithery, 1914; angle shop, laying-out
floor, bending slab, mold loft, 1920; angle shop, mold loft, 1934; Temporary
Service Shop, toilet and locker room, central tool room, 1946; Central Tool
and Temporary Service Shop, locker room, 1963; Material Control Center,
Temporary Service, locker room, 1973.
No. 41. Equipment store shed, 1890; blew down, Mar. 17, 1896.
No. 42. Built 1857. S/E machine shop, foundry, smithery, copper shop, brass
foundry, pattern shop, offices; Equipment chain shop, 1890s. S/E offices,
machine shop, foundry, boiler shop, pattern shop; C&R brass and copper forge;
Equipment chain forge, 1902; S/E offices, shops, forge, old Equipment chain
shop, 1906. 42-A, machine shop, heavy machine tools, pump and valve testing
shop, storage of misc. shop materials, stock room, ordnance storage; 42-B,
machine shop; 42-C, iron and brass foundries; 42-D, boiler and blacksmith
shops, electric substation; 42-E, boiler abd blacksmith shops, storage for
boiler plate material, machine shop for tools, pattern shop, storage for
patterns; 42-F, copper and pipe shops, 1912. 42-A, machine shop; 42-B, machine
shop; 42-C, foundry; 42-D, copper shop; 42-E, pattern shop; 42-F, testing and
pipe shop, 1916-1918. 42-A, machine and erecting shops; 42-B, machine shop,
office, instrument room; 42-C, steel and iron foundry; 42-E, pattern shop and
storage, toilet and locker rooms, brass foundry, torpedo testing plant, 1920.
42-A, machine and erecting shops; 42-B, machine shop, offices, instrument
room; 42-C, steel and iron foundry; 42-D, pattern shop and pattern storage,
toilet; 42-E, locker rooms, brass foundry, torpedo testing rooms, 1934. 42-A,
general machine shop, industrial x-ray; 42-B, machine shop office, instrument
room; 42-C, foundry, electric substation, 42-E, pattern shop and pattern
storage, toilet and locker rooms, brass foundry, 1946. 42-A, inside machine
shop, toolmaker; 42-B, machine shop offices, instrument room; 42-C, foundry,
pattern shop, substation, vibration and sound lab, ships' office space, 1946.
Inside machine shop, toolmakers' office, foundry, pattern shop, non-
destructive test facilities, substation, ships' office space, vibration and
sound lab, 1973.
No. 43. Built 1856. S/E boiler house, coal shed, 1890s; powerhouse for No.
42, 1909; old powerhouse for No. 42, storage, 1912; washrooms and lockers,
1914-1918.
No. 44. Built 1866. Shed, 1890s; Y&D inspection office, 1902; Y&D storage,
1906; master machinist afloat, 1909; Machinery Division, office for machinist
afloat, 1912; abandoned for government puproses, assembly room for Spanish War
veterans, 1912-1914; Machinery Division, machinist afloat, 1916-1918;
Machinery Division, temporary storage for parts of ships under repair, 1920.
No. 45. Shed, 1890s; recommended for removal, 1897.
No. 46. Shed, 1890s; recommended for removal, 1897.
No. 47. Built 1863. Heavy shell house, 1890s; formerly used as Ordnance
magazine, 1902; PW, boatswain's office, 1911; PW waterfront office for
821
assistant to captain of yard, 1912-1918; assistant captain of yard,
progressmen 's office, 1920; office of assistant to captain of yard, 1933;
waterfront office, mess hall, galley, ladies' rest room, 1940.
No. 48. Built 1863. Magazine, 1890s; Ordnance magazine and saluting battery,
1902-1918; captain of yard, storage of old material, 1920; removed late 1920s
or early 1930s.
No. 49. Shed for battery guns, 1890s; saluting shed, 1911-1916; storage for
rigging and waterfront material, 1918; captain of yard, boatswain's locker,
1920; removed late 1920s or early 1930s.
No. 52. Boiler House, 1890s.
No. 56. Built 1866. Barn, 1890s; destroyed, 1902.
No. 57. Shed for transporting wheels for guns; destroyed, 1890.
No. 58. No. 58. Built 1836. Ropewalk, 1890-1946; ropewalk, Industrial
Relations Officer, Labor Board, 1946; ropewalk, Industrial Relations and
Training Officer, 1953; ropewalk, Industrial Relations offices, apprentice
school, storage, 1963; rope manufacturing, Industrial Relations offices,
academic and general instruction building, fire station cart house, storage,
1973.
No. 59. Tar pit store shed, 1890.
No. 60. Built 1838. Tarring house for ropewalk, 1890-1963; storage, inactive
area, 1973.
No. 61. Old wooden structure, torn down, 1890.
No. 62. Built 1837. Hemp house, 1890s; Equipment, storing and packing hemp,
1902; Hull Division and S&A, hemp house and rope storage, 1911; Hull, storage
for oils, storage for hemp and cordage, hemp cleaning, 1912; hemp house, 1916;
ropemaking, 1918-1919; ropewalk, storage for hemp and rope, 1920; ropewalk
extension, storage for hemp and rope, 1934-1953; ropewalk extension, test lab,
1963; rope manufacturing facility, test lab, 1973.
No. 63. Built 1848. Timber shed, 1890s; S&A, Y&D timber shed, storage for
iron, lumber, etc. 1902; timber shed, 1906; iron storehouse, 1911; fire, Mar.
1913; storehouse for iron and steel, 1914-1916; office and rest room, storage,
1918; removed 1918.
No. 64. Built 1848. Tiinber shed, 1890-1911; GSK, storehouse for timber and
stores, survey room for condemned stores, 1912; totally destroyed by fire,
1916.
No. 65. Shed, torn down 1890.
No. 66. Timber bending shop, 1890; iron platters' shop, 1893; damaged by
fire, 1899; C&R iron platters' shop, 1902; demolished, 1903.
822
No. 67. Built 1868. C&R sawmill, shed, 1890s; C&R boiler house, sawmill,
1902; most of building demolished, 1906; remainder renumbered 130.
No. 68. Built 1825. Shiphouse, 1890s; Equipment, C&R, storage, 1902;
demolished, 1906.
No. 71. Built 1820. Shiphouse, 1890-1906, demolished 1906.
No. 73. Shiphouse, 1890s.
No. 75. Built 1848. Timber shed, 1890s; C&R, S&A, boat shop, timber shed,
1902; S&A timber shed, 1904; temporary use by C&R to store articles of ships
out of commission, 1906; S&A timber shed, 1911; GSK storehouse for lumber and
office of timber storeman, 1912; GSK/Supply timber/lumber storehouse, 1914-
1940; Supply Department pipe and bar storage, 1946; Supply Department
storehouse, 1963; Supply Department general warehouse (ready issue), 1973.
No. 76. Built 1849. Timber shed, 1890-1940.
No. 77. Built 1848. Mold loft and boat shop storage, 1890s; C&R boiler and
engine house, boat shop, 1902-1904; Hull Division boat shop, 1911; boat shop,
mold loft, GSK storage, 1912; converted to boat storage, 1914; storage for
small boats and equipment, 1916-1937; storehouse for small boats and
equipment, hemp storage, 1940; officers' garages, 1946-1963; garages, PW paint
storage, 1973.
No. 78. Equipment coal shed, 1890-1906; PW shed, 1911; PW wagon shed, 1912-
1918; Hull Division boat materials storage, 1920; PW, officers' garages, 1934-
1937; unused garage, 1939.
No. 79. Built 1852. Wire rope mill, 1890-1918; manufacture of wire rope
discontinued at Boston yard, 1918. Boat shop annex, office, washrooms, locker
room, braiding room, 1918; Supply Department storage, 1934; ordnance
storehouse, 1937; hemp and ordnance storage, 1940; apprentice school, 1946-
1951; material storage and control center, 1963; package store, Production
storage, 1973.
No. 80. Built 1866. C&R furnace for mast hoops, 1890-1902; C&R kiln furnace,
1906-1911; unused, 1912; old brick oven, 1914.
No. 81. Wood shed for lower quarters, torn down 1890.
No. 82. Shed, 1890.
No. 83. Old wooden structure (shed), torn down 1890.
No. 84. Built 1869. Watch (guard) house, lower quarters, 1890s. USNC
guardhouse, 1902-1906.
No. 85. Built 1825. Mast house, spar shop, 1890s; July 18, 1900, destroyed
by fire.
No. 86. Old wooden structure (steam chest), torn down 1890.
823
No. 87. Timber dock, 1890s.
No. 88. Shed (boiler building), 1890.
No. 89. Shed, 1890; recommended to be torn down, 1897.
No. 92. Shiphouse, 1890; demolished 1894.
No. 94. C&R carpenter shop, boat house, 1902; C&R storehouse for dry dock
timbers, 1906.
No. 95. Built 1899. Temporary electric light power station, 1902-1908;
abandoned as power station, 1908.
No. 96. Built 1899. Equipment powerhouse for ropewalk, 1899-1908; closed as
power plant, 1908; not in use, storage of old machinery for shipment to other
yards, 1912; fire, 1916; hemp storage, 1916-1918; fire, Oct. 7, 1919; Supply
Department storehouse, 1920; Supply Department storehouse, 1934; hemp storage,
1939; Supply Department storehouse, substation, 1946-1951; Supply Department,
storage, 1963; PW fork lift and pump repair building, 1973.
No. 97. Built 1903. Gate and Entrance House, 1903; gate and entrance house,
stowage of dry dock gear, 1909; guard and detention room, gatehouse, main yard
entrance, guards' sleeping quarters, 1912; gatehouse, 1920; gatehouse, yard
police, 1934; main gatehouse, 1946-1951
No. 98. Oil tank set in ground, 1902.
No. 99. Built 1899. Equipment oil tank, 1902.
No. 100. Built 1900. C&R ship keepers and foreman's office and lockers,
1902; C&R foreman's office, laborers' shed; 1904-1906; Hull Division Planning
Office, 1911; Hull Division office and tool storage for dock foreman; vacated
and torn down 1913.
No. 101. Built 1900. C&R Timber drying kiln, 1900-1909; Hull Division timber
kiln, 1911; Hull Division millwrights' and belt repair shop, 1912;
millwrights' shop, 1916-1920; Production Department storage, 1934-1937; tool
room for outside machinists, 1940.
No. 102. Built 1900. C&R oil tank.
No. 103. Constructed 1903-1904. Equipment chain and anchor storage. Chain
and anchor storage, storage workshop, Equipment rigging loft, 1905; chain and
anchor storage, electrical shop, 1909; Machinery Division, S&A, electrical
shop, chain assembly and storage shed, 1911; GSK storage of chain and anchors,
Machinery electrical shop, offices, storage, storage of machinery and piping
removed from ships under repair, 1912; electrical shop and chain storage,
1914-1917; electrical shop, 1920; pipe shop, 1929; pipe and electrical shops,
radio lab, 1934-1937; sheet metal and electrical shops, 1938-1940; sheet metal
and pipe coverers ' shops, 1946; sheet metal shop, 1963-1973.
824
No. 104. Built 1903-1904. Shipf itters ' shop, 1904-1912; shipf itters ' shop,
sheet metal shop, 1912-1918; shipf itters ', plumbers' and sheet metal shops,
1920; structural shop and sheet metal shop, 1934-1938; strutural shop (sheet
metal moved to No. 103), 1938; structural shop, mold loft, substation, 1946;
shipfitters' annex, mold loft, 1949-1973.
No. 105. Built 1904-1905. C&R smithery and power plant, 1905-1912; chain
shop moved from No. 40 to No. 105, 1913; blacksmiths' shop, 1916-1918;
shipsmiths and chain shop, 1918; smithery and chain shop, 1920; smithery and
locomotive and crane roundhouse, 1934-1946; forge shop, roundhouse, 1963;
forge shop, railroad equipment maintenance, 1973.
No. 106. Built 1904. Metal workers' shop, central tool room, galvanizing
plant, 1904; metal workers' shop, ordnance shop, C&R machine shop, storage,
1909; Hull Division, S&A, storage, metal workers' shop, office of master
shipf itter outside, 1911; galvanizing, nickel-plating, plumbing shops, tools,
storerooms, iron plate storage, Hull Division storage, 1912; boiler shop,
galvanizing and plating shops, GSK storage for iron stores, boiler tubes,
ordnance, 1914; galvanizing shop, boiler shop and storehouse, 1916-1918;
boiler and copper shops, galvanizing and plating shops, 1920; new ship
construction, 1934; shipfitters' shop, 1937-1940; boiler shop, substation,
storehouse for steel bars, 1946; diesinkers' shop, boiler shop, 1963;
dies inkers ' shop, boiler shop, substation, storage, 1973.
No. 107. Built 1904. Y&D offices and shops, 1904-1909; PW offices, GSK
storage, 1909-1911; GSK receiving rooms, storerooms, Y&D offices, 1912-1918;
Supply Department ordnance storage, Plant Department electrical, plumbers,
pipefitting groups, 1921; Supply storehouse, PW printing office, 1934; PW
shops, 1937-1940; PW building trades shop, printing office, battery charging
station, 1946; PW building trades shop, 1951-1963; PW paint shop, 1973.
No. 108. Built 1904. Y&D power and boiler house, 1904-6; Central Power
Plant, 1911-1973.
No. 109. Built 1903-1904. Equipment, coal pocket, 1904-1910; S&A, coal
storage, 1911-1920; PW substation, 1934-1940; PW substation, waterfront
office, 1946; waterfront office, substation, 1963-1973.
No. 110. Built 1901. C&R, Hull Division, pitch house, 1902-1934; storehouse,
1937-1940; Production Department soddering house for riggers' loft, 1946;
paint and storage locker, 1951; Production lead room, Shop 72, 1963;
Production lead room, Shop 72, 1973.
No. 111. Built 1901. Y&D, locomotive house, 1902-1911; PW storehouse, hand
carts, barrows, tools, 1912; repair shop for railroad rolling stock, 1914.
No. 112. Built 1900. Equipment, iron and steel storage shed, 1902; misc.
storage, 1914.
No. 113. Built 1901. C&R carpenter, repair shop, storehouse, 1902-1906; C&R
millwrights' lobby and belt shop, 1909; Hull Division millwrights' shop, 1911;
Hull Division, not in use, 1912; storehouse for power house materials, 1914-
1920.
825
No. 114. Built 1903-1904. C&R sawmill and spar shop, 1904-1907; sawmill, spar
and shipwrights' shops, 1909; spar makers' shop, sawmill, GSK boat storage,
1912; sawmill, spar and boat shops, 1914-1920; sawmill, joiner and boat shops,
1934-1940; sawmill, woodworking, boat and spar shops, 1946; woodworking shop,
substation, 1963-1973.
No. 115. Built 1899. Equipment electrical testing lab, 1902-1909; Machinery
testing lab, 1911-1912; Machinery planning office for Pier No. 6, 1914-1918;
Hull Division tool house, 1920.
No. 116. USMC guard house, 1902-1903.
No. 117. Built 1902. Y&D stable, 1902-1906; PW stable and carriage house,
1911; PW stable, carriage house, motor truck house, 1912; stable, 1916-1918;
PW garage, stable, carriage house, 1920; PW, officer's garage, 1934;
storehouse and pipe covering shop, 1937-1940.
No. 118. Built 1901. S/E, water closets, 1902-1906; PW, water closets, 1911-
1912; latrine, 1916-1918.
No. 119. Built 1902. S/E latrine, 1902-1906; PW, water closets, 1911-1912;
latrine, not in use, 1914; latrine, 1916-1918.
No. 120. Built 1905. Dispensary, 1905-1911; dispensary, surgeon's office,
pharmacist's quarters, 1912; dispensary, dental office, 1914-1918; dispensary,
pharmacist's quarters, 1920; dispensary, 1934-1940; dispensary, dentist's
office, 1946; dispensary, 1953; dispensary, dental clinic, office, 1963;
dispensary, dental clinic, ambulance, 1973.
No. 121. Built 1902. Equipment, underground oil tanks, 1902-1909; Machinery,
oil tanks, 1911; Machinery, gasoline and benzine storage tanks, 1912; storage
tank for fuel oil, 1916-1918.
No. 122. Built 1902. USMC rifle range, 1902-1925.
No. 123. Built 1906. Pumphouse for dry docks, 1906-1940; pumphouse,
substation, 1946-1973.
No. 124. Built 1903. C&R latrine, 1903-1905; Y&D, latrine, 1906; PW, water
closets, 1911; PW, water closets for yard workmen, 1912-1963; public toilet,
1973.
No. 125. Built 1905-1907. Paint Shop, 1907-1918; paint shop, substation,
1920-1973.
No. 126. Built 1904. PW, latrine, 1904-1911; PW, water closets for yard
workmen, 1912-1940.
No. 127. Built 1904, Y&D/PW latrine/water closets, 1904-1937; WPA paint
storage, 1940; PW, latrine/yard workers ' head, 1946-1963; public toilet,
classified material incinerator, 1973.
826
No. 128. Built 1904. Y&D, GSK scale house, 1904-1916; watchman 's house at
Pier No. 9, 1918; PW, watchman's station, 1925.
No. 129. Built 1904. Equipment, wireless station, 1904-1911; sleeping
quarters for warrant officer on night duty, 1912; visitors' water closet,
1914-1916; captain of yard, office, dump, 1920; unused, 1934; refuge for
incinerator operator, 1937.
No. 130. Remaining wing of No. 67, which was torn down in 1906. C&R/Hull
tackle storage, 1906-1912; to be abandoned and torn down, Oct. 1914; storage
for condemned goods, 1916-1920; Supply, storehouse, misc. materials, 1934-
1940.
No. 131. Built 1910. S&A, oil storehouse, 1910-1911; GSK, storehouse for
oil, paint, alcohol, 1912; oil house, 1916-1918; Supply, storehouse for oil
and paints, 1920-1940; Supply, storehouse for inflammable material, 1946-1963;
flammable storage, ready issue, 1973.
No. 132. Wire rope mill, 1909.
No. 133. Built 1905. Equipment coke shed, 1905-1909; Machinery coke shed,
1911; Hull, GSK, coke shed, storage of boiler brick, 1912; to be abandoned and
torn down, Oct. 1912.
No. 134. Built 1906. Powerhouse for Wabash, 1906-1912; old boiler house,
1914; old boiler house, unused, 1916; rebuilt as battery charging substation,
1918; substation, 1920-1934; substation, unused, 1937; surveyed and removed,
1940.
No. 135. Built 1910-1911. PW, refuse kiln/ garbage incinerator, 1911-1920;
PW, storage, 1934-1940.
No. 136. Built 1909. USMC administration building, 1909-1973.
No. 137. Machinery, storage of coal and coke for iron foundry, 1912.
No. 139. Machinery, storage for rivet steel, 1912; pump house for gasoline
storage, 1914-1940.
No. 140. Stone crusher, 1916-1918; removed 1918.
No. 141. Built 1914. GSK/Supply, pump house for fuel oil storage, 1914-1934.
No. 142. Built 1915. Storehouse for condemned goods, 1915-1934; Supply,
storehouse, 1937-1940.
No. 143. Built 1917. PW, lavatories, 1917-1937; WPA paint shop, 1940; toilet
and locker building, transportation, 1946; chapel, 1950-1973.
No. 144. Built 1917. PW, locomotive and crane house, 1918-1920; recommended
for removal, 1920.
827
No. 146. Built 1917. Supply, storehouse, 1918-1934; old storehouse, 1937;
storehouse, WPA cement storage, 1940.
No. 147. Built 1917. Supply, storehouse, 1918-1934; old storehouse, 1937;
razed 1940.
No. 148. Built 1917. Supply, storehouse, 1918-1934; old storehouse, 1937;
razed 1940.
No. 149. Built 1918. Supply, general storehouse, offices of IND, 1918-1919;
Supply, general storehouse, 1920-1946; Supply, main storehouse, offices,
substation, Comptroller Depart, offices, 1963; Supply, offices, general
warehouse (bulk), substation, CASDO, PERA, 1973.
No. 150. Built 1918. Garage, 1918; garage, Edison auxiliary service
substation, 1920-1940; power plant switch station, Edison auxiliary
substation, movie exchange, 1946; power plant, garage, 1953; power plant
switching station, Edison auxiliary substation, garage, storage, 1963; power
plant switching station, Edison auxiliary substation, planning files, filling
station, 1973.
No. 151. Built 1918. Supply, storehouse, 1918-1920.
No. 152. Temporary coal bins, 1918.
No. 153. Built 1917. Supply storehouse, Ordnance submarine charging station,
1918; Supply, battery charging station, 1920-1934; ordnance storehouse, 1937-
1940.
No. 154. Built 1917-1918. Machinery storehouse, 1918; Hull, storehouse,
1920; Supply, storehouse, 1934; old storehouse, 1937.
No. 155. Built 1917-1918. Machinery, storehouse, 1918-1920; Supply,
storehouse, 1934; old storehouse, 1937.
No. 156. Built 1917-1918. Machinery, storehouse, 1918-1920; Supply,
storehouse, 1934; old storehouse, 1937.
No. 157. Built 1917-1918. Machinery, storehouse, 1918-1920; Supply,
storehouse, 1934, old storehouse, 1937.
No. 158. Built 1917-1918. Machinery, storehouse, 1918-1920.
No. 159. Temporary coal bins, 1918; Supply, storehouse for coal, 1920-1925.
No. 160. Temporary storehouse, 1918.
No. 161. Machinery officers' shelter, 1918; Machinery, shop offices, 1920.
No. 162. Supply, storehouse for coal, 1920-1925.
828
No. 163. Built 1917. Bandstand, 1917-1940.
No. 164. Built 1918. Storehouse and clearing house, 1918-1919; Machinery,
toilet, washroom and locker building for No. 42, 1920; storehouse and clearing
house, 1934-1937.
No. 165. Built 1919. Oxy-hydrogen plant, 1919; Hull, acetylene plant, 1929-
1934; destroyed Nov. 1934; rebuilt 1937; acetylene plant, 1937-1940; oxy-
acetylene storage building, 1946; Supply, gas cylinder storage, 1963-1973.
No. 165-A. Acetylene storage, 1951; Supply, gas cylinder storage, 1963.
No. 167. Built 1918. Air house, 1918; Machinery, storehouse, 1920;
Production, air house, 1934; surveyed and removed, 1940.
No. 168. Machinery, storehouse, 1920-1925.
No. 177. Built 1918. Supply, storehouse, 1918-1934; old storehouse, 1937.
No. 178. Built 1918. Supply, storehouse, 1918; Hull, storehouse, 1920;
Supply, storehouse, 1934-1946; Supply, storehouse for scrap, 1963; Supply,
lumber storehouse, 1973.
No. 179. Hull, storehouse, 1920-1925.
No. 180. Built 1919. Storehouse, 1919; Hull, storehouse, 1920; Production,
storehouse, 1934; old storehouse, 1937.
No. 181. Hull, storehouse, 1920-1925.
No. 182. Hull, storehouse, 1920-1925.
No. 183. Hull, storehouse, 1920-1925.
No. 186. Built 1919. Storehouse, 1919; Hull, storehouse, 1920; Production,
storehouse, 1934; old storehouse, 1937; razed 1940.
No. 187. Built 1919. Storehouse, 1919; Supply, steel storage shed, 1920;
Supply, storehouse for steel, 1933-1940; Supply, general storehouse, 1946-
1973.
No. 188. Hull, storage for pipe, steel, etc., 1920.
No. 189. Built 1919. PW, transportation office, 1919; Hull, plate storage
office, 1920; PW, transportation office, 1934; old transportation office,
vacant, 1937; air house, 1940.
No. 190. Ingram Club, 1920-1925.
No. 191. PW, pump house, salt-water circulating loop, 1934-1973.
No. 191-A. Salt-water intake screen house, 1963-1973.
829
No. 192. Electric substation, 1934-1949; PW, substation, toilets, 1946;
demolished 1947 or 1948; rebuilt; substation, public toilets, 1963-1973.
No. 192-A. Substation extension, 1963-1973. .
No. 193. Built 1937. Salvage stores, 1937-1973.
No. 194. Gasoline filling station, 1940-1973.
No. 195. Built 1938. Pipe and shipfitting shops, 1940; pipe shop, assembly
and welding shop, shipfitting shop, boiler, shop. 1946; pipe shop, structural
shop, ordnance shop, welding equipment repair and welding lab, meter
calibration lab, 1963; pipe and copper shop, shipfitting shop, weapons shop,
outside machine shop, welding equipment repair and welding lab, temporary
service shop space, meter calibration lab, 1973.
No. 196. Built 1939. Ship machinery testing plant, 1940-1946; Production,
testing plant, inside machine shop, 1963; Production, test plant, inside
machine shop, civilian cafeteria space, 1973.
No. 197. Built 1941. Electronics and electrical building, 1945-1947; outside
machinists, electrical, electronics shops, electronics office, 1953;
electrical, eletronics, weapons, outside machine shops, 1963; electronics,
electrical, weapons systems shops, central tool shop space, optical shop,
1973.
No. 198. Built 1941. Temporary storehouse, 1946. Production, material storage
control center; Production, electronics school and equipment restoration, ship
strip material storage; optometrist, post office, military band, ships'
offices, 1963. Electronics paint shop space, ship repair shop storage,
restoration material storage, riggers' shop space, eye clinic office,
substation, mail room, 1973.
No. 199. Built 1941. Supply, general storehouse; Supply, storehouse,
electronics and electrical building facilities, 1949; Supply, general
storehouse, substation, 1963; Supply, general warehouse, cold storage
warehouse, substation, 1973.
No. 200. Built 1942. PW, offices, fire station, security; security office,
police and fire station, PW offices, Industrial Relations Department, public
address system, 1946; security office, police and fire station, PW
administration offices, public address system, 1973.
No. 201. PW, storehouse, 1946.
No. 202. /Ammunition inspection office, 1946.
No. 203. Built 1942. Incinerator building, 1946; incinerator (inactive),
sandblasting facility, 1963; incinerator (inactive), abbrasive blast facility,
1973.
No. 204. Built 1942. PW, garage, transportation office, 1946-1963; automotive
vehicle maintenance office, Industrial Manager, IND, office, 1973.
830
No. 205. Supply, salvage stores, 1946.
No 206 Built 1942. Production, locker building, 1946; Production locker,
head, washroom; office space for ships, storage, 1963; locker, public toilet,
ships' service space, storage, 1973.
No 207. Paper salvage building, paint storage, 1946; motion picture
exchange, disaster control storage, PW storage, garage, 1963; film exchange,
disaster control storage, PW paint storage, 1973.
No. 208. Built, 1943. Production Repair Superintendent, 1946-1951.
No. 209. Vacant, 1946.
No. 210. Built, 1943. Production, salvage building, 1946; Supply, lumber
storage, 1963-1973.
No. 211-A. Production, industrial service building, Pier No. 5, 1946.
No 211-B. Production, industrial service building , Pier No. 5, 1946;
Production, industrial service building, 1963; Production, shipfitters shop,
temporary service shop space, public toilet, 1973.
No. 211-C. Production, industrial service building, Pier No. 5, 1946
No. 212-A. Production, industrial service building, Pier No. 6, 1946.
No. 212-B. Production, industrial service building, Pier No. 6, 1946.
No. 212-C. Production, industrial service building, Pier No. 6, 1946.
No. 213-A. Production, industrial service building, Pier No. 7, 1946.
No. 213-B. Production, industrial service building, Pier No. 7, 1946.
No. 213-C. Production, industrial service building, Pier No. 7, 1946.
No. 214-A. Production, industrial service building, Pier No. 8, 1946.
No. 214-B. Production, industrial service building, Pier No. 8, 1946.
No. 215. Vacant, 1946.
No. 215-B. Production, industrial service building, Pier No. 10, 1946.
No. 215-C. Production, industrial service building, Pier No. 10, 1963;
Supply, industrial service building, Pier No. 10, 1963.
No. 216. Production, pattern storage, misc. storage, 1946.
Nc. 217. Production, lumber storehouse, 1946; Supply, lumber storehouse,
1963-1973.
831
No. 218-A. Built 1943. Supply, lumber shed, 1946; Supply, lumber store house,
1951-1973.
No. 219. Vacant, 1946; warf builder occupancy, 1951.
No. 220. PW, underground oil storage, 1963-1973.
No. 221. PW, underground water storage, 1963-1973.
No. 222. Water storage reservoir, 1967-1973.
No. 223. Water storage reservoir, 1967-1973.
No. 224. Substation, 1967-1973.
No. 225. Fire pump house, 1967-1973.
No. 226. Industrial service office, public toilet, substation, 1967-1973.
No. 227. Fire pump house, 1967-1973.
No. 228. Industrial service office, public toilet, substation, 1967-1973.
No. 229. Fire pump house, 1963-1973.
No. 230. Production, industrial service building, 1963; Production,
industrial service office, public toilet, substation, 1973.
No. 231. PW, switching station, 1963-1973.
No. 232. PW, fire pump station, 1963-1973.
No. 233. Production, industrial service building, 1963; Production,
industrial service office, public toilet, substation, 1973.
No. 234. Supply, track scales, 1963-1973.
No. 235. Supply, truck scales, 1963-1973.
No. 236. Tennis court, 1963-1973.
No. 237. Tennis court, 1963-1973.
No. 238. PW, floodlight tower, 1963-1973.
No. 239. PW, floodlight tower, 1963-1973.
No. 240. PW, floodlight tower, 1963-1973.
No. 242. , Flag pole, 1963-1973.
No. 244. Gatehouse, 1963.
832
No. 245. ComOne garage, 1963; gardener's shed, 1973.
No. 246. PW, floodlight tower, 1963-1973.
No. 247. PW, floodlight tower, 1963-1973.
No. 248. PW, floodlight tower, 1967-1973.
No. 249. PW, floodlight tower, 1967-1973.
No. 250. PW, floodlight tower, 1963-1973.
No. 251. PW, floodlight tower, 1963-1973.
No. 252. PW, floodlight tower, 1963-1973.
No. 253. PW, floodlight tower, 1967-1973.
No. 254. PW, floodlight tower, 1963-1973.
No. 255. PW, floodlight tower, 1963-1973.
No. 258. Police shelter building, 1963.
No. 259. Production, sand hopper, 1963; Production, abbrasive grit hopper,
1973.
No. 260. Bandstand, 1963-1973.
No. 261. Saluting battery platforms, 1963-1973.
No. 262. Supply, bridge crane supporting structure, 1963.
No. 263. Production, pickling tanks, 1963.
No. 264. PW, cooling tower, 1963-1973.
No. 267. Gatehouse, 1963-1973.
No. 268. PW, ash silo, 1963-1973.
No. 269. Garages, 1963-1973.
No. 270. Historical plaque, 1963; memorial plaque, 1973.
No. 271. Production, paint spray booth, 1963-1973.
No. 272. Saluting battery ammunition structure, 1963-1973.
No. 273. Abbrasive grit hopper, 1967-1973.
No. 274. Substation. 1967-1973.
833
No. 275. Substation, 1967-1973.
No. 276. Historical plaque, 1973.
No. 277. Oxygen bottle fill and storage, 1973.
No. 278. Substation, Pier No. 5, 1973.
834
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Items in this bibliography are listed under the following
headings :
I. Research Guides and Bibliographies
II. Primary Sources: Published
III. Primary Sources: Unpublished
IV. Navy Administrative Histories of World War II
V. Histories of Boston Navy Yard
VI. Secondary Sources.
VII. Other
I. Research Guides and Bibliographies
Albion, Robert G. Naval and Maritime History: An Annotated
Bibliography . 3d ed . ; Mystic, Conn.: Maritime Historical
Association, 1963.
Allard, Dean C.; Crowley, Martha L. ; and Edmenson, Mary W. U.S.
Naval History Sources in the United State s . Washington: U.S.
Naval History Division, 1979. Lists collections in various
archives and libraries, arranged by states and cities.
Bethel, Elizabeth et. al_. Preliminary Inventory of the Bureau of
Ships (Record Group 19) . Washington: National Archives,
1961.
Coletta , Paola E. ( comp. ) . A Bibliography of American Naval
History . Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1981.
Guide to the National Archives of the United States . Washington:
General Services Administration, 1974.
Hanson, Edward W. (comp. ) . A Guide to the Records of the Boston
Naval Shipyard . Boston: 1981. Lists the holdings of the
Office of the Curator, Boston National Historical Park. Its
appendices contain organizational charts for the Boston
Naval Shipyard, 1971-1973; a guide to the shipyard's
departments, divisions, offices, and other units; a list of
yard commandants and shipyard commanders; a list of the
commandants, First Naval District; descriptions of material
in other repositories; Wood's guide to the records of the
Bureau of Yards and Docks (see below); Wood's guide to the
Records of the Boston Navy Yard in the National Archives
(see below); and the Schwartz and Sagesser guide to the same
collection (see below).
835
Heimdahl, William C. and Marolda, Edward J. Guide to United
States Naval Administrative Histories of World War II .
Washington: Naval History Division, 1976. A guide to such
works as are included in section IV of this bibliography.
Hingham, Robin ( ed . ) . A Guide to the Sources of United States
Military Histor y. Hamden , Conn.: Archon Books, 1975. See
chapters by Dean C. Allard and William R. Braisted, which
discuss the historiography of the Navy since 1890.
Millett, Allan R. and Cooling, B. Franklin, III. Doctoral
Dissertations in Military Affairs : A Bibliography .
Manhattan, Kansas: Kansas State University Press, 1973.
Pitcaithley, Dwight T. The National Park Servic e in the
Northeast : A Cultural Resource Management Bibliography .
Boston: National Park Service, North Atlantic Regional
Office, 1984. Pages 23-31 cover the Boston Navy Yard.
Schwartz, Henry and Saegesser, Lee. Preliminary Inventor y of the
Textual Records of N aval Districts and Shore Establishments
(Record Group 181 ) . Washington: National Archives, 1966.
Pages 8-16 list the holdings for the Boston Navy Yard now
in the Federal Archives and Records Center, Waltham, Mass.
This guide replaced that prepared by Richard G. Wood in
1946. The Schwartz and Saegesser inventory does not include
material formerly in depositories in Suitland, Maryland and
Mechanics ville , Pennsylvania, which are now integrated into
the record group.
Schultz, Charles R. (comp. ). Bibliography of Naval and Maritime
History : Periodical Articles . Mystic Seaport, Conn.: Marine
Historical Association, 1971.
U.S. Naval History Division. Partial Checklist : World War II
Histories and Historical Reports in the U.S. Naval History
Division . Washington: U.S. Naval History Division, 1973.
U.S. Naval History Division, United States Naval History : A
Bibliography . Washington: Naval History Division, 1972.
Wood, Richard G. Preliminary Checklist of the Records of the
Boston Navy Yard : Record Group No. 181 : Records of Naval
Districts and Shore Establishment s . Washington: National
Archives, 1946. Superseded by the Schwartz inventory of
1966, although still of some use since it has lengthier
descriptions of the components of the record group.
Wood, Richard G. Preliminary Inventory of the Records of the
Bureau of Yards and Docks . Washington: National Archives,
1948.
836
II. Primary Sources, Published
Annual Reports of the N avy Department . In the late nineteenth
century and early years of the twentieth century, included a
report from each bureau, in which was contained a
description of the activities of that bureau's department in
each navy yard. After World War I, becomes Annual Report of
the Secretar y of the Navy and is increasingly general, with
fewer and fewer references to particular yards.
Code of Federal Regulations , Title _3 - The President : 1959-1963
Compilation . Washington: GPO, 1964.
Code of Federal Regulations, T itle 3 - The President : 1966-1970
Compilation . Washington: GPO, 1971.
Fourteenth Repor t of the Unite d States Civil Service Commission
( July 1 , 1896 to June 30 , 1897 ) . House of Representatives
Document No. 314, 55th Congress, 2d Session. US Serial Set
No. 3689.
Unite d States Statutes at Large . 99 vols. Washington: GPO, 1874-
1986.
III. Primary Sources, Unpublished
National Archives, Record Group 181.
The papers of the Boston Naval Shipyard are part of the
National Archives Record Group 181, Records of Naval Districts
and Shore Establishments. That section of RG 181 consisting of
Boston Navy Yard and First Naval District material is located in
the Federal Archives and Records Center, Waltham, Massachusetts.
Guides to this collection have been prepared by Wood (1946) and
Schwartz (1966), listed in section I of this bibliography.
Within the past year, the Waltham staff has proposed to the
National Archives a rearrangement of the collection so as to
eliminate errors and to integrate additional items. The architect
of the rearrangement is Mr. S. Tozeski . What this means for the
user is that there are three numbering systems for entries in the
collection: Wood, Schwartz, and Tozeski. It should also be
mentioned that some of documents for the years 1951 to 1969 are
in the custody of the Records Center at Waltham as distinct from
the Federal Archives.
The chief chronological parts of the collections are:
Correspondence 1823-1908, Tozeski entries 1 through 38.
This part is organized according to the identity of the
correspondent .
Correspondence 1909-1924. Tozeski entry No. 39,
Schwartz, No. 101. Documents grouped according to subject and
filed by year.
837
Correspondence 1925-1958, Tozeski entry No. 40,
Schwartz No. 102. Items filed in same fashion as 181-39 (101),
but using the Navy File Manual, introduced in 1925.
Correspondence, 1951 onward. Is that part of 181 in
the Records Center at Waltham.
Useful individual items are Shipyard (Station) Logs, 1888-
1958 (181-58); Docking Record, 1867-1929 (181-60); Annual Reports
and Estimates, 1856-1911 (Civil Engineer), 181-154.
Boston National Historical Park.
Holdings are described in the Hanson guide, listed in part I
of this bibliography. Documents tend to be from the last several
decades .
IV. Navy Administrative Histories of World War II
Administrative History of the U .S. Atlantic Fleet in World War
I I , vol . VI , C ommander Destroyers : An Administrative H istory
of D estroyers Atlantic F lee t . Published by the Commander in
Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet, 1946.
An Administrativ e History of_ the Bureau of Ship s During World War
II . 4 vols. Washington: Historical Section, Bureau of
Ships , n .d .
U.S. Naval Administration , W orld War I I , First Naval Distric t .
11 vols. Typescript, prepared by Historical Section, First
Naval District, submitted in 1946.
U.S. Naval Administration , W orld War II : Office of the Secretary
of the Navy : Civil ian Personnel . 3 vols. Washington: Office
of Secretary of the Navy, Historical Section, n.d.
V. Histories of the Boston Navy Yard
Bears s, Edwin C. Charlestown Navy Yard, 1800-184 2. 2 vols.
National Park Service, 1984.
"Boston Naval Shipyard: Historical Review, 1938-1957."
Typescript, dated Nov. 3, 1958, prepared by the Management
Planning and Review Department. BNHP, RG 1, Series 11.
Brady, Mary Jane and Christopher J. Foster, Inc. Historic
Structure Report : Dry Dock Ij_ Architectural Data . Boston
Nationa l Historical Park , Massach us etts . National Park
Service, 1982.
Brady, Mary Jane, and Crandall Dry Dock Engineers, Inc. Historic
Structure Report : Marine Railway No. 11 ; Architectural Data
Section , Charlestown Navy Yard, Boston National Historical
Park , Boston , Massachusetts . National Park Service, 1979.
Dana, N.T., "History of the Boston Navy Yard," 181-102 (1945),
Box 314, A-12. This is a draft of a history of the yard
during World War II. The final version constitutes the
section on the yard in the administrative history of the
First Naval District listed in Part IV of this bibliography.
Handlin, P.W. "History of the Boston Navy Yard." A mimeographed
typescript, produced in 1937. BNHP.
Ivas, Paul; Mullen, William E. ; and Palmer, William. Development
of D ie-Lock Chain . Forge Shop, Boston Naval Shipyard, 1950.
BNHP.
List of Vessels Converted at the U.S. Navy Yard, Boston during
World War II, Aug. 1945, BNHP.
Mansfield, George 0. Q. Historical Review, Boston Naval
Shipyard, Formerly Boston Navy Yard, 1938-1957 . Boston:
Boston Naval Shipyard, 1957.
Micholet, Margaret A. Charlestow n Navy Yard: Ship Ceremonies ,
1939-1973 . Boston: Boston National Historical Park, 1984.
National Register of Historic Places Inventory: Nomination Form.
The Historic Resources of the Charlestown Navy Yard, May
1978. The copy used in this report was obtained from the
National Park Service, Mid-Atlantic Region, Philadelphia.
Norton, Bettina A. "The Boston Naval Shipyard, 1800-1974,"
Proceedings of the Boston Society , 1974
VI. Secondary Sources
Abbazia, Patrick. Mr . Roosevelt "s Navy: The Private War of the
U.S. Atlantic Fleet, 1939-1942 . Annapolis: U.S. Naval
Institute Press, 1975.
Baldwin, Hanson W. The New Navy . New York: E.P. Dutton, 1964.
Bowen, Harold. Ships , Machinery , and Mossbacks: The
Autobiography of a Naval Engineer . Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1954.
Callahan, Edward A. (ed. ) . List of Officers of the Navy of the
United States and of the Marine Corps from 1775 to 1900 . New
York: L. R. Hamersly & Co., 1901.
Carrison, Daniel J. The United States Navy . New York: Frederick
A. Praeger, 1968.
839
Cooling, Benjamin Franklin. Gray Steel and Blue Water Navy: The
For mative Years of Ameri ca 's Mil i tar y- Indus trial Complex .
Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1979.
Davis, H. F. D. "Building Major Combatant Ships in World War II,"
U.S. Naval History Institute Proceedings , May 1947, pp. 565-
579.
Davis, Kenneth S. F DR: The Beckoning of Destiny, 1882-1928: A
History . New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1972.
Freidel, Frank. Frankli n D. R oosevelt: The Apprenticeship Years .
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1952.
Furer, Julius Augustus. Admin i stration of the Navy Departmen t in
World War II . Washington: GPO, 1959.
Garraty, John A. Henry Cabot Lodge: A B iography . New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1953.
Greenberg, Daniel S. "U.S, Destroyers for British Bases -- Fifty
Old Ships Go to War," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings ,
November 1962, pp. 70-83.
Hagan, Kenneth J. ( ed . ) . I_n Peace and War : Interpretations of
American Naval History , 1 775-1978 . Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood Press, 1978.
Howeth, L. S. History of Communications- Electronics in the
United States Navy . Washington: GPO, 1963.
Kay, Howard Norman, "The Fifty Old Maids Come Through," U .S.
Naval Institute Proceedings , September 1950, pp. 977-9
LaDage, John H. Modern Ships : Elements of Their Design,
Construction and Operation . Cambridge, Md . : Cornell
Maritime Press, 1953.
Lott, Arnold S. A Long Line of Ships : Mare Island 's Century of
Naval Activity iji Californi a . Annapolis: U. S, Naval
Institute, 1954. A well written account by a naval
officer attached to the facility. This is the only known
conventionally published full-length history of a navy yard.
McMahon, William E. Dreadnought Battl e ships and Battle Cruisers .
Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1978.
McPherson, Guy and Watts, Mary. Fixing Wages and Salaries of Navy
Civilian Workers in Shore Establishments, 1862-1945 .
Administrative Reference Service Report Number 9, NAVEXOS P-
289.
Mitchell, Donald W. History of the Modern Navy: From 1883 to
Pearl Harbor . New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946.
840
Paullin, Charles Oscar. Paullin 's Histor y of Naval
Administration, 1775-1911 . Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute,
1968.
Potter, E.D. (ed.). Se a Power: A Naval History . Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960.
Robinson, R.H.M. Naval Construction , Prepared for the Use of the
Midshipmen of the United States Naval Academy . 4th ed .
Annapolis: U. S. Naval Institute, 1917.
Roosevelt, Theodore. An Autobiograph y . New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1913.
Roscoe, Theodore. United States Destroyer Operations in World
War II . Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1953.
Ryan, Paul B. First Line of Defense: The U.S. Navy Since 1945 .
Stanford, Cali.: Hoover Institution Press, 1981.
Sprout, Harold and Margaret. The Rise of American Naval Power,
1776-1918 . Rev. ed . Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1942.
Thomas, Donald I., "The Four-Stackers," U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings , July 1950, pp. 753-7.
U.S. Bureau of Construction and Repair. History of the
Construction Corps of the United States Navy . Washington:
GPO, 1937.
U.S. Bureau of Yards and Docks. Activities of the Bureau of
Yards and Docks , Navy Department , World War , 1917-1918 .
Washington: GPO, 1921.
U.S. Bureau of Yards and Docks. Building the Navy 's Bases in
World War II : History of the Bureau of Yards and Docks and
the Civil Engineering Corps , 1940-1946 . 2 vols. Washington:
GPO, 1947.
U.S. Naval History Division. Dictionary of American Naval
Fighting Ships . 8 vols. Washington: Naval History Division,
1959-1981. Contains brief histories of all of the Navy's
ships, past and present. Also includes data about the
evolution of different types of ships.
U.S. Naval History Division. Fifty Years of Naval District
Development, 1903-1953 . Washington: Naval History Division,
1954.
U.S. Navy Department. History of the Bureau of Engineering , Navy
Department , During the World War . Washington: GPO, 1922.
841
VII. Other
Boston Navy Yard News . The yard newspaper, after November 1945
known as the Boston Naval Shipyard News . A bound set is in
the office of the Curator, Boston National Historical Park.
New York Times .
Oral History Interviews. BNHP. A collection of transcribed oral
interviews by the staff of BNHP with former employees of the
shipyard. Also includes an interview with Adm. Ray Burk, the
yard's next-to-last commander.
842
INDEX
AARON WARD (DD-132), 620
ABEL P. UPSHUR (DD-193), 620
Accounting Department, 187, 188, 390, 391, 466, 506, 511, 515,
642, 646. See also Fiscal Department
Acetylene plant. See Building No. 165
ACHUSNET (Coast Guard), 494
ACTIVE (Coast Guard), 494
Adams, Charles Francis, 441, 444
Adamson, Alfred, 126
Administration, 4, 7, 9, 73, 168, 254-255, 262, 387, 389, 409,
461, 635, 636, 644, 646, 654, 680, 698-699; and contracts
for new construction, 364-365, 367-368, 432, 439-440, 472-
473, 474-475; on demobilization, 636; during the Depression,
464-475; in the 1890s, 4-40; and the Masters' Conference,
393; 1900-1913, 166-196; in the 1920s, 384-400; 1946-1973,
641-668, 673-676, 731-749; order of command, 9-10;
reorganizations, of 176-182, 183-184, 384-388, 392, 644-648;
under scientific management, 184-186; during the Spanish-
American War, 123-128, 134-135; during World War I, 312-324,
365, 376-379; during World War II, 505-528, 545-547, 574-
575, 579-580, 633. See also Commandant; Shipyard commander
AGGASSIZ (Coast Guard), 494
Ago, James, 264
Air house. See Building No. 167
ALBANY (CL-23) , 356 '
ALBANY (CA-123, CG-10), 760, 780, 782-787, 793
ALBATROSS (Bureau of Fisheries), 494
ALLAGASH (AO-97), 723
Allied vessels, 505, 509, 510, 527, 628; and Destroyer-Bases
Agreement, 619; destroyer escorts for Great Britain, 604;
French vessels, 628; LSTs assigned to Great Britain, 612
ALOHA (SP-317) , 359
AMBERJACK (SS-522), 618, 640
AMERICA (AP, ex-AMERIKA), 362-364
American Society of Marine Draftsmen, 261
AMERIKA. See AMERICA
Ames Iron Works, 72
AMMEN (DD-35), 299
Ammunition depot. See Hingham ammunition depot
AMPHITRITE ( BM- 2 ) , 100, 115, 132, 139, 157, 159
Anchors, 23, 100, 706, 707; and chain making. See Chain making;
and forge, 42, 100, 467, 539, 560, 667, 745, 810, 812; and
nylon anchor cord, 734. See also Buildings No. 40, No. 103
Andrews, Phillip, 393-395, 398, 410-411, 414, 418, 420
Angle bending shop. See Building No. 61
Angle shop. See Building No. 40
ANTIETAM (Coast Guard), 494
Apothocary. See Buildings No. 4, No. 5
HMS AQUITANIA, 628
ARETHUSA ( AO~ 7 ) , 397
ARGO (Coast Guard), 494
ARIZONA (BB-39) , 492
843
ARKANSAS (BB-33) , 422, 426
Armory. See Building No. 5
AROOSTOOK (CM-3, ex-BUNKER HILL), 360, 361
Arthur, Russell B., 813
Atlantic Fleet, 285, 288, 293, 297, 299, 300, 354, 716, 721-722;
Amphibious Force (PHIBLANT), 723; Cruiser Force (CRULANT),
722; Destroyer Force (DESLANT), 722, 723; Service Force
(SERVLANT), 723; Submarine Force (SUBLANT), 722
Atlantic Reserve Fleet, 639, 711-712, 716, 721, 723-724, 725
Atlantic Submarine Force, 356
Atlantic Works, 43, 106, 107, 141-142, 155, 345
ATLAS (schooner), 107
ATULE (SS-403), 722
AUCILLA (AO-56) , 769
Auxiliary Defense Fleet (mosquito fleet), 122, 125, 127, 167
AYLWIN (DD-47), 356
AZTEC (SP-590), 359
AZUELA (Lighthouse Service), 494
BABBIT (DD-128), 491
BADGER (aux. cruiser), 157, 159
BAINBRIDGE (DD-246), 491
BANCROFT ( PG ) , 127, 128, 146, 148, 156, 157, 160
Banks, Cally, 267, 268
Barbour Stockwell Company, 633
Barge, torpedo testing, 366
Barker, James, 345
Barn. See Building No. 56
BARNEGAT (AVP-10), 6 24
BARNES (ACV-20), 723
Barton, John, 134, 136, 142, 144
BASSETT (APD-73), 723
BATAAN (CV-129) , 641
Bath Iron Works, 102, 116, 118, 282, 289, 291, 292, 352, 369,
492, 631, 632, 717, 793
Bathythermographs, 709
Battle Force, 490
Baxter, William J., 166, 273-276, 278, 313-314, 318, 319
BAYNTUN (DE-1), 605
BAZEL (DE-2), 605
Beech, E. L. , 246-247
Bending shed, 64
BENEWAH (APD-35), 618, 619, 640
BENHAM (DD-49) , 358
BERRY (DD-858), 722
Bethlehem Shipbuilding, 369, 377, 420, 421, 491, 492, 589-590,
598, 626, 631, 662
BIG HORN (AO-45, ex-GULF DAWN), 630
BIRMINGHAM (CL-2), 299
BISCAYNE (AVP-11), 624
Bleeker , J. V. , 37
Block Shop, 64
Boat No. 4 (Dept. of Interior), 494
Boat Shop, 28, 63, 194, 222, 339, 478, 753. See also Buildings
No. 36, No. 77, No. 114
844
Boiler house and coal shed. See Building No. 43
Boiler Shop, 59, 194, 213, 216, 392, 656, 740
BOSTON (CAG-1), 792-793
BOSTON (cruiser), 113
Boston and Maine Railroad, 209
Boston Branch Hydrographic Office, 12
Boston Edison Company, 679
Bosto n Globe , 156
Boston Nava l Shipyard New s , 6 8 3, 768
Boston Navy Yard (Boston Naval Shipyard), 1, 3, 11-12, 18-20,
123-124, 294, 296-298, 303, 376, 442, 443, 445-446, 476,
544, 642, 729, 731, 732, 743, 750, 804-810; administration
of. See Administration; as Atlantic Fleet home yard, 721-
723; manufacturing at. See Manufacturing; mission of, 664-
665, 705-706, 713; as national historic landmark, 815;
organization of, 6-10, 645, 646, 666-667. See also
Administration; physical plant, 40-65, 196-206, 325-328,
401-405, 475-487, 528-539, 668-680, 750-761; politics and
patronage, 2, 74-77; proposals to close, 2, 103, 439, 441,
442, 444, 446, 761, 798, 799, 805-814; as repair facility.
See Repairs; ships of the Central Powers, 307-309; training
programs, 335, 515-516, 575-578, 586, 764-766
Bosto n Navy Yard News , 462-463, 562, 565, 582
Boston Street Railway, 345-346
Boston Tugboat Company, 155
Brand, C. L., 623, 624
BRAZOS (AO-4), 336, 367-368, 371, 381, 425, 493
Brennan, Thomas, 267, 268
BRESLAU. See BRIDGEPORT
BRIAREUS (AR-12), 723
Brice, Thomas, 267, 268
BRIDGE (AF-1), 364-367, 369, 493
BRIDGEPORT (AD-10, ex-BRESLAU), 362, 364, 397, 433, 493
Brinser , H . L. , 471
BRONSON (DD-668), 722
Brooklyn (New York) Navy Yard (Naval Shipyard), 3, 57, 62, 102,
103, 139, 205, 294, 297, 749, 804, 806
Brooks, L. C, 255, 262-265
BROOME (DD-210), 62 5
Brown, Allan D., 134, 135
Brown, Wilson, 512
BUCHANAN (DD-131), 6 20
BUCKLEY (DE-51 ) , 627
"Build-a-Ship-at-Boston" movement, 365
Building No. 1 (gatehouse), 532; (masonry materials), 39
Building No. 3 (General Storekeeper's Dept . ) , 35; (shell house),
33
Building No. 4 ( apothocary ) , 36; (General Storekeeper's Dept.),
35; (naval reserves), 479; (Public Works workshop), 191
Building No. 5 (apothocary), 54, 66; (armory), 479; (dispensary),
36; (Naval Lyceum), 229, 238; (paymaster), 36
Building No. 6 (fire-fighting apparatus), 39
Building No. 10 (paint shop), 208, 223
Building No. 16 (foundry), 28, 62, 176
845
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
s Depart . ) , 35 , 53
479; (General Storek
54, 69, 216, 217; (
lding No. 22 (dry dock engine house), 29, 43, 47, 51-
66, 71, 142, 202, 226; (tinsmiths and shipwrights), 4
lding No. 23 (chapel), 11
lding No. 24 (clerical staff), 26; (Construction and
offices and rigging loft), 213, 218, 223; (pipe shop)
lding No. 25 (carpenters' shop and laborers' loft), 2
53, 195; (cart shed), 29, 53
lding No. 28 (electric lighting plant), 70-72, 226; (
and plumbers' shop), 28, 62-63
lding No. 29 (Commandant's office), 19, 42, 53, 54
lding No. 31 (muster house), 53-54, 72, 219, 676; (te
building ) , 532
lding No. 32 (Commandant's office), 39, 54, 68, 216;
union), 675; (shell house), 33
lding No. 33 (receiving station, Frazier Barracks), 46
516, 532; (sail loft), 23, 69, 102; (storehouse), 217
lding No. 34 (dental office), 398; (Greeting Center
(laboratories), 75, 478, 479, 481; (ordnance),
(storehouse), 35, 217; (training classes), 576
lding No. 36 (boat shop), 63; (cafeteria), 675; ( joi
pattern shops), 28, 62, 145; (mold loft annex), 479;
and Docks ) , 38
lding No. 37 (General Storekeeper
lding No. 38 (garage and movie),
Depart.), 35; (navy prison),
shop), 740
lding No. 39 (construction office), 479; (Headquarters
Naval District), 511; (INDMAN), 741; (ordnance), 3
(storehouse), 217; (Yards and Docks), 38
lding No. 40 (anchor forge), 23; (angle shop), 479
(Equipment Depart.), 22; (mold loft), 479, 529; (pi
shop), 63, 66; (rolling mill and anchor forge), 21
( smithery ) , 22 , 28
lding No. 42 (chain shop), 22, 65, 100, 216-217; (Equi
32, 42, 55; (foundry), 23, 401, 402, 480, 675; (
shop), 16, 30, 58-60, 65, 67-68, 131, 145, 172, 2
325, 401-402, 480; (pattern shop), 219, 220, 265, 266
lding No. 42-A (machine shop), 532
lding No. 42-C (foundry), 672
lding No. 43 (boiler house and coal shed), 32, 58;
shop) , 328
lding No. 44
lding No. 45
lding No. 47
lding No. 52
lding No. 56
lding No. 57
lding No. 58
lding No. 59
lding No. 60
lding No. 61
lding No. 62
lding No. 63
lding No. 64
lding No. 65
54, 62,
79
Repair
, 532
8, 39,
tinners
lephone
( credit
7, 478,
), 576;
11, 33;
ner and
(Yards
eeper s
weapons
, First
3, 145;
, 529;
umbers '
6, 228;
pment ) ,
machine
14-216,
, 529
pipe
copper shed ) ,
engine repair
shel 1 house ) ,
gun shed ) , 33
32, 145
shop) , 32
33
53
barn), 39; (cart shed), 54
gun wheel transport shed), 33, 53
ropewalk), 23, 219, 480, 532
tar pit storage shed), 23
tarring house), 23, 219, 480-481
angle bending shop), 53
hemp storage house), 23,, 219, 328,
timber shed), 213, 218, 326
timber storage shed), 220, 326
tool shed ) , 53
479, 481
846
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
Bui
lding No. 66
63; (shipfi
39
lding No. 67
lding No. 68
lding No. 71
lding No. 73
lding No. 75
lding No. 77
lding No. 78
lding No. 7
classes ) , 5
lding No. 81
lding No. 83
lding No. 85
lding No. 86
lding No. 92
lding No. 95
lding No. 96
lding No. 97
lding No. 101
lding No. 103
483; (sheet
lding No. 104
shop), 479,
lding No. 105
( shipsmiths
lding No. 106
217, 220, 2
lding No. 107
lding No. 108
485, 532, 6
lding No. 1
479
No. 114
478, 4
No. 116
No. 120
No.
No.
(iron plate shop), 65, 214, 221; (sawmill), 62-
tters ' shop), 62, 64; (timber bending shop), 28,
(sawmill), 62, 63, 66, 67, 221, 223
(shiphouse), 29, 53
(shiphouse), 29, 53
(shiphouse), 29, 41, 53, 68
(warehouse), 675
(mold loft and boat shop), 28
( coal shed ) , 23
9 (ordnance storehouse)
76; (wire rope mill), 23
(firewood shed), 53
(shed), 53
(mast house and spar shop
( steam chest ) , 53
(shiphouse), 29, 41, 53, 68
(power plant), 172, 173, 218,
(power plant), 172, 224, 226,
(gatehouse ) , 229
(storage), 478; (tool room),
(chain and anchor shop), 224;
metal shop), 676, 753-754
( shipf itters ' shop), 217, 220
482-483, 495, 530, 533, 675,
(chain shop), 327; (forge and
' shop), 172, 220-222, 227, 43
(machine shop), 675, 679; (me
22; ( shipf itters ' shop), 483
(Public Works), 190, 224, 227
(power plant), 172, 173, 224,
78
09 (coaling plant), 403; (el
479-480; (training
), 28, 213, 222
227
227
529
(pipe shop) , 479 ,
, 222; (structural
676, 677
roundhouse), 675;
6, 477, 479
tal workers' shop),
, 228, 479, 529
226-227, 402, 479,
lding
223
lding
lding
lding
lding
lding No.
lding No.
lding
lding
lding
lding
lding
lding
lding
lding
lding
(CASDO)
lding No.
lding No.
lding No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No
122
123
125
127
130
131
134
141
144
146
147
148
1
73
153
154
156
(electric substation),
(sawmill, joiner and boat shop), 219, 220, 221,
79, 529, 676, 753
guardhouse), 218
dispensary), 220, 676, 679
Marine Corps rifle range), 218
dry dock pumping plant), 201, 224
paint shop), 217, 220, 223, 479, 529, 658
latrine), 478; (temporary storage), 529
storehouse), 478, 529
storage ) , 529 , 675
electric substation), 134, 226
fuel oil pump house), 529
locomotive and crane shed), 327
storage), 327, 478, 529
storage), 327, 478, 529
storage). 327, 478, 529
(General
49
8
ordnance ) ,
shed), 478
shed), 478
Storehouse ) ,
326-327
326-327, 399, 518;
847
Building No. 157
Building No. 161
Building No. 164
Building No. 165
storage ) , 752
Building No. 165A
Building No.
Building No.
Building No.
Building No.
Building No.
Building No.
Building No.
Building No.
Building No.
679
Building No.
Building No.
Building No.
Building No.
Building No.
Building No.
Buidling No.
Building No.
Building No.
Building No.
Building No.
167
177
186
187
191
192
193
195
197
198
199
200
201
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
shed), 478
shed), 478
storage), 478
acetylene plant),
327, 480; (gas cylinder
(gas cylinder storage
air house), 529; ( sto
storage ) , 478
storehouse), 529
storehouse), 675
pump house), 402
outside machine shop)
salvage stores), 478,
pipe and shipf itters '
electronics), 507,
storehouse), 531, 668
storehouse), 531
fire station), 675; (
storehouse), 531, 675
incinerator), 531
garage and transporta
deperming station), 5
locker building), 531
decontamination), 531
first aid center), 53
first aid center), 53
Building Trades Shop, 401, 466, 510
BUNKER HILL. See AROOSTOOCK
Bureau system, 4-5, 13-16, 20, 45, 90,
4, 34, 170, 177, 505, 599-600,
Construction and Repair; Engineer
and Surgery; Navigation; Ordnance
Ships; Steam Engineering; Suppli
Docks
Burk, Raymond W. , 649, 775, 811-813
BURROWS (DD-29), 299
BUSHIPS MSR (Master Ship Repair) contra
Cafeteria. See Building No. 36
Cain, George L. , 260-261
CALUMET (harbor cutter), 155
CANANDAIGUA (CM), 371
CANBERRA (CA-70), 6 40
CANONICUS (CM), 182
Capital ship construction
Capps, W. L. , 177, 182
Captain of the Yard, 7, 9, 10,
187, 188, 206, 207, 304,
413, 646; R. C. Grady, 514,
G. Moody, 39 5;
Carpenters ' shop
), 752
rage) , 47
, 676
479, 529
shop) , 532 , 613
518, 531, 639, 676, 678,
, 675, 751
Public Works) , 531
tion office), 531
31
, 675
168-170, 187; changes in,
643-644, 731-732. See also
ing; Equipment; Medicine
; Provisions and Clothing;
es and Accounts; Yards and
cts, 741
See New Construction
17-19, 37, 53, 82,
313, 318, 349, 385
525; John Hilliard,
Yancey S. Williams, 395
143, 168, 178,
390, 394-397,
313; Roscoe
See Building No. 25
Carpenter shop and laborers' loft, 28
Cart shed. See Buildings No. 25, No. 56
CASCO (Coast Guard, AVP-120), 720
848
CASDO. See Computer Application Support and Development Office
CASE (DD-370) , 475, 500
CASSIN (DD-43) , 493
CASSIN YOUNG (DD-793), 790
CASTINE (gunboat), 102, 157, 158, 159
CATSKILL (monitor), 146, 148
CELTIC (passenger liner), 431
Central Powers, ships of, 307-309, 359, 360, 362
Central Tool Shop, 656, 740
"C" Fleet, 306
Chain and Anchor Shop, 23, 99-100, 216, 226, 228, 338, 465, 656,
675, 740, 744-745, 798. See also Building No. 103
Chain making, 22, 65, 100, 216, 228, 274, 275, 338, 344, 729,
734, 744; dielock chain, 435, 436, 438, 501, 734; and labor
strikes, 269, 272-274, 276-279; NACO chain, 436; new
developments in, 435-438, 501-503
Chain Shop, 65, 97-98, 194, 216, 272-278, 327, 338, 447. See also
Buildings No. 42, No. 103, No. 105
Chapel. See Building No. 23
Chaplains, 9, 11
Chapman, William H., 30
Charlestown Gas and Electric, 70
Charlestown Metal Trades Council, 769, 771, 773-774
Charlestown Navy Yard. See Boston Navy Yard
CHATHAM. See VULCAN
CHAUMONT (AP-3), 4 93
Chelsea Annex, 528, 537-538, 638, 667
Chelsea Naval Hospital, 11-12, 314, 398, 742
CHENANGO (CVE-28), 712-713, 723
CHESAPEAKE (bark, ex-SEVERN), 292-293
CHESTER (CL-1) , 299, 397
CHEWINK (AM-39), 493
CHICAGO (CA-14), 299
Chief of Naval Operations, 383, 473-474, 718, 731
Childs, Harry, 95
Chute, James P., 133, 134
CINCINNATI (C-7), 100
CINCINNATI (German liner). See COVINGTON
City Point Iron Works, 114
City Securities and Trust of Philadelphia, 197, 199
Civil Engineers, 9, 51, 53-55, 64, 93, 139, 143, 176-178, 180,
204, 211, 217; annual reports by, 45, 54, 58; and the wet
basin proposal, 55
Civil Service, 74-80, 82-83, 235-237, 258-260, 262, 279, 407,
411, 739, 766, 779; and competitive examinations, 26, 84-86,
236-240; effect on work efficiency, 95-98; regulations, 128,
129, 636, 681-684, 690. See als o Wages and working
conditions
Civil Service Commission, 332, 553, 554, 562
Civil War, 40, 57; veterans of, 83
Civilian workers. See Employment
Clancey, Peter T., 133
Clark University Training Program, 765
Cleveland, Grover, 76
CLEVELAND (C-19), 356
849
CLEVELAND (CL-55), 6 40
Coal depot, 225; and coal facilities, 208, 224-225, 400, 403-404
Coal shed. See Building No. 78
Coaling plant. See Building No. 109
Coast Guard, 424, 431, 434, 493, 742; Nahant Annex, 743-744
Coburn, Fred C. , 273, 274, 277
Coffman, Dewitt W. , 186, 188, 270-272, 274-275, 277
COLLETON (APB-36), 640, 723
COLORADO (CA-7), 42 5
COLUMBIA (C-12), 156
COLUMBUS (CA-74), 722
Combat Weapons Systems Division, 732-733, 739
Commandant, 7, 9, 10, 13-17, 19, 39, 42, 53, 54, 82-84, 88-90,
92, 123, 151, 177, 183, 188, 192, 195, 239, 241, 245, 247,
255, 385, 642, 650, 700; Phillip Andrews, 393-395, 398, 410-
411, 414, 418, 420-421, 427, 429; Wilson Brown, 512-513;
Dewitt W. Coffman, 186, 188, 270-272, 274-275, 277; L. R.
DeSteiguer, 393; and First Naval District, 168; Walter R.
Gherardi, 462, 469; Albert Gleaves, 413, 414; Felix X.
Gygax, 648; Henry M. Hough, 441, 485; Henry L. Howison, 95,
123-125, 127-128, 151, 153, 156; Joseph N, Miller, 88, 92,
95; Louis M. Nulton, 447, 451-453, 470-472; William R. Rush,
311-313, 315, 320-323, 333-334, 337, 349-351, 725; William
T. Sampson, 238, 256; Thomas 0. Selfridge, 113; Albert S.
Snow, 268; William Swift, 174, 178, 181; William T. Tarrant,
521, 548; Robert Theobold, 514; George F. F. Wilde, 266
Commandant's office. See Buildings No. 29, No. 32
Commissioning of ships, 116, 148, 152, 153, 154-155, 226, 280,
288, 356, 358, 370, 422, 492, 796. See also Repairs
Commonwealth Dry Dock. See South Boston Annex
Complaint Board, 255
Comptroller, 732, 739, 743
Computer Application Support and Development Office (CASDO), 737-
738. See also Building No. 149
CONCORD (PG-3), 113
Congress: appropriations by, 138, 143, 401, 405, 421-422, 431-
432; on closing the yard, 2, 804; in the 1890s, 20-21, 29,
44, 48, 51, 55, 57-59, 62, 65, 67, 72, 89, 90, 93, 103, 140,
143-144; and employment, 693, 703; on Navy bureau system, 4,
5; 1900-1914 yard improvements, 201, 205, 207, 210, 211,
224, 272, 278, 288; on patronage and politics, 74-77; and
peacetime military aid, 717; and repairs by private yards,
741, 803; and wages, 99, 138, 705, 775, 778; and wartime
measures, 322, 324, 330, 337, 343, 364, 366, 374, 380
Conners Brothers Construction Company, 265, 266
Connerton, James, 261
CONSTITUTION (IX-21), 119, 120, 207, 220, 296, 300, 303, 396,
433, 796, 797, 807
Construction, ships. See New Construction
Construction and Repair: Bureau of, 4, 8, 24, 25, 61, 62, 88,
105, 106, 108, 109, 141, 384, 388; Department of, 3, 6, 7,
10, 15, 16, 19, 20, 24, 26, 27, 28-29, 34, 39, 43, 45, 51,
57, 63, 64-65, 70-71, 82, 85-86, 91, 96, 98, 99, 103, 113,
114, 117, 118, 121, 127, 128, 151, 153, 156, 158, 397, 436.
See also Buildings No. 24, No. 39
850
Construction Corps, 8, 384, 388
Construction, Equipment, and Repair, Bureau of, 4, 5
Construction Office. See Building No. 39
Conte Silvio 0. , 769
Conversion of ships, 150, 153-156, 358-359, 360-364, 370-371,
629-631, 640-641, 650, 725-726, 780-786. See also Repairs
CONWAY (DDE-508), 722
CONYNGHAM (DD-58), 356, 491, 493
CONYNGHAM (DD-371), 475, 500, 596
Cook, Allen, 134
Coontz, Robert E., 303
Copper shed. See Building No. 44
Copper Shop, 173, 194, 214, 216, 328, 392
Cordage. See Ropewalk
CORDUBA (AF-32), 72 3
COVINGTON (AP, ex-CINCINNATI ) , 362-364
Cowley, Robert, 256
Crafts, P. P., 96, 97
William Cramp and Sons, 113, 151, 197, 364
Crandall Engineering Co., 376
Craneship No. 1. See KEARSAGE
Credit Union, 546, 695. See also Building No. 32
CROWNINSHIELD (DD-134), 620
Crowley, C. V., 264, 265
CUMBERLAND (Training Ship No. 1), 368
Curley, James M. , 271
Curran, Charles W. , 265, 266
CUSHING (TB-1), 52, 112
Dana, N. T. , 569
Daniels, Josephus, 278, 302, 330
DAVIS (DD-65), 493
DAVIS (DD-937), 792
Day, Benjamin F., 22
DAYTON (CL-105), 723
Decontamination Building. See Building No. 207
Defense Department, 729, 770, 803-805, 807, 809, 810
DELAWARE (BB-28), 354, 373, 425
DELPHY (DD-261), 375, 376
Demobilization, 639, 641, 661, 727
Denby, Edwin, 384; reorganization under, 404
Dental Department, 398, 652, 655, 732
Dental Office. See Building No. 34
Deperming (degaussing), 517, 534, 651. See also Building No. 205
Depression. See Great Depression
Design Division, 653
DES MOINES (CA-134), 722
DeSteiguer, L. R., 393
DETROIT (C-10), 97, 157, 159
DEWEY (DD-349), 492
DEWEY (DLG-14), 793-794
Dewey, George, 160, 286
Dielock anchor chain, 435, 436, 438, 501, 734
Dispensary, 317, 335, 394, 398. See also Buildings No. 5, No.
120
851
Dobbin, W. E. , 133
DOBBIN (AD- 3 ) , 432
DOLPHIN (PG-24), 105, 113
Donahue, C. J., 264-265
Douglas, William, 702
DOWNES (DD-45), 299
Draft. See Selective Service
Drake, Whitford, 273
Draper Building, 662
DRAYTON (DD-23), 356
HMS DREADNOUGHT, 163, 204
Dry dock engine and pump houses. See Buildings No. 22, No. 191
Dry dockings, 27, 52, 105-112, 114, 116-118, 121, 123, 146, 147,
151, 164, 175, 204, 279, 280-284, 289, 297, 298, 300, 328,
355, 357, 359, 369, 423, 489, 508, 595, 621, 627, 718, 719,
721, 734, 750, 758, 789, 791
Dry docks, 29, 66, 70, 73, 96, 104, 138-142, 144, 145, 169, 172,
204-205, 211, 229, 495, 680, 751, 758; Dry Dock No. 1, 40,
43-53, 141, 142, 200-203, 212, 301, 328, 381, 443, 484, 489,
495, 499, 530, 532, 600, 601, 612, 669, 671, 676, 730, 756-
759; Dry Dock No. 2, 45, 55, 141, 196-202, 205, 206, 208,
212, 224, 280, 282, 300, 328, 354, 362, 380, 381, 443, 484,
489, 497, 500, 530, 532, 600, 601, 612, 669-671, 676, 748,
756, 757, 759, 792, 796; Dry Dock No. 3. See South Boston
Annex; Dry Dock No. 4. S ee South Boston Annex; Dry Dock No.
5 (Shipways No. 3), 533, 534, 601, 612, 616, 668, 669, 671,
675, 677, 756, 807-808
DUNCAN (DD-46), 299
DUPONT (DD-941), 792
HMS DURHAM, 4 94
Dwight, Samuel, 86
Dyson, C. W., 59, 60
EAST BOSTON (ferry), 153-154, 207
East Boston Fuel Annex, 515, 528, 538, 539, 662, 743, 746
East Coast Sonar Transducer and Hydrophone Pool and Repair
Facility, 707-708
Eaton, George, 31
ECHOLS (APL-37), 714
Economy Act of 1932, 452
Economy Act of 1933, 453
EDISTO (AGB-2), 723
Efficiency-Rating Board, 690
Efficiency-rating system, 408, 446, 689-690
Eichorn, Newsome, 350-351
EISENHOWER (CVN-69), 744, 798
Eldridge, Josiah H., 86, 95
ELEANOR (SP-677), 359
Electric lighting and power plants. See Power facilities;
Buildings No. 28, No. 95, No. 96, No. 108
Electrical Shop, 194, 228-229, 262-265, 463, 479, 483, 529, 567,
656, 672, 676, 678, 740. See also Building No. 197
Electrical substation. See Buildings No. 109, No. 134
Electrification. See Power facilities
852
Electronics Shop, 636-637, 656, 672, 678, 707-709, 740. See also
Building No. 197
Emergency Fleet Classification List, 333, 335
Employment, civilian: categories and classsif ications of, 77-80,
87, 232, 233-237, 239, 456, 465, 541, 573, 593, 690, 774;
civil service. See Civil Service; efficiency-marking
system. See Efficiency-rating system; hiring procedures and
regulations, 2, 26, 74-77, 80-83, 84-86, 128-129, 137, 230-
236, 237-240, 553-555, 556-567, 571-572, 681; of minorities,
89, 524, 565, 571-572, 762; in 1890s, 4, 6, 17, 19, 20, 22-
31, 35, 36, 38, 73-98; 1900-1913, 174-177, 183, 187, 188,
190, 194, 229-279, 365; in 1920s, 390, 392, 394, 406-421,
424; in 1930s, 439, 442, 444, 445-464, 465-466, 472; 1945-
1973, 636-637, 653, 664, 667, 680-705, 727, 729, 738-739,
741-742, 745-746, 749, 761-779, 814; and reductions in force
(RIF), 365, 406-407, 445-446, 472, 661, 667, 668, 680, 683-
684, 688-689, 699, 767-768, 812, 814-816; and retirement,
253-254, 407, 411, 452, 682, 703-705; and selective service.
See Selective service; during Spanish-American War, 121,
127, 128-130; and training programs, 335, 575-578, 586, 764-
766; and unions. See Unions and employee organizations; and
wages. See Wages and working conditions; of women. See
Women; during World War I, 301-302, 305-306, 316, 322-325,
329-340, 352, 365, 369; during World War II, 520-526, 531,
540-594
Engine repair shop. See Building No. 45
Engineer Corps, 8, 124
Engineering, Bureau of, 386, 505
Engineering Division, 340, 386, 388, 390, 599. See also
Industrial Dept . ; Planning Division
Engineering Officer, 192, 246, 247, 256, 338, 352
Enright, Earl F., 514
ENTERPRISE ( CV- 6 ) , 503, 641
ENTERPRISE (screw sloop), 105, 108, 120
EPC (R) 849, 718
Equipment: Bureau of, 4, 99, 101, 127, 151, 170, 182, 225, 706;
Department of, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 16, 19-24, 28, 41, 61, 64,
65, 85, 87-88, 91, 98, 100, 102, 103, 134, 136, 151, 153,
158, 170, 172-174, 177, 181, 183, 187, 216, 224, 226-228,
292. See also Buildings No. 33, No. 40, No. 42, No. 58, No.
59, No. 60, No. 62, No. 78, No. 79
Evans, Holden, 185
Executive Department, 18
Executive Order 10988, 770-771
Fair Employment Practices Committee, 572
FALCON (AM-2 8) , 493
FANTASQUE (French destroyer), 628
"Farming out," 515, 633
FARRAGUT (DD-348), 492, 598, 600
Farrell, Hopper and Company, 141, 197
Farwell, Oscar J., 135, 136
Feaster, Joseph, 25, 26, 50, 126, 152
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 524
Federal Employees Veterans Association (FEVA), 696, 700, 772, 775
853
Federal Employment Relief Administration (FERA), 457
FERN (gunboat), 102, 105
Fire, destruction by, 213, 214, 220, 221, 222, 402
Fire, prevention of, 17, 217-220, 395, 396, 468, 479, 670
Fire-fighting apparatus, 218-220, 395-396. See also Building No.
6
Fire Fighting School, 536
Fire station. See Building No. 200
Firewood shed. See Building No. 81
First aid center. See Buildings No. 208, No. 209
First Naval District, 168, 307, 308, 312-315, 321, 378, 457, 476,
511, 517, 526, 585, 616, 648, 650, 662, 701, 742;
headquarters. See Building No. 39; and selective service,
549
Fiscal Department, 644, 646, 655
FISKE (DDR-842) , 725
FITCH (DD-348), 533
Fitchburgh Railroad Slip, 143-144, 206, 207, 223, 225, 374
Fitting out of ships, 118, 148, 152, 153-156, 280, 288, 297-291,
356, 370, 422, 490-491, 631-632, 722-23, 793-794. See also
Repairs
Five Power Naval Treaty of 1922, 383, 425
Flaherty, Thomas, 558
Fleet Rehabilitation and Modernization (FRAM), 788-790
FLORIDA (BB-30), 164, 204, 280, 319, 393, 401, 410, 424-427, 494
Flynn, J. E., 698
Foley, J. J. , 132
Folsom, J. D. , 30, 31 , 131
Fore River Shipbuilding Co. (Fore River Ship and Engine Co.),
282, 284, 289, 291, 304, 319, 345, 352, 358, 364, 369, 399,
420, 428
Forge, anchor. See Building No. 40
Forge and roundhouse. See Building No. 105
FORREST (DD-461), 533
FORRESTAL (CVA-59), 750, 760
Forrestal, James, 643
S. C. Forsaith Machine Company, 56
FORT MANDAN (LSD-21), 6 40
FORTUNE (screw steamer), 105, 108, 113
Foundry, 28, 62, 173, 176, 216, 328, 479, 487, 529, 656, 672-673,
675, 740 See also Buildings No. 16, No. 42, No. 42-A
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT (CVA-42), 760, 793
Freisinger, Karl, 523
Fuel Annex. See East Boston Fuel Annex
Fuel oil pump house. See Building No. 141
Furer, Julius A., 450
Garage. See Buildings No. 38, No. 204
GARFIELD THOMAS (DE-193), 725
Gas cylinder storage, 752-753. See also Buildings No. 165, No.
165A
Gate pass system, 309-311, 312, 396
Gatehouse. See Buildings No. 1, No. 97
Geisser, Henry, 523
General Electric, 70, 71, 96, 769
854
General Precision Laboratory, Inc., 765
General Ship and Engine Works, 626
General Storehouse. See Building No. 149
General Storekeeper's Department, 34, 91, 102, 103, 178, 183,
190, 258, 316, 326. See also Buildings No. 3, No. 4, No.
37, No. 3 8
GEORGE WASHINGTON (passenger liner), 431
GEORGIA (BB-15), 164, 289, 290, 298, 303, 354, 373
Gibbs and Cox, 599, 794
Gleaves, Albert, 413, 414, 649
Gobstoob, Julius, 522-523
Gold, Pleasant D., 669
Gooding, R. C. , 775
GOVERNOR RUSSELL (gunboat), 154
Grady, James, 95
Grady, R. C., 514, 525
GRAMPUS (SS-523), 618, 640, 714
Great Depression, 439, 445-448, 456, 459, 464-466, 475, 501, 503,
703
GREAT SITKIN ( AE- 1 7 ) , 723, 726
Green, Albert S., 27
Green, William, 686
GREENE (DDR-711), 757, 789
Greeting Center. See Building No. 34
GREGORY (DD-82), 356
GRENADIER (SS-525), 618, 640, 714, 722
Groves, John B., 132
Guardhouse. See Building No. 116
GULF DAWN. See BIG HORN
Gun shed. See Building No. 52
Gun wheel transport shed. See Building No. 57
GWIN (DD-433), 500, 533, 601
GYATT (DD-712), 729, 750, 780-782
Gygax, Felix X. , 648
HALE (DD-133), 620
HAMILTON (DD-141), 4 91
Harbor Commissioners' Line, 206, 208, 209, 329, 403, 476, 677
Harding, Warren G., 384, 418
Harrison, Benjamin, 40, 76
Hartt's Shipyard, 119
Harvard University Graduate School of Business, 765
HARWOOD (DDE-861), 722
HECTOR (steamer, ex-PEDRO), 145, 150, 152-153, 161, 207
HELENA (gunboat), 157-158
Hemp storage house. See Building No. 62
HENDERSON (AP-1), 493
Henderson, Alexander, 30
HENLEY (DD-46), 307
HERBERT (DD-160), 491
Herbert, Hiliary A., 76
HERNDON (DD-198), 493, 620
Hersey, Ezra L., 27, 254
Hichborn, William G. , 25-26, 62, 63, 86
Hilliard, John, 313
855
Hilliard, R. S. , 388
Himmelfarb, David, 481-482
Hingham ammunition depot, 167, 187, 401, 644, 742, 744
Hingham Storehouse Department, 662
Holloway, Wesley 0., 11
Hoover, Herbert, 442, 445, 453-454, 456, 476
Hospital. See Chelsea Naval Hospital
Hough, Henry H., 441, 485
HOUSATONIC (CM), 371
Howard, W. F. , Jr., 700-702
Howison, Henry L. , 95, 123-125, 127-128, 151, 153, 156
Hoxie, Edmund, 239
Hudson, John W. , 17, 73, 187
HUGH PURVIS (DD-709), 789
Hull Division, 183, 188, 192-194, 270, 273-274, 277, 296, 314,
317-318, 323, 325, 338, 348, 350-351, 385, 388, 404
HUMBOLT (AVP-21), 615, 617, 621
Hunter's Point Naval Drydock , 558
IDAHO (BB-42), 492
ILLAWARA. See ONEIDA
ILLINOIS (BB-7), 103, 284, 292
INCA (screw steamer), 154-155, 207
Incinerator. See Building No. 203
INDIANA (BB-1), 103
INDMAN. See Industrial Manager, First Naval District
Industrial Department, 305, 315, 316, 322, 378, 379, 384-385,
390, 395, 407-408, 421, 466-467, 476, 490, 505-506, 508,
510-512, 532, 545, 635-636, 641, 646, 656, 671, 687;
military personnel, 512, 514; safety engineer, 468; work
schedules in, 559. See als o Manufacturing; Planning
Division; Public Works Division; Repairs
Industrial Manager, First Naval District (INDMAN), 650-651, 740-
742. See also Building No. 39
Industrial Relations Counselors, Inc. (IRC), 542-545
Industrial Relations Department, 637, 642, 644, 646, 683, 704,
739, 768, 772
INGRAHAM (DD-694), 792
Inspection Department, 191, 195-196, 219, 317, 319-320
International Association of Machinists, 261, 417
Iron plate shop, 62, 64, 65, 214, 221. See also Building No. 66
ISABEL (PY-10), 350-351
IWANA (YT-2), 96, 104, 108, 116, 120
JACOB JONES (DD-61), 358
JACOB JONES (DD-130), 625
Jaffe, Jacob, 524
JENKINS (DD-42), 308
Johnson, Lewis, 685-686
Joiner and Pattern Shop, 28, 62, 63
Joiner Shop, 194, 339, 478. See also Buildings No. 36, No. 114
JOSEPH HEWES (DE-1078), 795
Kaiser Engineers, 807
KALAMAZOO (AOR-60), 7 96
856
KANSAS (BB-21), 282, 284
KASAAN BAY (CVE-69), 723
KATADHIN (ram), 116, 156
KATE JONES. See SEMINOLE
KEARSAGE (BB-5, Craneship No. 1), 354, 373, 397
Kennedy, John F., 769, 770
KENTUCKY (BB-6), 291, 354, 373
KEPPLER (DD-765), 722, 792
Key West naval station, 442
Knapp, John S. , 87, 88
Knox, Frank, 642
Korean Conflict, 635, 661, 680, 687, 713, 715, 721, 723-724,
726-727, 743
KRONPINZESSIN CECILE. See MOUNT VERNON
KULA GULF (CVE-108), 723-724
Labor Board, 19, 79, 81-83, 129, 130, 133, 232, 234-235, 237-239,
251, 278, 322, 399, 407, 409, 544, 562
Laboratories. See Building No. 34
Laborers and Riggers' Shop. See Riggers and Laborers' Shop;
Riggers, Laborers and Sailmakers ' Shop
Laborers' loft. See Building No. 25
Lake Superior Shipbuilding Co. , 632
LANCASTER (screw sloop), 119, 120, 146, 156
LANCEFISH (SS-297), 616, 640
Langan, John, 570
Langer-Chavez-Stevenson Act of 1948, 682
LANSDALE (DD-426), 500, 601
LARK (AM-21), 3 93
Latrines. See Building No. 127
George Lawley and Sons, 240, 345, 358, 628, 631, 632
Leach, L. L., 221, 265, 266
League Island Navy Yard. See Philadelphia Navy Yard
LEARY (DD-158), 491
LEBANON (AG-2), 150, 151
LEHEIGH (monitor), 146, 148, 150
Lend-Lease Act of March 1940, 596, 603
LEVIATHAN (passenger liner, ex-VATERLAND) , 406, 428-431, 489, 494
LEXINGTON, (CV-2), 399, 428
LEXINGTON ( CV- 1 6 ) , 793
LEYTE (CV-32), 726
Lighthouse Service, 424, 428
Lighthouse tenders, 494
Lightships (Nos. 86, 106, 117), 494
LING (SS-297), 616
LITTLE (DD-79), 356
Locker building. See Building No. 206
Lockwood's Basin, 316, 376-378, 397, 515, 528, 538, 626
Lockwood Manufacturing Company, 153, 155
Locomotive and crane shed. See Building No. 141
Lodge, Henry Cabot, 77, 88, 260
London Naval Treaty of 1930, 439, 440, 474, 488, 598
Long, John D., 166, 170, 237
LONG BEACH ( CG (N)-9), 788
Long Beach Naval Shipyard, 799, 805
857
Lowell, R. T. S., 388
Loyalty Review Board, 682
LST-1153, 610
LST-1154, 610
LST-1173, 432, 715-716
LURLINE (steamship), 494
Lutts, C. G., 481
Lyon, Frank, 313
Lyon, Henry, 10
Lyons, Kenneth T. , 696-697, 701-703, 775, 805
McAteer, Joseph S., 700-702
MCCAFFREY (DD-860), 722
MCCARD (DD-822), 722
McCarthy, Joseph, 683
McCormack, John W. , 444, 583, 701, 769
McDaniel, Joseph H., 76
MACDONOUGH (DD-351), 470-471, 473, 475, 495, 594, 596, 600
MCDOUGAL (DD-54), 3 56
McGraith, J. , 133
MACHIAS (PG-5), 102, 103, 146, 148, 156, 158
Machine, Galley and Foundry Shop, 23, 99, 100
Machine Shop, 16, 30, 58, 61, 65, 67, 131, 144, 189, 194, 197,
205, 214-216, 217, 328, 338, 391, 392, 465-466, 478-479,
487, 529, 634, 675; foundry, 101. See also Buildings No.
42, No. 42-A, No. 106
Machine Shop, Inside, 391-392, 465, 656, 740
Machine Shop, Outside, 466, 656, 675, 676, 740. See also
Building No. 192
Machine tools, installation of, 59-65
Machinery Division, 183, 184, 192-194, 214, 258, 313, 317-318,
323, 325, 338, 351, 358, 368, 385-386, 388, 404, 407
McNamara, Robert, 731, 804, 809
MADISON (DD-425), 500, 601
MAHAN (DD-102), 393, 598
MAINE (BB-10), 103, 123, 124
MAJESTIC (passenger liner), 431
Maiden nitre depot, 12, 123
MALIN (French destroyer), 628
Management Planning and Review Division, 644, 646, 655, 737
MANLEY (DD-74), 356
Manufacturing, 98, 99-102, 112, 632-634, 706-707, 744-746;
"farming out," 632. See also Anchors; Chain making;
Ropewalk
Manufacturing Department, 171, 177-178, 180-181, 183-188, 191,
192, 196, 259, 262-263, 305, 310, 316, 327
MARBLEHEAD (C-ll), 97, 103, 116, 117, 119, 132, 157, 160
MARCELLUS (AC, ex-TITANIA), 145, 150, 152
MARCUS ISLAND (CVE-77), 7 23
Mare Island Navy Yard (Naval Shipyard), 3, 57, 61, 102, 103,
139, 140, 185, 294, 344, 444, 446, 452, 708, 805
MARIETTA (PG-15), 157, 158
Marine Corps, 6, 11, 12, 66, 83, 123, 187, 188, 304, 309-311,
314, 315, 390, 395, 404, 486, 506, 520, 644
Marine Corps rifle range. See Building No. 122
858
Marine Fisheries Bureau, 538
Marine railway, 208, 373-374, 376, 538; Marine Railway No. 11,
374-376, 402, 410, 428, 484-485, 488-489, 492-493, 530, 534,
538, 621, 676, 677, 719, 755-756
MARION (sloop of war), 103
Mariwood, Mitchell and Company, 188
Marron, Adrian R., 648-649, 681
Martin, Ernest N., 410
MARYLAND (ACR-8), 199
Mason, Alexander, 240
MASSACHUSETTS (BB-2), 103
MASSACHUSETTS (BB-59), 631
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 166
Massachusetts Nautical Training School, 105
Massachusetts State Naval Militia, 104, 105
Mast house and spar shop, 28. See also Building No. 85
Master Mechanics Association, 258-259, 261
Masters' Conference, 393
MATAGORDA (AVP-22), 615-617, 620
MAYRANT (DD-402), 4 49, 500
Medical Department, 6, 7, 11, 20, 36, 152, 179, 183, 188, 189,
39C, 398-399, 642, 644, 647, 652, 732. See also Dental
Department; Buildings No. 4, No. 5, No. 120
Medicine and Surgery, Bureau of, 4, 5, 33-34, 398, 643, 652, 731.
See also Medical Department
Meekin, Robert, 87-89
Meigs, B. B. , 132
MELVILLE (AD-2) , 358
MEREDITH (DD-434), 500, 533, 601
Metal Workers' Shop, 220, 221, 222. See also Building No. 106
Metropolitan Coal Company, 378
Metropolitan Intercepting Sewer, 68, 69
Meyer, George von L. , 171, 181-184, 185, 260, 269, 301, 634
Military Department, 389, 395, 466, 506, 654
Miller, Joseph N. , 88, 92, 95
Milton, John B., 125
MINNESOTA (steam frigate), 105, 120, 125, 145
Mintoyne, William, 25-26, 50, 62-64, 72
Missiles, guided, 710, 733, 780, 781, 784, 785, 786, 796
MISSOURI (BB-11), 291, 292
Mitchell, W., 372
MOALE (DD-693), 792
Mold Loft, 28, 223, 479, 676. See also .Buildings No. 40, No. 77
Mold loft annex. See Building No. 36
MONAGHAN (DD-354), 473, 475, 495, 594, 600
MONTERY (steamship), 494
Moody, Roscoe G., 395
"Mosquito fleet" (Auxiliary Defense Fleet), 122, 167
Mostone, Albert, 548-549
MOUNT VERNON (steamer, ex-KRONPRINZESSIN CECILE), 364
Movie theatre. See Building No. 38
MUGFORD (DD-389), 475, 496, 498, 500, 599
Muster house. See Building No. 31
Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, 717, 724-725
Mystic Docks, 316
859
Mystic Docks Terminal Warehouse, 327
Mystic Pond, 67
428, 493
3), 114, 116
of Government Employees
NACO chain, 436
NANTUCKET ( 1 ightship ) ,
NARKEETA (Steam Tug No
National Association
776, 804-805, 814
National Association
Navy Yards, 261
National Association of
Defense Act of 1916, 330
Federation of Federal Employees,
Guard, 330, 332
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (NIRA),
460, 473, 477, 485
League of Employees of Government Naval
of
U
National
National
National
National
458,
National
NAGE), 772-774,
Leadingmen and Quartermen of the U.S.
S. Civil Service Employees, 259-260
414
440, 445
, 457-
Stations and
0, 261
Arsenals, 261
National League of Employees of Navy Yards and Stations, 26
National League of Government Employees, 257
National Metal Trades Association, 421
NATOMA BAY (CVE-62), 72 3
Naval architecture and engineering training programs, 766,
Naval Constructor, 139, 143, 153, 180-183, 194, 270, 273
William Baxter, 313-314, 318; Holden Evans, 185;
Feaster, 25, 26, 50, 152; Thomas Roberts, 319-321
Elliot Snow, 169, 174, 175, 178, 180, 259, 260, 30
Theodore Wilson, 10, 25, 26, 45, 61, 64, 139-140
Naval districts system, 167-168, 312, 314
Naval Facilities Engineering Command, 731
Naval hospital. See Chelsea Naval Hospital
Naval Industrial Reserve Gear Plant, 662
Naval Lyceum. See Buildings No. 5
Naval Overseas Transportation Service, 366
Naval Reserves. See Building No. 4
Naval Ships Systems Command, 731, 750
Navigation: Bureau of, 4, 124; Department of, 6, 7, 10, 20,
Navy, Department of the, 1, 4, 8, 13, 20, 60, 70, 82-85, 9
99, 106, 163, 166, 237, 411, 440, 444, 446, 449, 451
473-474; and coal facilities, 224, 225; fleet organi
by, 284-285, 297-298, 424-425; 1946-1973, 641, 643
692, 731, 749, 770, 803; during the Spanish-America
150-155, 158-160; regulations, 93-94, 127; during Wor
I, 305-307, 319, 322, 324, 330, 333, 335-338, 340-341
346, 364, 367, 369; during World War II, 541, 543, 548
563, 575, 587, 591, 599, 621-622
Navy, Secretary of. See Secretary of the Navy
Navy Coal Board, 224
Navy Prison. See Building No. 38
NEBRASKA (BB-14), 164, 298, 299,
767
, 291;
Joseph
, 349;
9-310;
36
0, 97-
, 470,
zation
, 673,
n War ,
Id War
, 345-
, 556,
NECHES (AO-5), 372
Neilson, John L., 152
NELANSU (SP-610), 359
NEPTUNE (AC-8), 3 97
Neutrality Patrol, 307-309,
337, 354
312, 360, 620
860
Newall, James, 132
NEWARK (C-l), 15, 113-114
Newberry, Truman, 171, 176-177, 185, 269, 384
Newberry plan of reorganization, 177-183, 185, 310, 319
New Construction, 139, 163-164, 292-294, 329, 364, 365, 369, 371,
372, 421-422, 425, 439, 441, 464, 465, 475-476, 487, 503,
730; BALOA-class submarines, 616; cruisers, 490; destroyers,
441, 444, 457, 473, 487, 494, 495, 594, 596-602, 618, 666;
destroyer escorts, 602-608, 618; landing craft, 608-615;
LCMs, 613, 618; LSDs , 609, 614-615; LSTs , 605, 608-612, 618,
640, 710, 715-716, 723; submarine chasers, 358; TENCH-class
submarines , 618
New Deal, 440, 456-458, 460
NEW JERSEY (BB-16), 164, 199, 284, 289-292, 296, 298, 372
NEW MEXICO (BB-40), 639, 712
NEWPORT (PG-12), 28, 117-119
Newport Naval Torpedo Station, 282, 367, 376
Newport News Shipbuilding, 364, 598-599
NEW YORK (ACR-2) , 267
New York Navy Yard. See Brooklyn Navy Yard
New York Shipbuilding, 282, 364, 598-599
New York Times , 181, 198, 814
NICHOLSON (DD-442), 500
NIPMUC (AFF-147), 723
Nitre depot. See Maiden Depot
NITRO (AE-2), 447, 493
Norfolk Navy Yard (Naval Shipyard), 3, 57, 61-62, 102-103, 114,
134, 139, 152, 185, 205, 270, 272, 294, 297, 344, 436, 442,
444, 475, 805, 806
NORRIS (DD-859), 722
North Atlantic Fleet. See Atlantic Fleet
North Atlantic Patrol, 537
NORTH CAROLINA (ACR-12), 300
NORTH DAKOTA (BB-29), 204, 209, 373
North Patrol Squadron, 122
Norton, Paul, 171
NUECES (APB-40), 640
Nulton, Louis M., 447, 451-453, 470-472
O'BRIEN (DD-415), 500, 601
O'Brien, Mary, 567
O'Brien and Sheehan , 141, 197-199
OGLALA. See SHAWMUT
OLD COLONY (SP-1254), 359
OLYMPIA (C-6), 103, 157, 160, 286-288
ONEIDA (SP-109), ex-ILLAWARA, 154
O'Neil, Henry, 350-351
Ordnance, 190, 289, 510; Bureau of, 4, 182, 643, 651; Department
of, 6-7, 9, 10, 19, 20, 32-33, 91, 174, 177, 182-183, 187,
192, 222, 290, 292, 319; Division of, 732. See also Combat
Weapons System Division; Buildings No. 34, No. 39, No. 153
Ordnance Shop, 675
Ordnance storehouse. See Building No. 79
OREGON (BB-3), 103, 139, 157
ORION (AC-11), 399-400
861
OSBERG (DE-538), 604, 640
OSWALD A. POWERS (DE-542), 640
Outfitting ships. See Fitting out
Paget Report, 642, 643
Paine, G. T. , 514
Paint Shop, 194, 195, 217, 220, 223-223, 256-257, 339, 468, 479,
529, 656, 657-658, 740. See also Buildings No. 10, No. 125
Panama Canal Commission, 438
PANTHER (AD-6), 182
Parker, Joseph B., 36, 67-69
Parks, Granville, 96-97
Parks, Rufus, 34-35
PASSAIC (monitor), 104-105, 108, 120
PATAPSCO (AT-10), 293
Pattern Shop, 64, 70-71, 173, 176, 194, 213, 216, 219, 220, 529,
656, 740. See also Buildings No. 36, No. 42
PATTERSON (DD-36), 299, 308, 358
PATTERSON (DE-1061), 795
PAULDING (DD-22), 299, 307, 434, 491, 492
Pay Corps, 9
Pay Department, 187-188
Paymaster of the Yard, 35-36. See also Building No. 5
Pay Officer, 178
Pearl Harbor Navy Yard (Naval Shipyard), 205-206, 376, 708, 805
PECOS (AO-6), 372, 402
PEDRO. See HECTOR
Pendleton Civil Service Act of 1883, 74
Pensacola Navy Yard, 3, 799
PENTUCKET (YT-8), 293-295, 368
PERA (ASW) (Planning and Engineering for Repairs and Alterations,
Anti-Submarine Warfare), 732, 736-739
PERRY (DD-844), 788
Personnel Relations Division, 508, 510, 543-546, 564, 574-575,
579, 581-582, 585; training programs, 576-578
Personnel Supervision and Management Division, 542, 555
PETREL (PG-2), 100
Petrelli, Albert, 521
Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Co., 151
Philadelphia (League Island) Navy Yard (Naval Shipyard), 3, 57,
103, 104, 139, 140, 148, 150, 182, 270, 294, 297, 432, 442,
444, 446, 475, 750, 804, 806, 810, 813
PICKEREL (SS-524), 618, 640
PILGRIM (commercial vessel), 96
Pipe and Copper Shop, 656, 740
Pipe Shop, 328, 392, 479, 483, 487, 529, 532, 570. See also
Buildings No. 24, No. 43, No. 103, No. 195
Planning Division, 508, 626, 641, 644, 646, 652-653, 655, 710,
732, 787, 794
Plumbers' Shop, 64, 173, 180, 392. See also Buildings No. 28,
No. 4
Polaris Support Complex, 805-806
Police force, 396-397
POLLACK (lightship), 494
PORTLAND (CA-33), 49 0, 6 41
862
Portsmouth Navy Yard (Naval Shipyard), 2-3, 28, 38, 47, 57, 103,
119, 140, 158, 168, 211, 293, 294, 308, 312-315, 424, 442,
444, 446, 616, 618, 640, 714, 750, 802-806
Power facilities: Central Power Plant, 96, 139, 144, 173, 184,
218, 226-227, 400-403, 447, 485-486, 539, 678; consolidation
of, 171-173; electrification, 70-73, 135, 144-145; power
plants and shops, 225. See also Buildings No. 28, No. 95,
No. 96, No. 108
Preparation Service Shop, 392, 465-466
PRINCE EDWARD (steamer), 126
Prindle, F. C. , 37-39
Printing Office, 652
Prison. See Navy prison
Production Division, 388, 391, 393, 468, 508, 510-511, 515, 625,
626, 638, 644, 646, 652, 655-656, 707, 732-733, 737, 739,
742, 765, 794
PROVIDENCE (CLG-6), 780, 782
"Providence" Building, 405
Provisions and Clothing: Bureau of, 4, 9, 34; Department of, 6,
7, 20, 33-35, 178. See also General Storekeeper's Depart.;
Supplies and Accounts
Public Works Department, 184, 187, 190, 209, 224, 226, 227, 256,
265, 315, 329, 378, 388, 390, 508, 510, 528-530, 539, 544,
637, 642, 644, 646, 652-656, 672, 732, 742. See also Yards
and Docks; Buildings No. 4, No. 107, No. 200
Public Works shops, 190, 466, 479, 529, 653-654, 656
Puget Sound Navy Yard (Naval Shipyard), 185, 205, 270, 294, 444,
446, 805, 810
Pump house. See Building No. 191
Pumping plant. See Building No. 123
PUTNAM (DD-287) , 425
QUAIL (AM-15), 493
Quality and Reliability Assurance Division, 732-734, 738-739
Quarters (yard officers'), 11, 229; upper and lower, 54
HMS QUEEN MARY, 628
RALEIGH (CL-7), 394, 447, 470-472, 490
RALPH TALBOT (DD-390), 475, 496-500, 599
Randolph, A. Phillip, 572
Ranks, listing of, 8-10
Receiving ships, 6, 11-13, 187, 314, 315, 467
Receiving Station, 467, 536-537, 644; Frazier Barracks. See
Building No. 33
REDBUD (AKL-398), 723
Repairs, 1-3, 12, 98-100, 104-106, 112-114, 116-117, 119-121,
279-280, 403, 421, 447, 490-491, 493-494, 500, 528, 535,
538, 626, 706, 729-730, 749-750, 756, 758, 766, 769, 800;
of Allied vessels, 505, 509, 628; on bathythermographs, 709;
battleships, 164, 354, 371-372; commissioning, outfitting,
and conversions, 164, 206, 285, 286-294, 298-300, 352, 356,
358, 370, 372, 490-491, 493-494, 629-632, 640-641, 687, 709,
717-726, 727, 780, 788-794, 812; decline of, 439, 464, 466,
472, 487-494; decommissioning, 119, 153, 160, 161, 370, 372,
425, 638; of electronic equipment, 707; in the 1920s, 383,
863
Repairs ( continued ) , 400, 422, 424, 428, 435; by private
companies, 106-108, 114, 116, 118-120, 306, 315, 316, 341,
344, 345, 420, 510, 515, 621, 626, 650-651, 741, 780, 800,
802, 804; of the reserve fleet, 711, 712; and reactivations,
713, 717, 724; during the Spanish-American War, 121, 145-
160; on submarines, 164, 356, 358, 434, 618, 665-666;
during World War I, 305, 323-325, 329, 352, 354-356, 364,
368-369, 371-373; during World War II, 505, 508, 516, 528,
535, 544, 621-629. See also Dry dockings; Fitting out
"Report of Master Mechanics on Discharged Men," 132, 133
Reserve Fleet. See Atlantic Reserve Fleet
RHODE ISLAND (BB-17), 164, 249, 284, 289, 291, 298, 352, 354, 373
RICHARD B. LEARY (DD-664), 596
Richards, Bill, 572-574
Riggers and Laborers' Shop, 180, 194, 339, 359, 392, 468, 478-
479, 524
Riggers, Laborers and Sailmakers ' Shop, 656, 740
Rigging Loft, 23, 99, 213. See also Building No. 24
Riley, Joseph, 31, 131
Roach and Sons, 159
ROAN (DD-853), 722
ROBERTS (DD-823), 722
Roberts, John H., 86
Roberts, Thomas, 319-321, 349-351
ROCKET (tug), 52, 104, 113, 120
Rockland Trial Course, 282
HMS RODNEY, 62 4
ROE (DD-24), 356
Rolling Mill, 23, 99, 101, 216, 226. See als o Building No. 40
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 246, 248, 257, 269, 271, 272, 275, 279,
340, 341, 440, 445, 520, 553, 572, 596, 619; and the
"Roosevelt Recession," 447
Roosevelt, Theodore, 122, 176, 291, 292
Ropewalk, 3, 21-22, 69, 78, 87, 99, 100, 134-136, 172, 194, 219,
226, 227, 328, 338, 339, 392, 401, 441, 447, 472, 480-481,
518, 532, 560, 566, 568-569, 587, 633, 656, 667, 706, 729,
734, 744-746, 752, 801-802, 807, 810; and the wire rope
mill, 23, 99. See also Building No. 58
Ruhlman, Fred L. , 702, 765
Rush, William R., 181, 182, 219, 220, 278, 279, 311-315, 319-323,
333-334, 348-352, 367, 368, 725
Russell, John T., 250-251
S-4, 434
Safety Engineer, 391, 468-469
Safety program, 540, 541, 578-579, 581, 586
Sail Loft, 23, 99, 101-102, 194, 339, 343-344, 392, 468. See
also Building No. 33
Sailmakers' strike, 343-344, 347
SALEM (CL-3), 299, 356
SALEM (CL-139), 722
SALERNO BAY (CVE-110), 723, 724
SALINAS (AO-190, 493
Salvage stores. See Building No. 193
Sampson, William T. , 238, 256
864
Sanborn, Ralph Samuel, 523-524
SAN DIEGO (CL-53), 631
San Diego Naval Station, 376, 749
Sands, James H., 22, 87
Sangamo Electric Company, 764
SAN JUAN (CL-54) , 631
SANTEE (CVE-29), 723
SARGEANT BAY (CVE-83), 723
SAUCY (PG-65), 629
SAVANNAH (AS~8, ex-SAXONIA), 364
SAVO ISLAND (CVE-78), 723
Sawmill, 62, 63, 67, 219, 220, 222-223, 339, 478, 479, 529. See
also Buildings No. 66, No. 67, No. 114
Sawmill and spar shop, 220. See also Building No. 114
Sawyer, Albert, 96
SAXONIA. See SAVANNAH
Scanlon, J. J. , 133
Schlabach, R. P., 458, 475
Schmitz, C. A. , 263, 264
Sciaky Bros., Inc., 764
Scientific management. See Taylorism
Scouting Force, 490, 491
Seattle Construction and Dry Dock, 364
Seavey, Horatio S., 27
Secretary of the Navy, 1-3, 5, 21, 45, 75, 76, 79, 84, 87, 90,
92, 98, 103, 104, 140, 170-171, 237, 244, 245, 249-250, 252-
254, 256, 266, 274-275, 285, 329, 333, 334, 337, 356, 379,
394, 412, 413, 415-416, 418, 450, 460-461, 485, 521-522,
525, 542, 548, 554, 556, 559, 560-561, 587, 589, 642, 703,
731, 751; Asst. Sec, 243, 246, 257, 269, 271, 272; Charles
Francis Adams, 441, 444; Josephus Daniels, 278, 302, 324,
330-331; Edwin Denby , 384; James Forrestal , 643; Hilliary A.
Herbert, 76; Frank Knox, 542; John D. Long, 166, 170, 237;
George von L. Meyer, 171, 181-183, 185, 260, 269, 301, 634;
Truman Newberry, 171, 176; Paul Norton, 171; Franklin D.
Roosevelt (Asst. Sec), 246, 269, 271-271, 340, 341; Claude
Swanson, 444, 474, 475; Charles S. Thomas, 701; Benjamin T.
Tracy, 34, 40, 76, 79, 80, 85, 86; William C. Whitney, 3, 34
Security during World War II, 517-527
Selective service system, 332-335, 541, 547-552
Selfridge, Thomas P., 15, 94, 103, 113
SEMINOLE (screw tug, ex-KATE JONES), 155, 207
Senate, investigation by the, 269
SERAD (Special Electronic Restoration and Distribution Program),
708-709
SEVERN. See CHESAPEAKE
Sewage system, 66, 68-70, 73
SHAMROCK ISLAND (CVE-84), 723
SHANGRI-LA (CVE-38), 724
SHAUMUT (CM-4, ex-OGLALA), 360
Sheds. See Buildings No. 83, No. 154, No. 156, No. 157,' No. 161
SHEEHAN (DE-541), 640
Sheet Metal Shop, 392, 482, 568, 656, 675, 676, 740, 753-754.
See also Building No. 103
Shell houses. See Buildings No. 3, No. 32, No. 47
865
Sherman, James S., 242
Ship Repair Training Unit, 516
Shipbuilding. See New construction
Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board of the Emergency Fleet
Corporation, 346, 347
Shipbuilding Ways, 476, 495, 676; No. 1, 530, 601, 605, 612, 614,
615, 617, 621, 671; No. 2, 601, 605, 612; No. 3. See Dry
Dock No. 5
Shipfitters' Shop, 62, 64, 72, 180, 194-195, 220, 221, 237, 276,
338-339, 351, 392, 483-484, 529, 532, 567-568, 740. See
also Buildings No. 66, No. 104, No. 106, No. 195
Shiphouses. Se e Buildings No. 68, No. 71, No. 73, No. 92
Ships, Bureau of, 466, 505-506, 599-600, 609, 628, 643-644, 651,
655, 659, 664-665, 672-673, 700-701, 705-707, 709, 725, 728,
731-732, 734, 741, 747-748, 750-752, 757, 759, 761, 770,
772, 782. See also Naval Ships Systems Command
Shipsmiths ' shop. See Building No. 105
Shipwrights' Shop, 194, 223, 339. See also Building No. 22
Shipyard Commander, 644, 646, 650, 651, 691, 728, 732, 740, 744,
750, 772, 810; Russell B. Arthur, 813; Raymond W. Burk, 649,
775, 811-813; Pleasant D. Gold, Jr., 669; R. C. Gooding,
775; W. F. Howard, Jr., 700-702; Adrian R. Marron, 648-649,
681; Fred L. Ruhlman, 702, 765; Philip W. Snyder, 698, 700;
Richard M. Watt, Jr., 686
Shipyard Defense Bill, 518
Shipyard Management Information System (MIS), 738
Shop committees, 413-416, 460-461, 691, 694; Joint Shop Council,
691-692
Shops, 19, 28, 62, 63, 79, 122, 194-195, 389, 391-392, 400-401,
413-415, 466-468, 516, 518, 560, 580, 636, 638, 706, 720;
manufacturing, 447, 465-466, 501-502; organization of, 656-
661, 672, 675, 739-740; in ship construction, 465-466
Shop superintendent, 544, 575
Shore Establishment Division, 542, 543
SHRUB (Lighthouse Service), 494
Simmers, C. M. , 388, 407, 410, 417, 427, 430
Simpsons Patent Dry Dock Company, 345
SIRIUS (AK-15), 493
Smith, August, 225
Smithery, 28, 63, 172, 173, 194, 220, 221, 226, 402, 479. See
also Buildings No. 40, No. 105
Snedeker, William A., 131, 133, 134
Snow, Albert S. , 268
Snow, Elliot, 169, 174, 175, 178, 180, 259, 260, 309-310
Snyder, Philip W. , 698, 700
Southall, T., 468
South Boston Annex, 476, 486, 510, 511, 516, 528, 536, 537, 539,
540, 576, 626, 629, 658, 662, 667, 672-675, 678-680, 712,
716, 726, 743, 744, 746, 749, 760-761, 807-809; Dry Dock No.
3 (Commonwealth Dock), 205, 380, 381, 489, 492, 494, 509,
535, 537, 621, 660, 665, 712-713, 748, 756, 760, 796; Dry
Dock No. 4, 660, 663, 664, 668, 748, 756, 760, 796; Net
Depot, 516, 537
South Boston Coal Storage Depot, 316
866
South Boston Iron Works, 12
SOUTHERLY (steamer), 150-152, 467, 493
Southwark Foundry and Machine Company, 52
Spanish-American War, 1, 31, 56, 72, 93, 94, 99, 108, 113, 120,
121-122, 128-131, 136-138, 140, 144, 145-162, 164, 167, 186,
201, 224, 229, 232, 301, 306, 309, 325, 635, 799
Spar Shop, 213, 222, 228
SPRINGFIELD (CLG-7), 786-787
Squantum plant, 369, 376-378, 397, 404, 405, 427-430,
Steam chest. See Building No. 86
Steam Engineering: Bureau of, 4, 29, 137, 170, 177, 182;
Department of, 3, 6, 7, 10, 16, 19, 20, 30, 31, 43, 45, 50,
57-59, 61, 64, 65, 68, 91, 98, 99, 103, 112-114, 117, 118,
121, 125, 127, 129-132, 136, 146, 151, 153, 155, 158, 172-
176, 180, 181, 183, 187, 192, 202, 214-216, 256, 260, 288,
290
STERLING (steamer), 161
Storage, 35, 307, 316, 326-327, 399, 478, 515, 536, 638, 639,
752. See also Buildings No. 3, No. 4, No. 33, No. 34, No.
37, No. 38, No. 39, No. 101, No. 127, No. 130, No. 131, No.
146, No. 147, No. 148, No. 149, No. 153, No. 164, No. 167,
No. 177, No. 186, No. 187, No. 198, No. 199, No. 201
Stowe, A. W. , 26 4
Streker, P. S., 575, 582
STRINGHAM (DD-83), 356
Structural Shop, 392, 465, 479, 482, 487, 529, 656, 675, 676.
See also Building No. 104
Submarine rescue techniques, 434
SUFFOLK COUNTY (LST-1173), 432, 715-716
Supplies and Accounts, Bureau of, 7, 9, 34, 170, 343, 643, 731
Supply Department, 306-307, 315-317, 326, 327, 334, 390, 392,
394, 399, 447, 466, 506, 508, 511, 536, 539, 544, 638, 642,
644, 654-655; and demobilization, 639, 662. See also
General Storekeeper's Department
SURPRISE (PG-63), 629
Survey Board, 62
Swanson, Claude, 444, 474, 475
Swift, William, 174, 178, 181, 256, 265
TACOMA (Cruiser No. 18), 356
Taft, William Howard, 163, 177, 230, 299
Tague, Peter, 256
TALBOT (DD-390). See RALPH TALBOT
TALBOT (DEG-4), 796-797
Talos missiles, 780, 785
Tar pit storage shed. See Building No. 23
Tarrant, W. T., 521, 548
Tarring house. See Building No. 60
Tartar missiles, 781, 786, 796
Tate, John M. , 28
Taylor, Frederick W. , 177, 184, 192, 271
Taylorism (scientific management), 184-186, 193, 269, 270, 323,
418; time studies, 184, 217
Telephone building and exchange. See Building No. 31
Telephones, introduction of, 72, 73
867
Temporary Service Shop, 565, 740
Temporary storage building. See Building No. 127
Terminal Island Navy Yard, 558
TERRIBLE (French destroyer), 628
Terrier missiles, 781, 782
TEXAS (second-class battleship), 103, 199
TEXAS (BB-35), 42 6
Theobold, Robert, 514
Third Battleship Division of the Atlantic Fleet, 354
Third Naval District, 359
Thomas, Charles S., 701
Timber Bending Shop, 28, 62. See als o Building No. 66
Timber shed. See Building No. 63
Timber storage shed. See Building No. 64
Time studies, 184, 217
Tinners and Plumbers' Shop, 28. See al so Building No. 28
Tinsmiths and shipwrights' shop. See Buildings No. 22, No. 28
TITANIA. See MARCELLUS
Tool room. See Building No. 101
Tool shed. See Building No. 65
TOPEKA (gunboat), 161
TORTUGA (LSD-26), 615
Tracy, Benjamin F., 34, 40, 76, 79, 80, 85, 86
Trade schools, 335
Training programs, 335, 515-516, 575-578, 586, 764-767. See also
Buildings No. 34, No. 79
Training Squadron, 422
Transportation office. See Building No. 204
Transportation Shop, 401, 510, 653, 656
Transportation system, 65; railway track system, 66, 212-213, 222
Treasury Department. See Coast Guard
Tribou, David, 11
TRIPPE (DD-33), 299, 308
TRIPPE (DD-403), 449, 500
TRIPPE (DE-1075), 795
TRIOMPHANT (French destroyer), 628
TRIUMPH (passenger liner), 431
Truman, Harry, 682-683, 686, 727
TUCKER (DD-57), 49 3
Turville, W. H. H. , 514
Unions and employee organizations, 244, 245, 251, 254, 257, 258,
259, 260-279, 413-416, 417, 421, 459-464, 585-586, 691, 692-
702, 761-762, 769-776, 804-805, 814; labor conciliation, 345
United Association of Journeyman Plumbers, Gasfitters, Steam-
fitters and Steamf itters ' Helpers, 257
United Housesmiths and Bridgemen, 258
United States Civil Service Retirememt Association, 261
United States Destroyer and Submarine Base. See Squantum Plant
United States Employee Compensation Commission, 399
United States Naval Boiler and Turbine Laboratory, 764
U. S. Naval Dry Dock, South Boston. See South Boston Annex
U. S. Naval Fuel Annex. See East Boston Fuel Annex
United States Lines, 424, 430
United States Shipping Board, 360, 381, 424, 430
868
Upholsterers' Union, 244
UTAH (BB-31), 164, 373, 393, 394, 424, 426, 427, 493
VANDALIA (screw sloop), 293
VANDIVER (DE-540, DER-540), 604, 716-717, 723
Vangelli, M. G. , 462
VATERLAND. See LEVIATHAN
VEGA (AK-17), 493
VERMONT (BB-20), 284, 292
VESUVIUS (dynamite gun cruiser), 109, 113, 116-117, 119, 157,
161, 207
Veterans, 233, 234, 551, 636, 683-685, 688, 696-702, 762, 768,
772; Civil War, 83. See also Federal Employees Veterans
Association (FEVA)
Vickers system of shop management, 185-186
VICKSBURG (Gunboat No. 11), 145, 161
Vietnam War, 729, 730, 745, 809, 812
VILLE D'YS (French sloop of war), 494
Vinson Act of 1938, 596
Vinson-Trammel Act of 1934, 440, 596
VIRGINIA (BB-13), 164, 288, 298-299, 303, 354, 362, 372, 380
VULCAN (AR-5), 723
VULCAN (screw steamer, ex-CHATHAM), 155-156
W. M. WOOD (DDR-715), 725
WABASH (screw frigate), 6, 11-13, 71, 104, 113, 120, 125, 127,
143, 146, 172, 173, 210, 226
WACCAMAW (AO-109), 723
Wage Board, 89-92, 242-248, 339-341, 412, 414-416, 449-451, 459,
544, 587-588, 703
Wage Review Board, 413, 418, 692
Wage schedules, 89, 91-93, 242-244, 246-249, 255, 339, 343, 347,
412, 414-416, 418-419, 449-450, 703
Wage Stabilization Board, 704-705
Wages and working conditions, 78-80, 89-94, 131, 241-262, 272-
273, 275, 338-352, 365, 368, 408-409, 412-413, 416-421,
449-455, 541, 545, 587-594, 622, 680, 703-705, 775, 778-779;
wage stabilization, 449. See also Wage Board; Wage
schedules
WAGNER (DE-539), 604, 716-717
WAHNETA (YT-1), 113, 116
WAINWRIGHT (DD-62), 358, 410, 493
WALKE (DD-416), 500, 601
Wallace, W. C, 514
War Department, 143, 209, 269
War Manpower Commission, 547
War Overtime Act, 593
War Production Committees, 580-581, 586
Warehouse. See Building No. 75
Warren , Earl , 702
WARRINGTON (DD-30), 308
Washington Navy Yard, 3, 21-22, 65, 103
Washington Technological Associates, 788
WASP (CV-18), 793
Water system, 66, 67, 73
869
Watertown Arsenal, 269, 567
Watt, Richard M. , 686
Weapons Shop, 740. See also Building No. 38
Webber, Moses H., 22, 23, 86, 134, 135
WELBORN C. WOOD (DD-195), 6 30
Welding Shop, 740
WELLES (DD-257), 620
Wells, G. C, 698
Wet basin, 55, 139
Wharf and pier facilities, 142-144, 197, 201, 206, 208-210, 328-
329, 529, 670, 677, 751, 755; cranes, 211, 212, 530-531,
671, 676, 678, 754; floating derrick, 210, 212; hoisting
shears, 56-57, 210-211; Pier (Wharf) No. 1, 44, 54, 55, 207-
209, 211, 224, 225, 328, 374, 484, 530, 670, 671; Pier No.
2, 44, 54, 56, 207, 224, 329, 401, 530, 671, 676, 754, 755;
Pier No. 3, 44, 54, 206, 329, 671, 676, 754, 755; Pier No.
4, 54, 56, 143, 207, 208, 329, 410, 485, 671, 676, 678; Pier
No. 4A, 208, 485, 677; Pier No. 5, 44, 45, 143, 208, 209,
485, 670, 671, 677, 678; Pier No. 6, 54, 143, 207, 208, 210-
211, 327, 400, 485, 671, 676, 678; Pier No. 7, 208, 212,
329, 400, 401, 530, 671, 676, 678; Pier No. 8, 208, 329,
671, 674, 754; Pier No. 9, 208, 530, 671, 674, 754; Pier
No. 10, 208, 212, 671, 674, 754; Pier No. 11, 671, 674, 678
WHETSTONE (LSD-27), 640
WHITNEY (AD-4), 371, 372, 432-433, 439, 484, 493, 594
Whitney, William C, 3, 34
Wilde, George F. F., 266
Wiley, Benjamin D., 86
WILKES (DD-41), 493, 500, 533
WILLIAM R. RUSH (DDR-714), 725-726
Williams, Y. A. , 247
Williams, Yancey S., 395
WILLIS A. LEE (DD-929), 791
WILMINGTON (Gunboat No. 8), 157, 158
Wilson, Theodore, 10, 25, 26, 45, 61, 64 139-140
Wilson, Woodrow, 269, 302, 308, 333, 337-338, 342, 367, 383
Wire Rope Mill, 135, 216, 226, 328. See also Building No. 79
WITEK (DD-848), 640, 718
Women in the work force, 335, 532, 540, 554, 565-570, 685, 762
Wood, Spenser S., 314
Woodworking Shop, 392, 656, 675, 740
WORCESTER (CL-144), 722
Worf, D., 133
Works Progress Administration (WPA), 457-458, 484, 486
World War I, 187, 206, 210, 241, 245, 279, 280, 294, 301-302,
307, 309, 315, 325, 332, 346, 369, 405, 418, 428, 434, 475,
493, 537, 635, 725, 800; and American neutrality, 302, 307-
309, 342; and Chilean submarines, 304; gate pass system
during, 309-311; work on ships, 352-364, 368, 371-372; and
yard facilities, 324-329
World War II, 372, 441, 469, 511, 512, 515, 635, 638, 650, 666-
668, 673, 677, 681, 688, 689, 703, 707, 710, 713-717, 723,
724, 726, 729, 734, 749-751, 757, 798-801, 803; construction
prior to, 440, 476, 500, 503; work on ships, 505, 594-632;
and yard facilities, 528-540
870
WYANDOTE (monitor), 125-126, 148-150
WYOMING (BB-32), 278, 422
YMT-15, 473, 495
YMT-119, 49 5
YMT-128, 495, 500
YACOMA (SP-617), 324
YANTIC (screw gunboat), 105, 116-120
Yards and Docks: Bureau of, 4, 9, 36, 38, 39, 56, 143, 178, 401,
457, 470, 472, 477, 487, 643, 654, 731; Department of, 3, 7,
9, 10-11, 17-18, 20, 38, 39, 48, 53, 55, 58-59, 63, 65-66,
68, 85-86, 93, 95-96, 169, 172-176, 184, 187. See also
Public Works Department; Buildings No. 36, No. 39
YORKTOWN (Gunboat No. 1), 113
YOSEMITE (AD-19), 722
ZEBRA. See SERAD
Zone Standards Agreements, 587
Zumwalt, E. R., Jr., 793, 794
871
<rU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 19 6 8- 5 1-565/80052
872
NPS D6162A
REPORTS OF THE DIVISION OF CULTURAL RESOURCES
North Atlantic Regional Office, National Park Service
The Division produces and prints reports on archeological , curatorial, historical,
and historic architectural topics that identify, evaluate, document, and interpret
cultural resources in National Park Service units of the North Atlantic Region. Some
of these reports are of general interest for their presentations of substantive,
bibliographic, technical, or methodological information. These are listed below. Those
that are listed with an NTIS number are only available from the National Technical
Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22151. Others are available
from the Division of Cultural Resources, NARO, National Park Service, 15 State Street,
Boston, MA 02109. Prices are listed.
No.
1
No.
2
No.
3
Cultural Resources Management Studies
Archeological Resource Study, Roger Williams National Monument.
Public Archaeology Laboratory, Brown University, 1979.
Archeological Overview and Evaluation at Minute Man National
Historical Park. Vernon G. Baker, 1930
Historic Resources Study, Jamaica Bay: A History.
Gateway National Recreation Area, New York-New Jersey.
Frederick R. Black, 1981.
No. 4 Archeological Site Examination: A Case Study in Urban
Archeology. Roger Williams National Monument.
Patricia E. Rubertone and Joan Gallagher, 1981.
No. 5 Archeological Resource Study, Historical Archeology at
Bunker Hill Monument. Boston National Historical Park.
Thomas Mahlstedt, 1981.
No. 6 Archeological Investigation at the Narbonne House. Salem
Maritime National Historic Site. Geoffrey P. Moran,
Edward F. Zimmer, Anne E. Yentsch, 1982.
No. 7 Historic Resource Study, A History of Fort Wadsworth,
New York Harbor. Frederick R. Black, 1983.
No. 8 Chapters in the Archeology of Cape Cod, I. Results of the
Cape Cod National Seashore Archeological Survey, 1979-1981
(2 volumes). Francis P. McManamon , editor, 1984.
No. 9 The National Park Service in the Northeast: A Cultural Resource
Management Bibliography. Dwight T. Pitcaithley, 1984.
No. 10 Celebrating the Immigrant: An Administrative History of the
Statue of Liberty National Monument, 1952-1982.
Barbara Blumberg, 1985
No. 11 Hoosac Docks: Foreign Trade Terminal. A Case of the
Expanding Transportation System Late in the Nineteenth
Century. Paul 0. Weinbaum, 1985
No. 12 The 1983 Excavations at 19BN281: Chapters in the Archeology
of Cape Cod, II. Christopher L. Borstel, 1985
No. 13 Chapters in the Archeology of Cape Cod, III: The Historic
Period and Historic Period Archeology.
Francis P. McManamon, editor, 1985
No. 14 Inventory of Structures: Morristown National Historical Park.
David Arbogast, 1985.
No. 15 The Scene of the Battle: Historic Grounds Report,
Minute Man National Historical Park, Joyce L. Malcolm, 1985
NTIS PB81 18513
NTIS PB81 18514
NTIS PB81 22664
6.00
NTIS PB83 18695
7.00
4.00
NTIS PB85 22010
7.00
5.00
4.00
5.00
5.00
7.00
3.00
No. 16 Chapters in the Archeology of Cape Cod, IV
No. 17 Chapters in the Archeology of Cape Cod, V: Indian Neck Ossuary 5.00
Francis P. McManamon, James W. Bradley, and Ann L. Magennis , 1986
No. 18 Interdisciplinary Investigations of the Boott Mills, 12.00
Lowell, Massachusetts. Volume I: Life at the Boarding Houses
Mary C. Beaudry and Stephen Mrozowski, Editors. 1987
No. 19 Interdisciplinary Investigations of the Boott Mills 12.00
Lowell, Massachusetts. Volume II: The Kirk Street Agents'
House .
Archeological Collections Management Project Series
No. 1 Archeological Collections Management at Salem Maritime National 4.00
Historic Site. Alan T. Synenki and Sheila Charles, 1983.
No. 2 Archeological Collections Management at Morristown National 3.00
Historical Park, New Jersey. Alan T. Synenki and
Sheila Charles, 1983.
No. 3 Archeological Collections Management of the Great Island 3.00
Tavern Site. Cape Cod National Seashore, Massachusetts.
Alan Synenki and Sheila Charles, 1984.
No. 4 Archeological Collections Management at Minute Man National
Historical Park, Massachusetts. Linda A. Towle and
Darcie A. MacMahon, editors.
Volume 1, Introduction and Fiske Hill Area, 1987 4.00
Volume 2, Nelson Road Area, 1986 6.00
Volume 3, Virginia Road and Wayside Areas, 1986 7.00
Volume 4, North Bridge Area and Miscellaneous
Collections, 1986 9.00
Other Publications
Cultural Resources Inventory, Lowell National Historical Park NTIS PB81 189169
and Preservation District: Report. Shepley, Bulfinch,
Richardson and Abbott, Architects, 1980.
The Archeology of Cape Cod National Seashore. Francis P. 1.00
McManamon and Christopher L. Borstel, 1982. (pamphlet 16 pp.)
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